


AFRICA NOW

TRANSFORMATIONS OF RURAL SPACES IN MOZAMBIQUE

EDITED BY
CECILIA NAVARRA AND
CRISTINA UDELSMANN
RODRIGUES



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**Edited by
Cecilia Navarra and Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues**



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TRANSFORMATIONS OF RURAL SPACES IN MOZAMBIQUE: INTRODUCTION TO A COLLECTIVE REFLECTION

Cristina Udelsmann Rodrigues
Cecilia Navarra

This joint publication addresses some of the current topics regarding rural transformation and development in Mozambique, exploring three main areas in which rural transformation is not only evident but is also engendering socio-economic, political, environmental and cultural considerations. One of the areas, the role of civil society and of local communities, contributes to ongoing discussions about the relations between different types of actors that shape the rural life of the country, making this a relevant topic in terms of the socio-political dynamics. The chapters on the topic of extractive activities show how these have amplified impacts in rural economies and societies in the context of increased mineral exploration in Mozambique. Another area of focus is agriculture, its relationship with the market(s), and how these are shaped by public policies. These three lenses contribute to reflections on African rural futures in general, and particularly to the relatively underexplored research on the rural spaces as a context of important ongoing changes.

This book brings together Mozambican researchers with those from several other countries with a solid research background on Mozambique. This dialogue represents an opportunity to develop multiple perspectives on the ongoing rural transformation in the country and of its complexities. The chapters in this book are based mostly on empirical research in several areas of the country, to provide an analytical approach to the study of Mozambican society and economy, and also to connect with existing research carried out in the country.

From a disciplinary and theoretical perspective, this book is multifaceted: the different chapters belong to a wide spectrum of social sciences and vary in terms of theoretical approaches. Indeed, the book has a clear focus – transformation in rural Mozambique – and the need to mobilize many tools to analyse the complex set of phenomena and transformations that are currently underway. The reader will come across chapters with a historical approach and chapters based on ethnographic research or chapters focusing on value-chain analysis, for example. In some cases, the focus is primarily on the structural relations among the actors involved, in others it is on the impact of public policies and donors' interventions,

and in yet others, the focus is on different rules and actors that intersect in the same areas.

The chapters in this book are based on a number of papers presented at a conference and policy dialogue that took place in Maputo in May 2018 around the broad theme of rural transformation in Mozambique. The topics were wide-ranging and followed the three main themes of this book, emphasizing their prominence in the Mozambican rural context: the changing role of civil society, the multiplicity of actors in rural Mozambique, and their relationships with local and state actors; natural resources, with a special focus on extractive activities and their impacts on local livelihoods; and transformations in agriculture and agricultural policies. The chapters show the diversity of the research conducted on rural Mozambique, and how that diversity of topics and approaches could be connected through some key issues. One of these, in particular, is how issues of inequality intersect with the rural transformation of the country.

The Nordic Africa Institute (Sweden) organized the conference in partnership with the Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos (IESE; the Institute of Social and Economic Studies, Mozambique), relying on a strong collaboration with the Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR, Mozambique) and involving other partners such as the Christian Michelsen Institute (Norway) and the University of Jyväskylä (Finland). Papers for the special session on policy perspectives and practices were from the organizing partners, Eduardo Mondlane University, Maputo, civil society organizations (WeEffect, Centro Terra Viva, Movimento Moçambicano das Mulheres Rurais, and the União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC)), representatives from international organizations and embassies in Mozambique.

Rural transformation in Mozambique: Setting the scene

The last few decades in Mozambique have been characterized by profound rural changes. While the country overall has experienced high rates of economic growth (mostly until 2014, then slowing down after the recent ‘hidden debt’ crisis), poverty reduction has occurred at a much slower pace. According to the World Bank, the poverty headcount ratio declined, between 2002 and 2014, from 60.3 per cent to 48.4 per cent (World Bank, 2018); nevertheless, the increase in inequality has hindered the effect of economic growth on poverty reduction.

Territorial and regional disparities have proved to be significant, and the decrease in rural poverty has been much smaller than in urban poverty. Since the early 2000s, almost eight out of ten poor people live in rural areas. According to the World Bank (2018), the rural poverty decreased from 69 per cent to 56 per cent between 2002 and 2014, but – because of demographic dynamics – the absolute number of poor people increased. Poverty persists at the national level and in the rural areas despite a number of investments considered to have high potential for economic development. These investments have nevertheless clearly shaped rural transformation. Historically, there have been several waves of ‘development endeavour’ policies, aimed at the transformation of the rural

areas, often strongly top-down. Colonial resettlement programmes (Jundanian, 1974) involved relocations in certain regions of the country, as did – albeit in a different political context – national post-colonial projects for the construction of communal villages and the socialization of the countryside through resettlement (Borges Coelho, 1998). These projects, coupled with a long Civil War that lasted for sixteen years (1976/7–1992) and continued labour migration, have generated intense population movements, both from rural areas to urban centres and to neighbouring countries, before subsequently returning to places of origin (Udelsmann Rodrigues, 2018). Accordingly, they have cumulatively transformed local rural realities over the years, shaping the way rural populations negotiate and embrace, accommodate or reject rural transformation (Bennike, Rasmussen and Nielsen, 2020). The mobility of people in rural areas has thus in itself contributed to shaping agricultural practices and configurations (Pérez Niño, 2017).

More recently, the large-scale extractive or agribusinesses projects have not only transformed rural areas but also generated a set of tensions and conflicts related to land tenure, population resettlement and livelihoods in general. Throughout the continent, examples of rural development engendering new types of ‘urban’ living and ‘rural urbanization’ (Agergaard, D’haen and Birch-Thomsen, 2013; Satterthwaite and Tacoli, 2003) seem to have multiplied. Urbanization associated with mining is particularly noticeable (Bryceson and MacKinnon, 2012; Udelsmann Rodrigues, 2018), and a country such as Mozambique, where mining has become a central economic path, has again witnessed rural transformation in its multiple facets. Transformation affects populations from the mining hinterlands, where large-scale megaprojects impact local communities (Langa and Mandlate, 2013; Mosca and Selemene, 2012) and the coastal areas (Cruz e Silva, Araújo and Souto, 2015). Mining and extractive industries push a new urbanization of the rural (Kirshner and Power, 2015) and new forms of living. The large-scale mineral-related ventures not only transforms the physical landscape, often leading to displacement, but also has impacts on the local economies, namely the labour market, and affects the modalities of workers’ organizations (Mossetto Carini, 2017).

Large-scale agricultural projects have also produced impacts in Mozambique (Zaehringer et al., 2018), namely through a new push to investor-driven commercial farming with heterogeneous effects on local contexts (Glover and Jones, 2019), the development of new forms of contract farming (Pérez Niño, 2016), or, for instance, industrial forest plantations (Bleyer et al., 2016). The development of agribusinesses, through large plantations or contract farming, have had an impact on the emergence of medium-sized and large producers and on social differentiation, potentially generating social tensions (Lazzarini, 2017; Pérez Niño, 2016). Simultaneously, smallholders, whose livelihood depends on farming and a mix of non-farming activities and who are often extremely vulnerable to shocks and to pressure over resources, dominate the Mozambican rural landscape. With the new local dynamics, there are important changing land issues (Filipe and Norfolk, 2017; Porsani, Börjeson and Lehtilä, 2017), reorganizations of rural production (Veldwisch, 2015) and, frequently, contestations of large-scale

agricultural projects (Shankland and Gonçalves, 2016). Large-scale agricultural investments, in particular, trigger direct and indirect land-use change (Zaehring et al., 2018).

In environmental terms, changes taking place in the countryside have implications for wildlife and forest resources, and foster further concerns about climate change, risks to agricultural production and food security (Nuvunga, Martinho and Porfirio, 2020). In this transformation scenario, new civil society organizations – community radio, unions, producers' associations, local development initiatives – emerge and are often stifled by local political, administrative and economic powers, making tensions and social conflicts emerge.

Today, research in Mozambique on rural transformation is significant. Two main knowledge hubs have carried out important research over the last few decades on a variety of issues related to the rural milieu, its socio-economic dynamics, the relationships and politics involving varied actors, and the structuring and restructuring of local economies.

Founded in 2007, the IESE is an independent research organization whose main remit is to conduct scientific research and, through it, to produce knowledge, add to intellectual thinking and stimulate public debate on issues of economic, social and political development relevant to Mozambique. Its research areas are currently as follows: economy and development; poverty and social protection; citizenship and governance; and Mozambique in the world. The books published by the IESE include titles that explore topics relevant to rural Mozambique. Since 2008, the IESE has published the *Cadernos IESE*, which aggregate working papers and discussion papers. The *Ideias* newsletter has also been published since 2008, and summarizes the IESE's ongoing research. The bibliographic bulletin, published monthly, lists IESE publications and those available in their documentation centre. The IESE also has other non-serial publications of interest for studying rural Mozambique.

The OMR, founded in 2012, is a leading organization in Mozambique on rural issues. Through research, studies, organization of events, provision of access to relevant documentation, advocacy and publications, the OMR aims to contribute to agrarian and rural development from an integrated and interdisciplinary perspective. Moreover, its remit is also to contribute to the development and monitoring of agrarian and rural development policies. The OMR has been working in main areas identified as critical for Mozambique: public policies and rural environment; rural development models for agribusiness; land and territory; environment and agriculture; and poverty, inequalities and gender; and social conflicts. As well as books, since 2012 the OMR has published the *Observador Rural*, a series of documents on a variety of relevant topics aimed at enhancing the understanding of rural Mozambique; since 2013, it has published a series of short pieces related to rural policy (*Destaque Rural*); and since 2017, it has published the *Boletim de Preços* (prices bulletin) for agricultural products.

Clearly, academic research in Mozambique has contributed greatly to the development of knowledge on rural contexts. Indeed, at universities in Mozambique and through the research work of some civil society organizations,

research on rural transformation in the country is also significant and growing. Most crucially, synergies and joint work by the various rural research hubs have generated relevant knowledge, both for academia and for policy.

Rural inequalities

As previously mentioned, three interrelated themes can be identified across the chapters of this book: the dynamics of relations between the different actors involved in rural transformation; the particular context of the Mozambican extractive sector; and the agricultural activities and production as they relate to social differentiation and patterns of economic inclusion and exclusion. However, an element that stands out is that Mozambique faces a rural question, which is profoundly linked to inequalities. As Santos and Salvucci (2016) point out, recent economic growth has not contributed to a convergence in welfare levels between rural and urban zones or between geographical regions. The gap between rural and urban areas is large and persistent. The agrarian sector in Mozambique is where growth has the highest pro-poor effect (Mazive, 2017), but at the same time, it is among the sectors with the lowest growth rate, which is also declining (World Bank, 2017). If there are issues of inequality between the rural and the urban, and between the agrarian sector and the other sectors, there is also an issue of inequality within the rural contexts and within the processes of rural transformation. These introduce patterns of inclusion and exclusion and produce unequal benefits: the inclusion in 'new markets' does not translate *per se* into a reduction in inequalities and so the issue of redistribution of those gains comes to the fore.. As the chapters of this book highlight, rural inequalities in Mozambique are not only of an economic nature but are more broadly due to power imbalances.

Inequality is particularly relevant in the analysis of the relations between the actors involved in the rural transformation. The complexity of the relationship between the state and social differentiation in the countryside is documented in João Feijó's chapter. The multiplicity and heterogeneity of the mobilization of people and forms of collective action – associations and, more broadly, civil society actors – engender different strategies for balancing collective and individual needs, and in the relationships established with private firms and the state. The relationship with the state, in particular, is complex and multifaceted, as underlined in Marta Patrício's and Brad Safarik's chapters. Civil society puts in place different strategies for participation in law-making processes that can take forms of complementarity and/or confrontation with the state power. Donors' interventions and rhetoric also play an important role in civil society and the dynamics of associations (see Inácio Dias de Andrade's chapter). The multiplicity of actors and governance levels (national/local, formal/customary, etc.) is also underlined in terms of environmental conservation in the chapter by Siteo et al.

Inequalities are particularly evident when analysing the role of big investments and land acquisitions, both for extractive and agricultural purposes. Despite the development promises of large-scale investments, redistributive issues

remain unresolved. A major issue relates to resettlement and compensation for people displaced by the acquisition of land by a company: the consultation processes display significant weaknesses and it appears that the costs to, and suffering of, people undergoing resettlement are systematically underestimated. The negative effect on people's lives is clearly indicated in Nikkie Wiegink's and Vanito Viriato Marcelino Frei's chapters, which underline different sets of implications of resettlements following mining land concessions. The governance of the relationship between companies and local people is, moreover, extremely unreliable: it depends on conditions that are usually out of the control of the affected populations and that can change rapidly. Information is another factor, since it is unequally accessible and possibly produces inequalities within the local populations. Overall, as underlined by Nikkie Wiegink, the contrast between expectations and reality appears to be strong and relevant: several cases discussed bring to light the contrast between the development rhetoric that surrounds the big investments and the actual living conditions of the affected population, which in most cases has worsened.

As far as agricultural activities are concerned, policies for the integration of smallholder farmers in value chains confront these farmers with a number of problems, as underlined in Rabia Aiuba and Yara Nova's chapter: limited options for commercialization, limited use of inputs and the low bargaining power of producers. These contribute to small producers being disadvantaged and strongly restrict them from actually benefiting from further 'integration into the market' (Cecilia Navarra and Roberta Pellizzoli's chapter). Moreover, top-down policies that aimed to transform rural economies through large land investments did not in fact drive the 'de-agrarianization' of Mozambican rural areas. The need for family farming may increase for fragile livelihoods, as indicated in Juliana Porsani's chapter. Patterns of exclusion from contract farming, rural wage work options, and even information itself lead us back to the issue of inequalities. The gender dimension of these inequalities appears clearly in relation to agriculture, as also underlined by Cecilia Navarra and Roberta Pellizzoli: the more a household is dependent on farmland, the more significant any land loss, most likely to be the case in female-headed households (see Juliana Porsani's chapter). In the case of big investments where the loss of land is exchanged for access to employment, there is a risk of exclusion of women, who have less access to wage employment.

As a final note, a cross-cutting theme in this book is the relevance of *continuity*, together with *transformation*. In some cases, processes and policies show great continuity with past experiences. Inequalities, however, tend to prevail, at times reshaped by the new elements steering the rural transformation.

Chapter-by-chapter summary

The chapters of this book are organized into the three areas mentioned above. However, the many intersections between the research and rural realities create links and overlaps between the chapters.

In Part I, the chapters focus on civil society organizations and local actors and how they create new relations with the state by adapting and contesting. The multiplicity of overlapping rules (e.g. formal and customary) is also underlined in this section. The article by Marta Patrício shows how in the rural remote areas of the country, legal pluralism is materialized, by focusing on the multiplicity of norms surrounding domestic violence and the conflictual patterns of social change. In the context of extractives, Inácio Dias de Andrade looks at the changes provoked by the development of a mining economy in Tete and the changing donors' presence, namely in relation to political activism. The article by Brad Safarik dealing with both Angola and Mozambique is included in the section to fuel reflection comparing the dynamics of local mobilization. By looking at the changes over the years of non-state rural networks, it shows how aspects of the changing – conflictual and collaborative, neutral and active – relations between state and non-state actors constitute a central topic for the analysis of the transformations of rural settings. The article by Almeida Siteo, Benard Guedes, Margaret B. Holland, and Sá Nogueira Lisboa, analysing the country's strategy for the reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, highlights how the multiplicity of actors involved may not have fully aligned views regarding climate change. It argues for the importance of understanding the contextual factors at stake when thinking about rural transformation, most crucially the relations between the different actors, and points to the need to triangulate these with the desired sustainable development of rural Mozambique.

As Mozambique's ongoing rural transformation relates specifically to the developments in the area of extractive activities, the chapters in Part II focus more specifically on them and analyse their implications for rural livelihoods and local economies. The article by Nikkie Wiegink looks at the important socio-cultural aspects of mines in certain locations, namely in terms of land and forced resettlement, analysing in particular their impacts on burial areas, seen as central infrastructures in people's everyday lives. Vanito Viriato Marcelino Frei's article also analyses how mining and particularly megaprojects in this sector are negatively affecting the local populations, by being contradictory and exclusionary.

Part III is focuses on agriculture and how it has changed in recent times. Cecilia Navarra and Roberta Pellizzoli discuss the contradictions on the ground of policies aimed at the market integration of small-scale farmers and of projects aimed at developing inclusive businesses (private businesses designed to include poor farmers and marginalized parts of society), with a specific focus on the gender dimension. Rabia Aiuba and Yara Nova analyse agri-food systems and value chains in Mozambique and describe the challenges and problems, especially in the prevalent small-scale of agriculture in the country. Juliana Porsani's article discusses a case study in Limpopo where large-scale agricultural investments pose challenges to local farmers, namely in terms of available farmland. Finally, in providing a historical perspective on social differentiation among Mozambican farmers and the relationship between this phenomenon and the state, João Feijó broadly appraises the social impacts of rural changes taking place in the country. These are strongly related to livelihoods, modes of agricultural production, and the

way in which natural resources are accessed and managed locally, thus connecting actors, resources and unequal relations that are strongly representative of the core concepts of this book.

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Part I

CIVIL SOCIETY, LOCAL COMMUNITIES AND THE MULTIPLICITY OF ACTORS IN RURAL SPACES

Chapter 1

CUSTOMARY RULES AND THE LAW OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONFLICTING NORMS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN RURAL MOZAMBIQUE

Marta Patrício

Introduction

Mozambique is a country full of contrasts. During the nineteenth century, the Portuguese unified a territory divided into different administrations, kingdoms and chieftaincies, each one following their own customs and traditions according to their ethnic origins. Mozambique covers more than 800,000 square kilometres and has nearly 28 million inhabitants. The government has been working for the last 45 years to bring together all this diversity into a unified state. The Constitution and the rule of law play an important role in this state-building process, since they establish the formal core of what is considered right or wrong, the roles that institutions should perform nationwide, and how people should framework their actions, with no geographical or ethnic differences or nuances.

This has been the mainstream political discourse since independence. As Mozambique's first president, Samora Machel, put it, 'to gather all the Mozambicans beyond traditions and languages requires that in our conscience we kill the tribe to give birth to the nation' (Machel, 1974, p. 35). This has been like a mantra, continuously repeated by the political leaders of Frelimo (the Mozambican Liberation Front), and it is also backed by international institutions, especially donors who have been funding the transition to democracy process since the 1990s.

The rule of law can be broadly understood as the extent to which people have confidence in, and abide by, the rules of society, the quality of their rights, the police and the courts, and the likelihood of crime and violence. It is the rule of law that determines the degree to which political and human rights are enjoyed equally. More recently it has been reinstated by the United Nations (UN) as a priority, namely in the agenda of Sustainable Development Goal 16 – which intends to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, given that the rule of law and development have a significant

interrelation and are mutually reinforcing.¹ This represents a huge challenge in Mozambique. Ensuring that the rule of law is understood, followed and respected in the whole country has proven to be a very demanding task, especially in the rural areas, where the local models of social reproduction are very strong and even the predominance of local languages can become a barrier between the people and the state.

The state has thus little material expression besides the formal presence of its local institutions. That is certainly the case in Mossurize, where, as in other rural (and remote) districts of Mozambique, a sense of distance towards the state prevails and most people are distrustful, resistant, and impermeable to anything coming from 'outside'. As such, they mostly follow local customs and social norms in almost all aspects of their lives – either because 'it has always been like that' or because they are unaware of state laws (do not know them at all or are not familiar with the principles of the legal language). Conflicts are mainly solved in traditional courts by applying customary law or by resorting to 'common-sense' rules. Here the rule of law is not only the exception as it is often seen as 'unfair'.

After previous failed experiences of eradication of local customs and of chiefs and their courts immediately after independence in 1975, the Mozambican state followed another path: in the 2004 revision of the Constitution it introduced Article 4 – legal pluralism: '[T]he state recognizes the various normative and conflict resolution systems that coexist in the society, insofar as they do not contradict the fundamental values and principles of the Constitution'. This can be considered as the official recognition of the country's huge cultural, linguistic and legal diversity.

However, despite this official recognition, nothing else has been done to regulate legal pluralism on the ground. The law that establishes community courts dates back to the 1990s and is oversimplified and outdated. And with so many community authorities on the ground (such as neighbourhood secretaries and chiefs), which have very similar duties (as stated by Decree no. 15/2000 and 11/2005) but embody different legitimacies, confusion sets in. As a consequence, people do not always follow a pattern and their actions are casuistic – it is not unusual for them to go the court that most suits them.

Legal pluralism is not a new phenomenon, as shown by a wide range of work from different academic fields (anthropology, sociology, law) in the second half of the twentieth century (Benda-Beckmann, 1997; Griffiths, 1986; Merry, 1988; Starr and Collier, 1989), and also by more recent debates (Isser, 2011; Kyed et al., 2012; Tamanaha, 2012). Legal pluralism is the coexistence of the rule of law with, among others, international law or local law – such as social norms or customs. The latter are an expression of cultural pluralism, recognized and celebrated by the international community – for instance, in Article 2 of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)'s Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001). However, and despite the fact that we live in 'heterogeneous states', marked by such recognition, and by 'interlegality', and 'legal hybridization' (Santos, 2003), the accommodation of different legal orders and the interactions between them still pose many challenges and trigger many discussions about inequalities of access to justice and human rights.

Academics have brought forward concerns about the need to address legal pluralism for achieving democratic social justice and lessening social and gender inequalities. However, such concerns have generally not been translated into tangible policy action. The reasons behind this inaction are not fully understood, and much remains unknown about the status of the legal pluralism issue on the policy agenda and policy pathways available. This may hamper the development of effective policies to address this issue.

The focus of my PhD research was legal pluralism in Mossurize. I wanted to compare this scarcely studied district with other districts in Mozambique that had already been researched (Kyed et al., 2012; Santos et al., 2003) in terms of the existence of strong customary practices that overlap with the rule of law and entail violence that harms people's rights. I chose two examples of domestic violence cases from my PhD investigation for this chapter.

It begins with the history of Mossurize and its present configuration. It then looks at the main customary rules of this district in order to understand how they frame people's actions and thoughts, but also how people mobilize them for their own interests and power strategies – especially during conflicts. The text then presents the work carried out by the Magistrates' Court and the District Attorney's Office (DA) to tackle such customs and implement the Law of Domestic Violence, namely a trial and a public lecture, through which the relationship between formal and customary norms will be discussed.

Drawn from empirical data gathered in interviews and observations during fieldwork since 2014,² and based on emic anthropology, this chapter will focus on tensions between the institutional discourse of the rule of law and the complex reality on the ground.

Mossurize: A borderland rural district

In the southern part of Manica Province, we find Mossurize, a district in the border between Mozambique and Zimbabwe. It received the name of the river that crosses the south of the district and its capital is the village of Espungabera. Mossurize currently occupies an area of 5,096 square kilometres and is divided into three administrative posts: Espungabera, Chiurairue (south of Espungabera), and Dacata (north of Espungabera). The vast majority of Mossurize's population belong to the Ndaou ethnic group – part of the large Shona-Caranga linguistic family from the Monomotapa kingdom (present-day Zimbabwe), which occupied the territories from the mainland to the Indian Ocean from the sixteenth century. In today's Mozambique, the vaNdaou (plural of Ndaou) live mainly in the central zone of the country, between the rivers Búzi and Save (Florêncio, 2003, p. 176; Newitt, 1995, p. 52). The population of Mossurize only speaks Portuguese in the capital and in the headquarters of the administrative posts – the further away from the centre, the more the local language (ciNdaou) prevails. In Mossurize there is no piped water and the electricity grid comes from Zimbabwe. Because it is a rural district, it does not have any city, municipality or local elections.³ There is

only one hospital, in Espungabera, and there are no banks. The main economic activity is subsistence farming on family land. According to the most recent data, the district has a total population of 203,738 inhabitants; 65 per cent live in the central area of the district and the remaining population live mostly in small villages.⁴

During much of the nineteenth century, namely between 1827 and 1895, the centre of Mozambique was under the rule of the Nguni and their Gaza Empire. Mossurize even became this empire's capital during Soshangané's reign, as well as during a few years of his grandson Ngungunyane's rule (Florêncio, 2003, p. 185). The Gaza Empire ended in 1895, when Ngungunyane was captured by the Portuguese army led by Mouzinho de Albuquerque (Newitt, 1995, p. 337), and part of its realm fell under the control of the *Companhia de Moçambique*.⁵

At this stage, Mossurize was an abandoned and inaccessible territory. Its long distance from the coast (more than 1,500 kilometres), the hilly and rugged terrain, the difficulties involved in building roads, and the endemic existence of the tsetse fly deprived it of any kind of economic interest and presented great difficulties to the Portuguese objectives of creating a settlement or a profitable farming zone (Lubkemann, 2008, pp. 51-52). The *Companhia's* authorities were unable to establish themselves effectively in this district but still made themselves present through tax collection and recruitment of compulsory labour (Allina-Pisano, 2003; Neves, 1998). A large part of Mossurize's population often fled to the territories under British administration to escape these constraints and simultaneously to work in their mines (South Africa) and farms (southern Rhodesia) (Newitt and Tornimbeni, 2008, p. 726).

Both during the rule of the *Companhia* and under the direct administration of the Portuguese (colonial) state, Mossurize was considered only as a place for labour recruitment. Therefore it was systematically excluded from development and investment plans (Neves, 1998, p. 176; Newitt and Tornimbeni, 2008, p. 720), which contributed to the persistence of poverty in this district and to it remaining very isolated from the rest of Mozambique.

The movements across the international border, established between Portugal and the United Kingdom in 1891, intensified during the liberation war (1964-1974) and the Civil War (1976/7-1992).⁶ The international border as a barrier thus never really entered the practices or representations of these populations. The awareness that economic conditions were more favourable 'on the other side', with better wages and more supplies, turned the border into a channel of opportunities instead. Thus, the Mozambique-Zimbabwe border was (and still is) particularly porous from the point of view of migratory movements, and the population living in the border area easily maintains transnational cultural and social networks (Tornimbeni, 2007, p. 39).

In this rural and isolated district, where the most widely spoken language is not the state's official language and where the proximity to an international border appears to disconnect Mossurize from the rest of Mozambique, state laws hardly penetrate and are constantly challenged by the resilience of the vaNdau customary rules. As beacons of the rule of law, the Magistrates' Court and the

DA's work are the result of recent investments in the local judicial institutions, namely the allocation of more staff to the court since 2012 (there are now six court clerks, whereas before there was only one, besides the Magistrate) and the actual establishment of the DA's Office in Mossurize in 2008. Their biggest efforts in the implementation of laws consist of translating the legal texts to ciNdau and using vocabulary that the population can relate to – either in the court's verdicts or in public lectures. In this landscape, the balance between the customary law and the rule of law is an everyday challenge, since there are several courts and justice providers in Mossurize⁷ whose jurisdictions either coincide or overlap each other.

CiNdau Chakakwana

CiNdau chakakwana, in ciNdau language, means 'the norm of tradition' and, according to this, vaNdau customary rules and norms are to be respected in all aspects of social life and must be applied to solve every *milando* (problem or conflict). The large majority of Mossurize's population belong to the Ndau ethnic group, and therefore *ciNdau chakakwana* represents an important principle in conflict resolution and social life.

Mambos (chiefs) are very important in this society: they are at the top of the hierarchy in the traditional pyramidal structure of political power, and they are also the main justice providers. However, political power is not autocratic and is shared with individuals or groups that help in the decision-making process, such as the *saguta* (village chief), the *mambo mudoco* (chief of groups of villages), and the council of *madoda* or *matombo* (elders). They assume, in many circumstances, a power almost similar to and sometimes greater than that of the *mambo*, especially when the latter is young and 'ignorant' of the traditions (Florêncio, 2003, pp. 195-207). This also prevails in the *mambo's bandla* (traditional court), where he presides over the assembly but pronounces the verdict only after hearing other chiefs' and elders' opinions and statements about the problems presented before them.

The most common customary rule establishes that the rights of succession (either political or within the family) fall on the eldest son of the first wife (patrilineal descent). But if the deceased has no children, or if the eldest son is underage or considered unfit for a leadership position, a brother of the deceased can be designated as temporary successor until the legitimate heir is ready for his role.

As for vaNdau marriages, which are often polygamous, literature dating back to the 1940s and 1950s shows that custom determined the payment of the *lobolo* (bride price), which consisted of money and sometimes livestock, whereas in the past it was mainly *capulanas* (cloth). The predominant form of marriage residence is still virilocal (Florêncio, 2003, p. 197). VaNdau practices also contemplate levirate, which means that a man marries the wife or wives and takes on the child(ren) of a deceased brother: the guardianship of the underage children rests primarily with the 'main heir and oldest paternal uncle who has replaced the

deceased, in paternal authority, joining one or all the widows' (Cota, 1944, p. 230). The levirate should depend on the family's agreement, approved by the head of the family and with the free consent of the widow. This woman, due to the *lobolo* paid for her, must agree to be 'inherited'; she has the duty to increase the progeny of this family since the *lobolo* binds the woman to her husband's family forever (Vilhena, 1996, p. 56). Marriage is still a central dimension in the life of these societies, with *lobolo* giving full power to the man over the woman, and perpetuating gender inequalities (Arnfred, 2014).

Although these customs and literature may seem outdated, fieldwork has proven their longevity and has shown that they are still very much present in people's everyday lives. The same goes for one of the most severely punished crimes among the vaNdau – adultery. As in other African societies such as the Nguni (who probably introduced this custom in the Ndau region), adultery was punished with death. But after Ngungunyane's fall in the late nineteenth century, adultery actually proliferated and betrayed husbands started to accept other compensations: whenever the woman was rejected for infidelity, instead of her being murdered, her family would restore the *lobolo* (cattle or money) to the husband (Gluckman, 1956, p. 57). This still happens today.

Divorces represented, and still represent, 'a correlative right of the constitution of the family', taking into consideration the very idea that the family 'can only be maintained by the harmony of the spouses'; divorce was always decreed by the *mambo* after examining the evidence and discussing the cause (Cota, 1944, p. 231). After divorce, the wife is obliged to return the *lobolo* and, if she has children, they belong to her husband's family.

With murders, the punitive system is essentially based on the idea of personal compensation or retributive justice, which is common to most African societies – murder necessarily implied the 'replacement of the dead' with the life of another person. Murder and causing bodily injuries also imply the payment of a fine to the *mambo* due to blood-spilling on his sacred ground. The crime of theft is punished with beating, material compensation or enslaving the culprit; in cases of slander, defamation and threats, the consequences can range from the death penalty (if they were against the *mambo*) to simple conciliation, with the latter being carried out by the families of those involved (Cota, 1944, p. 131).

Conflicting norms and the challenges of their coexistence

In Mossurize, the *milandos* that are solved in the *bandla* according to these norms of tradition are still very frequent. The *bandla* gathers regularly and consistently despite the fact that it is not officially recognized as a court by the Law of the Community Courts (Law no. 4/92). Community Courts are, according to this Law, the institutions with the prerogative to solve 'social cases' – small conflicts between family members and neighbours, and small robberies and minor physical assaults that are not subject to prison and that should be solved through reconciliation

of the parties according to fairness and common sense (Article 3). On the other hand, 'criminal cases' entail prison sentences and, as such, are a prerogative of judicial formal courts.

The *mambos* are considered as community authorities and, according to Decree no. 15/2000 (which establishes the relationship between the local state institutions and community authorities), they are expected to promote peace, justice and social harmony through 'mediation and common sense'. Nothing is written in the law about chiefs summoning their traditional courts or whether these are also some kind of community court. But in fact they pronounce verdicts on social cases and on more traditional matters such as accusations of witchcraft. The use of the customary law to solve these questions is seemingly unproblematic. Therefore, and at first sight, there is nothing wrong with the *bandla*, which takes place in the chiefs' compounds once or twice a week, where everyone speaks ciNdau, and which is considered by their users as a much closer forum for solving conflicts (proximity justice) than the Magistrates' Court.

However, the problem is when matters of criminal justice appear in the *bandla* and the chief, instead of reporting them to the police, decides to proceed with the trial. In fact, since criminal cases (such as causing bodily injuries or murders) often escalate from a social matter, the plaintiff takes into consideration only the origin of the problem instead of its outcome and complains first to the chief and not to the police officer. Those involved sometimes prefer to pay the chief the court fee in order to solve their problems immediately and according to custom.

Fieldwork in Mossurize has shown that marriage is the main source of conflict, since it is marriage that ensures much of the social reproduction of these rural populations. Hence, it is the *lobolo* paid to the family of the wife that guarantees the survival of those who 'lose' their daughter to a new family and, in turn, it is the offspring of that marriage that guarantee the survival of the husband's family. This shows that in this African society, and as Coetzee argues, justice is directly linked to the meanings generated by the distribution of roles and actions, especially within kinship, and conflicts occur when disagreement about meanings arises from social goods or their distribution patterns (Coetzee, 2002, pp. 278-280). If there are no offspring, the husband can demand a divorce by returning his wife to her parents and demanding the repayment of the *lobolo*, and this often creates frictions with his in-laws. In fact, during fieldwork I witnessed many women making complaints in police stations and also in the DA's Office, claiming that they did not want to go back to their parents' house and asking for help in order to avoid it. On the other hand, if the husband dies, all the intricate questions surrounding customary rules of inheritance and succession arise, which put the widow in a vulnerable situation from the constitutional point of view (e.g. like the levirate), and which ignore her consent and her human and constitutional rights.

In Mossurize, adultery is the main cause of murders – it is seen as an 'honour' crime perpetrated by the betrayed husband, who then flees to Zimbabwe to escape the police. In other cases, if the husband's family has issues with his chosen wife or, in the case of polygamous marriages, if there is no agreement between

all the wives and jealousy prevails between them, these conflicts often result in accusations of witchcraft and bodily offences. *Kuzvarira* (arranged marriages, which are sometimes underage) have not been completely eradicated yet from Mossurize, despite the fact that they are criminalized in Family Law (Article 73 of Law 10/2004); this sometimes culminates in the underage girl's suicide or, when the girl manages to flee from the husband, in the break-up of her ties with her family of origin.

All these social cases are, by their 'civil' nature, and according to Law no. 6/92, beyond the scope of state institutions. However, when the culprit considers himself/herself to be the victim and then decides to carry out 'justice with his/her own hands', these social cases often become criminal cases, such as homicides and bodily offences. This requires the intervention of the police because a formal complaint is then made in the police station and, if a case is opened, the DA/Prosecutor and the Magistrates' Court will also have to intervene. The same is true when victims go 'forum shopping' (Benda-Beckmann, 1981), in other words, choose the forum/court in which to present the *milando* that best suits their idea of retributive justice. If someone goes to a police station, the investigation may determine that the case is a social case, and so it will be sent back to the community level. On the other hand, and as will be shown next, despite being a social case in its origins, it may be considered serious enough to follow legal proceedings until the final step – the Magistrates' Court.

Levirate in the magistrates' court

When it comes to widowhood, the rules of *lobolo* establish how issues of inheritance should be resolved, including the distribution of property and the care of the wives and children of the deceased. This system is common to almost all African patrilineal groups (Gluckman, 1956, pp. 65-71), including the vaNdau (Vijfhuizen, 1998, pp. 45-46). According to Mossurize's local tradition, the levirate (*thaka* or *kupitakufa* in ciNdau) means that the brother of the dead husband who will marry his widowed sister-in-law may be chosen by his parents, uncles or other brothers. The widow herself can also choose her new husband through a ritual: holding a small clay pot with water, she will give it to the brother-in-law whom she prefers; he drinks this water as a sign of acceptance. Then the widow and her children can either move to that brother-in-law's house or stay in the house where they lived with the deceased, which the new husband will only visit. The material assets of the deceased are distributed to the next of kin.

There are cases where these visits are merely symbolic, in the sense that the new husband is only materially responsible for his sister-in-law and nephews/nieces and ensures their well-being. There are also cases where this new marriage is indeed consummated, often without the woman's consent, and the former brother-and sister-in-law become husband and wife in effect.

The case that I followed was first presented at a police station in southern Mossurize and the complainant was the man himself. He considered that he had

legitimate rights over the estate of his deceased brother, including his widows, with whom he had already had intercourse, threatening them afterwards over and over again. The police first tried to solve this through mediation, but as the man did not change his mind, the police officer had to send the case to the police station in Espungabera, where there is a special office to deal with cases of domestic violence (the Gabinete de Atendimento à Mulher e Criança Vítimas de Violência Doméstica,⁸ commonly known only as the Gabinete). After hearing the man and the women in the Gabinete, the police officer believed he was dealing with a case of patrimonial domestic violence, according to Article 19 of Law no. 29/2009 (the Law of Domestic Violence). He then filed a new police report where the man was presented as the offender rather than the victim. This case was trialed in Espungabera's Magistrates' Court a few days later and became a live battle between the customary law and the rule of law – a true example of legal pluralism in action.

Questioned by the Magistrate about what was happening, the defendant started by once again claiming his innocence, as he had already done in the police station, stating that he had been the one chosen to succeed his brother in the water pot ceremony, and that he was only helping to solve the conflicts between the three widows, because the first wife was usurping all the assets and preventing the other two from using them. The Magistrate said to the defendant, 'you are lying and we will do justice'. He ordered the women to come into the courtroom, one at a time, to make statements as witnesses. Two of the wives, after giving meaningless and somewhat contradictory answers to the Magistrate's questioning, seemed to be resigned to the situation of being 'occupied' by their brother-in-law.

Only the first wife, the last to be heard in a long interrogation, provided more detailed information, which did not fit with the other women's versions. She said that they all lived in Zimbabwe, where her deceased husband had fled during the Civil War in Mozambique, and that they had recently moved back to Mozambique. Her husband had died in December 2013 and she had not agreed to be inherited by her brother-in-law. As this woman was being 'disobedient', the defendant had returned to Zimbabwe to consult his other brother and ask for help to solve this problem. This younger brother advised the defendant to leave the women alone. The defendant not only did not follow this advice but he also began to sell the assets that his deceased brother had owned in both Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which included a mill. The Magistrate stated that this showed disrespect for the rights of the deceased's underage children over those assets, according to Article 326 of the Family Law (Law no. 10/2004).

The witness emphasized that she was not usurping anything from the other wives because all the estates and assets of the deceased had been distributed between the three of them and their children before this brother-in-law arrived and began selling everything. She assumed that she could even have accepted this man as a husband if he had been acting on behalf of the well-being of the family, but he only intended to take away the goods for his own benefit and that of his first wife, who lived in Zimbabwe.

The Magistrate questioned the defendant again about why he wanted to forcibly inherit his brother's wives, and the latter replied that it was them who wanted to be inherited. Visibly troubled by this individual's behaviour, the Magistrate reiterated:

That is not true! You are 44 years old; do you consider yourself so old to want to respect this tradition? I know that inheriting the family means taking the wives. There is a ceremony in the African traditions to choose the inheritance and you may even have been the one chosen to inherit. But you are now using the matter of tradition just to usurp. This is not a problem of tradition or poverty, it is a problem of your conscience!

The trial proceeded and the Prosecutor formalized the accusation:

[I]t has been proved that the defendant left Zimbabwe and came to Mozambique in order to seize the assets of his deceased brother on the basis of tradition, since the assets were in the possession of the widows. Many people still believe in tradition, but the law already addresses these issues and has a way of responding to them. Thus, the Public Prosecutor's Office seeks the conviction of the defendant for patrimonial violence with the aggravating causes of premeditation, excessive power, abuse of trust, having committed offences in the homes of the offended ones, and having obligations before the family.

In rendering the verdict, the Magistrate addressed the defendant in the following terms:

You wanted to enjoy your brother's assets unlawfully. While it is true that in most African traditions, from the earliest times, it is acceptable that widows may be inherited by her relatives, it is also true that these three ladies were not obliged to be inherited by the defendant. And above all, they were not obliged to have sex with you, especially at these times where there are so many sexually transmitted diseases. For this reason, the defendant is guilty because, in addition to usurping the widows assets, he also abused them by having sex without their full consent. With this behaviour he committed the crime of patrimonial violence according to #3 of Article 19 of Law no. 29/2009

The verdict was six months of imprisonment, a fine for six months at a daily rate of thirty meticaïs (fifty cents), 250 meticaïs (four dollars) for the legal fee and twenty-five meticaïs (forty cents) of emoluments. No compensation was ordered to be paid to the women, only that the defendant should leave to them the management of the assets.

From this case one can conclude that the reference to customs or to tradition can sometimes be more related to power strategies for obtaining personal benefits than to a lack of knowledge about state laws or a true respect for traditions; this

man had previously been warned by several people, including the police, that he was acting wrongly and yet he claimed to be only following customs.

As the Magistrate stated after the trial, it is not unusual to see this kind of 'invention of the tradition' in Mossurize:

[Even] in the past it was not a duty, it could be done or not. One could even tell the brother of the deceased that he had to inherit the woman and he could say, "I do not want to". Or tell the widow to choose which of the surviving brothers she wanted to stay and she could say, "I do not want any". The tradition is the same in central Mozambique and even in Zimbabwe, but there are those who exaggerate to take advantage. It is not that tradition is so stiff and unchangeable; as a matter of fact, tradition can be harmful and biased.

Although these cases of levirate and patrimonial violence are quite frequent in Mossurize, the people with whom I discussed this subject highlighted its controversial nature and that it is a practice they would like to eliminate. Doing so because it was what their grandparents did no longer seems to work as a justification; at the same time it causes many problems, as seen in court.

Custom or criminal offence: Public lectures on domestic violence

In Mossurize, the most widespread opinion about levirate is that it happens more in the 'bush' than, for example, in the village of Espungabera. However, the awareness-raising lecture on domestic violence given by the DA in the Chipungumbira neighbourhood in late 2014 revealed the opposite: most of the audience confirmed that the practice of *thaka* is still quite common today, and that when women refuse to be inherited by a brother-in-law, they are expelled from their homes.

This lecture about domestic violence given by the DA, like many other lectures he delivered all over the district, is a clear example of how the Law of Domestic Violence is being more widely introduced in Mossurize in order to decrease this type of crime. If patrimonial violence is part of the broader scope of domestic violence, physical domestic violence represents its most evident expression in this district.

These lectures are intended to discourage domestic violence and to contribute to social change, since domestic violence in Mossurize is culturally and socially accepted – beating up the wives is seen, both by men and women, as a way to express love and care, to educate the wife and to keep order in the home.

Even though lectures may not be considered as effective for changing behaviour as trials, they play an important role in raising awareness the population, which is otherwise completely unaware of the developments in the country's criminal legislation. In this lecture about domestic violence, the DA tried for more than an hour to make the legal language of the Law of Domestic Violence more easily

understandable, also translating it into ciNdau with the help of a police officer who is fluent in the local language. He involved the forty participants in the debate, encouraging them to present their examples and their doubts, and reinforcing the availability of the DA's Office to help all citizens who are victims of this form of violence.

The aim of the lecture was to explain that if domestic violence was once a problem within the family, and therefore a social case, now the state recognizes that domestic violence is a problem for the whole of society, and to protect the women and children it has decided to criminalize this act. The DA also explained what a public crime is and that domestic violence now fits into this categorization, which means that not only the people who are victims of aggression in their home but anyone who knows of such violence can and must report these acts to the police in the Gabinete. They should not be afraid of retaliation from the perpetrator and they will be granted police protection from him.

There was no understanding in Mossurize that domestic violence is a public crime, so if a complaint is made, it cannot be withdrawn. And if initially nobody wanted to talk about it, slowly some people began to share their stories of violence and their fears, and eventually they even clapped the DA when he said that he was not imposing his will but rather the will of the state. He underlined that these customs practised within their homes, although they appear to be part of a culture and of traditional norms of consent, in fact present controversial outcomes that are against the law and contrary to the Constitution. At the end of the lecture, the DA encouraged those who were present to talk elsewhere about what they had just heard and act as 'multiplying agents' among the rest of the population to reduce these cases. He reiterated the DA's Office availability and readiness to respond to all questions at any time.

Although it may be difficult to assess the impact of lectures or trials on behavioural or social change, since one can only quantify a complaint that is filed in a police station and not those that remain unreported, the number of domestic violence cases in the archive of Mossurize Magistrates' Court has been decreasing since 2013.

Mozambique has over time signed different international conventions and treaties about people's rights and freedoms.⁹ But these have hardly produced any practical effects since, according to the Constitution (Article 18 no. 2), international law has the same value as 'infraconstitutional normative acts produced by the parliament and the government' – and therefore has little strength in the domestic legal order, in contrast to other legal systems (such as the Portuguese one), where international law is above ordinary legislation and is subordinate only to the Constitution.

Thus, the work to improve access to information and to implement good practices regarding human rights and the dignity of the human person has been carried out in Mozambique mainly by associations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and not by the state itself. In Mossurize, since there are no civil society associations, it has fallen mainly to the DA to make the difference.

Conclusion

VaNdau customary law and its judicial practices and representations are a syncretic set of rules, some of which are common to other ethnic groups in Mozambique. They have managed to survive over time and nowadays they officially coexist with the rule of law under Article 4 of the Mozambique Constitution.

The fieldwork carried out in Mossurize since 2014 has proved that these rules remain in force and that *milandos* are frequently solved according to the customary law. Nevertheless, they often entail norms that are against the rule of law and reproduce practices that harm human rights. All this poses many challenges to the judicial institutions.

This chapter has emphasized, through discourse analysis, and whether inside or outside a courtroom, how groups and individuals manipulate a conflict to respond to their livelihood's tensions and challenges and pursue their goals and interests. During disputes, the actors invoke symbols, rules and ideas to support their own points of view and to give significance to their own expectations, even beyond the rule of law and the customary law.

Marriage is the main source of conflicts in Mossurize and the idea of justice that prevails in this district is essentially based on personal compensation or retributive justice, which is common to other Mozambican districts and most African societies. Through two specific cases of domestic violence, the roles performed by the Magistrate and the DA, and the reasoning of individuals about their own practices, this chapter has shown how the rule of law is slowly but increasingly being implemented in Mossurize, thereby colliding with the customary law and emphasizing people's rights. With these specific examples it has also become clear how the dynamic challenge between social cases and criminal cases embodies contemporary legal pluralism in a remote rural border district of Mozambique.

A possible explanation for this is that, according to these people's reasoning, and as happened in African pre-colonial normative systems, there is no separation between the public and the private (Chanock, 1998, p. 195), and no distinction between public and private law, criminal law and civil law, or between law and equity (David, 1978, p. 569). Hence, customary rules can be applied to any type of situation. The division that exists in European law between private law and public law, i.e. the separation of matters of civil and criminal law did not exist in African societies; all conflicts were solved according to the notion of retributive or compensatory justice and had to be solved as quickly as possible to restore the harmony and cohesion of the group.

The understanding of such contemporary forms of legal pluralism, as well as of people's own representations and meanings of justice and fairness, plays an important part in the debates about the access to justice in twenty-first-century societies.

The work of the Magistrate and the DA in Espungabera, especially in the last few years, is starting to shift its judicial landscape. Mossurize in particular, but also Mozambique in general, have a long road ahead to implement respect for

human rights and for its Constitution throughout the entire territory. Hopefully in the future it will not be uncommon to see rural people increasingly presenting themselves to the state's institutions to solve their problems instead of going first to their chief, even if today customary law is still considered by some to be a more democratic form of justice that is 'much closer to the citizen'. The current policy inaction towards the challenges that legal pluralism poses contributes to the existence of multiple justice providers, with jurisdictions that are unclear and overlap, and reproduce inequalities in access to justice. Not only does the Community Courts Law, dating back to the 1990s, need to be updated but also community authorities need to be overseen and accountable for their work on the ground.

Academic debates have long brought forward concerns about the dynamics of legal pluralism, with empirical evidence, to prompt policymakers to address legal pluralism if their intentions to achieve social justice are genuine. But policy responses so far have been scarce and insufficiently ambitious. And without the allocation of appropriate resources to promote formal justice mechanisms, rural districts like Mossurize are still immune from the state's authority. Therefore, without effective regulation, custom and inequalities survive.

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Chapter 2

THE TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS OF REDE TERRA: NEGOTIATING LAND TENURE IN ANGOLA

Brad Safarik

Rural dependence, production and poverty

While Angola's booming oil sector laid the foundations for an unprecedented peacetime development period, the rural populations, a crucial subset of its population has seen its marginalization grow conspicuously. Decades of underinvestment have left the agricultural sector in chronic underproduction and the rural populations with scarce public or private support to rely upon. This constant socio-economic instability of the rural populations, coupled with the potential for exploitation by outsiders has been identified by the Catholic Church, one of the most respected institutions in modern-day Angola, as being potentially the biggest threats facing the stability of Angolan society (Chatham House, 2005, p. 28). The access and use of land has been a fundamental asset for these communities, who depend directly on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods.

The central role of land tenure and access throughout the country is confirmed by a number of revealing statistics. Agriculture remained the principal economic activity for the majority of the population until 2012, slightly dipping to 46.2 per cent as of 2015 (CEIC, 2015a, p. 294). According to the Ministry of Agriculture, in 2010 family-based agriculture represented 99 per cent of all agriculture in the country, accounting for 94.2 per cent of the total cultivated area (Pacheco, Carvalho and Henriques, 2013, p. 315). Six years later, these numbers have hardly changed, with smallholders accounting for 95 per cent of total production and 92 per cent of land under cultivation (World Bank, 2019, p. 45). Furthermore, poverty has remained entrenched in Angolan society: 36.6 per cent of the total population live in absolute poverty, with an estimated 58.3 per cent of that population being rural and 18.3 per cent of it being urban (CEIC, 2015b, p. 146). These statistics highlight the very sensitive position that agrarian issues hold across Angola today.

A similar dynamic is playing out in Mozambique. Agriculture represents the principal economic activity for 70 per cent of the population, corresponding to

the same amount of population that lives in rural areas (Cammaer, 2016, p. 6; Nhelengethwa, Matchaya and Chilonda, 2014, p. 106). In rural areas, 53 per cent of the population live in poverty, compared to 40.7 per cent in urban areas (World Bank, 2019, p. xiii). Smallholder agriculture using family labour dominates 99 per cent of agricultural production, comprising around 80 per cent of the total workforce (Cammaer, 2016, p. 6). Without a strong oil sector to depend upon, like their Angolan counterparts, agricultural production also plays a more important role in the national economy. The sector contributed 25–30 per cent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP) during the first decade of the 2000s (Nhelengethwa, Matchaya and Chilonda, 2014, p. 106), dipping slightly to an average of 23 per cent over the last five years (World Bank, 2019, p. 3). These figures represent a significant contribution to the overall economy, though the sector is also characterized by erratic annual growth (World Bank, 2019, p. xiii). Nevertheless, the situation in both of these countries demonstrates the central role of agriculture for vast portions of their populations and thus the importance of achieving stable, long-term access to the land worked. It is important, then, to explore how the connection between the revolutionary governments, land use and the peasantry eventually led to national campaigns, led by civil society groups from each country, mobilized around land issues. The case of Angola is expanded upon below.

Marxism–Leninism and the role of the peasantry

After independence,¹ the newly installed transitional government resolved to reverse the depreciation of the rural world and provide it with institutional support to get it back to its colonial-era production levels. This grand vision, however, faded in the face of the many internal and external structural obstacles facing the new nation. While many areas of the country were significantly affected during the war of independence, the fighting 'did not cause substantial damage to the colonial agricultural production, as the battles were fought in areas of little economic importance and never achieved the levels of high intensity in subsequent armed conflicts' (Pain, 2008, p. 183). The agricultural infrastructure was therefore still mostly physically intact, but was severely lacking in the technical know-how to keep the systems running. The Portuguese population that had managed the sector had fled the country en masse upon independence: 'Between 1975 and 1976, in the space of one year, about 300,000 of these settlers left Angola. They too decamped with consumer durables, vehicles, boats, machinery, and equipment, and sabotaged what they could not take with them' (Bhagavan, 1986, p. 7). The agricultural sector was therefore severely affected by the loss of the technical capacity and knowledge jealously guarded by the Portuguese settlers. It was also affected by the collapse of the commercial network that delivered the goods from the fields to the markets. This breakdown in the urban/rural connection was arguably the most significant loss for the rural economy post-independence.

The government first started to nationalize the country's resources because of the heavy influence of the Soviet centralized models inspired by the political philosophy of Marxism–Leninism. This process gave overall power to the governing party, which was now in charge of remaking the entire political economy in its image with little, if any, opposition: 'The motivations for this vast enterprise, which has been compared with the Portuguese "effective occupation"² a century ago, were the party-state's own, i.e. consolidating its hegemony through territorial occupation, the co-optation of local elites, and the subjection of the majority' (Oliveira and Taponier, 2013, p. 173). The policy of nationalization had a profound effect on the agricultural sector. Its export system was one of the few areas that had been invested in and considerably developed during the colonial period, with its commercial impact changing the overall landscape of the country's urbanization. During the colonial days of the nineteenth century, 'Luanda was one of the most developed cities outside Europe, with many active trading companies exporting palm and peanut oil, wax, timber, ivory, cotton, coffee, cocoa, and many other products' (World Bank, 2018, p. 1). The growth of the agricultural sector driving the infrastructure boom across the urban landscape would later influence the mindset of Angola's leaders as they took the reins of their country and sought to drive their own future destiny back to the colonial heights guided by colonial production models. The looming towers of concrete rising above the skyline of Luanda's bay, today the ultimate symbol of its oil-driven economic prosperity, are in fact building on the foundation previously set by Angola's colonial agricultural exports.

The government's strategy for a state-led centralized agricultural system was twofold: (1) nationalize and reactivate the colonial-era farms and (2) organize peasants into associations and cooperatives, all overseen and directed by the government. In a first attempt to transform the disparate actors of the rural economy into organized sections, Agostinho Neto's transitional government created the Commission on Support and Dynamism of Cooperatives (CADCO)³ in August 1975 to provide official support for the creation of cooperatives. This commission only lasted a matter of months due to mismanagement, but its pioneering work would be the first of many ill-conceived attempts at institution building, with the goal of stimulating cooperative and associative practices among the workers (Morais and Pacheco, 1991, p. 11). The various versions that would follow all shared the same tension between promoting a free participative spirit in organizing rural workers and the colonial legacy of burdensome and invasive checks and controls on these same initiatives.

In 1977, the National Direction of the Organization of Production (DNOP⁴), under the guidance of the Ministry of Agriculture, published the first rough statistics on the level of the organization of cooperatives in twelve of the eighteen provinces, classified into two different grades (see Table 2.1). Grade one was composed of cooperatives or peasant associations based on organizing services and inputs among each other, while grade two was composed of cooperatives that collectively worked farms and plantations abandoned by the European colonizers under a Soviet-inspired *kolkhoze* system (a form of collective farm; Morais and

Table 2.1 Total number of cooperative organizations per province in 1977

Province	Grade 1		Grade 2		Total	
	Number	Members	Number	Members	Number	Members
Benguela	15	1,136	N/A	N/A	15	1,136
Bié	13	42,115	5	–	18	42,115
Cunene	9	713	–	–	9	713
Huambo	52	9,860	10	2,535	62	12,395
Huíla	136	15,164	–	–	136	15,164
Kuando Kubango	12	827	–	–	12	827
Kwanza Sul	158	15,717	31	2,480	189	15,197
Lunda Sul	3	–	10	–	13	–
Malanje	43	4,385	35	2,340	78	6,725
Moxico	31	–	3	–	34	–
Uíge	78	9,516	15	1,858	93	11,374
Zaire	9	1,500	–	–	9	1,500
TOTAL	559	58,819	109	9,213	668	68,032

N/A (not available) means that the province was not included in the study. ‘–’ means that data were unavailable despite the province being included in the study. The provinces of Bengo, Cabinda, Kwanza Norte, Luanda, Lunda Norte and Namibe were part of the study.

Source: data compiled from Morais and Pacheco (1991, p. 13).

Pacheco, 1991, pp. 11–12). The category of ‘peasant associations’ was described as being ‘agglomerations of peasant households making their own production decisions’ (World Bank, 1991, p. 61). Their presumed advantage was having priority in terms of government services and inputs, though they were different from cooperatives in that they did not work or produce collectively.

The latest manifestation of CADCO’s legacy is the Confederação das Associações de Camponeses e Cooperativas Agro-Pecuárias de Angola (UNACA, the Confederation of Associations of Peasants and Livestock Cooperatives of Angola) founded in 1990. Going against the original principles of voluntary association intrinsic to the associative and cooperative movement, in reality this structure represents the rural manifestation of Angola’s various ‘mass organizations’ that appear as spontaneous social organizing but find their origins and direction behind self-interested political actors. UNACA remains the main organization of the cooperative and associative movement and claims to assist 8,662 associations and 2,115 cooperatives, comprising nearly one million members.⁵ Given that UNACA is clearly associated with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the political party in power since independence, membership is viewed as implicit support for the party and vice versa. Similarly, refusing membership of UNACA could be seen as an implicit rebuke to the MPLA itself.⁶ The suspicions cast on those not willingly aligning themselves with the government appear to survive from the time of the Neto administration.

The Roots of rural suspicion

One of the main reasons that Neto's administration failed to provide significant material or financial support directly to these rural organizations, beyond the difficult socio-economic context, was his mistrust of the structure of the agrarian economy. This mistrust was fomented by the intervention of his Soviet allies, who had come to assist in setting up their centralized agricultural farming models. Neto's apparent support of the spontaneous formation of rural organizations was a central line of disagreement between his Soviet assistants: 'For them, the farming cooperatives provoked suspicion by keeping the commercialization process in the hands of the farmers ... who would become not only an economic, but also a political force' (Conceição, 1999, p. 142). Agostinho Neto later appeared to fully embrace this mistrust of independent rural entrepreneurship.

While initially wanting the farmers to organize themselves, ulterior motives quickly became a political concern. After initially lauding farmers as essential actors in the Angolan nation, Neto later expressed his misgivings of their true intentions, as he was once quoted as saying: 'The farmer has, in himself, a capitalist seed. What is the dream of a farmer? It's to have a big property ... to make lots of money. And his profits increase the costs of the workers that he hires. Farmers are exploiters' (Pain, 2008, p. 190).⁷ However, this clear scorn of capitalism was not a dogmatic position across the political economy. In 1978, he expressly stated that his government was not against private entrepreneurship as such, but that it would only be tolerated in cases where private capital could not 'exercise control over the economy' (Bhagavan, 1986, p. 26). Private capital was welcome as long as the state maintained majority ownership. This position demonstrates the extent to which the new Angolan government was willing to bend its ideology to the realities of the ensuing Civil War in order to ensure the survival of the economic engine, most notably in the oil sector:

Oil production, organized totally outside of the norms of the socialist economy and conducted by transnational firms in isolated enclaves, accounted for close to 90 per cent of export earnings, and these revenues enabled the military to purchase increasing quantities of arms and ammunition. The state virtually abandoned the peasantry and agricultural production, while the cities subsisted as best they could on exports. (Pereira, 1994, p. 10)

An increasing dependence on the oil sector and Neto's questioning of the peasants' motives laid the foundations of the essential abandonment of the peasantry as the agricultural sector received the least amount of public investment despite 80 per cent of the population being dependent on it for their livelihood (Pain, 2008, pp. 189-190). The MPLA quickly became financially dependent on a growing oil sector⁸ and was able to use these resources to construct a political machine that would come to overshadow every other economic sector. A system of clientelist distribution⁹ would serve as the favoured tool to silence critics, placate allies and spread the wealth among the well connected. The urban/rural divide

of the conflict represented a major obstacle to implementing any coherent rural policies as the Civil War led to political forces that further marginalized the rural populations' exclusion politically, socially, economically, institutionally and even symbolically.

Land tenure reform and rural mobilization

The transition to a liberalized economic model meant that the nationalization of the country's resources needed to be modified to allow for enough incentives to attract foreign investment and codify the resource transfers already underway. This period¹⁰ was 'characterized by legal ambiguity', which 'set the precedent for "land grabs"' perpetrated by 'the political elite, members of the armed forces, and businessmen' (Clover, 2010, p. 152). The Land Law of the time, Law 21-C of 28 August 1992, had been created and adopted against the backdrop of Civil War and a lack of technical and historical precedent to rely upon. Land conflicts continued to emerge shortly after its passage as its lack of effectiveness for resolving land disputes became clearer.¹¹

Despite the raging Civil War, by 1999 the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) was still able to distribute more than 2 million hectares of land, representing almost half of the land previously conceded to the commercial sector before 1975, though the vast majority of it was left fallow (Pacheco, 2002, III). This land distribution to 'businesspeople' (Pacheco, 2002, III), 'commercial farmers' (Clover, 2005, p. 358), or the 'new Angolan bourgeoisie' (Rede Terra, 2005, p. 6) solidified the colonial land grab of the last decade of Portuguese occupation, wherein 'one million rural families saw the average land area they occupied reduced from a little more than 9 hectares per family in the mid-1960s to about 4 hectares in 1973, while 6,000 commercial farmers had an average of 700 hectares, of which only 10% was actually cultivated' (Pacheco, 2004, p. 45). From 2000 to 2009, the considerable increase in agricultural production was due to increased land use, not higher production efficiencies (Pacheco et al., 2013, p. 316). Nevertheless, large investments have been made in support of this small segment of commercial agriculture.¹²

Just before the turn of the century, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was called upon by the Direcção Nacional de Desenvolvimento Rural (DNDR, the National Directorate of Rural Development) in 1999 to provide technical assistance in formulating a new regulatory approach to the myriad land issues affecting the country's urban and rural areas (Carranza and Treacle, 2014, p. 24). In July 2002, after a multi-pronged lobbying campaign led by the Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA), the most prominent national non-governmental organization (NGO) for rural land issues, the Canadian NGO Development Workshop, led by Allan Cain, which specializes in urban and peri-urban land issues, and the FAO, led by Dr Paulo Groppo, a land tenure systems analysis officer, the government announced its intention to host a public consultation period to modify the existing Land Law (21-C/92). Social synergies

and historical convergence led to the foundation of an NGO network that came to be known as Rede Terra, an organization guided in large part by the similar Campanha Terra, which emerged in Mozambique in 1998.

Mozambique leads the way

In order to understand the evolution of Angola's experience in both the government's efforts and the social organization around the issue of land reform, a brief review of the influence of Mozambique's case is needed (see Table 2.2). Importantly, both countries share similar political and legal colonial inheritances, the strong national presence of church organizations across the rural landscape, and decades of Civil War that destroyed their rural economies. In the early 1990s, an ad hoc land commission was set up through the support of the University of Wisconsin Land Tenure Center¹³ and USAID,¹⁴ aimed at addressing the land issues in Mozambique amid the structural readjustment programmes after the end of the war in 1992 and the country's first multi-party elections in October 1994.

The desire for land reform was brought to prominence by three major influences: (1) the support of the Catholic Church through its Caritas mission and the Diocesan Commissions for Justice and Peace; (2) the Christian Council of Mozambique via its Organization for Mutual Aid; and (3) the União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC, the National Peasants Union) reporting on the land conflicts resulting from the accelerated privatization of state land and the attempted land grabs of cooperatives (Negrão, 2003, pp. 6-7). In addition to Catholicism, there were also active Muslim and African Zionist influences (Negrão, 2003, p. 7). This was significantly different from Angola's experience, as it was almost exclusively

Table 2.2 Comparative timeline on land laws and campaigns (1979–2004)

Time period	Angola	Mozambique
1979	–	Land Law no. 6
1992	Land Law no. 21-C First multi-party elections	End of Civil War
October 1994	–	First multi-party elections
1996		National Land Conference – discussion of final draft of Land Law
1997	–	Land Law no. 19
13 June 1998	–	Campanha Terra launched
April 2002	Draft Land Law announced	
26 November 2002	Rede Terra launched	–
August–December 2003	Consultation with rural communities	–
9 November 2004	Land Law no. 9	–

Source: data compiled from Clover (2005), Groppo et al. (2004), Negrão (1999) and Tanner (2002).

influenced by the Catholic Church – there was no explicit mention of other religions participating in the process.

In order to try to consolidate the different efforts, the government created a new Inter-ministerial Commission in 1995 ‘with a clear multi-sectoral composition’ involving ‘[n]ine separate ministries’¹⁵ and ‘two representatives each working within the Commission’ (Negrão, 2003, p. 16). In order to strengthen the voice of the national population in the debate, a National Committee was formed ‘in order to join forces in the dissemination of information aimed, in particular, at rural families’ (Negrão, 1999, p. 1). This Committee, comprised of nine national NGOs,¹⁶ formed a network later called *Campanha Terra*. It organized a time-specific (six-to-nine month) information campaign after the new land tenure bill (Law no. 19/97) had been promulgated. *Campanha Terra* was officially launched on 13 June 1998 in the village of Marracuene in Maputo province (Negrão, 1999, pp. 3-4), coordinated by José Negrão of the Eduardo Mondlane University. Its formation brought the people directly involved in ‘the legislation process into active collaboration with the NGO sector and continues to sustain an effective dialogue and working partnerships’ (Tanner, 2002, p. 41). While it was active throughout the territory, ‘the Campaign did not consider itself to be a new NGO nor a forum for organizations’ and was decentralized at the provincial and district levels (Negrão, 1999, p. 1). Overall, the Campaign’s mission¹⁷ was to mobilize NGOs, churches, associations and cooperatives so as to disseminate educational campaigns about the new Land Law, promote justice through its proper application, and stimulate dialogue between the traditional and commercial agricultural sectors in the targeted areas (Negrão, 1999, p. 2). Building from this example, *Rede Terra* aimed to construct its own land-based social movement.

Rede Terra: The birth of Angola’s first land network

Amid all of these major changes, at the turn of the twenty-first century the country found itself at the cusp of a historic moment: the first officially sanctioned ‘dialogue’ between the MPLA-led government and civil society over a pressing legislative issue: a reform of the Land Law. The unique environment was set up, ‘... by the new multi-party “freedom” and “democratic” legislative framework, fuelling the emerging Angolan civil society organisations, which were able to grow throughout the nineties and voice growing criticism of the government despite the severe constraints imposed by the regime’ (Chabal and Vidal, 2007, p. 204). The multiple pressures on the government appear to have created the opportunity to further open this space of civic political discourse by bringing the public, private and donor spheres together around the negotiating table.

This unprecedented civic dialogue can be explained by the desire of the government to present itself, as much to the international community as to its national audience, as a legitimate actor by demonstrating that it was responsive to its people’s needs and was looking to take on its role as a positive force for national

unity. The country's precarious financial situation¹⁸ after the Civil War meant that 'Angola's leaders were well aware that they could not put the country back together without major foreign input and repeatedly called for a donors' conference to help them mobilize financial resources' (Oliveira, 2015, p. 54). This recognition of the importance of foreign aid and assistance prompted a significant number of these democratic overtures, but the participatory spaces provided by party officials remained closely guarded.

The demonstration of this desire was opening up a highly controlled democratic space, with land policies at the heart of the process. The public debate was initially fixed by the MPLA for a period of three months, but was later indefinitely extended after lobbying by various NGOs and the FAO, which had agreed to participate in the public consultation campaign for the new law. This time extension represented a first major victory for civil society participation in public policy formulation by considerably opening up the opportunities for dialogue between the government and its citizens. Otherwise, the whole exercise would have been little more than a symbolic gesture to the international community and the few participants of the activist civil society who wanted to have their voices heard.

After securing more time, different NGOs began to put together their own ideas, mostly revolving around strengthening the defence of agrarian rights, land access and use, and the protection of customary rights. The informal discussions eventually led to a consortium that became Rede Terra on 26 November 2002 at the Tivoli Hotel in Luanda, with twelve national and international NGOs in the initial group (see Table 2.3). Rede Terra declared its intention to officially begin its national campaign of public consultations, for an initial period of nine months, in January 2003.

The Rede Terra network was dominated by international NGOs, which comprised 66 per cent (eight out of the total twelve). This demonstrates the heavy influence that Western organizations had in founding the umbrella organization and in securing foreign financing for its work. The network was supported by three main donors, all coming from Western sources: Oxfam Novib (UK), Oikos Intermón (Spain/Portugal) and World Learning (USA). This Western funding of the organization and the heavy influence of Western NGOs supporting democratic initiatives and human rights would turn out to be very significant in the network's relationship with the government, as described later in this chapter. The initial coordination was led by ADRA engineer Manuel António da Silva Neto. As a network, the group decided on a list of five main activities in the preparations for the new Land Law (see Table 2.4).

One of the most influential activities the group undertook was the creation of a pamphlet used by its activists during their initial ground campaign to educate the local populations about the planned proposals being considered by the government. They simultaneously documented the needs and desires of the rural communities themselves to bring their voices to the debate for potential changes to the draft Land Law. The pamphlet was translated into five national languages¹⁹ to reach a maximum audience, and the activists were present in ten of the total of eighteen provinces in the country (Neto, n.d., p. 2). The provinces active in

Table 2.3 Founding members of Rede Terra

Name of organization	Origin	Main activities
Agência de Cooperação e Pesquisa para o Desenvolvimento (ACORD)	UK	Human rights, food security, rural development
Acção para o Desenvolvimento Rural e Ambiente (ADRA)	Angola	Rural development, social justice, democracy, organization of civil society
Norwegian People's Aid (APN)	Norway	Post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian help, human rights and democracy
Caritas de Angola	Angola	Post-conflict reconstruction, institutional capacity building, literacy and vocational training, and agricultural development
Centro Cultural Mosaiko	Angola	Contribute to establishment of culture and education of human rights
Development Workshop (DW)	Canada (first international NGO, 1981)	Policy and programme development for human settlements and housing, support for civil society
Oxfam Intermón	Spain	Support for social inclusion and human rights, gender justice, creating sustainable food systems and poverty reduction
Centro Nacional de Aconselhamento (CNA)	Angola	Democracy, human rights, community support
National Democratic Institute (NDI)	USA	Citizen participation, democratic governance, gender equality, youth political participation
Oikos	Portugal	Social mobilization and participation, democracy, transparency and development
Netherlands Development Organization (SNV)	Netherlands	Food security, gender equality, sustainable agricultural practices
World Learning (WL)	USA	Government accountability, education, women empowerment, poverty eradication

Source: information compiled by the author.

Table 2.4 Main activities of Rede Terra

- I. Develop actions to share information about the government's proposal for a new Land Law and its reorganization of territory.
- II. Promote civil debate around the Land Law proposal and land issues affecting rural and peri-urban communities.
- III. Collect citizens' contributions and recommendations in order to create a global document that reflects the range of opinions in civil society, in advance of the Land Law.
- IV. Organize social advocacy and other activities that directly or indirectly relate to land issues or the defence of citizen's rights.
- V. After the passage of the new Land Law, establish advocacy networks to ensure that rural communities negatively affected by the changes receive proper compensation.

Source: translated from Neto (n.d., p. 2).

the campaign were Bengo, Bié, Huambo, Huíla, Kuanza-Sul, Luanda, Malange, Namiba, Uíge and Zaire.

After the end of the ground campaigns were finished, the local information gathered by the Rede Terra representatives was shared with the local officials and sent on to the headquarters in Luanda. During this campaign, Rede Terra became a vehicle for directly educating the rural populations about their rights and the current legislation, while also communicating the needs and desires of these affected communities directly to the public officials who would be deciding on the final form of the Land Law. This type of democratic exercise, bringing the citizens' voices directly to the legislators, was the first in Angola. The final report, entitled 'Position of Rede Terra, relative to the Land Law project of 28 of November of 2003', was relayed to the president of the National Assembly (Neto, n.d., p. 2). While the MPLA accepted the work of Rede Terra and at least nominally worked in tandem with it, in the end the dialogue was limited to only a few specially designated local contacts.²⁰

In the final version of the Land Law, Rede Terra claimed as its own victories – the modification of certain articles of the law, such as the inclusion of proper compensation for the expropriation of land (though it lacked mechanisms to measure and enforce it), in the time required for the legalization of land titles (one to three years), and the introduction of a chapter dedicated to managing land conflicts. Another victory was the inclusion of provisions that both recognized and protected customary rights. The customary issues had been at the forefront of the concerns of Rede Terra, and their recognition was clear evidence, now written into law, of the positive measures achieved during these unprecedented discussions. However, they were sufficiently diluted to create significant ambiguities and were not legally operational, thus negating in part this supposed success.

The final Land Law (no. 9 of 9 November 2004) decreed that all land officially registered as 'communal' cannot be taken over by the state, except in cases where the public interest demands it (Foley, 2007, p. 11). This represented an important advance in rural customary protections, although the public interest clause left room for ambiguities and therefore its potential misuse. However, a last-minute revision added by the Dos Santos administration included 'the legal possibility of land appropriation for "private utility" motives – rather than just for public interest, as before' (Clover, 2005, p. 360). This provision allows for rural land to 'be requisitioned with payment of compensation', though a clear framework for establishing just compensation has not been established (USAID, 2007, p. 25). The accumulation of these ambiguities built into the 2004 Land Law is a central mechanism in creating the conditions for illegal and ambiguous land occupations. Ultimately, its 'effect was to weaken, not strengthen, property rights for the poor. [...] Weaker and less secure tenure also limited political empowerment. Simultaneously, the position of the authorities has been strengthened' (Clover, 2005, p. 360). A major goal of Rede Terra had been to reduce the ambiguities present in the law through the introduction of clear procedures and enforcement mechanisms, but the newest Land Law leaves much to interpretation, with rural communities still vulnerable to potential predatory practices.

Challenges: Stifling civil society

If access to government officials has always been a fundamental obstacle for civil society and the NGOs working in the country, the democratic deficit of Angola and its young civil society represented just as much of a challenge to community organizers. The authoritarian governing model, coupled with the enduring colonial legacy of the Portuguese, left the Angolan society with a mainly vertical system of governance. Amid the ongoing Civil War in the foreground, the expansion of oil production and the massive profits that came with it added another layer of verticality between the political elites and the population as a whole that ‘inhibited the appearance of an alternative social logic based upon notions of citizenship or class (where people place themselves horizontally in relation to the state) and therefore hampered the emergence of civil society as understood in the West’ (Chabal and Vidal, 2007, p. 203). Civil society found itself stalled²¹ in its quest for growth and development. In a 2008 monitoring report by Oxfam Novib, a major donor of the initiative, it was noted that:

Some of those interviewed, after having had time to reflect, made it clear that they had a firm conviction that after the whole process of consulting/involving civil society at the national level [...] while civil society was able to apply pressure, “in the end, the process ended up significantly manipulated and was no more than a well-set-up propaganda operation (...) providing social legitimacy to decisions that had already been taken at the higher levels”. (CCPE, 2008, p. 197)

The government’s reluctance to open up to Rede Terra is therefore not surprising given that it was fully financed by Western donors and 66 per cent of the overall organization was composed of Western NGOs. In May 2006, shortly after the passage of the Land Law, the MPLA government began implementing a new decree (no. 84 of 2002) designed to severely limit the freedoms of NGOs working within Angola and to regulate their activities through a burdensome system of constant surveillance. The intention was ‘to reduce the independence of NGOs, and to keep NGOs’ interventions restricted to humanitarian and emergency approaches only’ (Amundsen and Abreu, 2006, p. 7). Given that Rede Terra’s proposed mandate went far beyond humanitarian work, the organization would have been a prime target for the new decree’s ambitions to bring to heel any NGOs working outside of the MPLA’s accepted areas of influence. These suspicions went well beyond Angola’s leadership, representing a trend across the continent.

Table 2.5 reveals a wider trend of anti-NGO sentiment even though many of these governments rely upon the aid and assistance of non-state actors to provide basic services to their respective populations. In Angola, Executive Decree no. 74 of 2015 attempted to increase the control of NGOs using new mechanisms, specifically putting burdens on the foreign financing of activities. In 2016, Rede Terra went to court and won alongside the *Ordem dos Advogados de Angola* (the Angolan Bar Association) and the NGOs SOS Habitat and the

Table 2.5 African countries with anti-NGO policies or legislation (2004 to May 2019)

Enacted measures restricting activities (12)	With pending or impending measures (6)	Measures abandoned, rejected by legislature or invalidated by the courts (6)
Algeria, Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia	Egypt, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia	Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, Zimbabwe

Source: data compiled from Musila (2019, p. 3).

Centro Nacional de Aconselhamento (CNA, the National Counselling Centre) by arguing that the government's Decree no. 74 of 2015 was unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court upheld their argument on 5 July 2017, declaring that such decrees must come from the parliament and not the presidency, thereby imposing a significant check on the president's seeming omnipotence (USAID, 2007, p. 2). For Mozambique, the still-pending legislation strengthens the Law of Associations of 1991, under which NGOs currently operate, with a number of amendments to the law drafted in 2009 but never enacted (Musila, 2019, p. 16). The country is a restrictive environment for NGO operations, with multiple NGO leaders harassed, abducted or killed between 2010 and 2017 (Musila, 2019, p. 20). The effectiveness of these land networks must be considered within the restrictive spaces they were operating in.

Conclusion: Diverging interests in rural Angola

Despite decades of declarations of economic diversification and support for the agricultural sector, little has changed. In a rare public moment of introspection, President José Eduardo dos Santos admitted as much during his end-of-year speech on 15 December 2015: 'We spoke a lot about diversifying the economy, we did very little. Even so, it's better to start late than never' (CEIC, 2015a, p. 193). Nevertheless, this legacy of inaction appears set to continue to neglect the production potential of the peasantry in favour of an underdeveloped commercial sector, as evidenced in the 2017-2018 budget proposal for the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI). The document showed an across-the-board cut to nearly every programme supporting smallholder agricultural production, with the money saved funnelled instead into a 'Programme for commercial agricultural development' (UNICEF and ADRA, 2018, p. 15). Concentrating these resources into a limited commercial sector allows the political elite to remain in total control of the segmented economic diversification taking place. This strategy's logical end would be to undermine the development capacity of the rural populations in order to maintain control. Political and military elite interests run counter to those supported by the activities of Rede Terra, which largely explains why the Land Law ultimately weakened property rights.

However, public involvement in legislative matters in Angola is a rare occurrence. Developing democratic norms is a long-term process that occurs in fits and starts and even regresses. The opening up of the Land Law debate to the public could have had significant effects on democratic participation in the country, and these are only now beginning to appear. The election of João Lourenço in September 2017 represented a change in the office of the presidency, though the MPLA remains in power, with the same dynamics that continue to motivate the party to maintain its hold on power. Discussions have restarted on updating the current Land Law once again, to conform to current social and market conditions (Angop, 27 March 2019). Whether another process of social mobilization will accompany this process remains to be seen.

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Chapter 3

REDD+ LANDSCAPE AND TERRITORIALITY: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR MOZAMBIQUE

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Introduction

REDD+ is a concept that has been part of the global climate change policy dialogue facilitated by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) since 2005. This concept emerged based on the experiences of the then-current Kyoto Protocol, which introduced measures by which the forestry sector could contribute to the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Angelsen et al., 2012). The 5th Assessment Report (AR5) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that land-use change, mainly through activities related to deforestation and forest degradation, accounts for 10–15 per cent of all GHG emissions worldwide (IPCC, 2015, 2017). Despite the recognition that industry and transport, particularly in industrialized countries, are the biggest polluters, the position of the global policy community is that developing countries can also contribute to mitigating global GHG emissions through REDD+ actions, i.e. actions aimed at reducing deforestation and forest degradation, while also promoting forest conservation, sustainable forest management and restoration (Blackman, 2010).

When the concept was first introduced, a primary assumption was that REDD+ would be a simple, relatively low-cost and quick mechanism to help mitigate human-induced climate change and reduce the amount of carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere by human activity, while also yielding additional benefits, such as safeguarding natural ecosystem functions and biodiversity (Angelsen, 2008). The REDD+ concept evolved from the Kyoto Protocol market-based mitigation mechanism known as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), in which carbon credits could be sold and bought, thereby providing a business case for different actors, primarily private businesses, to be involved. CDM projects

were oriented towards reforestation and afforestation (forest planting), resulting in the development of forest plantations for mitigation benefits, and critics raised concerns that the focus on CDM projects could come at the expense of intact biodiverse tropical forests, or simply draw attention away from the low-cost option of conserving existing forests to sequester and store carbon (Hultman, Lou and Hutton, 2020). CDM projects were also supposed to yield co-benefits of sustainable development for implementing partners in the Global South. A recent systematic review of literature assessing CDM projects suggests that the sustainable development goals were broadly defined and left very much to the implementing national partners to define, monitor and evaluate (Hultman, Lou and Hutton, 2020).

The idea behind REDD+ is to incentivize the protection and sustainable management of existing non-plantation forests. Other key differences with REDD+ as a policy mechanism are that it is focused on mechanisms to compensate governments of developing countries (not markets) for carbon emission reductions, and is intended to yield direct benefits to communities recognized as forest guardians. For REDD+ the stored and removed carbon amount is the main objective for the compensation mechanism, although the Paris Agreement also considers other non-carbon benefits, e.g. enhanced food security or conservation of biodiversity (Angelsen, 2008; Duchelle et al., 2018; Streck, 2019).

In practice, the process of designing REDD+ strategies and further defining the process through REDD+ pilot initiatives uncovered other realities on the ground and made it clear that the design and implementation of national-scale REDD+ strategies would be complex and costly, requiring time, coordination and the full participation of all stakeholder groups (Nielsen, 2016). Developing countries, not being major emitters, have urgent development concerns linked to poverty reduction and their forestry sectors face complex barriers for effective governance.

Framing REDD+ as a government (not a private-sector) instrument seems to have provided an opportunity for tropical nations' governments to tap financial resources from multilateral agreements to fund sustainable forest management and conservation (Streck, 2012). Thus, even though REDD+ represents a complex policy and implementation process, the appeal of REDD+ as a source of financing for sustainable forest management and conservation remained strong. For example, it is estimated that between 2008 and 2015, more than 350 projects were implemented in 53 countries at a cost of at least €20 billion in public finance (Global Forest Coalition, 2020). Much of this funding was intended to prepare countries for REDD+ implementation (also referred to as 'REDD+ readiness'), help countries to establish the systems for estimating existing forest carbon stocks, and set up systems to monitor and evaluate carbon-mitigation measures (Henry et al., 2011; Holmes, Potvin and Coomes, 2017).

Opinions of REDD+ differ, however: some voices see it as the most successful approach to conserve tropical forests and talk about its 'transformational potential' (Angelsen et al., 2012) or assert that REDD+ 'could trigger the biggest paradigm shift in conservation history' (Strassburg et al., 2010, p. 99). Some caution against viewing the mechanism as a 'silver bullet' that could achieve a triple-win

scenario: slowing forest loss, reducing emissions and alleviating poverty (Thompson, Baruah and Carr, 2011; Van Dam, 2011). Still others point to the promise of REDD+ to bring significant funding for forest conservation directly into the hands of remote and often marginalized communities, while cautioning the ways in which the REDD+ implementation process can inadvertently trigger tenure insecurity, conflict over land or resources, and a weakening of the rights of indigenous and traditional peoples (Larson et al., 2013).

As the global dialogue on REDD+ and its procedural processes have evolved over the past decade, including lessons secured through pilot REDD+ projects starting in 2013, there has been a shift in the policy dialogue that pivoted REDD+ from a strictly forest-centred approach to one that embraces a more holistic landscape vision (Nielsen, 2016). A landscape is defined here as a geographical space with a heterogeneous mosaic of different land uses, including agriculture, forestry, water bodies, conservation areas and pasture land (Sabogal, Besacier and McGuire, 2015). The reasons for moving from a forest-centred to a landscape approach are multiple, but connect to an overall expansion and promotion of sustainable and comprehensive land-use planning across scales. The landscape approach seeks to promote integration of the various land-use systems in a joint management process. One suggested advantage of extending the scope of REDD+ to the landscape was that it would become more inclusive of the agriculture sector in REDD+ implementing countries, which for the early stages of REDD+ development had been aligned more closely with forestry and conservation agencies and organizations (Kalfagianni and Duyck, 2015; Nielsen, 2016). Thus REDD+ Landscape offers a linkage or way to bridge the often-divided government and sectoral divisions between agriculture and environment. Additionally, proponents of an integrated landscape approach to REDD+ suggest that it allows for more flexibility in safeguarding multiple ecosystem services (i.e. it expands beyond a carbon-centric focus), and provides incentives to develop land-use planning that require more bottom-up approaches to management, suggesting that the integration across a landscape would not only be across land-use sectors and geographies but also across scales of land-use actors and decision makers (Nielsen, 2016). However, there has also been criticism of the landscape approach, noting that although landscapes can offer useful ways of visualizing holistic and collaborative action, the term itself often lacks a concrete policy context as it does not translate easily into pre-existing management divisions. Perhaps more importantly, landscapes tend to be biophysically defined and therefore do not belong to specific groups of local people, resulting in a misalignment with pre-existing customary tenure structures (McCall, 2016).

While the policy vision of integrated landscape approaches to land-use planning is not new to the context of Mozambique (Governo de Moçambique, 2014), the advent of REDD+ Landscape, as formally adopted in 2017, represents a tangible set of opportunities to move this vision into implementation and potentially transform the current trajectory of land-use change and ecosystem degradation across priority landscapes in Mozambique. And yet there are considerable challenges to consider, as an approach that looks to integrate across

sectors and scales can risk getting stuck in costly legislative, administrative and bureaucratic loops that inhibit movement forward and render untenable any actual achievements in safeguarding vital ecosystem services in order to achieve more sustainable development.

In this chapter we focus on the case of REDD+ Landscape in Mozambique as a potentially pivotal policy and funding mechanism that could influence the sustainable transformation of large geographical areas with a heterogeneous mosaic of land uses. While we primarily discuss it from the viewpoint of landscape as a geographic concept, we believe that REDD+ Landscape management will also require an appropriate mosaic of landscape actors to articulate the integrations and collaborative management required of such an approach. We therefore explore the ways in which Mozambique's forests and other land uses have changed in the recent past, and identify the main pressures on forests and related ecosystem services. We review the involvement of Mozambique in the REDD+ UNFCCC policy dialogue and process, and the governance structure and planned implementation of REDD+ Landscape within the country. We then explore the ways in which existing approaches and policy mechanisms, many starting from within the forestry sector, offer lessons and opportunities for furthering a REDD+ Landscape vision into the future. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a discussion on the risks and benefits of REDD+ as a mechanism to promote an integrated landscape approach in Mozambique. Ultimately we find significant transformative potential in this vision and the actual financing it represents to alter the current unsustainable use of land and exploitation of forests, ecosystem goods and services.

Forest and land-use change in Mozambique

Mozambique is one of the few countries in the southern Africa region that still maintain a considerable proportion of their area in forests, with an estimated 43 per cent of the total land area covered by natural forest (Governo de Moçambique, 2018; Siteo, Salomão and Wertz-Kanounnikoff, 2012). Even so, deforestation and forest degradation are still progressing at an unprecedented rate, with an estimated annual rate of 0.79 per cent, based on a national-scale study for 2003–2013, which was the period chosen as a reference time period for the national REDD+ strategy (Governo de Moçambique, 2018). Shifting agriculture (often involving slash-and-burn techniques), commercial agriculture, charcoal production, logging and uncontrolled fires are the main causes of recent forest loss and degradation (CEAGRE and Winrock, 2016). According to national reporting, Mozambique has total GHG emissions of 66.8 MtCO_{2eq} (0.14 per cent of the world total), of which 58.8 per cent originated from land-use change and forests (USAID, 2017).

While there is indication of a slowing in the pace of deforestation in Mozambique for the period 2010–2013, the factors driving this slowed forest loss remain unclear (Governo de Moçambique, 2018). Longer-term trends still indicate that population growth and urban expansion will exert further pressure on land-use conversion, matched by the increased demand for wood from

international interests such as China and a domestic demand for charcoal and fuelwood (CEAGRE and Winrock, 2016).

In considering the potential trajectory for Mozambique and its forest base, the forest transition model offers a useful framework for examining past and predicted trends. The theoretical foundation for the forest transition model suggests that within the contexts of our global capitalist market structure and assumptions about individual decision-making regarding land use, deforestation will occur until the forests are depleted or until their exploitation is no longer economically viable (Mather, 1992; Rudel et al., 2005). The forest transition model consists of four phases: (1) pre-transition: high forest cover, low deforestation; (2) early transition: high forest cover, high deforestation; (3) late transition: low forest cover, low deforestation; and (4) post-transition: low forest cover, forest restoration (Hosonuma et al., 2012). This is a trend that can be observed on various geographic scales: from global scale, to national scale, to subnational trends (Lambin and Meyfroidt, 2011; Rudel et al., 2005).

Further, the model suggests that countries do not typically shift or transition to a phase of forest restoration before natural forests run out (Hosonuma et al., 2012). When assessing forest change in Mozambique within the framework of the forest transition model, the estimates suggest that the country, both at the national scale and subnational trends, remains solidly within the early transition phase, that is to say within a phase of increasing deforestation and forest degradation. A recent test of the model in Mozambique, at the district level, suggests that where forests in districts have already been fully depleted, suggesting that they are in the late transition phase, there is no indication of forest restoration. Rather the forests remain depleted within the district, and exploitation activity simply shifts over to neighbouring districts, in order to ensure the supply of forest products to local economies (e.g. charcoal and fuelwood production) or for export (e.g. timber and related wood products) (Mahamane et al., 2017; Sedano et al., 2016). This scenario has played out in the case of Maputo Province, where in the face of forest depletion the strategy appears to focus on extending into other districts such as Massingir and Mabalane in Gaza Province, where forest resources are still plentiful (Mahamane et al., 2017).

What the most recent reporting on the drivers of land use and forest change in Mozambique suggests (CEAGRE and Winrock, 2016) is that many sectors and stakeholders are responsible, especially when we consider those activities that more indirectly influence deforestation, such as large-scale agricultural production or wood extraction. Such activities trigger the displacement of one type of land use to another, such as large-scale production or extraction forcing the displacement of shifting agriculture and charcoal production further into natural forests. This understanding underlines the importance of observing and assessing what is occurring across the landscape, and not simply focusing on the change taking place directly within forests. Therefore, reducing deforestation requires strong and important interventions in other land-use sectors, particularly in the agricultural sector, in order to increase productivity so that increasing production will not be at the expense of the forests. But finding, implementing and securing the adoption

of such agricultural techniques may be difficult. Actors in the agricultural sector do not necessarily think that deforestation is a problem, and they are part of the solution.

REDD + in Mozambique

Mozambique was an early participant in global policy discussions on strategies to address climate change mitigation through the reduction of deforestation and forest degradation and embraced the concept of REDD+ as early as 2008, following the decisions at the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties 14 to develop implementation strategies for REDD+ and establish pilot projects. At the time, developing countries across the global tropics played a critical role in stimulating the conversation and debate on how best to safeguard forests and reduce emissions, while also enabling sustainable development for achieving global poverty reduction. By engaging in this debate, Mozambique was recognizing the urgency of addressing reductions in global GHG emissions, particularly those from land-use change, even while facing significant development and poverty-reduction challenges.

In fact, Mozambique was a participant in global efforts to increase the sequestration of atmospheric carbon within the context of the Kyoto Protocol (as explained above). The role that forests can play in mitigating climate change first became part of the global policy dialogue in the late 1990s with the Kyoto Protocol, which recognized and promoted afforestation and reforestation as a way to increase the sequestration of atmospheric carbon. The market mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol uses carbon as the currency of exchange and it is assigned a market value. As the voluntary carbon market is primarily driven by supply and demand, the high carbon supply by tropical countries drove the prices down to the point that carbon projects were no longer competitive when compared with other forms of land use (see, for example, Warren-Thomas et al., 2018). In the case of Mozambique, an early example of this was the Nhambita carbon project in Gorongosa (Johnson and Ryan, 2012), which began in 2005 with a price of \$12 per tonne of carbon, but that price plummeted to \$4 per tonne of carbon in 2015, so the project was no longer viable and was forced to close (Nunan et al., 2017).

Mozambique, as a signatory to the UNFCCC, decided to join the REDD+ mechanism in its early stages as a way of reversing the current scenario of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, culminating in the approval of the national REDD+ strategy. The current policy environment in Mozambique has set the stage for REDD+ to develop, and the country has made great strides in this direction since it has already invested scientific research into estimating national carbon emission factors from forest conversion (e.g. Guedes, Siteo and Olsson, 2018; Lisboa et al., 2018; Magalhães, 2018; Mate, Johansson and Siteo, 2015; Siteo, Mandlate and Guedes, 2014). Mozambique has also identified the causes under direct and indirect action of the main deforestation and degradation agents (CEAGRE and Winrock, 2016) and estimated the emission factors by forest type (Governo de Moçambique, 2018). At the national level, according to these

studies, the causes of deforestation and forest degradation are already generally associated with their emissions contributions, where each activity is linked to a specific emission factor (Hosonuma et al., 2012).

Mozambique committed itself early as an implementing country for REDD+, and as a result, in 2012 it was one of the countries selected to receive pilot funding via the Forest Carbon Partnership Fund (FCPF) of the World Bank, based on the development and approval of a REDD+ Preparation Proposal (R-PP). Under these FCPF 'REDD+ readiness' funds, the Mozambican government received a grant of \$3.8 million in 2013 and an additional grant of \$5 million in 2016 (Governo de Moçambique, 2016; World Bank, 2018). This process supported the design of the Preparatory Package, which included as specific outcomes:

1. A national REDD+ strategy.
2. Safeguard instruments to guide the REDD+ implementation.
3. A reference emission level.
4. A monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) system (Governo de Moçambique, 2016).

The overall goal of the Mozambique national REDD+ strategy is to promote low-emission development through the implementation of multisectoral integrated land-use actions. Strategic objectives include:

1. The establishment of an inter-institutional coordination platform, where all stakeholders are represented and can voice their views.
2. The promotion of practices as alternatives to slash-and-burn agriculture that increase the productivity of subsistence and cash crops.
3. Increased access to sources of energy alternatives to biomass in urban areas, and increased production and use efficiency of biomass energy.
4. Strengthening the conservation areas system, including secure revenue generation.
5. The promotion of sustainable forest management through an improved forest concession system and community forestry.
6. The establishment of forest plantations (including protection and commercial forests) and the restoration of degraded forests (Governo de Moçambique, 2016).

Environmental and social safeguards related to REDD+ strategies have been central to the global policy dialogue, and one of the key reasons for which REDD+ cannot be simply perceived as the cheap option for achieving climate change mitigation – there are concerns in developing countries related to the potential loss of control over land, restrictions on access and use of its natural resources, uncertainty over fair benefit-sharing systems, and the threat of losing traditional ecological knowledge by local communities (Aicher, 2014; Myers et al., 2018). As part of the process of preparing the national REDD+ Landscape strategy, the government developed a safeguarding instrument, involving two

main documents: the Social and Environmental Strategic Assessment (SESA) and the Social and Environmental Management Framework (SEMF). The SEMF is defined as a guide for screening the proposed interventions of the programme to ensure that they do not adversely affect the natural and social environment (Governo de Moçambique, 2017). In addition to investments in preparation activities, there has also been investment in mitigation and adaptation projects that are complementary to the national REDD+ Landscape strategy: for example, the five-year (2016–2020) forestry investment programme (FIP), better known as MozFIP, and the Donor Mechanism Programme dedicated to initiatives that are specific to local communities (MozDGM). The World Bank perspective is to use the integrated landscape approach to link agricultural development and natural resource management, both in terms of institutional management and implementation on the ground, so as to combine investments in large geographical areas (landscape) to maximize impact. This perspective was set in line with the Government of Mozambique's priority in sustainable rural development. The total cost for the programme is estimated to be \$47.0 million for MozFIP and \$4.5 million for MozDGM (World Bank, 2018).

Setting the establishment of an inter-institutional coordination platform as the first strategic objective of the National REDD+ Landscape strategy was in recognition of the cross-sectoral nature of the proposed actions. In addition, the strategy identifies actions that already align with existing legal and policy frameworks as a way to secure support from local institutions.

Community-based natural resource management and formal recognition of customary rights to land

Several progressive laws and policies that pre-dated REDD+ offer an important framework for the landscape strategy to realize its goals of integration across sectors, stakeholder groups and scales of governance. These laws and policies can act as the enabling conditions for a successful REDD+ Landscape strategy moving forward, but we first need to cast a critical eye on the ways in which the existing laws and policies have stalled in their implementation or failed to realize their goals on the ground.

Community-based natural resource-management initiatives in Mozambique were first piloted in the 1990s, and with efforts at that time mainly focused on developing methodologies and recommending strategies for community involvement (Matakala and Mushove, 2001). Ultimately, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) emerged as a key strategy chosen by the Government of Mozambique to address the dual objectives of achieving sustainable resource management while committing to improving livelihoods for rural communities (Nhantumbo et al., 2013).

To realize the goal of this adopted strategy, the government introduced the concept of community benefit-sharing into the Forest and Wildlife Law, stipulating that a set proportion (20 per cent) of revenues generated through forest and wildlife resource exploitation or through selected tourism revenues

in protected areas should be shared with community residents considered local to those specific forest or wildlife conservation areas to benefit community livelihoods (Governo de Moçambique, 1999). Even though the passage of this legislation placed Mozambique among the more proactive countries in terms of CBNRM legislative action, the actual implementation of the mechanism of community benefit-sharing has suffered (Chidiamassamba, 2012). The legislation is ambiguous in terms of measures to ensure that funds are actually disbursed back to the communities, and it is not clear which local institutions should receive the disbursements, even though there are several projects supervising the distribution mechanisms (Mustalahti and Lund, 2010). Alongside the legislated mechanism for benefit-sharing, the forestry sector has opened up fora for communities to actively participate through direct interventions (community forestry management) and through the establishment of a community consultation process that must be followed by forestry operators before they are granted access to forest concessions (Governo de Moçambique, 2002).

The 1997 Land Law (Governo de Moçambique, 1997) and a subsequent Ministerial Decree (Governo de Moçambique, 2000) granted customary rights to the communities on their lands through a relatively simple certification system based on the delimitation of communal lands. According to Tanner (2002), the Land Law is a powerful social development tool aimed at achieving equity and sustainable development. Following this, the CBNRM strategy ensures formal access and withdrawal rights to communities for both timber and non-timber forest products, in an effort to align with traditional values and cultural systems, while laying the groundwork for communities to generate financial and non-market gains from resources on customary lands (Siteo and Guedes, 2015).

While there have been important achievements related to establishing the legal framework for communities to gain formal recognition of their customary lands and access opportunities to share in the benefits of sustainable management of natural resources, there remain several challenges and barriers to fully realizing what the law envisioned. Several studies point specifically to problems encountered during the process of community land and resource delimitation (Chidiamassamba, 2012; German et al., 2016; Macqueen and Falcão, 2017). An important and early challenge to the implementation of the Land Law has been defining a community. The legislation assumes that a community is a homogeneous entity, but communities are not static, generalizable entities. Rather, they can be highly heterogeneous and dynamic, both in terms of the movement and growth of the resident population and the community's use of land-based resources, requiring more complex approaches for real benefits to be achieved (Siteo and Guedes, 2015).

Through the recognition of customary rights and local knowledge of resource limits, communities are expected to be protected against external land encroachment and informal land or resource acquisition, i.e. land grabs (Nhantumbo, Norfolk and Pereira, 2003). On the other hand, by gaining formal recognition of landholding and demarcating the boundaries of customary lands, communities become 'visible' to the state and to potential investors who have

interests in developing the land or otherwise extracting natural resources. The current context of demarcation of communal lands in Mozambique suggests that communities are unprepared for this situation of immediate engagement with investor and government interests, which often trigger situations of increased conflict, tenure insecurity and ultimately a loss of access and other formerly secure land rights. Conflicts and uncertainties can be aggravated by slow, costly and sporadic processes (Aquino and Fonseca, 2016).

Thus, despite legislative achievements and policy innovation, forest and natural resource management by communities is still a new frontier for implementation in Mozambique, and communities themselves are still limited in their ability to benefit from sustainable forest management (Siteo and Guedes, 2015). Indeed, sustainable forest management requires not only legal rights and strong community institutions but also technical expertise, financial capacity and business management as important prerequisites.

For local communities to be able to protect forests, a number of conditions have to be satisfied, including: the effective devolution of decision-making on land and land resource access, empowering communities in various aspects of forest management, and the availability of alternative sources of income generation other than the harvesting or conversion of forests (Siteo and Guedes, 2015). An important and immediate step is seemingly a simple one: fully informing local communities of their land and resource rights and how to derive benefits from existing policies and laws. This allows them to clearly detect the differences between national policy and local governance, and to leverage opportunities that might exist for them to benefit from sustainable forest management and ecosystem conservation.

A study by Muianga and Norfolk (2017) states that among the various NGOs at the provincial level, very few work with local communities to disseminate laws and rights with regard to forest resources, and even these do not continuously monitor the financial management arising from their resources. However, Siteo et al. (2007) reported that financial management, community governance and NGO monitoring are the main challenges that have led to the success or failure of CBNRM initiatives. Siteo and Guedes (2015) suggest that local communities still face challenges to obtaining their full benefits for reasons that include conflicting perceptions and interpretations among community members, government officials and private investors on customary and statutory regulations that result in complex and restrictive forest policies for community participation.

A fundamental problem for the successful implementation of CBNRM around the Global South has been the lack of funds to promote programme implementation (Robinson et al., 2013). The implementation of CBNRM is technically difficult and expensive, which is why most initiatives are still supported by community partners, which may include government agencies, NGOs and funding and development agencies in general (Siteo and Guedes, 2015). While the legislated benefit-sharing mechanism could represent a reliable source of funding for the implementation of CBNRM activities within communities, the work of ensuring the distribution of the benefits owed to communities has been far from effective or successful. Chidiamassamba (2012), assessing the effectiveness of implementing

the community benefit-sharing mechanism in the Forest and Wildlife Law in Mozambique, identified several barriers in the process of returning benefit shares to communities. The study has also shown that even communities receiving the legislated amounts did not opt for community-related investments that would lead to the establishment of sustainable and long-lasting businesses.

Licensing for logging and charcoal

Forest resources are recognized as important, not only to the local economy but also to the national economy. In 2011, the forest sector contributed an estimated \$330 million (2.5 per cent) to Mozambique's GDP. Based on this recognition, the Forest and Wildlife Law establishes the exploitation regimes for forest products under a simple concession and licence regime as a way of valuing resources and collecting revenues for the state. Single licence exploitation was established with the aim of allowing logging operations for a limited amount and time, while logging concessions involve several responsibilities related to sustainable forest management and local development objectives (Siteo, Bila and Macqueen, 2003).

There are numerous benefits that have motivated countries in the Global South to adopt a regime of forest management through private or public long-term concessions as a form of sustainable forest management. Forest concessions can promise economic, social and environmental benefits (FAO, 2018; Siteo, Bila and Macqueen, 2003). Nevertheless, experiences from around the world show that such a triple-win set of outcomes is often elusive (Arts et al., 2017). Challenges related to the efficient taxation system (Karsenty, 2010), illegal logging (Egas et al., 2013, 2018; Environmental Investigation Agency, 2013; Macqueen and Falcão, 2017), the low revenue-collection capacity, and the weakness of institutions combine to considerably limit the sector's contribution to the reduction of rural poverty. The study by Falcão, Bila and Remane (2013) indicated that between 2003 and 2013, the country lost about \$540 million due to illegal logging, and Global Timber (2016) reports that in 2014, China imported about 700,000 cubic metres of wood from Mozambique, which was worth about \$350 million, confirming the severity of the illegal logging. In the same year, Mozambique's official forest statistics (DNTE, 2015) indicate that they exported only 75,000 cubic metres of wood to China (valued at about \$50 million). This represents huge losses of revenue to the state and communities, which could be invested in strengthening institutions and contribute to sustainable rural development. The volume indicated as being imported by China is not only higher than the recommended annual allowable cut (Marzoli, 2007) but there is also an indication (Egas et al., 2013) that the country has already exceeded the limit of forest exploitation sustainability.

Logging practice is classified as a cause of forest degradation due to unsustainable practices used to selectively log large trees of species of commercial value, in quantities above the forest capacity to recover (Siteo et al., 2003). Meanwhile, logging has been attributed to the destruction of forests, due both to

overexploitation associated with illegal logging and the government's inability to enforce existing rules on forest harvests. In addition to these larger-scale drivers, there are activities, such as charcoal production and farming, that also contribute greatly to forest loss and degradation across the country (CEAGRE and Winrock, 2016).

While the Mozambican legal and institutional framework has been set to support sustainable forest management, the practice does not seem to be well aligned with sustainability goals. The practice is that when a site's forest resources are depleted, operators migrate to other locations with plenty of resources. The phenomenon is more commonly reported in the case of charcoal production. For example, for supplying the cities of Maputo and Matola, the districts of Boane and Matutuine were depleted in the 1990s and charcoal is now brought in from Mabalane and Chicualacuala (Woollen et al., 2016; Zorrilla-Miras et al., 2018). A similar phenomenon was found in Tete, where charcoal production occurred typically in the Changara District until 2012, but with the demographic explosion associated with mining companies, charcoal production moved to the Moatize District (Sedano et al., 2016). As long as access to forest resources is open and free, and local communities' rights do not exclude members of other communities, professional charcoal producers will invade areas to produce charcoal to supply cities. Producing charcoal from sustainable sources has proven to be difficult, although the energy and forestry sectors actively seek to promote biomass production for energy from sustainable sources, including natural woodlands and forest plantations.

Planting trees to increase carbon stocks

Pressures on natural forests and woodlands to obtain provisioning services, i.e. material benefits, have reached unsustainable levels in multiple tropical countries (Paquette and Messier, 2010), and the global demand for timber forest products (pulp and paper) continues at unprecedented rates - expected to grow from 360 million tonnes in 2004 to 494 million tonnes in the year 2020. For this reason, Mozambique, like other countries, has promoted reforestation as a high priority to reduce pressure on valuable species in natural forests, while also meeting the growing demand for timber products. By 2015, Mozambique had just under 64,000 hectares of planted forest, most notably in the provinces of Niassa, Manica, Zambezia and Nampula. The National Reforestation Strategy estimates that the country has about 7 million hectares of potential land available for forest plantations and has set the goal of planting 1 million hectares by 2030 for commercial and industrial purposes. This would create about 250,000 jobs created and provide an annual revenue of at least \$1.5 billion (MINAG, 2006).

However, forest plantations often have a poor reputation as predominantly large-scale industrial operations focused on single-species cultivation (monocultures). They have been called 'biological deserts' and it is even argued that 'plantations are not forests' (Stephens and Wagner, 2007). Though this reputation is at times

deserved, it is just as often misinformed (Paquette and Messier, 2010), and the impact of forest plantations on biodiversity will depend on the land use they replace (Pawson et al., 2013). Van Holt et al. (2016) suggest that to be sure that we fully understand the role of plantations in the ecosystem, across landscapes, and for society, we must treat them as a distinct form of land use, independent from natural growth forests.

Tree species can also be planted in association with agricultural crops, resulting in agroforestry systems. According to van Noordwijk et al. (2003), trees planted in agroforestry systems are excluded in formal and statistical definitions of forest plantations and neglected in the legal and institutional framework for sustainable forest management. Besides conserving biodiversity (Bhagwat et al., 2008), agroforestry systems also have the potential to sequester atmospheric carbon, and for this reason they have been widely promoted as an alternative to REDD+ in the agriculture sector (Lasco et al., 2013; Mbow et al., 2014) as they promote integrated management systems linking livelihoods and ecosystem services to agricultural production (Carsan et al., 2014). Agroforestry systems have the potential to alleviate rural poverty and reduce food insecurity (Lasco et al., 2013); however, their adoption is still very low in Mozambique, associated with the ineffectiveness of the methods for disseminating agroforestry system technology within communities (Linyunga, Matakala and Chintu, 2004).

The establishment of forest plantations in Mozambique is considered to be one of the main development strategies in the forestry sector (MINAG, 2006) and one of the REDD+ strategic objectives to increase forest carbon stocks and reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (Governo de Moçambique, 2016). A World Bank assessment of needs for improving the business environment in the forest plantation subsector suggests reducing bottlenecks in implementation and points out the lack of attention to important social and cultural issues that will remain as barriers unless addressed in an equitable way (World Bank, 2016). In the current context, the exchange of community lands for forest investments does not seem to provide equitable, viable and sustainable alternatives for the affected communities (Bruna, 2017). Bruna also concludes that the state is divorcing itself from the role of caring for communities and managing the territory, instead assuming a role of managing or brokering the exchange and leaving most of the decision-making to the private-sector interests and local communities. This situation presents a greater risk of co-opting power and process, and has resulted in more direct confrontation between companies and communities. Some studies on forest plantations in Mozambique and other African countries have shown that plantations can succeed at generating revenue for the investor and sequester atmospheric carbon, but they leave aside the reality of the communities where the same plantations are established, causing barriers to accessing natural resources for subsistence use in some cases (Bleyer et al., 2016; Lyons and Westoby, 2014; Richards and Lyons, 2016). For example, Siteo and Lisboa (2017) refer to these challenges in a case study of forest investments in the districts of Ile and Namarrói, where they find a small percentage (about 10 per cent) of people are dissatisfied and feel disadvantaged by forest investments.

Even when forest plantation investments have not yet implemented programmes to assist with community development, there can be dissatisfaction among community members due to unmet expectations. Even though certain forest plantation investments have included local community-development programmes in their projects, the implementation time is slow in generating perceptible impacts compared to the expectations of the local people for jobs and improved access to subsistence resources, among other things (Sitoe and Lisboa, 2017). The same study found that forest plantations prevent local communities from meeting their subsistence needs, while the forest plantations do not provide them with an equivalent income or alternative food-production systems to cover the land loss. This lack of alignment between community expectations and the actual realization of these promises is presented by some through a critical lens to suggest them as examples of land grabbing (Matavel, Dolores and Cabanelas, 2011), or a violation of human rights for primarily marginalized populations (Seufert, 2012). Critics of forest plantations in general point out that more enforcement of project criteria and stricter safeguards are needed to avoid creating negative impacts on local communities.

A possible solution to achieving investment in forest plantations is the establishment of more equitable and intentional investor–community partnerships. The concept itself seems attractive and could address the problems associated with the existing misalignment of benefits and expectations for forest investment in local communities. However, preliminary field assessments found incompatibilities between private investment and poverty reduction (German et al., 2016). These observations suggest an urgency in generating alternative forest plantation models that promote the integration of forest-production systems with food-production systems, while allowing rights of access, subsistence withdrawal and management of natural resources for local communities.

REDD+ landscape: A territorial space to reduce deforestation

Mozambique recognizes the need for land-use planning. The development of agro-ecological zoning (MINAG, 2014) and a potential reforestation map, which was used to support the design of the National Reforestation Strategy (MINAG, 2006) and to attract investors to the forest plantation sector (at national level), to support the national territorial development plan (Governo de Moçambique, 2018) and the preparation of the district land-use plan (De Wit, 2010) clearly reveal the understanding that it is important to plan land use and not let things happen randomly and unexpectedly. As long as decentralization remains a slow process and local power does not have the strength to decide on the use of natural resources (Weimar and Carrilho, 2017), then it will be difficult to reconcile different land-use forms. Today, we can assume that we do not yet have the knowledge of land-use potential, so we cannot make binding decisions in the long term; in the meantime, the forest is being overthrown. While the 2020 government architecture promoted some level of decentralization by allowing

the election of governors and provincial parliaments, these do not yet have powers to decide on local laws and regulations on natural resources (Governo de Moçambique, 2020).

The REDD+ strategy for Mozambique (Governo de Moçambique, 2016) is an example of a tool whose general strategic objective is to promote integrated multisectoral interventions for the reduction of carbon emissions. These are related to land-use change through adherence to the principles of sustainable management of forest ecosystems (natural and planted) contributing to global efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change and integrated and sustainable rural development. Although the UNFCCC does not formally define 'landscape', the concept had evolved from the Global Landscape Forum (GLF), a 'knowledge-led platform on integrated land use, dedicated to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and Paris Climate Agreement' (Global Landscapes Forum, 2019). The forum has been gaining momentum and shaping the views and concepts of an integrated land-use approach.

The 'landscape approach to REDD+', also called the 'integrated REDD+ approach' (Bastos Lima et al., 2017), goes beyond the limits of the forestry sector and draws attention to the need for more serious and committed territorial planning. For example, forest conservation requires a clear definition not only of what a forest is but also of what the country intends as a permanent forest heritage. As long as there is no such definition and other forms of land use take precedence over forest use, there is no doubt that forests will be replaced by other land uses. In part, changes in use are based on the principle that other land uses, such as agriculture, are more profitable than forest use. The landscape approach to REDD+, therefore, brings the idea of territorial management as a unit with a multitude of uses, such as conservation, agriculture and rural development, as suggested by the World Bank for the Zambezia Integrated Landscape Programme (World Bank, 2016), as presented above. The landscape approach shifts from the sectoral to a multisectoral approach, bringing together the different stakeholders with interests in land use to plan together, seeking to maximize multiple benefits.

However, further challenges are emerging, and since landscape is not a management unit, its materialization may be more complex than in theory, thus suggesting that the landscape (a biophysical unit) needs a territory (an administrative or management unit) in which it can be laid down (McCall, 2016). Moreover, in recognizing that one of the main causes of deforestation is the expansion of the areas of shifting agriculture, it is acknowledged that agriculture must develop towards being climate-smart agriculture. The recognition of this measure is increasing (Scherr, Shames and Friedman, 2012) and the challenges associated with promoting landscapes, where agriculture and forests are climate friendly, include strengthening technical, institutional and policy capacities to provide the necessary support for multi-partner planning, good governance, spatial integrity of investments, and multi-objective monitoring of impacts (Scherr et al., 2012). Observations made in Latin America (Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador) from REDD+ Landscape experiences have shown that although space has been created to integrate forest conservation with sustainable agriculture, maintaining

it is a challenge since it has to compete with business-as-usual investments, where no cross-sector integration is considered (Bastos Lima et al., 2017).

Mozambique has been developing integrated development approaches from different perspectives. The focus of the policy framework is to establish territorial planning that promotes interactions and cooperation among sectoral stakeholders instead of competition for land and land resources. Below, we analyse (1) the National Development Strategy, (2) the National Sustainable Development Programme and (3) the development corridors from the perspective of promoting the reduction of deforestation and forest degradation.

In 2014 the Government of Mozambique published the National Development Strategy for the period 2015–2035 (Governo de Moçambique, 2014). The strategic orientation is based on the vision and mission that Mozambique should be a prosperous, competitive, sustainable, secure and inclusive country, where economic and social development must be based on integrated policies geared towards wealth generation. The document also suggests that raising the living conditions of the population should be done through the structural transformation of the economy based on the industrialization of agriculture and incorporation of the rural population into the market economy.

The Ministry of Land and Rural Development (MITADER) defined a National Sustainable Development Programme (Governo de Moçambique, 2015) consisting of projects and objectives with concrete and determinant goals to ensure the economic, social, environmental, structural and institutional transformations aspired to in the Five-Year Programme (2020–2024) and the Social and Economic Plan. The National Sustainable Development Programme is an integrated rural development programme that aims to promote the sustainable use of natural resources, land organization and environmental management. The programme is complemented by several projects at different stages of implementation. These projects seek to integrate different local development components, such as agriculture, forestry, financial institutions and credit schemes, energy generation, biodiversity conservation, water-resources management, rural markets, land tenure and climate-change adaptation.

Development corridors, also known in other African countries as Spatial Development Initiatives, are another concept of integrated development that has been adopted in Mozambique (Governo de Moçambique, 2014). The ‘corridors’ designation is based on the association of the development space along the roads and railways that link the landlocked countries to the Indian Ocean in Mozambique (Fonseca, 2003). The idea is to use the facilities provided by the transport infrastructure to promote development of the communities alongside it. The integrated activities may include forestry, agriculture, tourism, fisheries and mining to achieve social, economic and environmental goals. However, as Fonseca (2003) discusses, the transport system established for the interests of the landlocked countries will depend on the capacity to establish alternative spatial arrangements of the population and activities along the corridor, suggesting adequate land-use planning.

All the policies evaluated, while not explicitly referring to reducing deforestation and forest degradation, are explicit in terms of integrated territorial development. They also have an emphasis on promoting development in multiple sectors, which will contribute in the medium-to-long term to increasing agricultural productivity, facilitating access to alternative sources of energy, biodiversity conservation, tourism development, sustainable use of natural resources, and quality of life (education and health), contributing to the increase of the GDP and the Human Development Index (HDI). Kauppi, Sandström and Lipponen (2018) evaluated the relationship between GDP and HDI with the forest growing stock change, a proxy for deforestation, using data from all the countries, and found a positive correlation. This suggested that nations with low HDI and GDP have a negative forest growing stock (reduction of forest cover), while nations with high HDI and GDP have a positive forest growing stock, indicating an increase in forest cover. Increasing the development indicators through the REDD+ Landscape approach requires an equilibrium in political (administrative units), economic (commodity production) and ecological (ecosystems) dimensions (Weatherley-Singh and Gupta, 2017), which are, in part, the components of sustainable development.

Conclusion

There are advantages, disadvantages, challenges and opportunities in implementing the REDD+ mechanism using the landscape approach. The key advantage is that in Mozambique, REDD+ strategy aligns with other strategies using landscapes or territorial approaches, development corridors and other integrated development approaches proposed by national policies. The integrated approaches have been discussed in Mozambique for a while, and have provided a good platform to bring stakeholders from different sectors and levels of decision-making into conversation with one another. Another important advantage is that the opportunity to use REDD+ financing to revamp governance processes – the landscape approach also encourages working across and within government sectors to align goals and work on the ground – forces government away from the classical sectoral silos way of thinking. The REDD+ Landscape approach also recognizes the interactions and interdependencies between land-use activities and their impacts (direct and indirect) on forests.

One major disadvantage of the landscape approach is that, while the original thinking of REDD+ is from the forestry sector, dealing with territorial issues and other sectors may not only be challenging but also costly (time, people power and money). One wonders if in doing the hard work of integrating across sectors, the time/opportunity to truly reach community integration is lost. The process remains at the top in terms of scales of influence, rather than building up from the bottom. Meanwhile, on the ground, the forests are losing space while high-level complex decision-making processes take place.

Governing a landscape, or rather governing a territory across different land-use forms, is challenging for a structure that still thinks and plans within sectors, that is, within the forest sector, within the energy sector and so on. So far it seems that the agenda of maintaining more forested landscapes continues within the forest sector, and perhaps within the environmental sector. Ongoing private investments are not yet in line with climate-smart and cross-sector landscapes.

Mozambique has progressive and visionary laws in place that could facilitate integrated landscape management. It is in the implementation and realization of those laws that we see a long road ahead. Deep transformations are needed for the investments that are being made through the REDD+ funds to be able to bring about the expected changes. Achieving the transformation of degraded forest landscapes and areas of shifting agriculture into climate-smart landscapes requires careful territorial management along with institutional and policy support that are able to match the challenges of reducing GHG emissions by reducing deforestation and local poverty. Current issues related to access to and possession of land, enhancement of ecosystem services, food production in sufficient quantity and quality to ensure food security for a rapidly growing population, and production of forest products as an alternative to the natural forest, among other things, are essential to ultimately achieving the integrated vision of REDD+ and the transformation of Mozambique's rural landscape. This chapter shows that attaining the goal of reducing deforestation will not succeed if the focus remains on the forests while people's priorities, such as food, energy, health and education, are not fulfilled. While believing that an integrated landscape approach is a way forward, we also recognize the challenges in making it a reality. Therefore, we urge policymakers to look at the big picture: integrated development as the main goal of REDD+ (finding ways to reduce poverty and increase the quality of life) and alternative sources of the income part of the global ecological goal to reduce deforestation, reduce emissions from land-use change and increase carbon storage through forestry.

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Part II

EXTRACTIVE ACTIVITIES, RURAL LIVELIHOODS AND LOCAL ECONOMIES

Chapter 4

MINING ECONOMY AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN RURAL TETE

Inácio Dias de Andrade

Introduction

‘Nowadays, this is all they care about. Coal, coal, coal ...’

That was Dórica’s complaint after a meeting with representatives of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) at the headquarters of the União Provincial de Camponeses de Tete (UPCT; the Provincial Union of Tete’s Peasants) in the Bamba neighbourhood of Tete City.

This was May 2013, and I was on my second trip to Mozambique. I had got to know Dórica the previous year, when I had stayed with her for a week. At the time, she was the UPCT’s president and responsible for linking international development organizations and local peasants’ associations whose members had joined the UPCT. So I decided to rent a room in her house in 2013, to spend six months in Tete as part of the fieldwork for my thesis.¹

I arrived in the province seeking to understand how Mozambicans perceived the new era of development apparently initiated by multinational mining companies from 2007. So I decided to spend the next few months with Dórica and the UPCT staff visiting rural villages that were involved in food security programmes financed by international organizations and implemented by UPCT staff.

However, to my surprise, during the entire time that I worked with the UPCT, only one food security programme was active. Based on the idea of supporting vegetable cultivation with modern planting techniques, this type of project distributed inputs, seeds and equipment to different farmers’ associations with the help of locally trained professionals who oversaw the process. These initiatives were highly appreciated in the villages and helped the UPCT build its reputation and legitimacy in Tete’s rural areas over the years.

When I met Dórica she was complaining about the ending of the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) long-term project, which had been operational since 2004. According to UPCT’s staff, the NPA had stopped financing food security initiatives in rural areas. In fact, the NPA’s strategy in Mozambique had gradually shifted: initially based on service provision, the organization’s aim changed to partnerships with selected local organizations. This shift did not aim to end or wind down

food security programmes in Tete. On the contrary, it was in line with the NPA's international strategy, which sought to strengthen local civil societies through the development of partner organizations. The outsourcing of some stages of development initiatives aimed to strengthen the local networks of Mozambican non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and partners by transferring the skills and know-how necessary for starting up food security projects. Ideally, the programme would contribute to the sustainability and improvement of partners' grass-roots groups. From this perspective, at the end of the new project, local organizations would be able to develop their own projects and to obtain funds from other donors, relieving the NPA of several obligations and allowing it to concentrate its efforts in different locations.² This capacity building or institutional strengthening of partner organizations was part of a major transformation in the international aid system. In fact, by the time I was in Tete, the UPCT had two current institutional improvement projects.

However, besides making the fieldwork tedious (the staff and I had to endure long hours inside UPCT facilities), this methodological shift did not work as planned and, in the end, its most obvious outcome was to reduce staff trips to the villages, severing institutional links and political relationships that had been carefully built over the years.

In 2013, only Belgium's Fonds voor OntwikkelingsSamenwerking (FOS; the Development Cooperation Fund) was financing food security programmes in the villages. Thus, in an attempt to understand the difference between the two types of projects and the type of development they proposed with their partners, I joined field trips to villages served by the FOS programme, especially Chitima, Dégue and the Nhartanda Valley, a peripheral area of Tete City.

At this time, I had informal conversations with UPCT staff and the project's beneficiaries. I also talked with a number of staff from other NGOs who supervised projects that overlapped areas served by the UPCT. I also took part in the project's daily activities, such as weeding the fields, planting plots or producing fertilizer, aiming to avoid the structured interviews that people in Tete's rural areas responded to with standard answers.

People in Tete are used to engaging with all sorts of development workers. They know how to respond to their questions and know exactly what they can expect from them. Today, in Mozambique – and especially Tete – 'development' and 'democracy' are the keywords used to define the present time. Since the end of the Mozambican Civil War (1976/7-1992) and the beginning of the democratization process in 1992, several NGOs have been funding development and democratic projects across the country. Additionally, in recent years, there has been greater optimism amongst the millions of Mozambicans living in poverty. In 2007, the arrival of the Brazilian giant mining company Vale brought billions of dollars to Tete. The Mozambican government granted Vale permission to mine one of the largest – and virtually untouched – coal deposits in the world.

In this sense, since the late 2000s, Tete has experienced a development surge boosted by mineral companies' dollars. Consequently, until the Covid-19 pandemic,³ Tete City, the provincial capital, became Mozambique's newest

economic centre, attracting highly paid foreign engineers, specialized national workers (mostly from the Mozambican capital Maputo) and a huge number of unemployed workers. All this turned Tete into a new migration destination. However, if public opinion, the media and the government celebrated the dawn of a new era of development in Mozambique, for the people directly affected by the foreign investment, the reality was much more complex.⁴

In 2103, shortly before the aforementioned meeting between UPCT and USAID, Vale had announced its new ten-year plan for the region, which included a \$10 billion investment (projected to last until 2022). The new investment strategy was just a bigger version of Vale's *modus operandi*. In addition, the whole operation was associated with different corruption scandals involving the company's management and government agents.⁵ Not surprisingly, its implementation started a social upheaval in Tete Province. In 2009, Vale evicted 2,000 families and transferred them to another location.⁶ In 2012, those evicted paralysed the company's production, demanding better housing, job opportunities, full payment of compensation for losses, and making other claims. After a brief negotiation with the government, the police violently suppressed the protest.⁷ Today, the tension between the company and the local population remains.

However, Tete did experience unprecedented economic growth.⁸ Tete's streets are filled with cars, *chapas* (shared taxis) and bicycles, people sell all sorts of goods on the pavements, and people from different regions and countries walk around in the busy city. Additionally, the controversial situation involving Vale and other smaller mining companies that were also prospecting in the region had caught the attention of international NGOs and cooperation agencies; these flooded Tete Province with new development projects. So, even though the UPCT was directly involved in highlighting and helping different populations whose rights and lives were affected by the coal exploration, its staff and members became very enthusiastic about the possibilities of new initiatives and opportunities for development work.

Thus, when I heard Dórica's complaint after the meeting with USAID, I thought that the American staff had decided to withdraw their proposal and deliver the project with a different organization. However, to my surprise, Dórica's complaint came in spite of the fact that USAID had decided to finance property law workshops and development projects for communities affected by the coal-mining companies.

I was even more astonished when I remembered that days before the meeting Dórica had warned me about the importance of the agreement. According to her, if the UPCT were not able to strike a deal with the Americans, the organization would probably cease its activities. Even though the UPCT's previous administrations had managed to build its headquarters with financial help from Swedish international aid and reorganized its budget by saving the old building's rent money, new projects were crucial to the current financing. However, since the 2008 economic crisis, the number of projects had diminished, and during my fieldwork peasants who lived in remote rural areas constantly visited the UPCT's headquarters in Tete City seeking new projects, seeds and machinery for their associations. Dórica had good reason to be worried. In 2012, following the NPA's

directives for the institutional strengthening of its partners' organization, the UPCT voted for a five-year plan in the presence of all its associated members, promising new projects, money and equipment for them. Hence, to consolidate her political group in the leadership of the UPCT and keep the UPCT financially viable, Dórica would have to create new partnerships. However, the absence of international projects put her in a complicated situation: she would soon be held to account by her voters, and there was not much to show.

I was intrigued by this. Shouldn't the agreement with the Americans be a good thing? During most of the time that I spent accompanying the UPCT's work, I constantly heard about the UPCT's project shortage. Therefore, why was Dórica upset by the situation? Something was changing in Tete's political landscape. Although the mining economy had brought a new influx of money, projects and international agencies to Tete Province, for some reason, the UPCT was not able to transform this overwhelming international structure into political capital in the rural areas. In this chapter, I argue that the mining economy changed the organization of political activism in Tete. The transformations in the international cooperation system and the restructuring of Tete's role in the national economy were dismantling local forms of political engagement and depriving the UPCT of its role as mediator in Mozambican civil society.

UPCT's history: The rise of Westernized civil society in socialist Mozambique

The UPCT was officially founded in 2003; however, the relationship of its staff with international aid organizations is much older. The history of the UPCT started in the 1980s during the Mozambican Civil War when United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) arrived in a Tete City surrounded by troops belonging to the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (Renamo; the Mozambican National Resistance). The city was full of refugees who had fled from the war-torn rural areas. Aiming to provide emergency relief to refugees in the Mozambican urban areas, UNICEF started working on the green zone projects. The plan, created by Samora Machel to mitigate the hunger crisis in Mozambican regional capitals, was intended to support agricultural production in plots close to the cities and thus alleviate the food shortages in the overcrowded urban areas.

This programme was not the first public policy for rural production from the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Frelimo; the Liberation Front of Mozambique). After independence in 1975, the main project of Samora Machel's government for Mozambican rural areas was based on the restructuring of traditional agriculture and the collectivization of rural production. This programme, known as communal villages, had two cornerstones: the resettlement of populations and the transformation of rural production relations (Borges Coelho, 1993). The agrarian policy of Samora Machel's government was aimed at the modernization of Mozambican peasantry, which had been kept in poverty

during the colonial regime and had endured ten years of the liberation war against the Portuguese.

Thus, the Mozambican government started to implement a big socialist project for rural modernization. According to Frelimo, the Mozambican peasantry should be reorganized around the so-called communal villages. Specifically, the Comissão Nacional de Aldeias Comunais (CNAC; the National Commission for Communal Villages) grouped millions of farmers throughout Mozambique into modern villages, from having been isolated in small settlements. In this new type of spatial organization, the villagers would elect peers to general assemblies and people's tribunals. They would work the land collectively and organize production cooperatives. This model was to replace traditional ways of life and transform Mozambique into a developed, classless country. This entire structure would be coordinated in a top-down way by Frelimo's politicians (Thomaz, 2008; West, 2005).

However, the combined attempts to change traditional production systems, to discredit local beliefs, to concentrate dispersed populations and to reorganize traditional political structure resulted in a series of local conflicts that eventually undermined the revolutionary party-state authority and legitimized post-independence guerrilla warfare (Geffray, 1990; West, 2005).⁹

The communal villages programme was especially successful in the northern provinces. In Tete, in the early years of the plan, only one village had been established by the end of 1977, while another three were considered to be in an 'embryonic stage' (Borges Coelho, 1998).¹⁰ Although the number of communal villages did increase, in Tete, the main objective – to reallocate the entire province's peasantry in the new villages – was frustrated by the weak presence of the Mozambican state in the region and prevented by Renamo's raids. In 1977, Renamo troops, initially supported by southern Rhodesia, entered Mozambique across the border of today's Zimbabwe. Driven by popular support from farmers who were not happy with Frelimo's rural policies, Renamo's soldiers were able to increase the level of dissatisfaction. In Tete, the first signs of military activity came early in 1982, and its development strongly affected government plans for the region (Borges Coelho, 1998). From then on, with the rural areas taken by guerrillas, many people fled to urban Tete and Moatize, while many others moved to Malawian refugee camps.

Renamo's first military operations in Tete were, on the one hand, to focus on communal villages and cooperatives as targets, and on the other to destroy infrastructure and steal goods. Almost 70 per cent of Renamo's targets were communal villages, while the rest were cooperatives. According to Borges Coelho, the communal villages were especially vulnerable to attacks because they became 'marks of state presence' in rural Tete. Moreover, the villages became favoured sites for plundering and recruiting for the guerrilla forces (Borges Coelho, 1993).

The outbreak of the Mozambican Civil War in Tete ended the plans for restructuring rural production. However, in the late 1970s, the fragile infrastructure of the socialist state, the low rates of production of collective work, and general discontent provoked by Frelimo's rural policies had already induced the collapse of state development strategies and interventions. At that time, it was becoming very

clear that the total restructuring of rural production relationships was a massive enterprise. Nevertheless, Mozambique was not alone: from the 1960s, Frelimo's determination to tackle racism, two militarily powerful neighbours and the social inequalities produced by colonialism and capitalism generated much admiration and offers of support. Fostered by Samora Machel's inspired speech, Frelimo's struggle came to the world's attention, attracting the interest of Nordic countries, which had a record of giving material and political support to anti-colonial and anti-racist movements in southern Africa. After independence and the end of the Civil War, this support became organized within the framework of a government-to-government aid programme, and the Mozambique Nordic Agricultural Programme (MONAP) was created (SIDA, 1991). The idea of MONAP was developed between the Government of Mozambique and the Nordic aid agencies in 1975 and 1976.

MONAP Phase I (MONAP I) formally came on stream as a three-year programme at the beginning of 1977, and it was followed by MONAP II (1981-1984) and MONAP III (1985-1990). In practice, MONAP represented an expansion of the emergency financial assistance that the Nordic donors had previously provided for Mozambique's purchases and imports. From this perspective, the programme was a succession of particular projects aimed at developing Mozambican agriculture with Nordic financial and technical assistance. Nonetheless, the content of the programme was redefined after each phase, according to donors' interests and the conditions on the ground, which changed as the war advanced through Mozambique (SIDA, 1991).¹¹

The agrarian transition to socialism proposed by Frelimo was structured around two central components: the development of the family sector through villagization and cooperative agriculture, and the development of state farms. Nordic aid, in turn, identified important links between the two sectors: the cooperative agriculture was to be a source of seasonal labour for the state farms, and the state farms were to provide agricultural machinery and extension services to the cooperative sector. After Frelimo's Third Congress this policy was intensified: the state farms were to be development hubs, assisting in the establishment of modern agricultural production systems in the cooperative sector. Thus, MONAP I directed substantial investments into the acquisition of machinery for state farmers and communal villages. However, in practice, the cooperative sector never developed. The directives from the Third Congress emphasized the use of people's own resources to develop cooperatives. Accordingly, contrary to the two-sector strategy of socialist agrarian transition approved by MONAP, the cooperative sector received only 2 per cent of public investment in agriculture in the first years of independence (Mackintosh and Wuyts, 1988). By contrast, state farms received the other 98 per cent of the total amount invested. Excluding the tiny proportion organized into cooperatives, the family sector received nothing directly (Adam, 1996; SIDA, 1991).¹²

In 1980, at the end of MONAP I, after a technical evaluation of the programme, the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA) identified that the lack of trained personnel to operate the new equipment reduced the average operating life of a tractor to one year. The external auditors who evaluated the results of MONAP I were surprised by the amount of abandoned equipment throughout

the country (Ofstad and Brochmann, 1990). Therefore, for the implementation of MONAP II (1980-1984), the Nordic countries decided that a change of priorities was necessary. For them, Mozambique's lack of technical staff, the donors' unfamiliarity with local agriculture, and the characterization of the first phase of the programme as a simple transfer of money and equipment led MONAP I to uncritically embrace Machel's methodology, i.e. the implementation of the communal villages (SIDA, 1991).

For MONAP's staff, Mozambican rural production could be divided into four areas: the state sector, the cooperative sector, the family sector and the private sector (SIDA, 1991, p. 61). According to them, MONAP I focused excessively on the state sector. For the donors, the second phase of the programme was to correct such faults, creating a new methodology that favoured families' crops and cooperative farming. Thus, the CO-1 and CO-2 projects were created to develop cooperatives and create technical centres for rural support. Under pressure from donor countries and constrained by the impacts of the war, Frelimo's agrarian policies changed drastically.¹³

Unable to resettle peasants and under pressure from donors' interests, the Machel government decided to give priority to a more focused cooperative programme. In this sense, although the cooperative system and the implementation of communal villages were initiated by the Machel's government, the project only gained momentum after the Gabinete de Organização e Desenvolvimento das Cooperativas Agrárias (GODCA; the Office for the Organization and Development of Agrarian Cooperatives), with funding from the Nordic Countries Development Agency, launched two major projects in 1981. The Centro de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cooperativo (CADECO; the Cooperative Development Support Centre), better known as Project CO-1, was planned as a response to the training and technology problems of cooperatives, while the Centro Regional de Experimentação e Desenvolvimento (CRED; the Regional Centre for Experimentation and Development), Project CO-2, intended to install regional centres to disseminate and technologically improve agricultural production and reduce poverty (Bowen, 2000). In this sense, MONAP II started in 1981. By focusing on family agriculture and on the cooperative sector, the new \$62 million plan, although based on the agrarian policies of the Machel government, would change the way in which peasants organized themselves politically in Tete (SIDA, 1991).¹⁴ The new approach was an attempt to limit the flaws of previous projects, but it also had its own downsides and limitations.

Following MONAP II directives and attempting to establish a viable economic base in the villages, the government initiated development projects in Changara, a village in the eastern part of the province. In 1982, Project CO-1 was set up in Changara. Its goals, among others, were to: (1) create conditions for the development of cooperatives; (2) provide incentives for small farmers to form cooperatives; (3) promote the integration of collective farms and communal villages in the cooperative sector; and (4) support cooperatives in the formation of general unions (Adam, 1996). However, as soon as CADECO was installed in Changara its facilities were attacked by Renamo.

It was in this context that UNICEF arrived in the province. Struggling against the food shortage in Tete City and unable to cope with the increasing violence in the eastern part of the province and the Malawian border, UNICEF focused its efforts on the capital and its surrounding area. Intending to enhance production in a small space, the provincial government also encouraged farmers' cooperatives, first in Déguè, a village near the capital, and later in the Nhartanda Valley.

The Nhartanda Valley is a big geographic depression that currently separates central Tete City from its peripheral zones; it was also the last urban frontier of the area taken by Renamo's troops. It was there that the UPCT's members first met. At the time, Frelimo's questionable public policies in a war zone had meant that the cooperatives were unable to produce food for their members in a city ravaged by hunger.¹⁵ The lack of government support alongside the drought that affected the Tete region in 1983 rendered the situation uncontrollable.

In 1982, Dórica was new to Tete City. Born in Changara, she went to the capital to escape Renamo. After she had left, Renamo soldiers destroyed the promising CADECO centre in Changara, obliging international agencies to concentrate their efforts on projects near Tete City. When she arrived in Tete, Dórica had already worked in previous projects supported by Nordic countries and was one of the few people in Tete with previous experience of cooperative work. She took part in the first phases of the MONAP programme in Changara when she was a member of the Cooperativa Massacre de Wiriamu (Wiriamu Massacre Cooperative), and when the foreign aid workers finally left the rural areas, fleeing from Renamo's troops, Dórica was able to reconnect with them in Nhartanda Valley, creating a new association, Nós Vamos Vencer a Fome (We Shall Overcome Hunger).

From then on, the associations grew in Tete City. With Nordic aid and UNICEF money, the peasants obtained water pumps, supplies and animal stocks; they also took part in workshops about modern agriculture techniques and associative work.¹⁶ In 1985, after confronting the resistance of government officials who wanted to use cooperatives to increase their economic and political power (Bowen, 2000), MONAP achieved one of the programme's long-term goals, favouring and encouraging grass-roots organizations rather than state projects. By the middle of the decade, Nordic staff had started to encourage cooperative members to organize a national peasant association. To pursue this objective, MONAP staff promoted the formation of provincial peasant organizations. In Tete, four cooperative unions were founded: the General Cooperative Unions of Changara, Cahora Bassa, Tete and Moatize.

Thus, the local unions received assistance with international cooperation – in how to contact technicians, countries and donor agencies, for example – and became familiar with foreign aid methodologies. They learned how to produce reports, guidelines and minutes, and how to account for their actions to international organizations. Most of the union members became fluent in the developmental lexicon of the time, and general meetings with representatives of local peasant unions were held in Maputo.

Dórica, who had been to primary school and was therefore literate and numerate, was elected vice-president of the General Union of Cooperatives of Tete City in 1985. The new MONAP II directives for gender equality seemed to be decisive in Dórica's

election and, in the next three years, SIDA, along with NPA, HelpAge International and World Vision, coordinated training courses and national peasants' meetings in the Mozambican capital. During this period, the União Geral das Cooperativas de Maputo (UGC; General Union of Maputo Cooperatives) became the basis for the foundation of the União Nacional de Camponeses (UNAC; the National Union of Mozambican Peasants) in 1987. Headquartered in the country's capital, UNAC was to be the starting point for an institutional network of rural cooperatives in Mozambique, connecting international agencies to peasants throughout the country, coordinating provincial offices, and encouraging other peasants to create new associations under UNAC's administration. Dórica was elected secretary of the new organization and, in the process of creating new peasant unions, in 1994, the NPA and HelpAge encouraged the creation of a general peasant union in Tete. After a few years of logistical support, technical training and increased funding for rural development projects, the UPCT was officially founded in 2003.

When UNICEF arrived in Nhartanda Valley, intending to increase local production and mitigate the hunger crisis, it found that peasants' associations had already been formed. Grouped together with Nordic aid inputs, the peasants were organized differently. Each farmer cultivated their own land, using seeds, fertilizer and other equipment that belonged to the cooperative. However, following Nordic aid priorities, the new working method did not try to impose a collective production system or aggregate products for the redistribution. This strategy suited the farmers, who had perceived the communal villages' structures more as a form of surveillance and control rather than a public policy to stimulate rural production (Thomaz, 2008; West, 2005).¹⁷ Additionally, the money from international cooperation overcame one of the main defects of Machel's policies: the lack of investment.

So MONAP II not only changed the focus of aid from being state-oriented to focusing on a more cooperative and family unit approach but, by doing so, international agents also identified a partner in which they saw elements of an embryonic civil society. By standing between the Mozambican state and the incipient economic Mozambican market that slowly grew through neo-liberal reforms, the idealized homogeneous group of Mozambican farmers was forged as a legitimate collective partner for international organizations. Thus, for MONAP staff, involving all peasants in technocratic networks was essential. In this sense, foreign aid had put in motion a project that was more ambitious than Samora's: building a Westernized democratic civil society from scratch.

Changing scenarios: Building political actors and expanding institutional networks

What happened in Mozambique is not particularly different from international cooperation experiences elsewhere. The expansion of bureaucratic institutional frameworks is part of the historic *modus operandi* of development organizations all over the world.

According to Ferguson (1990), the best way to look at the developmental phenomenon is through the analogy with the Foucauldian critique of prisons. Ferguson argues that development, like other planned social interventions, forms complex networks of power and control that are never conceived of or even recognized as such. In addition, such mechanisms of control become surprisingly competent at producing new subjects for their policies. Just as prisons ensure the success of their institution with the production and reproduction of the category of 'prisoners', the aid structure sustains itself by reproducing the idea of 'underdevelopment'.

In this sense, the failed methodologies of international development agencies, which were unable to overcome poverty during the several decades of their existence, cannot be analysed by what they promised to accomplish.¹⁸ In fact, quite the opposite is true. To understand the resilience of the developmental enterprise in spite of its unfortunate results, we should investigate what it actually does and how it manages to maintain its structures while working without producing any concrete results. Thus, from this perspective, the analysis of the development agencies' interventions should highlight their real purposes: to expand state bureaucratic power and depoliticize poverty, whose causes are reduced to technical issues, and to maintain the self-referenced network that the international aid system has implemented.¹⁹

According to Vianna (2014), for international institutions, the expansion of locally based organizations provides paths along which money, projects, people and documents can flow. Moreover, according to her, the increasing branching of different developmental organizations becomes a process of producing capital goods for major foreign agencies and NGOs to sustain their practices in engaging in a highly competitive international aid market.

Thus, the creation of UNAC and the foundation of the UPCT can be analysed as part of a core functioning method shared by all developmental agencies. By providing agricultural goods, equipment, technical training and democratic workshops, the Nordic developmental agencies built an institutional framework through which their projects could flow.

When MONAP II started, changing its former state-oriented approach to a grass-roots organizations perspective, the programme predicted the increasing complexity of the development network and the subsequent changes in international methodologies. During Mozambique's transition to peace, there was an inextricable link between donor support for the peace process and patterns of aid conditionality that emphasized a stable and successful transition to multi-party democracy through the engagement of a strong and participatory civil society (Manning and Malbrough, 2012; Pfeiffer, 2004; Pitcher, 2002).

This increased funding for collective groups that were perceived as civil society organizations. From the 1990s, Mozambique rural areas were flooded with workshops on accountability, democratic participation, and the creation of associations and civil society organizations. Funding from international agencies now required properly organized democratic grass-roots organizations, and the

relevant law established on 18 July 1991 began to regulate and encourage the creation of civil society organizations. In all the projects I followed, courses on modern planting alternated with classes on the basic principles of democracy and civil society. However, in intending to counterbalance the power of the Mozambican socialist state and induce a peaceful transition to democracy by strengthening civic organizations, the donors' initiative produced a complex bureaucratic network that demands an unceasing flow of projects.

However, with the advent of the controversial mining plans, the international aid system in the region changed. The aid industry was always subject to focus shifts according to the emergence of new themes of strong international appeal (Nérin, 2011). Thus, following the controversial announcement of mining projects in the region, different NGOs and development agencies turned their attention to Tete and the impact of the mining economy.

The increasing preoccupation of the international community with the installation of mining companies, the evictions and the violation of human rights created a new set of themes for development projects. The formerly monothematic projects for the modernization of traditional agriculture and democratic participation became more diversified. Currently, there are several social questions addressed by international organization projects in Tete, such as land propriety workshops, the mapping of traditional communities' land, food security programmes for displaced people, and all sorts of environmental initiatives – including the tragicomic charcoal production workshops, designed to help peasants selling small packs of environmentally sustainable firewood alongside one of the world's largest open coal mines.²⁰

In this sense, different local organizations appeared to compete in Tete's new aid market. Encouraged by the incoming projects, newly formed Mozambican NGOs have inevitably changed the setting in which the UPCT was formed. Moreover, the 2008 international economic crisis drastically reduced the number of projects funded by international organizations in Mozambique.

Additionally, although the themes covered by international cooperation became more diverse, its target group narrowed. If the previous monothematic focus of international organizations – rural development and democratic participation – allowed any villager in Tete to participate in development projects, the variety of new topics covered by the current methodologies focuses mostly on attending to populations affected by the mining companies. Thus, in Tete's current aid market, the competition for funds is increasing at the same time as development institutions are decreasing the amount of investment and restricting their target groups.²¹

To make matters even worse, over the years, with the increasing complexity of aid organizations – described by Ferguson (1990) and promoted by recent international methodologies for capacity building – the bureaucratic procedures required by international donors have become more and more intricate. For each project, foreign staff have started to demand reports, assessment procedures and detailed courses of action, organizational charts and other documents written in

an indecipherable technical language - a code that can be easily understood by graduates of university courses on development but that is completely opaque to the older UPCT staff. Trained in the earlier stages of the international assistance in Tete, when the aid operational mode consisted in transferring funds and equipment through a much less complex network, the UPCT staff can hardly compete with the new local NGOs, who hire young professionals who have recently graduated from Mozambican universities and who have been trained in the current idiom of international development agencies.

This became clear when I was invited to the launch of the Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (SNV; the Netherlands Volunteers' Foundation) food security project in Angónia, about 300 kilometres from Tete City. To get there, I got a lift with Bernardo Machesse, a young project coordinator for the *Iniciativa para Terras Comunitárias* (ITC; the Community Land Initiative), a newly formed Mozambican organization that helps peasants to legalize their land and avoid land grabbing or forced eviction by mining companies.

Machesse, a native of Chimoio, Manica Province, rented a room next to mine. Having graduated in agronomy, he came to Tete to work at the ITC. With the advent of megaprojects and the displacement of entire villages, territorial disputes became a constant in the area, attracting large amount of money from international agencies. The ITC received funding from the UK government's Department for International Development (DFID) and USAID. Although the ITC mainly worked with people directly affected by the mining industry in Tete, Bernardo told me that they were negotiating partnerships to expand their activities to Sofala, foreseeing problems in the concession area of the Nacala Corridor.²²

Like most Tete NGO workers, Machesse was invited by the SNV to the launch of their project, which was to engage Angónia farmers to produce and sell a new variety of beans to the South African market. For this purpose, the SNV organized the peasants into producers' associations and financed one-year courses on modern agricultural techniques and democratic participation. The launch of the project was a major event, attended by the provincial governor, various local politicians and numerous workers from Tete's NGOs and social movements. The project was regarded as ground-breaking. The amount of money spent was impressive; the SNV completely restructured local production, shifting crops from tobacco to beans. According to the SNV's project coordinator, the peasants were to achieve autonomy and independence after three years of financing.

Afterwards, Machesse and I drove back to Tete, and on the way we met two UPCT coordinators standing on side of the road because of a problem with their car. After help them, we continued with our journey and Machesse commented:

'Those two are very old. Did you see the condition of their car?'

After seeing the confused look on my face, Machesse continued:

'They don't know how to write projects. They don't know how to work anymore! You can't wait for projects to fall into your lap. I wake up early every day, put on my suit, write a presentation, and go to Chimoio to fool those donors!' he said seriously.

‘Those two are too old! Did you see how tired they were just changing the tyre on their car?’ He laughed out loud. ‘How they gonna get projects? They can’t even change the tyre on that old car.’

In fact, the first time I had met Dórica she had been very excited about the possibility of me writing a project for the UPCT. Similarly, on different occasions when I had met with representatives of local NGOs, it was not uncommon for me to receive a job offer. No matter how many times I tried to explain that in my area of expertise, anthropology, the research projects were completely different from the ones they wanted and that I myself was unfamiliar with the methodologies required by the development agencies, the job offers continued. Many of the local coordinators thought that a young white man who had graduated from a foreign university could get more projects for their organizations. The Agencia de Desenvolvimento Económico Local de Tete (ADELT; Tete Local Economic Development Association) coordinator told me that his young Mozambican staff could barely write Portuguese, so how they could submit a project in English to funding agencies? ADELTE did not work with a specific subject; its coordinator, a sociologist who had graduated from a Brazilian university, bragged about his ability to write any kind of project, no matter its subject, goals or methodology. ‘The projects just happen. If anyone comes here with a project for tomorrow, I will stay awake during the night writing.’ However, according to him, he had not been so lucky recently and his office was running dangerously low on projects.

ADELTE, unlike the UPCT, does not have its own programme of work, and even if they wanted to have one, they need to keep it as open and flexible as possible. The work of most NGOs is defined by the projects they receive and the rules set out by them. To keep the money flowing, organizations must increasingly broaden their range of activities. Moreover, all energy not being used in the execution of ongoing projects is spent on competing for more funds and external resources. As one ITC technician put it, ‘[i]t’s hard work, which involves long trips to distant locations, tiresome dialogue with local communities, government workers, and technicians, and the elaboration of new projects.’

Once, during a project’s celebration event, the director of a local NGO revealed the dynamics of the business: ‘You know, Mr Inácio, Africans don’t eat when they want, but when they get something.’ I asked if it was not complicated to set up projects that communities knew little about or were not interested in. ‘What are they going to say? Communities do not say anything. They just accept, as they always have.’

Most newly formed local NGOs are well positioned in the new development market, not only because they have the necessary expertise to deal with the new international aid technical language but also because they are structured differently to the UPCT. Analogous to European social movements, the UPCT was forged as a political representative of Tete’s peasantry. Its political legitimacy is based on its ability to speak for all peasants in the province. In contrast to NGOs, which carry out projects according to international financiers’ interests and give little or no accountability to their target public, the members of the UPCT, who

pay subscriptions to participate in its internal politics, evaluate its work according to its capacity to bring 'development' to different parts of the province.²³ But what is that development?

Whose development?

Although the concept of development is constantly used by politicians, NGO workers and bureaucrats, 'development' is not a new word for the inhabitants of Tete. It is, in fact, quite the opposite. The first thing I noticed when I arrived in Tete is that 'development' is not a word restricted to macro-political analyses, media debates, academic texts or political promises. The concept of development is used throughout the province, and the most isolated peasants are used to talking about their lives in terms of the presence or absence of development. Development, as a local NGO worker once put it to me, is 'the arrival of all the good things.'

After the end of the Civil War in 1992, aid workers left the besieged capital and promoted development initiatives throughout the province, a fact that would eventually lead to the UPCT's success. Every villager in the province became eager to take part in this promised world of development and peace. However, it is not difficult to see that, despite twenty-five years of international cooperation projects, Tete continues to be one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country.²⁴ According to different foreign NGO workers with whom I talked during my fieldwork, most of the projects failed because the assisted villagers were incapable of perceiving the project objectives as their own and 'grabbing the development with their own hands.'

However, during several agricultural workshops that I attended, held by different NGOs in different localities, I was amazed to see how much farmers from distant villages and local extension workers hired or outsourced by international organizations knew about modern agriculture. Every association's members could masterfully carry out modern methods of cultivation in the small plots of 35 square metres that were had been carefully demarcated in NGO workshops. The farmers weeded the area, stored the grass removed, carefully measured the distance between the seedbeds, and counted each seed they buried in each bed. They gathered the animal manure, mixed it with the collected grass and carefully spread the fertilizer over the land - a simple, everyday task that they were perfectly accustomed to performing without too much supervision from extension workers after years of experience with the NGOs and rural development programmes that succeeded each other in the region over the years. Thus, even those farmers who were not at the time enrolled in food security projects used to try to convince any white foreigners in rural areas to bring new development programmes to their villages.

Yet, despite the skill with which farmers have mastered modern planting techniques, international donors, aiming to improve the food security of poor farmers, have year after year directed large sums of money toward teaching and improving cultivation in the rural areas of Mozambique. Behind this thinking lies

the assumption that traditional farming in rural Mozambique is exclusively low-yield subsistence crops. According to international workers, to start a virtuous circle of sustainable economic growth, the peasants need to learn how to cultivate market-oriented crops.

Contrary to what almost all NGOs believe, Tete's inhabitants have never produced food exclusively for their subsistence.²⁵ Many of Tete's peasants have large maize plantations – measuring almost 7 hectares – where they produce a surplus for local markets. The small minivans that are used for public transport are always crowded with women and children carrying large baskets of tomatoes, bananas, corn and other produce to sell in the local markets. Each day of the week, a different village holds a local farmers' market to sell their produce. Many also sell electronic products brought from Malawi, such as solar panels, mobile phones and watches. Anti-inflammatories, antibiotics, analgesics and Viagra are displayed alongside traditional medicines. The vitality of the local economy contrasts with the NGOs' descriptions of rural areas as places desolated by low-income plantations.

Nevertheless, with the rise in prices resulting from the arrival of mining companies, farmers throughout Tete's rural areas were forced to increase their area under cultivation so that they could buy clothes, supplies and other products.²⁶ If, in the past, cultivating 2 hectares was more than enough to support a family, nowadays the situation is different. One might suppose that the peasants could improve their production by joining a development association and using modern cultivation techniques. However, cultivating a 7-hectare farm is not an easy task, especially as the men's migration to Tete City and other urban areas for work constitutes one of the main sources of income, leaving crop production to women and children.

Thus, peasants completely ignored the techniques taught by the international NGOs once they were cultivating their own areas. The unfeasible amount of energy they would have to spend to reproduce these same techniques in an area of 7 or more hectares led to them hiding the fact that they were not using the techniques. Association members dedicate a few days of work to the NGO plot where they supposedly learn modern techniques, then spend the rest of the time cultivating their own plots as they always have. Some people separate off a small area of their own land to implement what they have learned. They know that Western agricultural techniques offer better results, and many use them to cultivate vegetables for their family. Furthermore, this reserved portion of land is used to display the association's progress when foreign aid workers come to evaluate the project.

However, the food security programmes do not encourage peasants to produce for the market for one simple reason: they have always produced surplus to sell locally. In addition, they already know how to use modern cultivation techniques, so the long hours spent on courses and at workshops are almost completely useless.

So, why do farmers continue to engage with these kinds of projects? Because being part of international development programmes means participating in an international network in which money, inputs, equipment and animal stocks circulate. One of the most common complaints from foreign development workers,

that farmers were much more interested in the material gains than acquiring modern planting skills and democratic understanding of associative work, was completely incomprehensible to Tete's peasants. For most of the associated farmers, being part of development projects was a way of maintaining their traditional mode of production at the same time as accessing modern planting equipment, such as water pumps. Trying to deal with rising inflation due to the mining economy without working increasingly long hours, Tete's farmers turned to international development projects for technological improvements and capital. However, most development workers insisted that to achieve real development, international agencies should not provide equipment and material inputs, but rather promote a change in the mentality of Mozambique's peasants. For rural farmers, 'grabbing development with their own hands' does not mean learning something they already know how to do and continuously choose not to do, but instead means participating in an international network of consumer goods and products that otherwise would not be available to them.²⁷

In Tete, the branching of international development frameworks cannot be credited only to the self-reproducing nature of the aid system, as Ferguson (1990) points out. In fact, for many villagers, taking part in peasant associations constituted the main strategy for increasing inputs into their production system. Even though modern techniques cannot be applied in largely rural areas, the benefits that come along with them – seeds, chemical fertilizers and, in particular, water pumps – are the main reason for farmers' engagement in international schemes. It is not unusual for people to join two or more associations, with very similar methodologies and techniques. By engaging with different organizations, Tete peasants try to overcome their need for inputs without actually changing their traditional methods of planting or selling. It was this dynamic that made farmers' associations grow throughout rural Tete, and it was this very tendency that turned the UPCT into an important reference point in Tete's political landscape. For a long time, the UPCT was the main regional agent for negotiating projects between local producers and the international development structures. However, in recent years, this configuration has changed, and Dórica was well aware of that.

Conclusion

The change in the economic landscape of Tete Province, which diversified the themes covered by international cooperation at the same time as it narrowed its target group, produced intensive competition for international funds. Alongside changes in internal procedures in the international cooperation framework, the UPCT, mostly formed by older staff untrained in the contemporary methods of international development cooperation, saw their main role as mediators between international structures and local farmers at risk. Meanwhile, international organizations, initially formed for delivering inputs and equipment to local associations, shifted their methodologies, intending to strengthen local civil

societies through projects for the sustainability, improvement and autonomy of partners' grass-roots groups. Without seeing any improvements in their institutional skills and unable to compete with the up-to-date staff of new local NGOs, UPCT staff are struggling to keep its structures running. Its declining ability to bring Western equipment and raw materials to the traditional production system in the villages has jeopardized its role as a political representative of its members.

'They only care about coal now,' said Dórica. 'We hardly have any food security programmes active now and people don't want to pay their annual subscriptions.'

In contrast to NGOs, which jump from one project to another without any involvement with local communities, the UPCT was created with a different objective: to give a voice to the needs of peasants who were joined by their common interests. However, the UPCT's prestige among Tete's farmers depends on their success in negotiating international projects for all regions of Tete Province. The increasing numbers of coal-related projects that are very narrowly focused, alongside changing dynamics in international cooperation that the ageing UPCT staff could not follow, has prevented the UPCT from keeping its prominent political role in Tete. In this sense, the local dynamics of Tete's mining economy present a challenge to political activism in Mozambican rural areas: how to seriously take local demands into account. This is a permanent political challenge in a continually changing landscape.

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Chapter 5

DISLOCATION OF THE DEAD: LAND, BURIAL AND RESETTLEMENT AROUND COAL MINES IN MOZAMBIQUE

Nikkie Wiegink

Introduction

It took us an hour to locate the cemetery. It was June 2017 and I was in a car with Antonio, one of my research participants, and a driver, who was steering us in a pickup truck slowly over the dirt road just outside Mualadzi. Mualadzi is the resettlement village that was built by a coal-mining company for a large proportion of the people who were living in the concession area of the Benga coal mine, which is located in Moatize District, Tete Province. The resettlement village comprises housing, a hospital, a school, an orphanage and, among other buildings and infrastructure, a cemetery. However, this cemetery, or rather the area that had been cleared by a contractor of the mining company to be used as a cemetery, was not in use, and I wanted to see it for myself.

‘It should be somewhere here,’ Antonio said, puzzled, while we were slowly moving along the road flanked by tall, dry, yellow grass and bushes on both sides. He then added, ‘There used to be a fence here, but people stole the wire. It seems they even dug up the poles.’ At a certain point we arrived at a house, where Antonio asked for directions. We were kindly directed back in the direction we had come from. We were told that somewhere on the left, just before a slope, was where the cemetery area was supposed to be. It could be recognized by a big stone. Driving back slowly, we found the stone and then we saw the overgrown path that was probably used by the company vehicles that had once cleared the plot. The area was indistinguishable from its surroundings. I took some pictures of the low trees, the yellow grass and the overgrown path that was the only indicator that something had once been planned there. We then left. Back in the car, our driver, who had been excited about finding the cemetery, was puzzled. Why was the cemetery not in use? And where did the residents of Mualadzi bury their dead?

I had asked the same questions during my fieldwork in the resettlement village. People had told me over and over again that it was impossible to bury people in the cemetery demarcated by the company. They were terrified that starting a cemetery

would cause many more people to die. People feared that since there were no other bodies buried in the cemetery, the first corpses to be buried there would call for others to come to join them. For that reason, no one in Mualadzi had dared to bury their dead in the cemetery allocated by the company. Some residents of Mualadzi had asked the company to exhume the dead from the cemetery of their previous area of residence, Capanga, and rebury them in Mualadzi. Only then would the residents be able to use the cemetery allocated by the mining company as a burial ground. However, the exhumation of the dead in Capanga never happened.

I wanted to see the cemetery in Mualadzi for myself, as people had repeatedly told me about their difficulties with burying their dead near their village and how this forced them to make use of far more expensive burial options that were further away. It was one of the various issues that were indicative of the rupture the residents of Mualadzi had experienced when they had been resettled from Capanga to a newly built village 40 kilometres away. The hardship and loss of the *reassentados* (resettled persons) in Tete has been well documented (Lillywhite, Kemp and Sturman 2015; Osório and Cruz e Silva, 2017). Yet these studies have largely focused on the loss of livelihoods, as illustrated by the report ‘What is a House without Food?’ by Human Rights Watch (2013) and, on suffering and resistance, as evidenced by the work of Lesutis (2019a, 2019b). In this paper I contribute to these analyses by focusing on a specific aspect of the territorial, social and cultural consequences of people’s dislocation that has received less attention, namely the issue of leaving one’s dead relatives and friends behind and having to find new places for burial. This chapter thus considers rural transformations in Mozambique in the context of the increasing number of foreign investment projects that are considered central to the country’s development. These investment projects have been largely ineffective at reducing poverty and have mostly benefited Mozambique’s political elites (Castel-Branco, 2014; Hanlon, 2011). Yet investment projects have led to profound changes in people’s surroundings, as exemplified by the rapid urban expansion of the towns of Tete and Moatize (Feijó and Raimundo, 2017; Kirshner and Power, 2015; Mosca and Selemane, 2011; Selemane, 2010) and by the project-induced displacement of thousands of people.

The central aim of this chapter is to explore the complexity of restoring burial grounds in the context of resettlement induced by investment projects. I will detail how the cemetery was planned and conceived in the resettlement processes spearheaded by the mining company; why residents of Mualadzi refuse to bury their dead in the cemetery provided by the mining company, due to people’s understandings of the socio-spiritual world in which the living and the dead interact closely (Lubkemann, 2008); and how this causes great financial strain and health concerns for the residents of the resettlement area. At the same time, the lack of a proper cemetery also features in the politics of entitlements of Mualadzi’s residents and feeds into the claims they can make to the mining companies and government (cf. Fontein, 2011, p. 714). By addressing issues of burial and reburial and spiritual insecurity, I want to draw attention to the multitude of ways in which involuntary resettlement produces local impacts that also include the socio-spiritual world. This focus shows how resettlement planning and cultural

understandings of resettlement-affected communities intersect and clash in particular ways. Furthermore, this contributes to a sub-debate in the study of mining that considers its socio-spiritual aspects (Calvão, 2017; Stern, 2019) and a more general debate on ‘mining encounters’ (Pijpers and Eriksen, 2019) as this analysis of resettlement is not about a stand-off between the foreign companies and the local populations’ beliefs and practices; rather I see this as a complex encounter between a diverse set of actors with differences, conflicts and commonalities.

The data presented in this chapter are based on multi-site fieldwork conducted between 2016 and 2019 that involved participant observation in daily life in resettlement areas; participation in conferences and meetings organized by activists, NGOs, extractive companies, and the government; and work meetings of the community relations officers of two coal-mining companies. This was complemented by numerous interviews with NGO representatives, company staff, government officials, journalists, people affected by resettlement, and many others. I also draw on the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) drafted in 2009 for the mining company, which detailed the resettlement of the residents of Capanga. In addition, I make use of the various reports on resettlement in Tete by NGOs and human rights organizations. Because the issue of cemeteries and exhumation has been largely ignored in these reports, this chapter makes a crucial empirical contribution to the debate on resettlement in Mozambique.

Project-induced resettlement and precarity

The resettlement of people is often an inevitable by-product of the realization of infrastructural, extractive and agricultural projects. When a project wants to acquire land, there might be people living on this land or using the land for production. Resettlement can be defined as the planned process of relocating people and communities from one place to another as part of the land acquisition that is necessary to allow a project to proceed.¹ According to the standards of the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the investment agency of the World Bank Group, resettlement should be avoided or minimized, and when this is not possible it should be fairly compensated.² Moreover, the IFC standards prescribe that people’s life conditions should be restored or enhanced. However, as multiple studies have shown, this has proven to be rather difficult to achieve (Owen and Kemp, 2015; Vanclay, 2017).

Project-induced resettlement is a growing phenomenon in Mozambique, and is referred to as ‘involuntary resettlement’. The Ministry of Land and Rural Development (MITADER) has estimated that there are more than sixty resettlement processes ongoing (as of 2019) and that there are more to come, as the Government of Mozambique has geared its development strategy mainly towards foreign investment in resource extraction and land use. The involuntary resettlement of (especially rural) populations is far from being a novel practice in Mozambique (Milgroom and Spierenburg, 2008). The process has several historical precedents in forced dislocation conducted by the Portuguese colonial

administration, referred to as *aldeamentos* (fortified villages), and the post-independence policy of the Frelimo government to assemble people in communal villages, referred to as the *aldeias comunais* (Borges Coelho, 1998). Tete Province has also seen development-induced displacement for the Cahora Bassa dam, starting in the 1970s (Isaacman, 2005; Isaacman and Isaacman, 2013), and for floods in more recent decades (Arnall, Thomas, Twyman and Liverman, 2013). The recent wave of project-induced resettlement that started in Tete in 2011 differs from previous resettlements in the fact that these are driven by private companies.

For the open-pit coal mines in Tete, approximately 10,000 people have been resettled since 2011 (Lesutis, 2019a) and many more are living in areas singled out for future resettlement. The district of Moatize is the area with the two biggest coal-mine concessions, which are owned by the Brazilian company Vale and the Indian consortium International Coal Ventures Limited (ICVL). Vale owns the Moatize mine for which 1,365 households were resettled between 2009 and 2011, most of them to Cateme, a newly built village about 35 kilometres away from Moatize. The Benga mine was initially explored by the small mining company Riversdale, which was subsequently bought by the British–Australian multinational Rio Tinto, which then sold the concession to ICVL. The more than 700 households that were resettled for the Benga mine between 2013 and 2014 were relocated to Mualadzi, the area of focus of this chapter. This village is located close to Cateme, but even further from Moatize and the main road.

These resettlement processes typically start with a household-based baseline survey that register not only a household's property, the size of the house, land use, crops and so on, but also a range of social and cultural traits. Based on this survey, an RAP is formulated, which stipulates the relocation and compensation. For the households that were to live in Mualadzi this involved, among other things, a new house, its size depending on the size of one's previous house, a set of furniture and a minimum of 2 hectares of land. The company provided the infrastructure for the village, including roads, electricity, a health centre, school buildings and so on. In addition, Mualadzi's residents received livelihood assistance, including projects such as poultry farming.

Many people affected by resettlement in Tete initially viewed the process as an opportunity for development. As one of my research participants said, 'we first thought this was a blessing'. Her expectations and those of many other *reassentados* had been high before they moved. However, my own research and that of others (e.g. Lesutis, 2019a, 2019b; Lillywhite et al., 2015) reveals that these *reassentados* are worse off than before: they are demoralized by unmet expectations and promises, and face a series of problems, including the insecure supply of water; the long distance to the market of Moatize; the aridity of the land the resettled families were given; the loss of activities to sustain livelihoods, such as farming and fishing; a lack of participation and information; and the repressive attitude of the government toward protests (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Lesutis, 2019a, 2019b; Lillywhite et al., 2015; Siteo and Queface, 2015). Resettlement certainly did not affect everybody in the same way, varying on gender, age, socio-economic status and so on (see also Vanclay, 2017). Despite this variety of resettlement experiences,

most people I spoke to in the resettlement villages recalled better lives in their previous area of residence, even though most of them had lived in suboptimal housing conditions with no land-use title and made ends meet through multiple, vulnerable livelihood strategies.

The critical literature and reports on resettlement in Tete have largely emphasized the loss of means of livelihood and increased precarity as problematic issues central to coal-mining-induced resettlement. Lesutis (2019b, p. 1221) called the resettlement areas in Moatize ‘spaces of suffering’, describing people who feel as if they are considered to be ‘nothing’ in the eyes of the government and companies. Elsewhere I have argued that resettlement is experienced in terms of ‘waithood’, as an in-between position of not knowing who to turn to and if and when things will be resolved (Wiegink, 2018). Here I will build on this sense of waithood and precarity by stressing the consequences of losing burial grounds, which is an aspect of resettlement hitherto less analysed.

‘The things that hurt’: Cemeteries and resettlement planning

The loss of cultural resources and sacred sites is noted as a fundamental point for consideration in resettlement planning in IFC standards and resettlement handbooks (Reddy, Smyth and Steyn, 2015). The authors of the handbook *Land Access and Resettlement: A Guide to Best Practice*, for example, indicate that there are some serious ‘risks’ involved by not carefully addressing aspects of cultural and religious significance (Reddy et al., 2015, pp. 354–355). The authors note that these are ‘emotive’ issues and warn that, for example, the failure to address a sacred site or cultural heritage in due time may cause delays and community disputes and opposition (Reddy et al., 2015, pp. 354–355).

The loss of sacred sites and cultural heritage, including burial grounds, is the ‘thing that hurts’, a community relations officer of one of the coal-mining companies in Tete concluded. At the same time, he pointed out, it might be impossible to avoid the loss of sacred places altogether. The community relations officer recalled a man who had a *maçanica* (jujube) tree in his courtyard that he believed his ancestors’ spirits inhabited; he felt protected by them when the wind moved the branches of the tree. In the courtyard of his resettlement house a tree was planted, but this was not the same thing, as the man lost his ancestral protection. ‘It is these things that mark the resettlement for these people. [...]. That change their existence,’ the community relations officer remarked. In this way, he indicated his awareness of the difficulties of compensation and restoration of religious and sacred places and things that are lost due to resettlement.

Similarly, the RAP that was approved by the Government of Mozambique in 2009 and that stipulated the resettlement for the Benga mine mentions the sacred places and burial grounds as being of important symbolic value for the protection and unity of local communities. It takes note of an ‘animistic and ancestors [*sic*] cult’ that is intimately related to the landscape and consists of ‘strong linkages between the human and natural environments’ that manifest in ‘trees, rivers, lagoons, and

rocks' (RAP, 2009, p. 58). In relation to the cemeteries, the RAP notes that these are basic social services of which more than 90 per cent of the population participating in the survey made use (RAP, 2009, p. 129). The RAP indicates the loss of cemeteries as one of the main categories of entitlement for which Riversdale, the company exploring the Benga concession at the time, was to pay the costs (RAP, 2009, p. 5). From the RAP it is clear that there were several consultations about the cemetery with members of several communities of Capanga in the Community Committee, consisting of community leaders, and the relevant government bodies. From the community consultations and discussions with the Community Committee, the RAP concludes that the community would prefer to close the cemetery and open a new cemetery, involving 'a reputed traditional healer from Malawi' (2009, p. 125). The company was to pay for this and in the RAP stipulates the clearance of a space of 6 hectares to be used by the community as a cemetery.

Exhumations were a more ambiguous issue in the process of planning the resettlement for the Benga mine. On the one hand, the RAP notes that the communities were not necessarily in favour of exhumations, as it quotes a resident of Capanga who argued that 'it is hard to remember the past' (RAP, 2009, p. 125), implying that opening up graves can be a traumatizing process. On the other hand, from the discussions with the technical working group and the provincial resettlement commission, which included government representatives, the RAP concludes that exhumations needed to happen and that Riversdale was to carry the cost of exhumations, reburials and transport (RAP, 2009, p. 132). At the same time, the RAP notes that regulations in relation to exhumations and reburials needed by development projects in rural areas are not clear, and are mainly to be planned in consultation with traditional leaders. Nevertheless, from the RAP it is clear that Riversdale intended to exhume (some of) the bodies from the cemeteries in Capanga, even hiring a contractor to carry out the exhumations and reburials (RAP, 2009, p. 209), and including them in its schedule (RAP, 2009, p. 217).

However, these exhumations never happened, and neither was a traditional healer from Malawi hired to carry out a ceremony to 'open' the new cemetery in Mualadzi. The reasons why this particular aspect of the RAP was not implemented never became entirely clear to me. When I asked a former resettlement manager of Rio Tinto why exhumations in Capanga had not happened, he was surprised. He was aware that exhumations were in the RAP and had assumed that this had happened after he had left Rio Tinto for another company. His explanation for this failure was that when the Benga concession was sold to ICVL in 2014, the new owners of the mine did not see the (further) implementation of the RAP as their priority. The changing ownership of the mine was mentioned by many of my research participants as a reason for the flaws of the resettlement process and for the *dificuldades* (difficulties) that people faced in Mualadzi. Yet this should also be seen in the context of a global decline in coal prices, which resulted in ICVL pausing the operation of the mine in 2014 and freezing any funds to the community relations office. However, for the people affected by resettlement, especially those living in Mualadzi, the failure to provide the village with a cemetery that they deemed usable had far-reaching consequences.

The empty cemetery

The first time I heard about the difficulties that residents of Mualadzi faced in burying their dead was in the office of the village's Committee for the Management of Natural Resources. These Committees exist throughout Mozambique and form a reference point for public and private actors involved in resource extraction from an area. In theory, such committees are in charge of dealing with the distribution of the percentage of revenues that extractive companies are to return to the communities by law. In Mualadzi, however, the Committee was largely occupied with advocacy work and had taken charge of the communications and negotiations with the government and the mining company about resettlement. The Committee consists of approximately sixty people, with a core of a few highly active individuals who have become reference points for NGO staff, human rights advocates and researchers (such as myself) who come to the village wanting to understand or address the resettlement process.³ The Committee has its own office, centrally located in the same street as Mualadzi's administration. The office has basic furniture supplied by a national NGO and a computer and a printer to facilitate the Committee's advocacy work.

During my fieldwork in Mualadzi, the Committee's office was also a reference point for me. When I visited the office in October 2016 after five months of absence, I noticed a new feature: on the walls of the main room were three large flip-chart sheets. On one of the sheets was a hand-drawn map of their previous area Capanga, including the River Revúboé, the *machambas* (fields), the houses, the places where the residents sold sand and stones, and – particularly relevant to my work – the cemetery. The second was a hand-drawn map of Mualadzi, with its bigger houses, streetlights and the Committee's office, but no drawing of the cemetery. The third sheet listed sixteen *dificuldades*, which included potable water, famine, the lack of a tractor, the lack of work, and the word *cemitério* (cemetery). This *dificuldade* referred to the lack of a cemetery where people could actually bury their dead.

As mentioned before, the company – Riversdale – at the time allocated a particular plot for the residents of Mualadzi to use as a cemetery. This area is sensibly located on the fringes of Mualadzi's residential areas. This is a common place for cemeteries in rural Mozambique, as the proximity enables people to bring their dead easily to the cemetery, but also offers enough distance to keep people comfortable, as cemeteries are believed to be places with a certain sense of contamination. However, as I described in the opening paragraphs of this chapter, this particular cemetery offered by the coal-mining company was not in use.

One of the first people I spoke to about the cemetery in Mualadzi was a woman I will call Agua. Most of the time she lived with her three grandchildren; her husband had passed away and her children were living and working elsewhere. This seemed to be a fairly common family set-up, as Mualadzi did not offer any job opportunities and many of its young adult residents had left. Agua told me that in Capanga she sold stones and wood along the busy main road that connects Moatize town with Tete City. She said, 'We had a bit of money,' touching the upper folded part of her

capulana (cloth), where women often keep their cash. 'Here we can only wait for death,' she then added sadly. Talking about Capanga, Agua said, 'when someone would die, there was a ceremony, but here [in Mualadzi] we do not do this.' She immediately linked this to the cemetery, as she said:

To open the cemetery, we need to do a ceremony. But we did not do that. Here people go to the church and then home. When someone dies here, we go to Cateme. They ask for *xima* [cornflour porridge] and chicken and money. Those who have the possibility, go to [the cemetery of] Capanga. If we started burying alone [without the ceremonies and *curandeiros* (healer-diviners) or *régulos* (chiefs) present] you would hear that we, here in Mualadzi, have all already died.⁴

Agua referred to the common fear of people in Mualadzi that if they started using the cemetery this would result in many more people dying. People were terrified of burying their dead in the plot allocated by the mining company. To further understand this issue, I had a conversation with one of the two certified *curandeiras* in Mualadzi; she was a member of the Associação de Médicos Tradicionais de Moçambique (AMETRAMO; the Association of Traditional Doctors of Mozambique). I asked her to explain people's difficulties with the cemetery. In her view, there was one way to resolve this situation: 'First of all, those bodies [in Capanga] have to come here. If they will not do this, the whole population will die. It is already happening. We are not many here. When you open a cemetery usually people start to die in high numbers.'⁵ Also, the *curandeira* stressed that burying people in an empty cemetery would result in many people dying. The residents of Mualadzi whom I spoke to about this issue feared that the dead buried in an empty cemetery would be lonely and start calling others.

Cemeteries in Mozambique are a particular feature of the landscape as the human remains and the ground they are buried in are in many ways central to the ongoing relationships between the living and the dead (see Krmpotich, Fontein and Harries, 2010, p. 273). In Mozambique, death is often understood in relation to what can be called a 'socio-spiritual world', in which people and spiritual beings interact closely (Lubkemann, 2008). This interplay becomes particularly clear in people's understandings of health. Illness, sudden death, unexplainable diseases and misfortune are often linked to forces within the spiritual realm, which includes ancestral spirits and *feiticeiros* (sorcerers) (Lubkemann, 2008; Raimundo, 2009; West, 2005; Wiegink, 2013). Transformations and social change, which resettlement also engenders, often have profound effects on the relationships between the living and the dead, and other dynamics that belong to the supernatural world (see Wiegink, 2013). While spiritual distress may take many forms and be interpreted in a multitude of ways, dealing properly with the bodies of the dead is one of the ways in which a harmonious relationship can be fostered and maintained. Burial of relatives is thus, among other things, a profound health issue. It is through these understandings about death and health that we should view the unwillingness of the residents of Mualadzi to bury their dead in the new cemetery. The refusal to use the cemetery had profound practical and financial implications.

A financial burden

The socio-economic survey conducted by the consultancy that prepared the RAP for Riversdale concluded that cemeteries are a central 'social service' that is considered to be just as central as the market and the clinic. Proximity is crucial in this regard, since the survey noted that on average people lived at a 30-minute walking distance from a cemetery (RAP, 2009, pp. 129, 101). Generally, people in rural areas in Mozambique do not transport a corpse over a great distance. When someone dies, the burial usually takes place the next day. The corpse, either in a coffin or wrapped in a cloth, is carried or transported in a wheelbarrow to a nearby cemetery. It follows that the proximity of a cemetery is a crucial feature of this 'social service'.

The inability to bury their dead in the cemetery provided by the company thus presented Mualadzi's residents with a problem: they were not able to bury their dead close to where they lived. They had to look for other solutions, which all involved higher costs that placed quite a financial burden on some families. During fieldwork in Mualadzi between 2016 and 2018, people mainly used two alternative burial options. The first was to arrange a burial in the cemetery of nearby Cateme, which belonged to a village that was already there before the resettlement village was constructed. The cemetery had thus already been in use for a long time and was therefore considered a safe option. The cemetery is about 10 kilometres away from Mualadzi, which is still within walking distance. However, the keepers of this particular cemetery, the *régulo* of the area and the fellow traditional authorities and gravediggers, charge people coming from Mualadzi a particularly high fee and require them to provide additional offerings. From my interviews I understood that for the burial of an adult the payment is 1,000–1,500 meticaís (\$13–20), and for the burial of a child, the payment is 700 meticaís (approximately \$10). These fees are relatively high and are small fortunes for most of the residents of Mualadzi who have no regular income. In addition, the keepers of the cemetery in Cateme ask for a plate of *xima* with chicken and alcoholic beverages, adding to the outrage of Mualadzi's residents, who feel they are being taken advantage of.

For residents of Mualadzi the second alternative for burial was to transport the dead to Capanga, the area of origin of most residents of Mualadzi, which is 40 kilometres away. The cemetery is still in use, as there are still people living within the Benga concession area. This seemed to be the preferred option for many, albeit a very expensive one, because of the transport costs involved. To take a corpse from Mualadzi to Capanga one needs to rent a pickup truck, which for many residents was not within their financial means. To compare, the cemetery in Cateme is much closer and a corpse can be taken there using a wheelbarrow, if need be. Addressing this financial burden of having to transport a corpse from Mualadzi to somewhere else, one of the participants of a focus group in Mualadzi remarked that 'sick people are going to Capanga to die close to the cemetery because their families have no money for the transport'. During the same meeting, another participant recounted, possibly slightly exaggerating the situation, that 'there was this person who stayed dead in his house for three days because there was no money'. Later I

was informed that this situation had lasted only twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, it shows the predicament of people trying to bury their dead in a way that they consider safe and affordable.

Exhumations and entitlements

As exemplified in the list of sixteen *dificuldades* that a group of residents of Mualadzi formulated, the lack of a proper cemetery was considered one of the central predicaments of life in the resettlement village. This predicament was regarded as a direct consequence of the resettlement process and the failure to provide the resettlement area with a proper cemetery. When I asked people what the solution would be to the *dificuldades* with the cemetery, the answer was generally that it was necessary to exhume the bodies from the cemetery of Capanga and to rebury them in the cemetery of Mualadzi. Some suggested that the whole cemetery of Capanga needed to be moved, others thought it would be sufficient to exhume a couple of bodies. One person, very specifically, thought it would be enough to exhume an adult, a child and an elderly person, as this would cater for people of all generations. In general, people stressed that in combination with the right ceremonies and the reburial of a certain number of bodies from Capanga this would 'open up' the cemetery and allow for others to be buried there.

In my conversations with community relations officers from different mining companies, I was told that exhumations are costly and sensitive, and therefore a complex matter.⁶ One of the community relations officers recounted his experience with an exhumation that resulted in 'a terrible experience for all involved'. He told me that he and his team were exhuming bodies (mostly remains of clothing, he said) and had opened ten graves, at which point they found they were behind schedule and managed to close only six. The other four graves were left open. 'This was a huge problem, because the graves stayed open for a while and this terrorized the population. They thought that every night a person would die to fill those graves.'⁷ Another community relations officer recalled a widow who had been so sad that her husband had died that she could not conceive of going through a reburial. This resonates with what the RAP also reported as a reason for not exhuming the cemetery in Capanga, namely that it would be painful for people to dig up the past. I did not come across such considerations among the residents of Mualadzi whom I spoke to. This reveals nevertheless a diversity of attitudes toward exhumations. By evoking such stories in our conversations, the community relations officers showed themselves to be sensitive to cultural issues, while at the same time legitimizing why exhumations could not be easily conducted.

However, for many residents of Mualadzi, resolving the cemetery issue was not merely a practical or spiritual matter; it was also linked to feelings of injustice and a sense of entitlement to being properly compensated for having given up their land, including its graves. This is well illustrated by the words of Pita, an unemployed male resident of Mualadzi, who said he felt stuck in Mualadzi and

exclaimed, ‘I do not even know where I will be buried on the day I die.’ This, he felt, was a dreadful and unjust situation and he emphasized that he hoped I could publish this story, as then ‘the government will be ashamed’. Pita’s words allude to a sense of injustice and the related claims that residents of Mualadzi make about the coal-mining companies *as well as* the government.

The *reassentados* said they felt entitled to be taken care of by the company that had initiated the resettlement. In relation to the cemetery, my research participants from Mualadzi expected that exhumations were to be carried out or paid for by the coal-mining company. Several of them stressed that the exhumation of graves in the cemetery in Capanga had been promised to them by the company, which the RAP document seems to confirm. However, in Mualadzi – at the time of my research – exhumations were not part of the discussions between the *reassentados* and the mining company. As one of the residents remarked, ‘when we talk to Rio Tinto [now ICVL], they say, “This is your problem, take care of yourself over there”’.⁸ This exemplified a general perception expressed by most residents I spoke to, which was that the coal-mining company ICVL was not interested in the resettlement area and in fulfilling promises that had been made in the RAP or verbally by representatives of previous companies.

Representatives of the resource-management committee also presented the list of *dificuldades* to the district government. They felt the government should protect its citizens, especially those who had sacrificed their houses and land for ‘development’. The experience of the *reassentados* was that the government generally sided with the company in any case of dispute or discontent from the resettlement-affected populations (see also Lesutis, 2019a, 2019b; Marshall, 2015, p. 8). Nevertheless, the presence of the graves in the concession area of the mine has become part of the politics of entitlement that have characterized the *reassentados*’ claims against the company and the government.⁹ For the people in Mualadzi, the graves in the concession area have become a symbol of the unfinished process of resettlement, as part of the community is still left behind.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have approached resettlement, a consequence of investment projects throughout Mozambique, as a process of dislocation that has potentially far-reaching consequences for people’s burial practices. The existing literature on resettlement in Mozambique largely explores the consequences of such displacements in terms of food security, livelihood, access to basic services, and the fracturing of communities, resulting in increased precarity and vulnerability. I hope to have added to these discussions by drawing attention to the consequences of resettlement for the loss and (inadequate) compensation of burial grounds. I want to assert that the loss of places such as burial grounds is not only as Reddy et al. (2015) put it, ‘an emotive issue’, but instead a central part of the infrastructure of people’s daily lives. In Mozambique, cemeteries are fundamental for people’s interactions with the socio-spiritual world and as a consequence for

their considerations in terms of health. Failing to provide for this has resulted in additional financial burdens for the residents of Mualadzi in already vulnerable livelihoods.

A broader conclusion can be drawn from the analysis carried out in this chapter in relation to rural transformations in general, and the transformations that are instigated by resettlement across Mozambique in particular. This chapter attests to a general claim about everyday life in Mozambique, and by extension its transformations: namely that people live in one way or another in interaction within a supernatural world that is home to spiritual beings with powers over the material world. This is fundamental to understanding people's ontological and epistemological stances in everyday life, including how people understand their relations to a place and to the living and the dead. An analysis of resettlement experiences cannot but engage with this context. But my analysis has not been predominantly one of a clash of different world-views. The analysis of company documents (the RAP) and interviews with Mozambican community relations officers show consideration for the socio-spiritual world, including in the planning of resettlement. The failure of the cemetery in Mualadzi is thus first and foremost a result of a combination of factors, including commodity prices and the mine's ownership changes, as well as the Mozambican political and economic context. All in all, the experiences from residents in Mualadzi who find themselves unable to bury their dead in a safe and affordable way reflect the deep complexity of restoring people's living environments.

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Chapter 6

MINING MEGAPROJECTS AND THE ONUS ON DEVELOPMENT IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES OF NAMPULA PROVINCE, MOZAMBIQUE: THE CASE OF TOPUITO, LARDE DISTRICT

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Introduction

In Mozambique, mining has, for a long time, been an important factor in the accumulation of, and disputes over, territory. Considered by Raffestin (1993) to be one of the main assets of power, the ownership and control of territories that are relatively wealthy in territorial resources were always important in some societies. In the case of Mozambique, the development of mining has always been related to the historical trajectory of building the Mozambican nation, where the need for control and exploitation of mineral resources has always been accompanied by expropriation of land from native communities.

Mining in Mozambique dates from the pre-colonial period. Along with agriculture, mining was decisive for the settlement of the first Bantu peoples in the region, then for the commercial prosperity of the first empires, and later still for the settlement of the Portuguese and the beginning of the colonization process. The history of the establishment of the first societies in Africa and in Mozambique was thus particularly influenced by the mineral wealth that was one of the main factors that attracted invaders (Frei, Chaveiro and Macaringue, 2016).

From the middle of the fifteenth century, with the beginning of Portuguese mercantile penetration into the country, the process of accumulation of capital in Mozambican territory began and, consequently, the prelude to violent processes of expropriation of land from native communities. The initial motivation was the demand for gold for the acquisition of Asian spices; later it was Portugal's economic growth, which culminated in the colonization of Mozambique by Portugal. Mozambican territory was thus organized to meet the political, economic and social interests of the colonizer.

This chapter is an extract from my PhD, completed in 2017 at the Instituto de Estudos Socioambientais da Universidade Federal de Goiás, Brazil.

Characterized by an essentially extractive economy, as pointed out by Castel-Branco (2010), there are great expectations in the country of an abundance of territorial resources that will be able to contribute to the reduction of the scourge of poverty that the majority of Mozambicans experience (Brynildsen and Nombora, 2013). The country has attracted significant foreign investments for the exploitation of these resources (heavy sands, mineral coal, precious and semi-precious stones, gas and oil) with the aim of transforming them into valuable resources. Selemene (2010) and Castel-Branco (2010) state that the Mozambican government is determined, by means of concessions, to facilitate the extraction and export of these resources as quickly as possible, assuming that their exploitation will contribute positively to financing vital aspects of the life of Mozambicans, such as health, education and infrastructure, which will then lead to economic growth as well as the reduction of poverty in the country.

However, from the point of view of production and social relations, the actions in the capital of Mozambique translate into the appropriation of land and resources by multinational mining companies. Therefore, caution must be exercised because the resources being explored are not renewable, so these foreign multinationals will end up appropriating most of these precious resources, leaving only the leftovers for the Mozambicans. Moreover, as the natural wealth of the country is in rural areas that local communities use for family agriculture or for future use, the (re)discovery of resources whose quality and quantity favour commercial exploitation can lead to changes in land use that benefit only those multinational companies (Matos, 2016).

The appropriation of the mining territories in Mozambique and the resulting expropriation of the local communities¹ has two facets. On the one hand, the capital reorganization² of the local territories only benefits the foreign multinational companies, by meeting the demands of capitalist development. On the other hand, appropriation is a fundamental condition for obtaining added value, while at the same time expropriating the communities and intensifying the conflicts over possession and security of land and other resources in rural Mozambique, which, for the majority of the population, is the basis of their social, material and immaterial reproduction.

As Matos (2016) states, in the current conditions of global rules being more and more defined by the interests of people at great distances from each other, territorial changes tend to have a much greater effect on the areas bearing the brunt of international capital. The search for areas for the accumulation of capital that support the capitalist system has made the *peripheral* areas more dependent of the strategies adopted by the countries in the *centre* that rule the economic, social, environmental and cultural policies that the *peripheral* areas must adopt, in the interests of capital.

Matos (2016) also believes that in Mozambique, the addition of the domestic territory into the international flows of accumulation of capital connected to the geopolitical strategies of appropriation of natural wealth and, therefore, of the mining territories, has been possible thanks to the cooperation of the state. The state has constantly reformulated Mozambican laws that reinforce other laws, such as the Land Law and the Mining Law. This is not to guarantee the security,

ownership and control of the territories by the communities, but is instead to stimulate the large international corporations to invest in the country.

Beyond the constant onslaughts on legislation by the state to facilitate foreign direct investments (FDIs) in the country, both the representative capitalist power and the state make use of speeches that emphasize positive views of development and social welfare in order to promote 'social consensus', to quote Mendonça (2004), to justify the injection of capital into the community territories. In that respect, Catsossa (2015) takes the view that these speeches omit the truly controversial systems of capitalist production, as it is commonly known that the relationship between public politics and legislation in operation in a country are always for the benefit of interests other than those of the communities.

Therefore, as the aforementioned laws and speeches give preference to investors, the expropriation of communities becomes an irreversible process. In fact, Article 12 no. 2 of the Mining Law (Law no. 20/2014) establishes that 'the pre-existing rights to use and benefit from land shall be deemed extinct upon payment of fair compensation to the users of the land and their revocation, in accordance with applicable law'. In other words, if the benefit of compulsory displacement is considered acceptable by the state, then the families that are going to be harmed by those activities are going to be forced to abandon their land; the Mining Law does not offer the opportunity to the target families to refuse to be resettled.

As a result, in Mozambique, communities are compelled to adopt to new ways of life because of the significant changes that territorialization and accumulation of capital have produced in the use, ownership and control of community territories. In short, the insertion of Mozambique into the international flows of accumulation of capital is contradictory, as it is imposed by the state and the international economy, as Harvey (2012) would say, through 'accumulation through spoliation', where the mining megaprojects and too many processes of reproduction of capital change the territories into homogeneous spaces and producers of profitability.

Mendonça (2004) believes that the insertion of the community territories into the system of capitalist production of goods not only changes the natural wealth of these territories but also changes the work, culture and ways of life of the communities where the megaprojects are based. In aiming to guarantee profits, one of the most widely used strategies by the mining megaprojects consists, on the one hand, of the elimination of 'undesired subjects' and, on the other, of the production of huge 'excluded contingents' (Bata and Barreira, 2015). Local communities are evicted from their lands and forced to construct a new history, culture and identity in their compulsory resettlement, where they are obliged to live in new areas with new living conditions and, above all, with old and new problems as a result of life in resettlement.

The observed empirical reality in Topuito during my field research evidenced the way that the resettled families, as a result of the exploitation of heavy sands, are upset by the process of resettlement set out by Kenmare. In these places, the population's lands have been expropriated and they have been resettled on inappropriate land, where they cannot practice agriculture and trade, among other activities, and they are without the minimum social and economic infrastructure

or environmental sanitation. In other words, there is a reterritorialization process that is based on a precarious inclusion and that aggravates the conditions of the communities impacted by the mining megaprojects, not only in Topuito, Nampula Province but also to some extent across the whole country.

As pointed out by Matos (2016), the process of territorialization of capital, as well as of the mining megaprojects in Mozambique, brings not only a change in land use and resources but the establishment of new territorialities that exclude the previous ones and where the new use of the territory implies the introduction of new objectives and new actions, generating different territorialities that culminate in the expulsion of whole communities along with the destruction of historical objects and actions that are not tied to territory. From this perspective, the aim of this chapter is to analyse the responsibility of the development of the territorialization of capital and, therefore, the mining megaprojects in the rural areas of Mozambique, especially Nampula Province, with a focus on the experience of the communities in the Administrative Post of Topuito, Larde District, which was impacted by heavy sand exploitation by Kenmare over a period of ten years (2007–2017).

Thus, the analysis developed in this chapter focuses on territory, which allowed me to understand the power and conflict relations that are involved in territorial processes, that is, the appropriation and expropriation of territories set in motion by the different hegemonic actors. Therefore, the constructed theoretical–methodological approach adopted considers the territory in its total dimension (Haesbaert, 2009).

I prioritized theoretical reflection that would allow a dialectic analysis of the social relations, specifically of the power and conflict relations that are involved in the different strategies of appropriation of mining territories by multinational capital in Mozambique, given the fact that territory is a product of historical and social factors (Saquet, 2007). The view of capital in the territories where the study was based is a view that is both political and geopolitical (Mendonça, 2004). This reflection enabled an understanding of the transformations that occurred in the power relations by the appropriation of the territories, as well as the nexuses that were established in the socio-spatial organization of capital and its relationship with the strategies and/or the mechanisms of expropriation and the processes of territoriality involved.

To understand the socio-territorial implications of the mining megaprojects in Topuito, I carried out bibliographical and documentary research. In 2013–2017, I carried out fieldwork in Topuito and in the cities of Nampula and Maputo to collect empirical data, using questionnaires and interviews with the local community and community leaders, as well as with some state institutions and other actors connected to the mining sector in Nampula Province. In total, I conducted six interviews: one in Maputo with Kenmare; two in Nampula City with the provincial directorate of Mining Resources and Energy, and with the provincial directorate of Land and Rural Development; and three in Topuito with traditional leaders. Forty-three families in the Administrative Post of Topuito were involved in this research through questionnaires (seventeen families resettled in the village of Mutiticoma, seventeen families in the village of Tipane and nine families in the village of Topuito).

Kenmare resources and the mining territories in Nampula Province

Kenmare Resources PLC is an Irish enterprise group that was officially formed in 1972 under the name of Kenmare Oil Exploration Limited. After some years of oil exploitation, it became a publicly limited company, Kenmare Oil Exploration PLC, in 1985. Then in 1987, the company changed its name to Kenmare Resources PLC.

The presence of Kenmare in Mozambique dates back to 1987, when Mozambique was experiencing an unprecedented economic, political and military crisis, aggravated by the fact that the Civil War (1976/7-1992) was at its peak. That year Mozambique also joined the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and this was followed by the end of the socialist regime and the opening up of the country to neo-liberalism through the adoption of the Programme of Economic Whitewashing (PRE). In this context, Kenmare took advantage of the tumultuous political and economic life in which the country was immersed to negotiate extremely favourable conditions for the exploitation of mining resources.

Among the first mining operations developed by Kenmare in Mozambique were gold exploitation between 1992 and 1999, by Niassa Gold in Niassa Province, and graphite extraction and processing between 1994 and 1999, by the Ancuabe Graphite Mine in Cabo Delgado Province, one of the largest producers of high-quality natural flake graphite. From 1987, Kenmare showed interest in obtaining a mining concession for the exploitation of areas containing heavy sands along the coastal zone of Nampula Province. In light of this interest, on 28 February 1996, Kenmare Resources PLC obtained from the Mozambican authorities a prospection licence for the research of heavy mining in Topuito, in Congolone and Angoche in Angoche District, and Quinga in Mogincual District.

The feasibility studies on the Topuito mine were concluded in February 2001; they were a detailed evaluation of all the aspects of the proposed development and confirmed the technical and commercial feasibility of the mine. Kenmare obtained the mining concession for activities related to the prospection, search, development and production of heavy mining in Larde, Angoche and Mogincual districts; the contract was signed between the company and the Government of Mozambique on 21 January 2002. Later in the same year, the company signed two documents received from the Mozambican government: an agreement to a modified mining licence and an execution agreement, including the processing and export of the products. The Mozambican government granted the Irish mining company the Right of Use and Exploitation of Land (DUAT) and of mining exploitation over 43,867.37 hectares of land in Nampula Province.

Before the arrival of the mining company, the communities had the right to use these lands, which guaranteed them economic activities such as farming and growing food for family consumption. The land also ensured the communities' social and material reproduction along with their diverse cultural, religious and symbolic identity manifestations. Table 6.1 shows Kenmare's concession areas in Nampula Province.

In Larde District, the total area of Kenmare's contract is 35,062 hectares, of which 15,240 hectares are the mining concession and 19,822 hectares are for

Table 6.1 Kenmare's mining concession areas in Nampula Province, 2002

Name	Communities affected	Area (hectares)
Larde mining concession	Namalope Nathaka	15,240.00
Larde licence area (prospection and research)	Mualadi Pilivili Mpitini Marrua	19,822.00
Congolone, Angoche mining concession reserve	Congolone	1,771.87
Angoche mining concession area	Angoche	2,844.00
Quinga, Mogincual mining concession area	Quinga	4,189.50
Total		43,867.37

Source: Ministry of Mining Resources and Energy (MIREME) (2002) in Frei (2017).

prospection and research. Combining the licences for mining, prospection and research, the concession area for Kenmare in Larde District includes the territories of the communities of Namalope, Nathaka, Pilivili, Mualadi, Mpitini and Marrua. So, in Angoche District, the total area of Kenmare's contract is 4,615.87 hectares, of which 2,844 hectares are mining concession and 1,771.87 hectares are part of the mining concession in the reserve of Congolone, which is in Sangage, Angoche District. Finally, in Mogincual District, Kenmare's mining concession is in the Administrative Post of Quinga and covers 4,189.50 hectares. Figure 6.1 shows the areas owned by Kenmare in Nampula Province.

Although the mining concession contract between Kenmare and the Government of Mozambique had been signed in 2002, the mining operations only started in 2007, with the beginning of heavy mining (for ilmenite, zircon and rutile) in the reservation of Namalope, in the Administrative Post of Topuito. In December of the same year, the first minerals extracted in Topuito were exported.

Based on the Kenmare concession contract, the Government of Mozambique guaranteed the company the mining concession and its exclusive right and benefits for the exploitation of heavy mining in Nampula Province for an initial period of twenty-five years from 2002, with the option of being extended every fifteen years. In other words, the future of the communities of the current and future generations in the areas where Kenmare mining projects are and will be developed is definitely compromised.

Kenmare and the compulsory expropriation of communities in Topuito

To enable the development of the first phase of the productive operations of the mine, the company removed 145 families from the community of Namalope and resettled them in the village of Mutiticoma. However, obtaining the mining




Figure 6.1 Kenmare's mining concession areas in Nampula Province, 2002 (Frei, 2017).

concession licence in Mozambique did not depend on an environmental impact assessment (EIA). Nevertheless, mining companies are required to present a concession licence in order to obtain an environmental licence and then the DUAT.

From the data collected from the interviews, it was clear that neither the district communities, nor the local government, nor even at times the provincial governments were consulted. The government granted the mining concession licence to the company without consulting the communities to be impacted by the project(s). The result is that the local government and the affected communities are subordinate in the process, instead of being active agents, and have no warning of the arrival of mining megaprojects in their territories.

The communities are finally consulted when the projects are in progress, which depends on the acquisition of the DUAT for the concession area. This almost always leads to the expulsion of the communities from their territories, over which the company then has the right of use. As the Law of Mines grants preference to the holder of the licence of prospection and research for the mining concession, the expropriation of the communities becomes an irreversible process.

At this point, the company must present a resettlement plan, which, along with the EIA, the local government officials that oversee the area must approve. The beginning of the mining operations therefore remains dependent on the approval of these documents and the resettlement of the communities impacted by the mine. In Topuito, the process was not unusual: the talks for the process of resettlement between the company, the local government and the community of Namalope to

be resettled only began after the mining began. Mutiticoma was identified as the place where the 145 families would be resettled for the duration of project.

The local government, with its scarce resources, participated very little, if at all, in the monitoring of the process. As a result, the company constructed new houses corresponding to the number of families, which was not enough. The families were only compensated for the agricultural crops that were in their fields (for instance, maize, beans, cassava, nuts). It was a controversial process that involved only some of the people affected, in which the resettled families were the most unfairly treated.

About ten years later, in 2017, the resettled communities and those living near the mine still complained of the same problems: the precarious conditions that they were subjected to with the arrival of the project and compulsory resettlement, as will be further discussed below. This situation still remains aggravated by the fact that the negotiating power of the resettled communities and/or those affected by the projects is extremely low compared with the power of the companies. This is related to the low level of education in the communities. Table 6.2 shows the results of the data collected during the fieldwork in Topuito in 2016, and gives an idea of the level of education of the target families affected by the Moma Titanium Minerals Mine in Topuito.

As is clear from the data in Table 6.2, the level of education in the communities is extremely low. From the total of the selected sample (forty-three families) in the Administrative Post of Topuito, only the heads of the household of two families had stayed at school until the age of fifteen, and three until the age of seventeen. Twelve (28 per cent of the sample) had not completed any schooling levels, and nine (20.9 per cent of the sample) had never been to school. Nine others had only stayed at school until the age of twelve, and eight (about 19 per cent of the sample) had stayed at school until the age of ten. The data presented show the inequalities of information and bargaining power between the affected communities and the companies. Allied to this, the majority of community members do not speak

Table 6.2 Level of education of the head of the household, 2016

Topuito/ neighbourhoods	Number of participants	Education level					
		EP1 ^a	EP2 ^b	ESG1 ^c	ESG2 ^d	Other ^e	Never went to school
Total	43	8	9	2	3	12	9
Topuito	9	0	3	1	1	3	1
Mutiticoma	17	4	2	1	0	6	4
Tipane	17	4	4	0	2	3	4

Source: fieldwork, Topuito, 2016.

^a EP1: six- to ten-year-olds; ^b EP2: eleven- and twelve-year-olds; ^c ESG1: thirteen- to fifteen-year-olds; ^d ESG2: sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds; ^e Other – people who went to school but did not complete any schooling levels.

the official language of the country, Portuguese. This language barrier results in difficulties in communication and the management of expectations.

The levels of training and experience of the communities are extremely low, due to the fact that the majority of the members of the communities are living in the most economically and financially difficult situation possible. This is therefore where there is the highest incidence of poverty in Mozambique. By contrast, the negotiating power of the companies is extremely high, given their financial resources and the quality of their human resources. Table 6.3 shows the main economic activities of the heads of the households in the communities.

From the data presented in Table 6.3, it can be seen that the majority of the population living in Topuito basically depend on subsistence agriculture for their survival. Subsistence agriculture depends exclusively on the physical natural conditions, i.e. it is a form of non-irrigated agriculture that is characterized by a low level of productivity.

Therefore, removing an entire community from its land, from its territory, is extremely dramatic for those affected. That is why the resistance of the communities to the process is inevitable. Being removed means losing their bond with the land, with the territory that generation after generation has allowed families to reproduce their social bonds, both material and immaterial. It also means, as pointed out by Matos and Medeiros (2012, 2013), losing their referential identities, their cultural history, their lineage, their way of life, part of themselves and even dying. As an example, commenting on the process of removing cemeteries and sacred places in Topuito, a local community leader I interviewed in Tipane said the following:

What Kenmare has done is a veritable attack on the spirits of the Topuito community. We are even afraid. Afraid of the spirits getting angry and affecting people's lives here in Topuito, even affecting the Kenmare company itself. If the spirits get angry, it is normal for Kenmare to stop working without knowing the reason. We have never seen a person who died a long time ago be dug up and put in a box to be buried again in another cemetery. This is taboo for us. We have never seen it in our lives. We started to see it with Kenmare. Many people here have cried about it. Other people even today are afraid.³

Table 6.3 Main economic activities of the head of the household in the administrative post of Topuito, 2016

Topuito/ neighbourhoods	Number of participants	Main economic activities of the head of the household						
		Formal trade	Informal trade	Informal mining	Subsistence agriculture	Public Service	Private Sector	Other
Total	43	3	2	0	24	0	0	14
Topuito	9	3	0	0	3	0	0	3
Mutitcoma	17	0	1	0	12	0	0	4
Tipane	17	0	1	0	9	0	0	7

Source: fieldwork in Topuito, 2016.

The resistance to change is also due to the fact that the resettlement areas do not meet the needs of the communities, above all in access to good-quality productive spaces, water and other resources that, most of the time, are at some distance from the resettlement.

The farms given to the resettled families, besides being far from the Mutiticoma resettlement neighbourhood (10–15 kilometres on average), are not good enough for agriculture. Families also face difficulties in obtaining essential water. Indeed, as pointed out by Matos and Medeiros (2014, p. 600):

In Mozambique, the land plays a fundamental role for the local communities, whereby apart from being a source of social reproduction of these groups, it becomes a way of building a connection with their antecedents, for the sacralization of spiritual relations. Access to the land for these communities is their liberation, a factor that since the Portuguese occupation has never happened [...] The land is, also, the foundation of their reproductive culture and of specific forms of organization and occupation of the space. The fight for the land is seen as an integral part of the needs of many people, mainly in African societies, with prominence for the Mozambicans, where their ancestry is perpetuated and their ethnic groups are consolidated.

(Matos and Medeiros, 2014, p. 600)

Even if the communities are reluctant to move, mining legislation in the country does not give them the right to stay. The Law of Mines in Mozambique makes it clear that the use of land for mining is a priority, as long as the economic and social benefits of the mining operations are greater. Therefore, the communities have no choice but to accept their expulsion and go to live in resettlement areas.

The process of compensation and the dilemma for the communities in Topuito

Agricultural law in Mozambique states that before the arrival of any enterprise, the local community must be consulted. It should agree to the project and the compensation proposal before it goes ahead. However, as discussed above, community involvement in the mining megaproject only begins after the acquisition of the mining concession and when the company intends to acquire the DUAT and the Environmental Licence. Table 6.4 shows the public consultation process carried out by Kenmare.

The data in Table 6.4 show that Kenmare did not take the opinion of the communities into account, since the communities are the last to be asked for their opinion. When they are asked, all the decisions have already been made.

In Brazil, for example, an investor who intends to obtain a DUAT would make a proposal to the local community in order to buy occupied land. According to Rossi (2015), in Mozambique, the process is much cheaper. Since privately owned land does not properly exist in Mozambique, an area of land cannot be bought. Instead,

Table 6.4 Kenmare's community consultation on the resettlement process

Topuito/ neighbourhoods	Number of participants	Was your opinion taken into account by Kenmare?			
		Yes	No	Don't know	Not applicable
Total	43	3	12	2	26
Topuito	9	0	0	0	9
Mutitcoma	17	3	12	2	0
Tipane	17	0	0	0	17

Source: fieldwork in Topuito, 2016.

compensation is paid. In the opinion of Rossi (2015), the word 'compensation' is used excessively. In reality, compensation is the lowest payment possible handed to the displaced families in exchange for having to abandon their agricultural and extractive practices. The values are established by the public agriculture agencies of each province. Each element has a table of prices: grass or stone houses, fields and fruit trees, for example.

When Kenmare signed the contract for prospection, research, development and production of heavy mining in Larde District, Congolone (Angoche District) and Quinga (Mogincual District) in 2002, Mozambique was not yet ready for the new form of foreign investment in the country. It was the first capital-intensive contract between the government and a multinational in the mining and energy sector, and it would lead to more foreign megaprojects in the country. The innocence and lack of experience of the Mozambican state in this type of business rather blurred a future so long awaited by the leading elites of the country. Few hid their anxiety about the financial capital that intended 'to sip the still-warm blood of the sleepwalking Mozambicans', to use the words of the poem 'Surge et Ambula' by the Mozambican writer Rui de Noronha.

As pointed out by Brynildsen and Nombora (2013), the lack of, for example, financial resources, government experience in the mining industry, qualified human resources, and infrastructure for investments from the private sector that characterized the country up to the date of the signature of the contract with Kenmare implied weak laws with many gaps. Motivated to a large extent by the conditions and political strategies imposed by the multilateral donors and the government ambition to attract large investments, Mozambique established investment politics and a legal system that foreign investors favoured, to the detriment of the Mozambicans. And Kenmare was one of the companies benefiting from this system. Up until 2002, it was not yet clear to the Mozambican government how much compensation they would have to pay foreign investors in cases of loss due to occupation of areas for various economic purposes. The government had not yet established rigorous criteria to safeguard the interests of the local communities that had used and managed the land for their survival.

In Topuito, the amount of compensation for the family fields was negotiated between the company and the community to be resettled. Later on, when the

process started to become controversial, the local government joined the process as mediators. Only four years after Kenmare had resettled the community of Namalope in Topuito, in 2011, the government of the province finally compile an official table of the amounts of compensation to be paid to the families for their loss of production (this was updated in 2014).

Due to the difficulties in accessing information from the company, it was not possible to find out how much Kenmare has actually paid in compensation, or indeed how much the company has paid for each type of crop grown on the land of households affected by the project. Instead, Table 6.5 gives an estimate of the amount that each household received as a result of the expropriation process that enabled the start of Moma mining activities.

The data in Table 6.5 shows that only nine families out of the forty-three surveyed in the study, both resettled and non-resettled, were compensated by Kenmare. The data also show that of the nine families compensated for their resettlement, the majority (six families) were compensated with less than 10,000 meticaïs (about 360 dollars) for their entire lives. If these families had continued to live on and work their lands for the rest of their lives, they would have produced much more than the 10,000 meticaïs given by Kenmare. It was not possible to survey the entire community impacted by Kenmare in Moma, but it is clear that the amount of compensation paid to the resettled families was extremely low, given the absence of other resources they could access and the costs of living in the resettled areas.

In Mozambique, until 2020, the minimum monthly wage paid to a public administration employee was 4,467.75 meticaïs (about seventy dollars) at the exchange rate at that time. In 2020 the minimum annual income was approximately 850 dollars. So the minimum amount of compensation paid to the affected families was a quarter of the lowest annual income of a public service employee in Mozambique. Furthermore, in conversation with the affected families, almost all

Table 6.5 Amount of compensation received from Kenmare in the administrative post of Topuito

Topuito/ neighbourhoods	Number of participants	If you have been compensated, indicate the amount of compensation received (value in thousand meticaïs) ^a						No compensation
		< 10	[10-19]	[20-49]	[50-100]	[100-200]	> 200	
Total	43	6	2	0	0	0	1	34
Topuito	9	1	0	0	0	0	0	8
Mutiticoma	17	5	2	0	0	0	1	9
Tipane	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	17

Source: fieldwork, Topuito, 2016.

^a The estimated exchange rate on 31 December 2006 was twenty-eight meticaïs per US dollar (Banco de Moçambique, 2008)

Table 6.6 Degree of satisfaction with the amount of compensation received from Kenmare in the administrative post of Topuito

Topuito/ neighbourhoods	Number of participants	Were you satisfied with the amount of compensation received?		
		Yes	No	No compensation
Total	43	2	7	34
Topuito	9	1	0	8
Mutiticoma	17	1	7	9
Tipane	17	0	0	17

Source: fieldwork, Topuito, 2016.

of them were unanimous in their dissatisfaction with the amount of compensation received, as shown in Table 6.6.

In 2014, even the updated amounts to be paid to the families for losing their harvests were considered derisive by the affected communities; they were more derisive still when Kenmare negotiated compensation with those resettled in Topuito. In my field research, some people involved in the process pointed out that the compensation agreements were not understood equally by all the parties involved. The affected communities remain dissatisfied. In their opinion, they believe they have a right to more, not only in respect of the compensation but also in regard to other rights, such as education and employment opportunities.

Life in resettlement: The onus on development

Kenmare built 145 houses for an equal number of resettled families. The new houses were based on the type of house that the families had lived in their native communities. Bigger houses, with three or more rooms, were built for those who had previously lived in bigger houses, and smaller houses were built for those who had previously lived in smaller houses.

However, in the original areas the houses, both big and small, were slightly set apart from each other. There were fields around the compounds that separated one family from the next. The space allowed the families better farming conditions, such as access to fertile land near water sources for irrigation. Unfortunately, Kenmare modified this pattern of socio-spatial organization. In Mutiticoma, the families have limited land, limited access to water, and houses built too close together to respect the culture and *modus vivendi* that those communities are used to.

In Mutiticoma, for instance, all the families with bigger houses were resettled in one specific area, and the families with smaller houses were concentrated in another area. Although the company intended to reproduce the ways of life of the communities, it failed to take into account the type of lifestyle that characterizes the Mozambican rural environment.

The houses provided to the resettled families, as well as not matching their traditions and culture (for example, they are used to the kitchen being outside the house, but the houses provided have inside kitchens), are also poorly constructed. The haste with which the builders put up these houses can be seen at a glance: very shallow foundations have led to fissures in the walls, allowing water to infiltrate and putting the lives of the families at risk.

In my field research in Topuito, the degree of dissatisfaction of the resettled families with the quality of the houses provided by Kenmare was evident. However, the company has closed the file on the houses and there is no possibility of the company improving them. Therefore, while still trying to replicate the way of life of the communities, Kenmare also made a serious mistake. In the original housing, the fields were next to the houses and the families could freely produce what they wanted to. In the resettlement, areas demarcated were 20–30 square metres, just enough space for a house, a kitchen and an outside bathroom.

The fields provided by the company are 10–15 kilometre away from the new houses. For all the families, the land granted by Kenmare is both unproductive and smaller than the fields where they came from. The families resettled and affected by the heavy sands exploitation project in Topuito face great difficulties in terms of access to agricultural land to grow crops. Again, from the fieldwork, it was clear that the demand for new spaces for the production of family food led to a series of conflicts between the communities of Topuito and many other surrounding communities. The reason for this misunderstanding may be because other communities believe that there was an agreement between Topuito families to *sell* their lands to Kenmare, and that they have received huge sums of money, which in fact never happened. The population of Topuito, especially those resettled in Mutiticoma, are also dissatisfied with the lack of drinking water, the difficulty of access between the community and other regions, and the deficient system of basic environmental sanitation.

Another problem for the communities from this mining project in Topuito, particularly among the resettled families, is electricity. Article 10 no. 1 of the Contract of the Mining Concession of Kenmare establishes that:

The company is committed to attempt reasonable efforts to facilitate the construction and to support the capitation of necessary funds for the construction and establishment of the line of transmission of electric energy from the most appropriate point of connection with the central line of energy close to the mining area [...]. The company will not have obligation, through itself properly or through its affiliates to supply, to obtain, or to guarantee such funds.

(MIREME, 2002, p. 22)

In fact, Kenmare constructed a line of electric chain transmission of average tension (110 kilovolt amps), extending for about 170 kilometres, from the city of Nampula. In parallel, the company installed diesel generators with a capacity of 6 megavolt amps. But electricity is only available to part of the community, mainly

the families in Mutiticoma: a very small proportion of the population and the health centre constructed by the company benefit.

Although having electricity in the new houses built by Kenmare is seen as being good for the families that were moved from their native communities, it has led to a dilemma for these families: for them, the cost of using this electricity is quite high. Due to the economic circumstances of the families, the chances of them being able to pay for using the electricity are quite remote. At the beginning, for about three months, Kenmare helped the families to pay Eletricidade de Moçambique for using electricity. Soon after that, however, Kenmare stopped paying the families' electricity costs. Today, many families resettled in Topuito use oil lighting instead.

Kenmare and the government point to the fact that electricity was supplied to the new houses to influence local, provincial, national and even international public opinion that their efforts would improve the quality of life of the communities. However, as the participant families resettled who were involved in the study asked, 'What is the advantage of having electric energy in the house if we cannot use it?'

Conclusion

This study reveals the contradictions in the territorialization of capital and the mining megaprojects – the development model prioritized and imposed by Mozambique.

In Topuito, there is an enormous difference in negotiating power, which puts the mining megaprojects in a winning position and the communities in a losing position. Added to which, as the Land Law and the Mining Law favour mining investment over acceptance or otherwise by the communities, any negotiation is more of a bureaucratic activity than a forum for shared decisions. As a result, a community's way of life starts to be dependent on the goodwill of the mining company, since the state relegates its responsibilities to the companies operating in a certain community to support education, health, employment programmes, the development of infrastructure for water supply and electricity, housing, roads, etc. In Topuito, the situation of the families affected by the heavy sand exploitation project is not easy. Their forced removal from their old territories leads to difficulties in adapting to their new lives.

The new settlements lack almost everything: there is no land for agricultural production, there is no employment for the families, the houses are very poorly constructed and do not cater for the needs of the traditional way of life of the communities, there is little water available, and electricity is a problem. Moreover, medical assistance is deficient and the families feel isolated and abandoned.

It is essential that the government continues the process of reviewing land and mining legislation, not only to facilitate foreign investment in the country but above all to ensure that the greatest beneficiaries from the exploitation of the natural wealth available in the country are actually the local communities and Mozambicans.

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Part III

AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

Chapter 7

THE GENDER DIMENSION OF SMALL FARMERS' INTEGRATION IN RURAL MARKETS IN MOZAMBIQUE: A TEN-YEAR-LONG DIALOGUE ACROSS CONTEXT CHANGES AND EVOLVING PERSPECTIVES

Cecilia Navarra
Roberta Pellizzoli

Introduction and contextualization: 'Bringing the rural poor into the market' in Mozambique

For more than a decade, the link between private agribusiness and African small farmers has been a widely debated issue in the academic and technical literature on agricultural and rural development (Amanor, 2009; Lahiff, 2007; Oya, 2012). That link has come to be seen, among international development actors, as a key element for integrating smallholder farmers into markets and agricultural value chains (FAO, 2015; IFAD, 2015). The 2008 World Bank Report on Agriculture (World Bank, 2007) highlighted the relevance that business models based on agreements between private actors and small farmers (either in associations, at community level, or individually), mediated by local government institutions, could play in contributing to the integration of small farmers into rural markets and agribusiness value chains. According to the World Bank,

[t]he private sector drives the organization of value chains that bring the market to smallholders and commercial farms. The state - through enhanced capacity and new forms of governance - corrects market failures, regulates competition, and engages strategically in public-private partnerships to promote competitiveness in the agribusiness sector and support the greater inclusion of smallholders and rural workers. In this emerging vision, agriculture assumes a prominent role in the development agenda

(World Bank, 2007, p. 8)

The same international development actors have, over time, linked smallholders' value-chain integration to gender equality and women's empowerment outcomes (European Commission, 2019; FAO, 2016), climate-change adaptation (Mwongera

et al., 2019), poverty reduction and food security (FAO, 2011). A decade ago, in the wake of the food and economic crisis, food insecurity for African small farmers was linked to the increasing food demand from rapidly growing economies, declining rates of yield growth for some commodities, the impact of climate change and increasing non-food crop production (FAO, IFAD, WFP, 2011, p. 11), and the consequences of large-scale transactions that were shaping the rural context in Africa (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009; Hall, 2011; Odhiambo, 2011), including in Mozambique (Fairbairn, 2013). In this framework, strategies included government policies that promoted inclusive partnerships between private-sector actors (including foreign investors) and local communities or smallholder farmers' associations.

However, many scholars and activists were concerned that the prevailing model of large-scale land acquisitions was jeopardizing the land and resource rights, livelihoods and food security of rural communities and the rural poor, thus increasing their risk of being dispossessed and losing their assets. These actors, analysing the 'failure of land governance systems to recognize and protect the land interests of the rural poor and the political marginalization of smallholder production – which are themselves in part a legacy of histories of colonialism and political exclusion' (Anseeuw et al., 2012, p. 10) stressed the need to legally recognize the land rights of the rural poor, put smallholder production at the centre of strategies for agricultural development, and make decision-making relating to land inclusive, transparent and accountable. Notwithstanding the two contrasting approaches, partnerships between private investors and communities mediated by public institutions were often considered a viable and sustainable policy option by both, in that they 'may provide mutually beneficial solutions where communities have the necessary secure resource rights, organization, and negotiating capacity' (Anseeuw et al., 2012, p. 7).

Within this debate, gender analysis stood out prominently as analysts and academics discussed how contract farming¹ – the most common, though not a new, form of 'inclusive partnership' – could impact on entrenched gender-based discrimination in rural areas and in agriculture. Analysts tended to agree on the distinctive negative consequences that women have been suffering from the mounting commercial pressure over land (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Daley, 2011; FAO, 2011; Tandon, 2010) and argued that women had generally been excluded from contract-farming arrangements due to limited direct access to land and control over productive resources (FAO, 2011; Schneider and Gugerty, 2010). To address these types of discrimination and related vulnerabilities, a variety of recommendations and practical methodologies were developed to ensure that these partnerships and strategies to enhance small farmers' value-chain integration would be accessible, participatory and based on a gender-sensitive analysis and design (Agri-ProFocus, 2012; FAO, 2018; ILO, 2007), and that governments would 'create a good investment climate through strengthening property rights' as well as customary land rights (FAO, 2011, pp. 46-47; see also Anseeuw et al., 2012, p. 62). This would not only contribute to closing the gender gap in agriculture and rural employment but would also positively impact on the economic empowerment of women and other so-called vulnerable groups.

Simultaneously, academics such as O’Laughlin (2009, pp. 154, 156) questioned the idea that rural poverty could be addressed by extending the ‘commodified space’ and ‘bringing the poor into the market’. From this perspective, policies aimed at market integration are themselves a consequence of having framed poverty as ‘market exclusion’, while rural producers are not disconnected from markets and subsistence production is not independent of market exchange.

It was in this context that the research presented here was initially developed, taking different forms over time as the working focus of the two authors changed. The analysis that follows brings together a dialogue and reflection of almost fifteen years on the impact of policies aimed at market integration of small-scale farmers in Mozambique, with a focus on farmers’ associations and on women and gender dynamics; all of this seen from different perspectives – PhD students, academic researchers, development consultants and non-governmental organization (NGO) staff. After we carried out postgraduate research in Mozambique on women’s access to irrigated land in the southern part of the country (Pellizzoli, 2010) and on producers’ associations and cooperatives (Inguaggiato, Navarra and Vailati, 2013), the starting point for this dialogue and collaboration was, in 2010, ‘a remarkable explosion of interest in land, together with a new (or renewed) and equally remarkable focus on the women who work on it’ (Pellizzoli and Rossetti, 2013), which led to a research project that analysed the gender impact of selected rural and agricultural development programmes of the Italian Development Cooperation – in Mozambique and in the Sahel – and provided recommendations on how to increase and improve the participation of women and enhance their role in food security, environmental sustainability and agriculture.

The aim of this chapter is to discuss the policies aimed at smallholders’ market integration and their implementation on the ground. The focus is, first, on constraints to market participation and exclusion patterns, with a focus on the gender dimension. Then, we discuss the specific role played by agreements between farmers and private firms (especially contract-farming schemes), what they do and do not do in the cases that we studied.

The empirical material analysed was collected during a number of qualitative fieldwork campaigns in Maputo, Sofala and Manica Provinces over the last decade or so, in the context of the authors’ postgraduate research and of international cooperation projects in which they were involved in different capacities. These include the IAO/Gender Project: a gender analysis of rural development programmes, funded by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by the Istituto Agronomico per l’Oltremare (2010–2013); the Programme for the Socio-Economic Empowerment of Women (PESED), implemented by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS), Maputo Office (2014–2017); and two projects funded by AICS and implemented by the Italian NGO Helpcode, namely: Rural Development and Community Resilience Strengthening in Magude, Moamba, and Manhiça Districts – Mozambique (AID 10862) and Beyond Subsistence: Promotion of Sustainable Agricultural Value Chains in Gorongosa and Marínguè through Supporting Farmers’ Producer Associations (AID 11471).

Background

In 2010, the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture launched the Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agrarian Sector (PEDSA) 2011–2020, which was based on three guiding principles: the development of value chains, according to an agro-industry model, the need to promote a different approach for each key crop, and public-private partnerships to enhance small farmers' market integration (Republic of Mozambique, 2011, p. 32). PEDSA provided a concise analysis of women's participation in agriculture:

Women face enormous obstacles in being able to work due to the existing gender relations in rural communities. Women have limited control and access to resources and services, specifically to land, inputs, credit, production of cash crops, animal farming, extension services, information, training, technology and work. Moreover, their participation in decision-making related to productive and economic aspects is low because of the role that they play at the social and traditional level.

(Republic of Mozambique, 2011, p. 30)

A more comprehensive gender analysis² and response is absent in the plan, and gender is only briefly mentioned in the approaches proposed for the implementation of the expected results of each pillar.

In March 2020, the Mozambican Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development released its 2020–2024 Zero Hunger strategy, which identifies five priorities: food security, increase of households' income, employment creation, social inclusion and increase of agricultural production and productivity. Support for smallholder agriculture through the strengthening of the extension services and the integration of small producers in market-oriented value chains and the promotion of agribusiness are included among the key sectors for intervention. In terms of impact on rural poverty, the programme foresees a decrease from the current 46.1 per cent to 27 per cent in 2024. SUSTENTA, the national programme for the integration of family farming into productive value chains, which was approved at the beginning of 2020, establishes that 'taking into account gender inequalities and women's and men's unbalanced access to natural and productive resources', women will comprise 60 per cent of the beneficiaries.³

Between 2010 and the PEDSA approval, and the recent agricultural policy developments, several shocks occurred that contributed to significantly altering the scenario that, at the end of the first decade of 2000, placed Mozambique among the African countries that were experiencing impressive gross domestic product (GDP) growth. Since 2013, the central region and its population, mostly rural, has been affected by the ebbs and flows of a low-intensity conflict between Renamo (the Mozambican National Resistance) and government troops, which caused intense disruption in access to basic services and in income-generating activities in a predominantly rural, agriculture-based economy. In August 2019, Felipe Nyusi, the Mozambican president and chairperson of Frelimo (the Mozambican

Liberation Front) and Ossufo Momade, the Renamo leader, signed the National Accord for Peace and Reconciliation. However, violent incidents in the central region have not yet stopped, due to a Renamo splinter group (Junta Militar) that is still operating. Conflict is also affecting the northern province of Cabo Delgado, where since 2017 a group of insurgents belonging to an Islamic group (Morier-Genoud, 2020) have been perpetrating violent attacks on villages and grave human rights abuses, resulting in thousands of deaths and massive internal displacement. In 2016, the discovery of government-guaranteed secret loans – which were given to three state companies supposedly for the purchase of naval equipment and a fishing fleet – created a debt crisis that caused a severe setback in the processes of economic growth (which had been praised internationally a few years before) and caused an immediate backlash that affected the poorest and most vulnerable segments of the population the most. In fact, the financial crisis resulted in a reduction in foreign investment, the devaluation of the national currency, an increase in the prices of basic goods and services, and the implementation of austere fiscal policies.

Mozambique's high vulnerability to climate change has translated in the last five years into high economic costs due to damages and losses (human, production, infrastructure, environmental). In 2015, a severe drought affected the whole southern African region and Mozambique, resulting in a massive food crisis⁴ and loss of livestock and productive resources for thousands of rural households. Between March and April 2019, two cyclones hit the provinces of Sofala, Manica, Tete and Cabo Delgado, devastating infrastructure, roads and around 80 per cent of agricultural production. The World Bank (2019) calculated that the combined consequences of cyclones Idai and Kenneth directly affected more than 1.7 million people, with damages and losses amounting to \$3 billion, while the total cost for recovery and reconstruction was an estimated \$3.4 billion. The cyclones caused an estimated \$115 million worth of damage to the private sector, with at least 356 companies facing significant disaster impacts (damages to warehouses, offices, facilities and equipment) across the four provinces.

These phenomena slowed economic growth, increased the vulnerability of rural populations, and exacerbated existing issues of redistribution of economic gains and of inequalities.

Limits and constraints to smallholders' market integration in Maputo, Sofala and Manica

Expand and sell production: For whom?

The research carried out between 2010 and 2019 mentioned in the introduction confirms that increasing supply is not always possible for farmers, even in the case of higher market prices (often considered to be the right incentive for farmers by development actors, and expected to increase investment in agriculture, e.g. in FAO et al., 2011). Demand-side constraints to the expansion of production seem

to be underestimated in the debate on market integration of smallholders. In our interviews, however, it was often stated⁵ that the main limitation to production expansion is the lack of opportunities to sell greater quantities. On the one hand, the size of local markets is limited by the low rural incomes and therefore low demand, and on the other, the chances of reaching wider markets are limited by the high marketing and transport costs. According to the director of a Maputo producers' cooperative,⁶ these are the main reasons for an excess of supply coexisting with shortages in food and primary products. Women merchants at the wholesale Zimpeto market, in the Maputo suburbs, told us that the costs of buying vegetables in South Africa to be sold in Maputo are considerably lower than the costs of buying the same products in Mozambique, even close to the capital city. Marketing costs are high, mainly due to huge transport costs and an inefficient road network, which restrict the exchanges between the rural and urban areas of the country. These high marketing costs result in severe production losses, as the capacity to store and process crops remains limited.

The weakness of the link between producers and traders is frequently raised in interviews: one element mentioned by a trader⁷ is that often merchants and intermediaries are undercapitalized and lack resources to consistently buy and pay for all the produce from smallholders. For their part, producers often told us that 'merchants just buy our products',⁸ while they would need traders to also provide credit before production and inputs such as quality seeds and fertilizers.

Expand and sell production: Who is able to?

Supply-side limits due to high production costs are also significant, since there are few opportunities to exploit economies of scale. Together with the limited size of plots,⁹ the difficulty in specializing in a limited number of crops hinders the possibility of benefiting from economies of scale: as underlined in interviews with NGOs, crop specialization implies that goods that are not self-produced have to be bought on the market and this is a highly risky decision for smallholders.¹⁰ Using the market instead of one's own production means incurring potentially high marketing costs: the purchase price of staple crops can end up being much higher than the cost of producing them (Jayne, 1994). Moreover, price volatility is a major threat to rural livelihoods, which may explain the choice of not abandoning production for one's own consumption (Fafchamps, 1992; Heltberg and Tarp, 2002). Cash crop specialization, however, may occur in the case of specific support from international cooperation projects, which tend to include input provision, technical training and the creation of marketing linkages, as well as the availability of extra land in order not to reduce food crop production. However, the sustainability of these kinds of interventions and the capacity to maintain the activities after the end of a project need to be explored.

Another key observation arising from our interviews is that producers do not always benefit from marketing their products. One of the elements that make marketing profitable for small farmers is the ability to enter the market when prices are higher: out of season, or at least not immediately after harvest. M.E.T.,¹¹

the woman president of a producers' association close to Maputo, clearly stated that only those who have access to fertilizers and effective storage facilities are able to profitably sell their products at the 'right' marketing time. This capacity to store production plays a crucial role: those who cannot store the harvested product are forced to sell all of it in the first few days, when prices are lower. Survey data from the Trabalho de Inquérito Agrícola 2005 data set¹² show that 60 per cent of food crop producers sell their whole harvest in a single day. In the case of food crops, this means that they will have to buy the same product for consumption later on at higher prices.¹³ The bargaining power of these producers is thus very low (Inguaggiato, Navarra and Vailati, 2009), and marketing itself is a symptom of the poverty trap rather than a way to escape it.

A problem that is related to both storage and high marketing costs is that producers often face a monopsonistic market¹⁴ and are forced to sell at the conditions set by the merchants; many interviewees told us that the 'price is set by the merchant.'¹⁵ P.T.,¹⁶ the president of a producers' association in the peri-urban area of Maputo, told us that buyers collude, so that 'if they don't like the proposed price, they buy elsewhere'.

Access to inputs is another constraint to the expansion of production and is an important divide between those who benefit from market participation and those who do not. Access to inputs is in itself constrained by the lack of cash income: women interviewed in Vanduzi (Manica Province)¹⁷ said that they had to increase their work as day workers in the richer neighbours' fields since their production had decreased and therefore more inputs and fertilizers were needed. Indeed, the literature emphasizes that the capacity to commercialize part of the production is also dependent on the household's assets (Benfica, Tschirley and Boughton, 2006; Boughton et al., 2007; Salvucci, 2011). Policies that aim to increase the marketed share of production, and make peasants more dependent on the market, risk shifting the risk 'down to the lowest levels' in that very part of the population that has a lower risk-bearing capacity (Hanlon, 2007).

The gendered dimensions of these constraints

The gendered dimension of producing for the market within rural households

The existing literature also shows that the pattern of exclusion from the benefits of market participation also follows gender lines and that women often face limitations in accessing resources, which constrains their production. Daniel (2001) argues that women heads of the household lack access to a labour force and to savings that are needed to begin cash crop production. Evers and Walters (2000) identify other gender-specific constraints in accessing markets, such as transport costs and security of property rights.

Being generally in charge of the household, women's care work includes responsibility for the family's food. However, household dynamics are generally

more complex and do not necessarily correspond to a static picture of women being systematically more prone than men to subsistence farming. First of all, the distinction between 'subsistence' and 'market' production is not clear-cut. As O'Laughlin states, 'the daily livelihood strategies of rural Mozambicans are in many ways linked to the market' (2001, p. 36). From our observations we found various outcomes. Just as examples, we met women producers who put aside maize from the household reserve to be sold when needed, or who first keep what was needed for consumption and sold the excess. We also met producers who sold the best-quality harvest and kept the less valuable part for their own consumption. Thus, there is not sharp distinction between what is cultivated to be sold and what is cultivated to be eaten, at least for some products. Moreover, women do participate in commercial activities, although usually in smaller or informal markets than those used by men.¹⁸

As stated by many of the women farmers interviewed, the household is the arena for the negotiation of the share of production to be sold, where women may push to reduce it in order to increase the amount that is kept for consumption so as not to have to ask the husband for money to buy food. The literature underlines that, in these negotiations, women may lose out when greater crop commercialization occurs, since men in rural households have greater control over cash income (Evers and Walters, 2000). This indicates that shifting production away from family farming can have gendered effects. Indeed, some of the literature points out that increasing cash crop prices, following liberalization policies, may decrease women's bargaining power within rural households, because of an increased workload or because of an increase in cash income (Warner and Campbell, 2000).

These gendered effects are also related to the work relationships within households. Women substantially participate in cash crop production across all family production. At the same time, it is often observed that the production relations within rural households are highly unequal,¹⁹ especially in terms of the discrepancy between women's work in the fields and their control over the output. This does not necessarily correspond to lower women's management and technical skills. Outside the household - that is, within farmers' associations - women often work on a par with men, and are keen to attend technical training courses in order to become more independent in the management of equipment and inputs. In a project implemented in Moamba, Magude and Manhiça districts (Maputo Province) by the Italian NGO Helpcode, farmers seemed to perceive these associations as places where there are no differences between men and women and where women are recognized (and recognize themselves) as equal producers to men: 'in the association we are all the same, the differences are at home.'²⁰ While gender differences and discrimination against women in the household are openly recognized, in this case, roles do not seem negotiable: '[T]hat is the way it is with us: men get us pregnant, and then they relax, and we do the rest.'²¹

Since 2017, the impact of the economic and environmental shocks of the last decade has put a further strain on rural households' productive capacity and on their food security. This has led families to adopt detrimental coping strategies such as child marriages, rationing the amount of food consumed daily (and in

some cases resorting to eating once every two days), and selling households assets. In Magude District, a member of the Komani Swa Tiya association said during a focus group:²² ‘We’ve changed, we’ve lost weight. Look at these arms; before the drought they weren’t like that, I was strong (...). Before the drought, the money to buy meat came out of the *machamba* [field], now the land does not give us enough money: even our animals died, we sold some at banana prices just before they died.’ The food crisis, and the change in family models of access to and consumption of food, have repercussions on the organization of women’s work and on intra-family relationships, as they find themselves having to negotiate with their husbands, to a greater extent than before, over the use of money to buy food, such as maize, that was previously available in the family *machamba*:²³ ‘[I]t is more difficult than before to get food, and at the same time it is less difficult because we now only cook once a day.’

Cash income: Off-farm employment, small businesses and their gendered dimension

Access to cash income, usually wages, income from contract farming, and remittances, is emphasized by many farmers as a much-needed resource for increasing production: inputs that require cash income such as fertilizers and good-quality seeds are increasingly needed, thus creating major inequalities in terms of production and productivity between those who can afford them and those who cannot. Some of the women farmers interviewed declare their willingness to expand or diversify production, but they are constrained by the lack of money, which could possibly come from off-farm activities, together with the limited access to education, information, technologies, credit and decision-making space, which is perceived as giving access to such activities.

For some 20 per cent of richer households in Mozambican rural areas (Hanlon, 2007), at least half of their total income is composed of non-farm revenues. One of the features of poorer households, on the other hand, is that they mostly depend on farm income (Carrilho et al., 2003). This is the reason off-farm revenues are considered an important way out of poverty. At the same time, most wage and small-business incomes in rural areas are fragile and often too low to allow significant investment in farming activities.

As pointed out by Cramer, Oya and Sender (2008), rural labour markets are indeed present, although in different forms, in the economic life of Mozambican rural populations, including that of poor people. The weak bargaining power of wage workers, especially agricultural and domestic workers, translates into precarious and vulnerable conditions. Furthermore, wages often do not allow for a significant increase of revenues with respect to farm income. This has specific gendered consequences since, when men do not earn enough from their wage employment, the need for cash income is fulfilled by women, who very frequently work, if needed, as casual workers for neighbours, clearing fields. J. (Chiteue, Manica Province)²⁴ told us that her husband is a bricklayer, but that it happens that he does not bring home enough money, and thus it is she who has to go and work

in others' fields to earn what is needed. Oya and Sender (2009) make a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' non-farm jobs and draw attention to the fact that the former are predominantly performed by men and the second by women.

Is micro and small entrepreneurship a viable alternative cash income source for rural households, and for women? Again, things have changed over time. Self-employment and small businesses are often a tool for earning cash income to complement or reinvest in farming activities. These businesses are nevertheless risky because they require an initial investment and they provide uncertain revenues. As Hanlon (2007) underlines, most of the households that fell below the poverty line between 2002 and 2005 were households that lost the *extra* income previously gained through self-employment.

In recent years, opportunities to access wage work in rural areas have decreased as a result of the multiple crises and shocks that the country has faced, giving way to policies and programmes that promote off-farm rural entrepreneurship and access to credit, often with a focus on women.

Between 2015 and 2017 we were involved in a research project implemented by the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation in Maputo in collaboration with the Coordination Centre for Gender Issues of Eduardo Mondlane University.²⁵ The aim of the project was to increase knowledge of existing initiatives in Mozambique in support of women's entrepreneurship, access to financial instruments, relations between economic promotion and social inclusion, and the impact of women's empowerment on the country's development processes. The evidence collected showed that micro- and small enterprises (MSE) owned by women in Mozambique were often born out of necessity due to life events (i.e. divorce, widowhood, migration). In some cases, this might have turned into an opportunity for women to make independent decisions about their lives, family expenses or investments. However, entrepreneurship born out of unforeseen situations faces difficulties such as informality, limited access to relevant information and credit opportunities, lack of support from the family, and an increased burden between productive and care activities. This distinction seems to be in line with UNCTAD's (2015) definition of 'entrepreneurs by choice' and 'entrepreneurs by necessity', seen as two categories that need different support strategies; the former often starts from better conditions and pursues accumulation strategies, whereas the latter uses entrepreneurship to complement inadequate incomes or to cope with shocks. One of the limitations faced by the women's businesses studied is the high risk of being small in highly competitive sectors, and therefore being at the lower end of the value chain in activities characterized by low added value.

How about inclusive business models in agriculture, then?

The inclusive business models discussed in the introductory section – especially contract farming – have also been a source of cash income for rural households in Mozambique, though not consistently and not without conflicts. Considering the constraints to increasing smallholder production, the specific obstacles that

women face in being integrated into the market, and the institutional and discursive support that these business models have been receiving from international, national and local policies, it is not surprising that many initiatives of this sort have been implemented in rural Mozambique.

The economic literature underlines the potential positive impacts and downsides of contract farming: Bijman (2008) indicates that small producers benefit from reduced risks in production and marketing, which may allow the development of riskier cash crops and easier access to inputs, training and credit. Studies on the effect of these contracts on producers usually find an increase in income and a decrease in its volatility (Bellemare, 2010; Bijman, 2008), which nevertheless may go together with some negative consequences: producers' dependency on a monopsonistic buyer and vulnerability to his changes in strategy, or changes in the local market at the expense of out-of-contract producers (Bijman, 2008; Ramaswami, Pratap and BIRTHAL, 2006). The risk of selection of better-off farmers is observed by Singh (2002). Navarra (2017) finds that farmers who enter into contracts for cotton and tobacco in central and northern Mozambique are those that are already food secure. Evidence shows lower participation by women-headed households in contract farming (Benfica, Tshirley and Boughton, 2006; Boughton et al., 2007; Navarra, 2019). At the same time, 'cheap' female labour can be a 'competitive advantage' for farmers' households in contract-farming schemes, but that risks increasing the exploitative elements of family division of labour (Key and Runsten, 1999) and can affect negatively women's control over resources within rural households (Navarra, 2019).

We started analysing these arrangements in 2010, in Manica Province, starting with the case of an agro-industrial company that at the time produced fruit, vegetables and aromatic herbs both for the national and international markets. The company, which employed more than 1,500 people (of which 35 per cent were women), had recently supported the strengthening of eleven farmers' associations²⁶ that were growing *piri-piri* (chilli peppers), peas and green beans through formal seasonal contracts with the company. The farmers' associations had almost 300 members between them, of which 30–35 per cent were women. According to the contract, farmers received seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, technical assistance and training from the company. The price was agreed at the beginning of the growing season but, according to the managers interviewed, there was some room for the farmers to negotiate a better price if market prices were favourable.²⁷ At the end of the harvest season, the company selected products directly from the farmers' fields according to its quality standards. Once the inputs costs had been deducted, the farmers received their earnings. According to the company, the farmers working within this scheme were better off than 'standard' farmers, in that they had guaranteed access to the market that was regulated by a formal contract.

With regard to the high percentage of women's direct participation in these contracts, the company quality manager argued that 'women usually deliver a better harvest than men since they are more dedicated to working in the fields'. Indeed, the success stories to which we had access were remarkable: for example, Z.J., a member of the IV Campo farmers' association in Belas (Manica Province),

had gained a prize as the best *piri-piri* producer, having produced one and a half tonnes in 2010 and earned a net profit of 25,000 meticaís (roughly \$400). According to her, the yield obtained was so high compared to the other farmers' first because she decides herself how to organize her working days, and second, because she always does what the company's agricultural extension worker recommends, whereas 'men farmers do not follow his advice: if he says that we have to spray the pesticides today, they do it days later'.²⁸ A widow with two children, Z.J. employs three people for the harvesting of *piri-piri*, and has another parcel of land where she grows maize and vegetables both for household consumption and for the local market. The contract, according to her, was an excellent option for diversifying her livelihood strategies, since *piri-piri* can be considered a labour-saving crop that does not require longer hours of work in the fields except at harvest time.

In another case, the twenty-three women members of an association of milk producers in the Sussundenga District in Manica used to sell half of the daily production to a dairy factory while the other half was used for home consumption or sold to casual buyers. The reason was that by the time they were ready to deliver the second half of the milk cans, the factory had closed for the day and none of the association members had a fridge in which to store the milk overnight. The agreement between the association and the factory was informal and, according to the president of the association, the price that they got (sixteen meticaís (twenty-five cents) per litre in 2011) was not fair, with the packaged milk being sold at forty-eight meticaís (seventy-seven cents) per litre in the dairy factory shop and local supermarkets. With three cows, the president earned around 2,000 meticaís (thirty-two dollars) per month (the minimum salary in formal rural employment) from selling the milk to the factory, but he would have liked to raise more cows and increase production. With this monthly revenue, his family did 'not go hungry anymore' but they did not have any capital to invest.²⁹

From our observation, the *piri-piri* case is an exception rather than the norm. The outcome had been enabled by the existence of a formal contract between the company and the producers, by the company sharing the risks, by the very good agroclimatic conditions of the area, and by the specific social responsibility approach of the foreign investor.³⁰

Overall, the general evidence is that the profits that farmers obtain through the observed experiences of contract farming were mostly used to smooth households' consumption, cope with crises, and improve the food security rather, than as a reliable source of income that would allow the transition to 'emerging farmers' (Smart and Hanlon, 2014), or to build a sustainable long-term strategy. This is because the partnerships were usually short term and rarely formalized – thus limiting the negotiation capacity of local producers – and totally dependent on the investment and marketing decisions of the private actors. In some cases, these are the reasons that push certain farmers' associations to turn down and vocally oppose such contracts (see Pellizzoli, 2010 for southern Mozambique).

Contract-farming arrangements continue to be implemented across Mozambique, particularly for maize, tobacco and cotton production in the central

and northern regions. The concept of inclusiveness, though, seems to have become diluted, as the agreements often appear to be imposed by companies on farmers – either individual or associated – with a ‘take it or leave it’ approach as demand for entering these schemes remains high. And while companies tend to highlight the contribution they make to local development, farmers question the transparency of the agreements, as the companies ‘often buy at a lower price than promised, and they force farmers to adhere to the scheme to sell right after the harvest, when prices are lower’; however, ‘people continue to adhere to these schemes only because they need seeds.’³¹ Still, small-scale farming, which mixes household consumption and selling in spot markets, therefore remains central, though with all the limitations discussed above in terms of barriers to accessing markets.

Where to go, then? Over the last decade of collaborative research and work in Mozambique we have observed with increasing interest the role that farmers’ associations can play in integrating small producers into sustainable agricultural value chains, increasing their livelihoods, improving the scale and efficiency of small agricultural production, and contributing to women’s empowerment in the rural areas. The story of farmers’ associations and cooperatives in Mozambique is a complex one (Bachke, 2009; Mosca, 2011), as they switched from being the basis of collective agricultural production after independence to being, in many cases, dependent on projects and on external support, with very fragile governance models. While they continue to face many limitations in terms of production capacity, management and business strategy, farmers’ associations remain an important space – including in times of crisis – where the collective voice and bargaining capacity of both women and men producers can be strengthened, resources can be capitalized to reduce the costs of accessing markets, and new techniques can be tested and disseminated.

This potential is clearly not without conflicts and inequalities, but farmers’ associations can also be a context where gender roles are renegotiated. In interviews, as previously mentioned, it was often repeated that traditional norms in the family are considered immutable and non-negotiable by both men and women: ‘this is how it is, this is our tradition.’ However, women, like men, when they see themselves as farmer-members, are calling for change, for ‘things to happen,’³² for quality seeds to be made available or irrigation systems to be rehabilitated. Women’s empowerment is much more than a simple by-product of economic empowerment, and particularly so in a vulnerable country such as Mozambique. Even so, it seems that listening to women’s and men’s requests for change as rural producers might contribute to overturning the common portrayal of women as vulnerable by nature and as heroines because of their circumstances.

Conclusions

In this chapter we first analysed the constraints and consequences of market participation by smallholders in Manica, Sofala and Maputo provinces in Mozambique gleaned from qualitative fieldwork carried out in different capacities

across a decade. We underlined the demand-side constraints of primary product markets and the unequal distribution of benefits on the supply side: not all producers benefit from marketing activity, as asset-based analyses have also shown. More precisely, advantages are difficult to grasp if agricultural producers are not able to effectively store cash crops for marketing when the prices are higher, or if they do not have enough cash to buy inputs. There is further evidence of the lower participation of women in marketing activities compared to men, which cannot be satisfactorily explained by the static portrayal of the 'subsistence-oriented woman farmer'.

Access to cash income seems to be a key element that allows smallholders to benefit from market participation and establish themselves as 'emerging farmers', as Smart and Hanlon (2014) put it. Access to sources of cash income has nevertheless become more difficult in the last decade for rural households, not least as a consequence of the several crises that the country has faced. In this regard, inclusive businesses that have been promoted by a variety of actors – despite positive cases – fell short of the expected outcomes, particularly in terms of providing a sustainable alternative income source and of building socio-economic inclusion. The emphasis that at the end of the 2000s was put on inclusive business models was framed in a mainstream approach that saw poverty reduced as a result of market integration. Mozambique and its agricultural sector have changed significantly over the last ten years, and market integration of small farmers remains a priority, now to be achieved through approaches aimed at the strengthening of value chains. While this view might provide a broader understanding of the different obstacles that small farmers face in accessing markets, we argue that important lessons might be learned from how the inclusive business model has developed and impacted rural livelihood strategies.

From our case studies, we argue that participating in contract-farming activities – the form that inclusive business models took most of the time – has rarely been an instrument of social mobility for smallholders: it provides cash revenue, often for a limited time, which enables consumption smoothing but not a shift to emerging farmers (Smart and Hanlon, 2014). These revenues are usually small (close to the minimum wage in the agriculture sector) and part of a contractual structure that leaves little to no space for small farmers to negotiate better conditions or to voice their requests. Formal and enforceable contracts are often missing, the purchase of the final production by the enterprise is not always guaranteed, the dependence of farmers on a single buyer had increased instead of reduced, and the lack of a comprehensive gender strategy to address gender-based discrimination can result in disempowering outcomes given the socio-economic, and gendered context in which these changes – involving multiple and overlapping interests – are taking place. Overall, the business relationship between companies and farmers might benefit from a more comprehensive dialogue involving local institutions that could play a regulatory role and create a space for farmers to voice their requests.

Far from transforming farmers into entrepreneurs, these contracts seem to provide extra revenue for households during hardships, crises and food shortages,

without substantially stabilizing incomes or making the overall livelihood strategy more secure. We also argue that further possibilities might be explored as the Mozambican rural scenario changes rapidly, and small farmers and rural communities are asked to adapt to the impact of chronic crises and become resilient. Based on our observations, we highlight how small-farmers' associations – their fragilities notwithstanding – can create a space for learning, mutual exchange, and access to inputs, information and credit, where both women and men recognize themselves, first and foremost, as skilled producers. Small-farmers' associations could therefore be a promising entry point also for addressing gender-based discrimination that is perceived as given but that, in fact, also reflects exclusion patterns from market access and, in turn, constrains women's capacity to produce and commercialize their crops. This potential role of small-farmers' associations is clearly not free from possible conflicts, and neither is it independent of a greater responsiveness of public policies and development actors to changes occurring in rural Mozambique and to the vulnerabilities of rural populations.

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Chapter 8

THE AGRI-FOOD SYSTEM AND COMPETITIVENESS STRATEGIES IN VALUE CHAINS IN MOZAMBIQUE: A CASE STUDY OF MAIZE, COWPEA AND SUGAR

Rabia Aiuba
Yara Nova

Introduction

The concept of agri-food systems was first discussed in the 1980s from the perspective of political economy approaches to agricultural geography, in the context of the globalized food-production system and the increasing loss of control by farmers and farming organizations over food-production processes (Castree, Kitchin and Rogers, 2013; Malassis, 1988, p. 193). They defined an agri-food system as being composed of 'all activities that contribute to the food function in a given society at a given time, as well as the regulatory mechanisms of that system'. Agri-food systems have the primary functions of supplying food, providing for nutritional needs, and contributing to the development of economies (Barbosa et al., 2012). The study of agri-food systems enhances knowledge of the economic, political and social mechanisms that are behind the production and distribution of food. This facilitates the development of strategies for each stage of production and greater integration of the producer into the market (Aiuba, 2018).

In recent years, through the process of globalization and the inflow of foreign capital for investment in agriculture and natural resources, there have been changes in local agri-food systems. This is a result of gradual changes in the different stages of the production chains, the increasing inflow of foreign capital for the production of agricultural commodities, increased openness to foreign markets, the addition of new products to the diet of Mozambicans, the entrance of new economic agents, changes in the tastes and preferences of consumers, etc. (Joala et al., 2016.; Mosca, Bruna and Mandamule, 2016).¹

Production chain analysis allows us to establish the agents involved, the types of interaction, the competitive strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, and the structure and governance. It also allows important issues to be raised, such as: (1) where along the chain the value is concentrated; (2) who the beneficiaries are; (3) the pricing, financing and subsidies, investment, research and development

programmes, technical assistance and extension policies; and (4) how the added value is distributed along the value chain (Nova, 2018).

The performance of a value chain can be measured by its ability to generate added value, as well as the dependencies, interactions and relationships that can be created between the agents involved in the value chain. Thus, the development of value chains may represent a response to the low incomes of the producers, their difficulties in accessing markets and even food insecurity (Confederação das Associações Económicas de Moçambique, 2012; Nova, 2018).

The government plays an important role in the dynamics of value chains. In recent years in Mozambique there have been investments in production equipment (tractors, irrigation systems, storage infrastructure, transport and communications) and in training professionals specializing in agricultural production abroad.

For this chapter we have referred to the Food Production Action Plan (PAPA), the Agricultural Marketing Strategy (ECA) and the Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agrarian Sector (PEDSA). These were adopted to increase production by developing programmes to boost the agricultural sector in general, and each of the stages of some of the production chains of particular food crops. This chapter analyses the value chains of maize, sugar and cowpea within the Mozambican agri-food system, in order to identify the main stages and value added. It also analyses government plans and strategies that focus on the agri-food system and value chains in order to identify the stages and products on which they concentrate and how they meet the needs of these value chains.

Methodology

The maize and cowpea value chains are important in Mozambique: data from the Integrated Agrarian Survey showed that in 2015 around 72.5 per cent of small and medium enterprises produced maize and 41.2 per cent of them produced cowpea (Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar, 2016). The sugar value chain is a case of a successful and organized oligopoly in the Mozambican agricultural sector, with production directed at both the domestic and foreign markets. The data presented in this article were collected from three cities in the main regions of Mozambique (Maputo, Beira and Nampula), as these are the cities used to calculate national inflation for national statistics. The data used to calculate the added value were from mid-2017 and 2018, with the exceptions detailed below.

Maize: the price charged by the retailer was calculated from the average price in a weekly survey conducted by Observatório do Meio Rural (OMR) at the main markets in the cities of Maputo,² Beira³ and Nampula.⁴ The price paid to local traders was calculated from the average in the production areas. The price of maize meal was the average of three big brands (Top Score, Pembe and Mariana) in the major northern, central and southern markets (in Nampula, Beira and Maputo).

Cowpea: the producer price was the average price paid to the producer (data from the Agricultural Market Information System [Sistema de Informação de Mercados Agrícolas]) in 2015. The average price per kilogram of cowpea paid to

wholesalers in Maputo was based on the price of a 50-kilogram bag. The average price charged by retailers was based on a weekly survey conducted by OMR at the main markets in Maputo, Beira and Nampula.

Sugar: the producer price is the 2018 price in Nhamatanda District, Sofala Province. At the processing stage, the price was the purchase price at sugar factories, which was the price the National Sugar Distributor (the DNA) paid the companies in 2016.

The Mozambican agri-food system

Malassis (1988, p. 193) defined an agri-food system as a system composed of ‘all activities that contribute to the food function in a given society at a given time, as well as the regulatory mechanisms of that system.’ An agri-food system comprises all the value chains of a given place at a given time, regardless of the level of contribution of each product to national production.

In the Mozambican agri-food system, the distribution of production across the country is quite uneven. Agricultural production is mainly carried out in the northern and central regions, and due to the poor condition of the communication routes, supply to the southern region has been the most problematic. Within this system, market structures in Mozambique vary according to the type of crop, and basic foods (mainly maize, peanuts and beans) are bought directly from producers or through wholesale or retail agents.

The predominance of imperfect market structures (oligopolies and monopolistic competition), combined with storage problems, low levels of training and information from the markets and about prices, weak negotiating capacity, and the lack of liquidity to meet household expenses, all increase the need of small farmers, in particular, to sell their production soon after harvest (Nova, 2018).

In the Mozambican agri-food system, the majority of the production is carried out on small plots of land (small farmers), mainly for self-subsistence, with low capitalization. There is low industrialization and high commercialization of food in the informal market. These producers have difficulties integrating into the formal market and value chains. Agriculture carried out using intensive agricultural chemicals and machinery is practised by a small number of producers and crop groups, and financed by internal and external capital (Aiuba, 2018). One of the biggest implications of large external and internal capital investments in agriculture is the increased insecurity regarding land ownership among small producers, since most small farmers subsist on traditional lands without a Right of Use and Exploitation of Land (DUAT). According to Joala et al. (2016) in a paper on the impact of large agri-investments on the right to food, a survey of several small farmers in Mozambique and Zambia indicated that they feel insecure about the land due to new agri-investors in the area with a DUAT.

This analysis of the Mozambican agri-food system (see Figure 8.1) provides a valuable background for all the stages of agricultural value chains in general and the main interconnections of food from production (on small, medium and large farms) to final consumers.




Figure 8.1 The Mozambican agri-food system.

Source: Aiuba (2018).

Inputs

According to the 2008 Agricultural Household Sample Survey (TIA), the use of agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, is low in the national agri-food system, accounting for only 5 per cent of farms (Guanziroli and Guanziroli, 2015). Data from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar, 2015) showed that about 4.6 per cent of farms used chemical fertilizers, 4.7 per cent used pesticides and 8.8 per cent were irrigated. The low use of agrochemicals is due mainly to financial constraints, difficulties in obtaining financing, limited access to input retailers, low incentives to use inputs, uncertainty in relation to the prices of products on the market, and limited information on the benefits and more efficient use of these products (Benson, Cunguara and Mogues, 2014; Guanziroli and Guanziroli, 2015).

In general, farmers who have access to improved inputs in rural areas are those belonging to higher-income groups. Small-scale production uses rudimentary tools for agriculture, in addition, this group still face serious difficulties in obtaining transport and production processing. Draught animals are used in areas where there are plenty of cattle (Cunguara et al., 2013; Guanziroli and Guanziroli, 2015; Uaiene, 2015). The factors that affect fertilizer prices in Mozambique are the (high) transport costs, exchange rate variations, government taxes (value added tax, import duty, etc.) and the low numbers of suppliers (Benson, Cunguara and Mogues, 2012; Matenene, 2015; Uaiene, 2015).

The use of improved seed varies: formal seed supply meets about 10 per cent of agricultural needs, informal seed supply meets about 20 per cent, and farmers supply the rest from their own production. Informal seed distribution and exchange is most common for crops produced for self-consumption, such as cereals, vegetables and tubers (Pereira and Heemskerk, 2012; Uaiene, 2015).⁵

Agricultural production

This is mostly carried out in associations by the household sector (about 99.7 per cent of food crop production) and a rain-fed system for self-consumption. The areas of greatest production are the central and northern regions of the country (in 2015, the two areas produced 71 per cent, 75 per cent, 93 per cent, and 84 per cent of the cereals, groundnuts, beans and tubers in the country, respectively). The main crops are tubers, cereals and vegetables (Abbas, 2015; Uaiene, 2015). Although the vast majority of people are involved in food production, Mozambique has high levels of dependence on food imports, which contributes to the widening trade deficit. Foreign investment in agriculture focuses on production for the market, especially for export. Investments in agribusiness 'are implemented by medium and large companies and/or through subcontracting, integrating small producers in value chains, and/or also for the promotion of what is known as emerging farmers'⁶ (Mosca et al., 2016, p. 97).

In Mozambique, around 90 per cent of the women of working age work in the fields (Fórum Mulher, 2019). Despite their important role in agricultural production, especially food crops, women's participation in the rural context has been limited due to reduced access to economic resources (for example, access to credit is limited by the low literacy levels and lack of identification documents) and vital resources for the production process (land,⁷ water and agrarian extension services), and having to juggle work outside the home with the responsibilities of household work and family care. However, there has been an empowerment of women in rural areas, mainly thanks to education and campaigns aimed at postponing the conception of the first child (Agy, 2019). Casimiro (2011) adds that women's involvement in associations and income-generating activities contributes to their economic and social emancipation.

Financing

Agricultural activity is financed by informal credit, credit from suppliers, bank loans, foreign direct investment, and subsidies, among others (Bettencourt, 2014). Access to credit as well to other forms of financing for agriculture is limited and decreasing. Data from the Bank of Mozambique (2018) show that credit for agriculture was about 3.5 per cent of total bank credit in the Mozambican economy in 2017. However, the proportion of credit to other sectors, such as the service sector, has been increasing each year.

Medium- and large-scale investment in the agricultural sector is usually allocated to areas such as forests, agro-processing and crops for export. These cultures usually have specific characteristics regarding the type of investments and the market in which they operate. It has been stated that if that portion were subtracted from the total investment in the agricultural sector, less than 5 per cent would be destined for food crops (Mosca et al., 2013; Mosca and Selemane, 2013). The government has public policies for promoting the agricultural sector, such as public investment (in, for example, building infrastructure), research and extension services, tariffs and subsidies (Aiuba, 2018).

The food industry

The agro-industrial sector is underdeveloped and can be divided into two sectors: industrial, consisting of 174 medium-sized and large companies concentrated in urban and rural centres, and the rest, consisting of micro- and small companies (Ministério da Agricultura, 2009 Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2002). In 2016, the food industry contributed about 20.5 per cent to national industrial production (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2017). The obstacles that limit the growth of Mozambican agroindustry are related to markets, infrastructure deficiencies, obsolete technology, low labour capacity and industry transformation, high prices, and poor quality and irregularity in the supply of inputs (Ministério da Indústria e Comércio, 2013; Ministério da Agricultura, 2009).

Commercialization

Although the biggest proportion of production is for self-consumption, agricultural commercialization plays an important role in the rural economy, and it is one of the main sources of revenue for the population in these areas. If well organized and developed, it can be one of the main drivers of rural development. Basic food is commercialized through various channels (direct purchase from producers or through wholesale or retail agents). Food is mainly bought in informal markets.

The retail sector can be divided into three groups: (1) micro-retailers or family-owned stores (which operate mainly in the informal sector); (2) small and medium-sized retailers; and (3) large supermarkets and hypermarkets (in most of the products are imported) (Pokhrel, Pimpão and Bolnick, 2015). Within the rural areas, commercialization of agricultural products takes place in shops, tents, stalls, and by local merchants. Agricultural fairs are held regularly, where agricultural inputs and capital goods are also traded (Ministério da Indústria e Comércio, 2013).

Strategies for agriculture in Mozambique

Public policies are instruments used by the state to ensure citizens' rights. In agriculture, the public policies are aimed mainly at correcting market distortions and stimulating domestic production in order to guarantee producers' incomes, national supplies and consumer protection.

Mozambique, being a country where agriculture is still mostly for self-consumption and is dependent on natural conditions and the use of rudimentary inputs, needs joint private and public efforts to develop the sector, using the available resources in the most efficient and effective way. The plans and strategies presented below show part of the guidelines drawn up by the Mozambican government for the agriculture sector using the value-chain approach, with the main purpose of increasing the sector's production, productivity and competitiveness.

Food-Production Action Plan (Plano de Acção para a Procução de Alimentos [PAPA]) 2008-2011

The Plano de Acção para a Procução de Alimentos (PAPA) was created by the Mozambican government in 2008, with the objective of promoting agrarian production and food self-sufficiency and reducing dependence on imports. The strategies were designed to intervene at all stages of value chains. The plan was drawn up in the context of a global food crisis, rising fuel prices and climate change, which had direct impacts on production. According to Mosca (2011), with the creation of this plan, the government intended to both strengthen food production and solicit more resources from donors for agriculture.

PAPA's priority was to increase the production, productivity and competitiveness of crops that were essential to the domestic market as well as the external market, and value chains, taking into account the agro-ecological potential of the areas of the action plan. Programmes were defined for each product, covering the following

aspects: seed production, import of fertilizers, agricultural mechanization, irrigation systems, phytosanitary campaigns, extension and research. Some funding programmes were created to support the private sector. These funds were from the government budget and from donors in the private sector, and were mainly focused on agro-industrial, transport and production equipment.⁸

In general, according to Mosca (2011), with this plan, the government intended that the producers would increase their production to solve the food supply deficit in the market, avoid imports, reduce food aid, and eventually obtain foreign currency with exports, through policies using subsidized inputs (seeds, irrigation, research, etc.). However, favourable macroeconomic policies were hardly ever applied to agricultural production and the rural environment.⁹

Agricultural Marketing Strategy (Estratégia de Comercialização Agrícola [ECA]) - I and II

The *Estratégia de Comercialização Agrícola* (ECA) was created based on economic and development policies, with the aim of minimizing constraints, and improving and developing agricultural commercialization, by carrying out a series of actions at an inter-sectoral level in the value chain.

The ECA is in line with the objectives contained in the government's Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) and Commercial Policy and Strategy (PEC), particularly in the following aspects: (1) facilitation of the commercialization process; (2) food safety; (3) sustainable economic and social development; (4) reduction of external economic dependence; and (5) mitigation of poverty levels. The ECA defined as priorities the development of actions for agricultural commercialization (directly and indirectly linked to agricultural commercialization), the promotion of investment in appropriate market infrastructures, the creation of product standards and the certification of product quality, the creation of support services for commercialization such as credit, and the promotion of the development of agro-industries in rural areas.¹⁰

Integrated agricultural marketing plan (Plano Integrado de Comercialização Agrícola [PICA]) 2013-2020

Plano Integrado de Comercialização Agrícola (PICA) (2013-2020) is an operationalization instrument of PEDSA for agricultural marketing on a multi-sector level, led by the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The aim was to mitigate the constraints identified through the value chain to improve commercialization and stimulate production and productivity growth through actions to improve technical assistance, investments in infrastructure such as irrigation systems, warehouses, access roads, commercial extension networks, systems and research, as well as support for commercialization services.¹¹

Strategic plan for agrarian sector development (Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário [PEDSA]) 2011-2020

Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento do Sector Agrário (PEDSA) was developed by the Ministry of Agriculture. The overall objective was 'to contribute to the

food security, income, and profitability of agricultural producers and increase market-oriented agricultural production in a fast, competitive, and sustainable manner' (Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar, 2009, p. 34). The approach to the implementation and operationalization of PEDSA was based on value chains, taking into account all the activities related to: (1) providing inputs; (2) agricultural production; and (3) processing and marketing added value to agricultural products, livestock, forestry and wildlife.

PEDSA aimed to establish public-private partnerships and subsidies for technological packages, mechanization and electricity, especially for food production, as instruments that would induce the proposed growth levels (Mosca, 2011). For this purpose, PEDSA proposed the development of four strategic pillars with the specific objectives of increasing production, productivity and competitiveness, improving market infrastructures and services, the rationalization of the use of natural resources (land, water, forests and wildlife), and the strengthening of agricultural institutions, the legal framework, and conducive agricultural investment policies.

Overall, the analysis of government plans and strategies confirms that there is a particular interest in the increase of agricultural production, productivity and competitiveness based on an agri-food system approach, focusing on some stages of value chains (inputs, infrastructures and credit) and commodities for domestic consumption (cereals, tubers and oilseeds) and for export. This strategic plan, along with others, culminated in projects such as the building/repair of warehouses (currently managed by the Mozambican Commodity Exchange), irrigation systems (in the main production areas, being part of these irrigation systems managed by producers), and service centres (both privately and publicly managed).

Analysis of the maize, cowpea and sugar cane value chains

The reasons for choosing these products are as follows: (1) maize and cowpea are two of the main food crops in the Mozambican diet; (2) sugar cane is a cash crop with a production structure directed at the domestic and foreign markets. Production chain analysis allows us to highlight the agents involved, the forms of interaction, and how the added value is performed and distributed along the chain. The analysis is also a strategic way to identify the stages that present competitive advantages within an interconnected system from production to consumption.

Maize value chain

Inputs

Farmers mainly use seeds from previous government campaigns, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the private sector (see Figure 8.2). The seeds from the government and NGOs are improved. In some campaigns, the government subsidizes part of the price of certified seeds, providing them to small producers in particular. The private-sector production and marketing of improved seed maize in Mozambique is carried out by small businesses and




Figure 8.2 The maize value chain.

Source: the authors.

larger-scale enterprises (Bauaze, 2014; Siteo, 2014). According to data from the Integrated Agrarian Survey, on average 8.7 per cent of farms used improved seeds, all of which were concentrated in the central region, especially the province of Tete (20.8 per cent) (Ministério da Agricultura e Segurança Alimentar, 2015).

Agricultural production

In Mozambique maize is produced mainly by small producers (mainly for self-subsistence, using intensive labour and rudimentary equipment) and by a minority of commercial producers of surplus, so-called ‘emerging farmers’, which are often organized in associations, use improved inputs, practise monoculture, and commercialize most of the production (Nova, 2018).¹² In a study by Mutondo (2015), it was found that small producers’ maize production is usually from

unimproved seeds. Maize is produced by approximately 69 per cent of farmers and is one of the most important crops for the Mozambican consumption (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2011). It is produced mainly in the central and northern regions of the country.

Processing

The processing of maize is done in three ways: manually by families, usually for self-consumption; by small and medium mills, mainly in rural areas, which buy the raw material from the local population (Tschirley, Abdula and Weber, 2005); and by large mills and wholesalers (in the commercialization stage, between storage and processing), which act in an oligopolistic manner due to the few companies in operation. The agents in this stage of the chain (the processing stage) are responsible for adding the greatest value to two types of traders: retailers and exporters, as can be seen in Table 8.1.

Commercialization

Maize is commercialized by different types of economic agents and through different channels (see Figure 8.2). This market appears to be a monopoly when analysing the number of producers, buyers and product characteristics (products are similar), but in practice not all the characteristics of this market structure are observable, as buyers usually have the power to influence the price and the producers are essentially price takers.

As can be seen in the value chain, maize is marketed by different types of agents. At the base of the value chain, there are the national producers (small and medium) and associations of producers, while at the distribution stage there are the wholesalers, private traders and retailers. The national producers are mainly subsistence producers that sell part of their production surplus, mainly at local markets within a radius of 10–15 kilometres from the production area. In this niche market the quality standards requirements are reduced.

Producer associations sell to different traders, seen through the relationships with different agents (wholesalers and retailers) in the distribution stage of the chain. Depending on the type of agent, prices are decided based on the transaction costs, the information exchange system of prices among potential markets, the profit margin of producers, the product quality, storage costs, post-harvest losses, and the manufacturing process (separation of the grain and husk). However, both small producers or associations of producers face difficulties, namely (1) a lack of agricultural tools, (2) limited technology and (3) difficulty in accessing credit, which limits their ability to integrate into the market (Cunguara et al., 2013; Feijó and Dadá, 2018; Nova, 2018).

Small producers sell less than 20 per cent of their production, usually at a relatively low price due to low quality resulting from low inputs and non-production processing, which brings, among other things, reduced negotiating power (Nova, 2018). Local traders and wholesalers sell maize to the processing companies and retailers. Retailers mainly buy maize through three distribution channels: (1) wholesalers, who buy from producers' associations, which offer a higher-quality product than small producers; (2) local traders - these are supplied by small producers and producers of the so-called 'emerging farmers', providing




Table 8.1 Distribution of added value along the maize value chain (percentage contribution)

maize to retailers mainly in the case of deficit stocks; and (3) wholesalers and processing companies, which buy maize from different types of producers and sell their processed products at a higher price compared to other agents (Nova, 2018). The high transaction costs (mainly those associated with logistics), poor and inappropriate storage conditions, and information asymmetry (differentiated pricing information on markets and potential markets) by producers lead to lower-quality products, contributing to the loss of bargaining power for sales and reducing the value added.¹³

From Table 8.1 it can be seen that the added value is mainly at the processing stage, being about 35 per cent of the final product value. In addition to the operating costs for the processing of grain into meal, the costs of transport from the production areas to the processing companies (large firms are concentrated in the south of the country) have an influence on the final price of maize. Thus, agents that operate in this stage added the highest value, as can be seen in the table. Small producers are at a disadvantage in the marketing of maize because they usually sell it at a relatively low price compared to other stages as a result of the poor quality of the product (low use of improved seeds, farm inputs, and poor storage conditions). Also, the lack of information on markets and difficulty in disposing of production, which implies lower yields, affect their ability to save and then invest in stages with more added value.

Cowpea value chain

Inputs

The cowpea is one of the crops that are most attacked by pests and diseases. To combat these, producers resort to using insecticides, biopesticides or integrated pest management (Walker et al., 2016). Producers have access to improved seeds

from the private sector, subsidized NGOs and the government (Aiuba, 2018). The use of inorganic fertilizers is low, with the only usage recorded being in Tete Province in 2011 by 9.2 per cent of the small farmers in that province (Mather, Cunguara and Tschirley, 2015).

Agricultural production

The cowpea is a staple food and is one of the most widely produced crops, after cassava, maize and sorghum, being grown by about 44 per cent of producers (Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2011; Bolsa de Mercadorias de Moçambique, 2016). The cowpea is produced mainly in the northern and central regions, by two types of producers: small producers (on small farms, for self-consumption and to sell the surplus) and commercial producers of surplus, called ‘emerging farmers’, which often, as in maize, are organized into associations (see Figure 8.3) (Nova, 2018).




Figure 8.3 The cowpea value chain.

Source: the authors.

Commercialization


Only about 10 per cent is to be marketed. In addition to the regions surrounding the production areas, cowpea is sold in the southern markets (Walker, Cunguara and Donovan, 2016). The commercial producers provide product to local traders and wholesalers, who sell directly in local markets. Taking into account the number of participants in the commercialization of goods on the supply side (10 per cent of the production), who have the power to influence the price, the market resembles an oligopoly. Local traders buy the cowpea from small producers and associations, and supply retailers who, in turn, sell on to the consumer market, both domestic and foreign.

Wholesalers have the largest proportion of the added value along the cowpea chain, accounting for about 64 per cent (see Table 8.2). Since it is mainly produced in the northern and central parts of the country, when it is sold in the southern markets, the price is high, principally because of high transport and storage costs. In the cowpea chain, due to the lack of industry investment, and as the crop is mainly produced for self-consumption and needs little processing, the value accumulation process is reduced.

Sugar value chain

Inputs

The production of sugar cane occupies about 60 per cent of the irrigated area of the country. It is among the crops that use the most fertilizer, which is purchased on the domestic and foreign markets. It is estimated that in 2010 sugar cane, along with tobacco, accounted for approximately 90 per cent of fertilizer use (Benson, Cunguara and Mogues, 2014; Ministério da Agricultura, 2013).



	Producer	Wholesaler	Retail
Price at the agent (MZM/Kg)	16.5	29	37.50
Added value	-	+12.5	+8.5
Added value in relation to the base price (producer)	-	+12.5	21

Table 8.2 Distribution of added value along the cowpea value chain (percentage contribution)




Figure 8.4 The sugar value chain.

Source: the authors.

Agricultural production

The sugar companies combine the sugar cane from their own plantations (more than 80 per cent), associations of small-scale producers, and independent private producers, who are outgrowers in the surrounding communities, in a typical oligopoly structure (see Figure 8.4) (Pereira, 2015).

Financing

Sugar cane producers obtain financing from national financial institutions, and in some cases receive aid from international donor institutions and NGOs, such as the European Union and the African Development Bank, for instance the sugar mills managed by Tongaat Hulett (e.g. the Xinavane and Mafambisse sugar mills). The sugar cane producers, which usually have contracts with companies, have higher

access to credit and receive agrochemicals, work equipment and assistance from the sugar companies.

Commercialization

Mozambique has a centralized commercialization system for sugar, where the DNA, which owns sugar companies and uses private and public capital, distributes and wholesales the sugar from all the factories in the internal market, to retailers and to exporters. The DNA is simultaneously a monopsony (when it acquires sugar from the factories) and a monopoly (when it sells to retailers). It may also be considered a constituted company for the operation of a cartel on the part of the sugar companies.

The protectionist policy adopted by the government for the sector aims to shield the domestic sugar industry from foreign competition and promote the development and competitiveness of the sector. One of the government actions regarding this policy is the application a surcharge to the import duty when the price of imported sugar is lower than the national price (Aiuba, 2018). Protectionist policies can be advantageous for domestic sugar producers, ensuring job creation and encouraging the development and application of new technologies.¹⁴

Nevertheless, in the long term, they can make companies lose competitiveness in foreign markets due to low investment in technological innovation, and price swings (Nova, 2018).

Processing

Currently there are four operational sugar companies, consisting mainly of foreign capital, located in Maputo and Sofala Provinces (Pereira, 2015).




Table 8.3 Distribution of added value along the sugar value chain (percentage contribution)

This value chain concentrates its added value on the DNA's processing and distribution stages, which are 36 per cent and 24 per cent, respectively (see Table 8.3). The sugar processing companies act as oligopolies, which mean that they can influence the market price through the DNA, whose shareholders are the sugar companies themselves. In relation to the price paid to the producer, the added value of manufacturing, approximately 130 per cent, is higher than the amount paid to sugar producers. The price paid to the producer is relatively low, given that the time to grow sugar cane is long (twelve months), directly affecting income. Thus, sugar cane producers grow other food crops and develop other activities linked to agriculture. Although the price paid to the producer is low, the production system that they are part of means they have guaranteed market and therefore a significant amount of income.¹⁵

SWOT analysis

SWOT analysis, which is usually used in an organizational context, has the following components: Strengths and Weaknesses, which are factors that can be internally controlled and manipulated in order to achieve the organization's goals (such as organizational human resources), and Opportunities and Threats, which are external to the organization and therefore not under its control (examples include government policies). According to Phadermrod, Crowder and Wills (2019), this analysis is commonly used for analysing and positioning an organization's resources and environment. Here we use a SWOT analysis to diagnose factors in favour of and against the development of the proposed value chains, points that policymakers can use to improve the performance of the three value chains.

For sugar, the strengths identified were the existence of favourable agro-ecological conditions and protectionist policies. The weaknesses relate to processing capacity and the fact that the market structure for sugar does not give the consumer much power to negotiate the final price. The opportunities for the producers include easier access to inputs (the outgrower system), and the growth of the consumer market, both internal and international. The threats are the low prices for the producers and the entry of imported sugar into the Mozambican market, creating competition.

The strengths identified for cowpea and maize are the fact that they are produced mostly for self-consumption, they are part of the government priority crops and that there are, internally, favourable agro-ecological conditions for their production. Their weaknesses are the low use of inputs, which affects the yield per hectare, the lack of certification standards, asymmetric information in the market, and low storage capacity. The opportunities in these value chains are linked to the fact that these crops are widely internally produced and consumed. Finally, the threats are the unstable access roads and difficulties in obtaining access to credit (see Table 8.4.)

Table 8.4 SWOT analysis

	Maize	Cowpea	Sugar
Strengths	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Favourable agro-ecological conditions, mainly in the central and northern region. Maize is one of the government's priority crops. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Favourable agro-ecological conditions, mainly in the central and northern regions. Strategies and action plans by the government for the development of value chains. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Fertile soil. Proximity of production areas to processing factories. Protectionist policies to protect the internal market.
Weaknesses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production is in small areas and is mostly rain fed. Low productivity per hectare. Production mainly for family subsistence, with the surplus sold. Limited use of agricultural inputs (fertilizers, improved seeds, mechanization, among others), due to low purchasing power, with direct effects on yields per hectare and product quality. Lack of instruments to certify the production. Low capacity for processing the production. Asymmetric information among the potential markets and commercialization agents. Poor storage conditions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Production is carried out in small areas and is mostly rain fed. There are no processing units. Lack of certification standards. Low purchasing power of the small-scale producers to acquire inputs. Poor storage conditions. Asymmetric information among the potential markets and commercialization agents. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low sugar-refining capacity. Low purchasing power of small-scale producers to acquire inputs. High investment required in the processing stage. Oligopoly/monopoly of the sector, primary producers are at a disadvantage, which affects the price to final consumers.
Opportunities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consumption both domestically and in other countries. High demand, especially in urban areas. The crop is produced by about 90 per cent of the population and is an important part of the Mozambican diet. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Large direct consumption by the local population. High demand, especially in urban areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence of sugar cane derivatives, in addition to sugar. Growth of the internal market. Production carried out mainly by contracts between factories and producers. Guaranteed external market, free from import duty payments.
Threats	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> High transport costs (from production areas to the areas of greater consumption) because of unstable access roads. Poor quality of inputs. Limited access to credit. Seasonality of supply and prices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> External competition with low and stable prices. Limited access to credit. Unstable access roads, increasing prices to final consumers. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Low prices to the producers. Sugar imports. External competition with low and stable prices. Unstable access roads increase production costs and the price to final consumers.

Conclusion

In the maize value chain, the crop is commercialized through different channels and types of agents. In the process of value accumulation, the small producers are at a disadvantage as a result of their low incomes resulting from low production capacity and difficult market access. These factors directly reflect on their investment capacity at the highest value-adding stage: processing.

In the sugar value chain, added value is concentrated in the processing factories and the DNA company (whose factories are shareholders), due to the market structures (oligopoly and monopoly) having power over the final price of the product.

In the cowpea value chain, added value is concentrated in wholesalers. This is due to two factors: (1) wholesalers mostly have higher incomes that allow them to transport production from to the consumers (in the south region of the country); and (2) because of the structure of the market for the product.

The Mozambican agri-food system has characteristics that make access and competitiveness in the market difficult, especially for small producers. There have been efforts by the government to develop plans and strategies to improve the constraints faced in agricultural commercialization, the development and coordination of value chains, and the promotion of production, but small producers still face difficulties, as shown by the value chain analysis and SWOT analysis.

The set of policies, plans and strategies created by the government can be seen as attempts at integration and/or development of the value chains. Accordingly, the relationships inside the value chains seem to be isolated from these governmental instruments as well from the individual actions between agents. This is because these instruments aim to prioritize every economic agent involved in the value chains, but in practice this rarely occurs – only in some particular cases, as with the sugar value chain, where agents and the stages of the value chain are connected and there is governmental support specifically targeting the value chain.

The policies and strategies based on the agri-food system/value chain have mainly benefited medium producers (both commercial and emerging producers) and large producers (companies), while small producers have continued to be marginalized. In the long term this can lead to increased inequalities and the relative impoverishment of the majority of producers.

One of the biggest issues with the agrarian policies in Mozambique is that, on the one hand, many policies, programmes and strategies overlap, which weakens their efficiency and effectiveness. On the other hand, despite the fact that agriculture has been deemed to be the basis of national development, there have been inconsistencies and constant variations in the development model and growth pattern (in recent years this has been associated with the mining sector). There has also been some national instability, given that there have already been twelve ministers of agriculture over the forty-five years of the country's independence. Hence, it is important to create an agricultural policy that provides the agricultural model that Mozambique really needs, along with general guidelines to achieve it.

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Chapter 9

RURAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE FAMILY FARMERS OF THE LOWER LIMPOPO

Juliana Porsani

Introduction

In the last decade, particularly after the recent global food price spikes (2007–2008 and 2010–2011), scholars have devoted considerable attention to the rush of private agricultural land deals, also called ‘land acquisitions’ or ‘land concessions’, in the Global South (De Schutter, 2011; GRAIN, 2012; Hall, 2013). Mozambique, a country deemed to have large tracts of available and fertile land, has been the locus of several land concessions and is therefore the object of analysis of an increasing number of studies (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; Edelman, Oya and Borrás, 2013; Nhatumbo and Salomão, 2010).

This chapter examines the local processes and livelihood implications of a land concession of 20,000 hectares to a Chinese company in southern Mozambique in 2012. The overarching guiding questions are as follows: how do private land investments occur at particular sites? How and why are livelihoods being affected by these investments (e.g. by the loss of land versus the creation of new livelihood opportunities)? In general, what livelihood trends are driven by investments at the local level, and how do these trends affect livelihoods from the household and gender perspectives?

This chapter draws on the work done for my PhD thesis, and uses primary data collected over three months in 2013 and two months in 2017 through participatory focus group discussions and interviews with local farmers, officials from a local non-governmental organization (NGO), the local government and the Chinese company (Porsani, 2020; Porsani, Börjeson and Lehtilä, 2017; Porsani, Caretta and Lehtilä, 2019; Porsani and Lalander, 2018).¹

Agricultural transformation efforts in post-independence Mozambique

After independence in 1975, through the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) government, Mozambique declared its Marxist–Leninist orientation in 1977 and

committed itself to centralized planning. Some of the large fields abandoned by Portuguese settlers and companies were taken over by local farmers, but there was little active redistribution of private commercial plantations and Portuguese settlers' fields among family farmers. Instead, many colonial fields were turned into state farms or communal fields and villages, where family farmers were expected to work, respectively, as wage labourers or together in cooperatives. The assumption was that these settings countered the fragmentation of landholdings and fostered division of labour, mechanization and economies of scale (Mosca, 2011, p. 60; O'Laughlin, 1995).

Mechanized state farms were deemed to be the fastest and most appropriate way to increase production, whereas the family sector was perceived as outdated and bound to disappear (World Bank, 1988, pp. 2-3). In other words, since 'individual farmers would become members of cooperatives or labourers on state farms within a matter of a few years [...] it has been considered that there was no real justification for giving priority to family farmers' (Tarp, 1984, p. 10). According to Mosca (2011, p. 110), in 1986, only 2 per cent of the total credit for the agrarian sector went to cooperatives and family farming.

Nonetheless, despite the bulk of the resources being destined for state farms, they were very inefficient producers (Dinerman, 2001; Mosca, 2011, p. 111). Due to a variety of different factors (e.g. incorrect timing of operations and inexperienced management), the costs of imported and expensive inputs (e.g. seeds, fertilizers and pesticides) could exceed the value of the output (World Bank, 1988, p. ii). In addition, the work in state farms and cooperatives competed with farmers' work in their own fields (CEA, 1979; O'Laughlin, 1981). Furthermore, the sudden departure of Portuguese traders deprived local farms of outlets in which they could purchase or sell agricultural goods (Cravinho, 1998). Last but certainly not least, the ongoing Civil War (1976/7-1992) disrupted the transport system, displaced people, made living in rural areas dangerous and even more difficult, and directed the bulk of 'resources to defence rather than development' (Lunstrum, 2008, p. 340). These combined factors contribute to explaining why agricultural production, both on state and family farms, had collapsed by the early 1980s (Mosca, 2011, pp. 97-103).

In 1983, the liberalization and promotion of market-led policies was initiated, and in 1987, a formal programme promoting the market economy was approved: the Economic Rehabilitation Programme. As explained in a World Bank report (1988, p. 5), 'the government has recognized the need to increase the pace and broaden the scope of reform measures [...] focused on several central macroeconomic policy issues, including the exchange rate and trade policies, pricing policies, the budget and credit, and on policy and institutional reforms in the key sectors of agriculture, industry, and transport'. In the agricultural sphere, these reforms marked a shift in the profile of the government from interventionist to facilitator and regulator. Accordingly, Mozambique's market-led approach implied the contraction of the state in all stages of agriculture, including production (subsidies, provision of inputs, extension and research), storage, processing and marketing.

The idea behind these reforms was basically to make prices responsive to markets, so that monetary devaluation, combined with the deregulation, and downscaling of the state apparatus, would increase overall economic efficiency (Mosca, 2011, pp. 113, 122, 141). However, in practice, the rolling back of the state meant that family farmers lost the meagre official support they had, and commercial dealers that marketed production benefited directly from the reforms (Mosca, 2011, p. 113). Furthermore, trade liberalization, despite monetary devaluation, meant that national producers started to face growing competition from countries such as South Africa (Mosca, 2011, p. 135; World Bank, 1988, p. 76).

The promotion of private agricultural investment in Mozambique has taken place in this context. Accordingly, 'the state was seen to facilitate the release of market forces and the "unchaining" of the private entrepreneur' (Havnevik et al., 2007, p. 16). The prevailing belief is that the expansion of agricultural business, whether national or foreign, can lead to agricultural transformation. This belief is enshrined in some of Mozambique's main policy and legal documents as well as in its agricultural programmes and plans, such as the National Land Policy and Agricultural Policy (Mozambican Republic, 1995a, 1995b); the Land Law (Mozambican Republic, 1997); the Programme for Agricultural Strategy and Expenditure (PROAGRI, late 1990s to 2011); the Strategic Plan for the Development of the Agrarian Sector (PEDSA, 2011 to 2020); and the National Plan for Agricultural Investment (PNISA, 2013-2017). Although these instruments are not exhaustive of the agricultural sector, they cover most of the liberal (post-socialist) time and, due to their national scope and rather overlapping views, may be deemed representative of the government's agricultural vision in this period.

Overall, this agricultural and land framework builds on two central underlying assumptions, namely that (1) private investors are essential and (2) family farmers are essentially private actors who will become more business- or commercially minded under the right conditions and following the right incentives. These documents recognize, however, that many farmers will not be able to undergo the transformation from producing in small plots, mainly with family labour and for subsistence, relying on rainfall and almost without mechanization and inputs, to producing in larger plots, with hired labour and mainly for profit, relying on expensive technological packages (machines and equipment, seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides, etc.).

Therefore, these documents also reinforce the idea that family farmers should form groups or associations so that they are better able to become commercially oriented (Mozambican Republic, 2013, p. 56). Another suggestion for those unable to upgrade their production is to join contract-farming schemes so as to improve their access to technological packages and thus increase the quantity and quality of their agricultural output (Mozambican Republic, 2011a, p. 42). For farmers who do not take any of these routes, the documents imply that market expansion will boost employment opportunities (Mozambican Republic, 2011a, p. 62).

To ensure a synergistic relation between businesses and the heterogeneous group of family farmers, a clear legal framework on rights over land was deemed critical. The need for regulation for the transfer of land-use rights to secure land

tenure for citizens and investors had previously been indicated in the National Land Policy. Such legislation should oblige 'any entity or person [...] to negotiate with the local community. This way the community can become a partner in the investment, sharing the profits and benefits resulting from it' (Mozambican Republic, 1995a, point 25). Accordingly, an extensive body of legislation has been created. In 1997, Mozambique's most recent Land Law was approved, replacing the previous Land Law of 1979 and its Regulation of 1986. The 1997 Land Law (1) maintained all land and natural resources as state property; (2) recognized the customary right to land and the right to land used for at least ten years (so-called 'good faith occupation'); and (3) required investors seeking land to acquire land-use titles, i.e. a *Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento de Terras* (DUAT; a Right of Use and Exploitation of Land) (Mozambican Republic, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2010a, 2011b).

Furthermore, according to the Land Law, when the land targeted by an investor is used by local farmers, the provision of the DUAT is conditional on the approval of these farmers, who may decide whether to cede the land and the terms of the eventual exchange. These encounters between investors and communities occur through community consultations, and are regulated by additional legislation (Mozambican Republic, 1998, 2010a, 2011b).

Mozambique's legislative framework seeks to enable the expansion of large-scale private land concessions while not only safeguarding family farmers' land rights but also allowing them to negotiate and possibly benefit from the deal (see Åkesson, Calengo and Tanner, 2009; Tanner and Baleira, 2006). Nonetheless, as the legislative framework corroborates ultimate state control over all land, it also safeguards the state's land rights in relation to all land users. Accordingly, if the state deems a piece of land to be of national interest, then it has the legal right to expropriate the land's users, even if they have the right to information, participation and compensation for eventual livelihood impairment (Mozambican Republic, 2007, 2008, 2010b, 2012, 2014). Overall, the legal recognition of customary rights and of good faith occupation, along with the obligation of investors to acquire DUATs, contingent on community consent, contributes to explaining why Mozambique's legal framework has been described as one of 'the most promising legal frameworks in Sub-Saharan Africa' (Kloock-Jenson, 2000) and why private land investments have been framed as potential win-win drivers of agricultural transformation (CFS, 2014, pp. 3-4; FAO, IFAD, UNCTAD and World Bank, 2010, pp. 1-2).

The research area: The Lower Limpopo Valley

In the Lower Limpopo Valley, in 2010, the public company Regadio do Baixo Limpopo (RBL) was created with the mandate to support investors' establishment and operations and maintain the local irrigation infrastructure. The area under RBL's administration is near the town of Xai-Xai, approximately 215 kilometres from Maputo, and it has been deemed as ideal for the production of rice, vegetables, cattle and poultry (Mozambican Republic, 2011a, p. 60; Mozambican Republic, 2013, p. 18).

This region is also where a previous *colonato* (colonial settlement) was established in the 1950s (and further expanded in the 1960s through the Junta Autónoma do Povoamento Agrário do Baixo Limpopo). It was then that irrigation infrastructure was first constructed, enabling Portuguese settlers and ‘assimilated’² Mozambicans to practise irrigated agriculture and access loans and grants (Bowen, 2000; Roesch, 1991). This period saw the first large-scale land eviction in the area, through which Mozambican farmers had to cede the best farmland to Portuguese settlers, who set up cotton and rice monocultures (Roesch, 1991). Following independence in 1975, most farms were abandoned by the Portuguese. While some of the land could be taken over by Mozambican family farmers, a portion of the land was turned over to cooperatives, communal fields and state farms under the administration of the state company Unidade de Produção do Baixo Limpopo (Munslow, 1984, p. 211).

In 2010, 70,000 hectares were placed under the administration of RBL. In this area, in 2012, the Chinese company Wanbao Africa Agriculture Development LLC (Wanbao) received a 20,000-hectare land concession to cultivate rice. Wanbao’s land is located on the east and west sides of the Limpopo River, near the EN1 national road. In Wanbao’s first season, the area was hit by floods, which led to a major loss of production. In the following seasons (the 2014–2017 harvests), Wanbao restricted cultivation to the east side of the river. Cultivation on the west side was put on hold, and the land has since been grazed by the local cattle.³ In mid-2017, Wanbao used approximately 8,300 hectares.

The local process and implications

The lack of consultations (or, alternatively, information and compensation for dispossessed land users)

When Wanbao arrived, there was virtually no unused land on either side of the river: all land was used mainly for farming or animal husbandry. The east side of the river includes the area that was first upgraded with irrigation and drainage channels during the colonial period. Historically, there has been mixture of land uses on both sides of the river: family land that farmers obtained in line with customary norms down the generations and land that had been colonial or state farms and then occupied by local farmers when left fallow.

In some locations, information about the land concession reached land users through the community leader and/or through RBL, whereas in other areas, farmers only found out about the concession when they saw Chinese tractors entering their fields. In one of the locations, farmers were partially compensated with fields elsewhere, whereas in most areas, farmers received no compensation. The experiences in Baixa de Chicumbane and Lhovucaze, on the west side of the river, are illustrative of the different dynamics of land occupation.

As described by Porsani et al. (2019), farmers who cultivated land in Baixa de Chicumbane were called to a meeting in which the local authorities informed

them about the ceding of their fields to Wanbao. They were also informed that they were to receive compensatory fields in a different location, which they later discovered to be on the other side of the EN1, a place known as Mutropa. However, not all farmers received compensatory plots in Mutropa. Those who did received 0.25 hectares, regardless of the size of the land they had to cede. Most of the land lost in Baixa de Chicumbane had belonged to colonial farms and had been taken over by farmers in recent decades. By contrast, in Lhovucaze, no one was informed about or compensated for the loss of mainly family land, which they had used for generations. Some families also lost houses and family graves. When farmers reached out to the company, they received the following reply: 'Go speak to your government; they gave us the land' (Porsani and Lalander, 2018).

The reason why only some individuals, in only part of the affected area, received information and some compensation is unclear. Land loss and the lack of compensation was perceived as unjust, particularly when the field was family land. In general, individuals felt more entitled to family land than to land that they had taken over but that they recalled had previously belonged to others (e.g. the Portuguese, a company or the state). Nonetheless, it is important to note that throughout the area, individuals were largely unaware of their right to be consulted or at least informed and compensated. Instead, they were under the impression that since all land belongs to the state, the government had the right to take it. In other words, from the local perspective, land seizures approved by the government, although unfair, were not deemed illegal. This generalized misconception legitimizes the complete lack of consultation or partial consultations, where information is shared but the concession and its conditions are not discussed.

Furthermore, it is unclear whether Wanbao has acquired the DUAT, and if so, from whom. Wanbao started its operations in 2012, whereas RBL (although created in 2010) was granted the DUAT for the 70,000 hectares under its administration in 2015 (Mozambican Republic, 2015). Thus, it is unclear who approved Wanbao's investment and exempted the Chinese company from engaging in community consultations. In any case, the law seems to have been broken not by Wanbao but by those who approved the investment. Additionally, the government may have broken the law regarding involuntary land expropriation when it placed under RBL's administration land that was used by local farmers without informing and compensating these users.

In 2013, when I first visited the area, RBL officials portrayed the project as an important initiative to develop the valley, enabling the fulfilment of the local productive potential, in line with the government's plans to rehabilitate and expand the irrigation systems in the country. The project was also described as a driver of development through the creation of jobs and the inclusion of family farmers in a contract-farming scheme. Thus, the lack of consultation and compensation was justified based on the overall positive impact of the concession.

In 2013, I met with RBL officials and Wanbao representatives a few times to ask them questions about the investment, their rationale and their plans. Their answers were usually evasive, and they could not show (some saying they did not have) any documents on the legal status of the targeted area, project or exploration

plans, or for socio-environmental assessments. In 2017, both RBL and Wanbao refused to answer questions. This lack of concrete information makes it difficult for outsiders to navigate and evaluate the legality of the process and exemplifies how agents of the government, aligned with investors, are the main parties responsible or co-responsible for infringing the law. Thus, Mozambique's land legislation, which is deemed exemplary on paper, turned out to be empty words in practice.

Widespread livelihood impairment, particularly for women

In the Lower Limpopo Valley, farming and animal husbandry, complemented by migration and other local livelihood activities directly dependent on the environment, have been undertaken by local inhabitants since pre-colonial times. Women have largely been responsible for most of the agricultural work, particularly the work done without ploughs pulled by cattle. As explained by Feliciano (1998), in Tsonga societies, in the southern part of Mozambique, women have traditionally been ascribed the 'organized' (domestic) community space. Men's circular migration, mainly to South African mines, which started as early as the mid-1850s and became very significant during the first half of the twentieth century (CEA, 1998; Raikes, 1984), contributed to reinforcing a gendered division of labour, in which women predominate in farming and men predominate in wage and self-employment in non-agricultural sectors that bring cash into the household (Raimundo, 2008). Accordingly, in southern Mozambique, men's ability to meet their family's needs through cash income is directly linked to the archetype of masculinity (Raimundo, 2008).

In the research area, men usually plough the hard clayey soils with ploughs pulled by cattle, while women do most of the other tasks (i.e. sowing, ploughing with hoes, weeding and harvesting). It is also mainly women who do farm *biscate* (daily work on other farms mainly for cash) and the small-scale trading of agricultural and non-agricultural products. Men mainly work in local wage employment and non-farm *biscate*, migration, herding and fishing. There are very few adult men who are single, whereas a significant number of adult women are single (e.g. separated or widowed), which leads to a large proportion of households being headed by women (see Porsani et al., 2019).

On the west side of the river, where Baixa de Chicumbane and Lhovucaze are located, farming was the main activity that had been restricted. As reported in Porsani et al. (2019), most households that lost land due to Wanbao's concession in these sites were either able to keep or regain access to fields in the valley. The main methods used to access new fields were renting, receiving land as a gift, occupying land and receiving compensatory land. Nonetheless, farming had been restricted in two important ways: (1) the total amount of land under the control of households had been reduced and (2) a large proportion of the fields acquired were either of worse quality (i.e. fields that were 'occupied'⁴ or provided as compensation) or required payments of cash, agricultural produce or work (i.e. rented fields) (Porsani et al., 2019).

Thus, although this concession affected all households that had land in the target area (decreasing the inter-household difference with regard to the amount of land held), it had more severe implications for individuals who were relatively more dependent on farmland, i.e. women and, in particular, single women without a husband's complementary income. To compensate for the loss of food and cash from farming, women took on more farm *biscate*, mainly for cash, and small-scale trading (reselling products). Farm *biscate* became particularly important for single women, whose access to cash from the small-scale trading of their own produce was reduced. Single women also reported to depend more on members of their extended families, such as their adult children and grandchildren, whereas married women reported to depend more on their husbands (Porsani et al., 2019).

It is important to note that this land concession did not spare male-headed households, which also underwent land loss without appropriate compensation. Nonetheless, as land loss limited women's means to provide agricultural produce and cash for their households, it made them more dependent on typically male income sources, fostering women's dependence on men and limiting their autonomy in relation to their husbands or other family members. Thus, worse land access had negative material and immaterial implications, which tended to be worse for women than for men.

The creation of formal jobs

Proponents of large-scale land investments tend to hold the creation of jobs as a central benefit to farmers at the local level, contributing to transforming agriculture and their livelihoods (FAO, 2009; Janvry, 2010; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009; World Bank, 2008). Initially, according to data from RBL from May 2014, Wanbao hired 87 Mozambican workers under permanent contracts, 11 of whom were women, and 400 temporary workers, all of whom were men. In addition, Wanbao employed 346 Chinese workers (seven of whom were women) (Porsani et al., 2017). Most of these positions were for the construction of new facilities (pumping stations, storehouses, etc.). In 2017, neither RBL nor Wanbao provided further official information, but according to unofficial information from local contacts, the employment rate had been reduced after the end of the construction work.

With regard to employment generation, it is important to emphasize that jobs are greatly needed. In Mozambique, households that lack off-farm income tend to be the poorest (Waterhouse, 2001). However, we cannot ignore the fact that the few jobs that were created were held by men, usually young men. Thus, once land is exchanged for jobs, in practice a fundamental resource in rural women's livelihoods is exchanged for a male source of income, meaning that women's autonomy is curbed, whereas young men's autonomy is enhanced. This exchange would not be problematic if there were no intra-household conflict regarding the way that women's versus men's income is used; neither would it be problematic if all households that lost land included a man who gains employment, which is not

possible in an area where a large share of households are headed by women and lack male labour.

Another central aspect is *why* jobs are mainly taken by men. First, there is of course the type of person sought by the company. However, cultural roles can also be an important barrier preventing women from seeking fixed employment. In Mozambique, particularly in rural areas, it is often seen as inappropriate for women to be employed (Sender, Oya and Cramer, 2006). In the research area, women noted not only that jobs were rarely available but also that they would find it very difficult, even unappealing, to work full-time elsewhere. Women's reproductive work and their wish to keep their farmland (which may be confiscated by local authorities if left uncultivated for long periods) competed with a full-time commitment elsewhere. Women's concerns were thus manifold. They expressed their need (and, to different extents, their want) to keep conducting reproductive (fetching water, firewood, cleaning, cooking, taking care of the children, etc.) and their productive activities, mainly farming.

Therefore, considering the gendered dimension of local livelihoods, the exchange of land for jobs was not beneficial for at least three reasons: (1) jobs did not target the families that lost land (and therefore did not serve as a type of indirect compensation); (2) there were few jobs, and a share of them ceased to exist once the construction work had ended; and (3) there is a gendered division of labour that favours men in formal wage employment. In contrast, farming was a persistent intergenerational livelihood alternative that engaged most households in the valley.

Contract farming

According to Wanbao and RBL, 10 per cent of the total concession (2,000 out of 20,000 hectares) were to be allocated to contract farmers. In the first season (the harvest of 2013), twenty-three individuals were selected by RBL to become part of the scheme and produce rice. On behalf of Wanbao, RBL tried to select the most 'progressive' farmers (deemed to be better educated and capable of learning new techniques). Although some of the individuals chosen had lost land to the concession, the loss of land was not a selection criterion. Initially, fields of up to 2 hectares were allocated to each individual. They received the necessary inputs, services and training from Wanbao, the cost for which was to be deducted from the total value of the harvest that they were to sell to Wanbao.

The scheme is thus typical for contract farming, through which the firm provides credit, inputs and farm machinery and oversees different aspects of production, and the farmers provide labour (and, in some cases elsewhere, land as well). After the harvest, the firm is entitled to the production, and the farmer is entitled to the cash equivalent of the sale of the production after deductions for inputs and services (see Eaton and Shepherd, 2001; Glover, 1990; Little and Watts, 1994; Minot, 2007; Prowse, 2012).

In the first season, the scheme suffered a drawback: the flooding of the Limpopo River devastated the fields and led to net losses for farmers and Wanbao.⁵

Nonetheless, in the following years, the group expanded, experienced net gains and prospered, spared from worse weather conditions and floods. In 2014, second-year farmers started to receive loans from a financial institution to cover part of their production costs (e.g. the cost of fertilizers and additional labour), whereas the remaining costs (e.g. water, herbicides, seeds and services) continued to be paid by Wanbao or RBL. New farmers entering the scheme could not, however, receive loans in the first year. During this initial period, they were expected to prove their ability to produce (in relatively small fields, the majority being less than 1 hectare) and therefore had to be able to meet part of the production cost from their own savings.

By 2017, the management of the scheme had been partly transferred from Wanbao to RBL, which became responsible for training farmers and ploughing fields. In 2017, the group had approximately 170 members, with the most experienced cultivating in plots of 4–5 hectares. According to these members, in 2017, a combination of delays due to weather, RBL's late ploughing, the inadequate clearing of the channels, and poor drainage contributed to jeopardizing the production of the majority of farmers, causing them to go heavily into debt. Thus, after approximately six months of work (January to June 2017), the farmers had accumulated large debts.

To the extent that these contract farmers did not own or control their means of production, their situation was similar to wage workers'. However, contract farmers may be worse off than wage workers if we consider the different risks borne by each group, with contract farmers bearing the risk of production failure (see Little and Watts, 1994; Watts 1992). It could be argued that farmers usually bear the risk of their own production and are thus used to inter-year variability. Nonetheless, the risks that these contract farmers face in their own fields and in the contracted fields differ in two aspects. First, the production costs in their own fields are much lower (in general, they use very little or no purchased chemical inputs or water for irrigation), whereas the costs of production in the scheme are heavy and include the costs of mechanical ploughing (by tractor), the controlled flooding of paddy fields (known as *empapamento* in Portuguese), seeds, herbicides, urea, water, and mechanical harvesting and transport of the produce (also by tractor). Second, in their own fields, they have more autonomy to decide the timing of activities and to perform them themselves or select a service provider of their choosing (e.g. the owner of a tractor or a plough pulled by cattle). However, in the contracted fields, they are bound exclusively to Wanbao or RBL and have very little say in the timing and quality of their services. Risk is particularly important since insurance is not included in the scheme.

In August 2017, most farmers still did not know the exact amount of their debt and if/how they were to repay it. They were expected to repay the debts in instalments throughout the subsequent harvests. Overall, they noted the lack of communication in and transparency of the scheme. For example, with regard to the order and timing of services listed above, it was not clear to them how decisions were made (i.e. why some individuals were first). In addition, farmers signed the contract without having understood all of its conditions. Once the harvest was

weighed, its quality was assessed and a corresponding value was subtracted. The harvest was given a price, from which RBL and Wanbao deducted their specific costs. The balance was paid to the farmer, who used some of it to repay his or her debt. Farmers noted the lack of clarity with regard to the classification of 'impurities'. Despite their concerns, they noted the difficulties involved in complaining since it could lead to 'all types of unspoken reprisals'.

Thus, high costs, the lack of insurance, and the lack of transparency and communication decreased farmers' autonomy and contributed to making the scheme a risky 'take it or leave it' opportunity. However, despite these shortcomings, none of the farmers (more than thirty-five of them) whom I spoke with in 2017 wanted to leave the scheme. Instead, they wanted it to be improved. Farmers who had recently entered the scheme were still hopeful, encouraged by the experience of other farmers who were content with the benefits from previous years: they were paying for their children's education, they had built or expanded their houses with bricks, and they had purchased home utensils, appliances and vehicles. These material gains justified most farmers' wishes for better conditions and larger fields. Furthermore, contract farmers who faced a shortage of family labour explained that except in the first year (when no loan was granted), in the following years, the loan allowed them to hire additional labour not only for the contracted fields but also for their own family fields, so that they could maintain parallel food production. This meant that the food production of farmers who received credit was not hampered by the scheme, which is in line with experiences elsewhere in Mozambique (see Navarra, 2017). None of the farmers with whom I spoke wanted to work only on the contracted fields. They saw contract farming as an important activity coexisting with and supporting their own production. Some were looking for additional fields, but finding available and accessible fields in the valley had become more challenging since a large part of the area close to the national road was part of the Wanbao concession.

Having mentioned that most farmers in the scheme did not want to leave it, it is also important to note that the scheme excluded worse-off households due to economic barriers to entry and increasing political barriers. The economic barrier to entry was mainly the lack of access to a loan in the first year, which forced individuals to finance their production with their own savings. For farmers who were struggling to produce in their own fields, financing production that was even more expensive in contracted fields was either unfeasible or required them to redirect investment from their own fields, thereby forcing them to sacrifice their own food production. This latter strategy means specializing rather than diversifying in the first year, a strategy that can be dangerous for the more vulnerable households, e.g. those lacking complementary off-field income sources (such as households headed by women). In addition, the lack of insurance made the scheme a risky endeavour for all households, and in particular for the more vulnerable households, which may not have accumulated enough savings to fall back upon in the case of harvest failure in the contracted fields. With regard to the increasing political barrier, according to farmers who had been in the scheme for longer, it had become more difficult to enter without personal connections.

The three years of net gains had attracted the attention of influential individuals. Nonetheless, in comparison to wage work, the scheme could not be accused of being gender-biased since it welcomed both women and men.

In conclusion, and bearing in mind that the land conceded to Wanbao (part of which is being used by contract farmers) was previously largely under the control of local farmers, one may wonder if the exchange can be seen as a good deal from the local perspective. I contend that given not only the insecurity of the contract-farming scheme in its current form but also the social insecurity in Mozambique, new alternatives such as this one, although significant, should not undermine individuals' ability to continue with their own family farming. This compromise could be achieved if the concession were not such a large one, and if, in the process, land for family farming was secured in the valley. This could be possible if the affected communities had a say in the process through transparent and inclusive consultations, as envisioned by the Mozambican framework on land concessions, which, as we have seen, did not occur in practice.

Conclusion

Since the processes and implications of this case are not atypical in the Mozambican context and thus not specific to Chinese land investments, the insights and lessons from this case can also be of value elsewhere in the country. So what have the local experiences from this case shown?

This case illustrates the little weight that an exemplary legal framework can have in practice. In a historically important valley, relatively close to Maputo and crossed by a national road, the law was disregarded, i.e. the majority of farmers who lost land were not informed before the event, not to mention compensated. In general, the findings of this case stress that, despite the prevailing rhetoric on a potential synergistic relation between land investors and family farmers, large-scale land investments that seek to transform agriculture (from small-scale family farming to large-scale mechanized industrial farming) may lead to the general impoverishment of family farmers or to their further economic differentiation. Family farmers who lost land either kept smaller fields elsewhere or/and regained access to land by different means, though usually to worse fields. Thus, this concession did not impede family farming but rather furthered the destitution of affected individuals and their households, particularly women and women-headed households, who have fewer sources of off-farm income. At the same time, farmers who were part of the contract-farming scheme were able to reinvest their earnings in their own family production in good years, but had to rely on their own family production in bad.

The above findings are not surprising since family farming, despite unfavourable conditions since colonial times, remains an important source of livelihood in the Lower Limpopo Valley and in Mozambique in general. Farming that is small-scale, low in external inputs and carried out mainly using family labour is either critical

or supplementary in most households. In the long term, it is deemed central by all households whose members are uncertain of their own and their children's future in a context where secure employment is scarce. Thus, farmland is critical not only for households with little opportunity for alternative off-farm livelihoods but also for households with members in off-farm work who are juggling risk by keeping one foot on the farm.

On a broader structural level, people hang on to family farming largely due to what Li referred to as the lack of a 'pathway from country to city, agriculture to industry, or even a clear pathway into stable plantation work that pays living wages' (Li, 2011). Additionally, on the cultural level, family land is often embedded with symbolic values such as experiences of identity, of home and of spirituality. In the case analysed here, farmers also strived to continue with family farming because of specific shortcomings in the new livelihood alternatives created by investors (i.e. the meagre and gender-biased wage employment and the risky contract-farming scheme, which has economic and political barriers to entry).

Thus, based on the insights from this case, it is possible to conclude that agricultural transformation in contexts marked by structural economic insecurity must consider the enduring importance of family farming. Accordingly, efforts that purport to widely benefit local livelihoods must respect individuals' access to farmland and support livelihood alternatives that, instead of competing with family farming, can work together with it.

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Chapter 10

THE EMERGENCE OF MEDIUM-SIZED COMMERCIAL PRODUCERS IN MOZAMBIQUE: (DIS)CONTINUITIES AND POLITICAL (DIS)ALLIANCES

João Feijó

Introduction

Colonial capitalist penetration in central Mozambique started several centuries ago, but the penetration process of agrarian capital in rural areas has not been sufficiently widespread and continuous. Therefore, no structural transformation of agriculture or the peasantry has occurred in Mozambique. In this context, Marxist proletarianization or semi-proletarianization is limited, both in numerical and spatial terms. In fact, not only has the peasantry not disappeared but there has even been an increase in the number of people with agriculture as their main occupation and source of income. Alongside this, despite the emergence of medium-sized market-integrated agricultural producers (Smart and Hanlon, 2014), there has been no formation of an economically and politically expressive rural bourgeois class (Mosca, 2017).

This chapter is an analysis of social differentiation in the rural environment, with three specific objectives: the first is to understand, from a historical perspective, the process of the emergence of medium-sized Mozambican farmers, as well as their expectations of, and alliances or conflicts with, political power; the second is to understand not only the intensity of poverty in the rural environment but also the existing level of social differentiation; and the third objective is to analyse different strategies used by emerging producers in their economic progress, considering not only the economic activities carried out and their sources of income but also the type of relations with the market and political power.

The colonial period: Discrimination and political exploitation

Throughout the colonial period, the Portuguese government gave particular support to big plantations (owned by international companies such as Sena Sugar States) and settlements to the detriment of African farmers. As in other African colonies,

the colonial government was not interested in developing a local agrarian capitalist class, by helping them to acquiring land and labour, to compete with colonial farmers and plantation capital. It was mainly the colonial agrarian bourgeoisie that was supported with development plans, the construction of transport infrastructure, and the creation of commercial services or granting subsidized credit (Bowen, 2000, p. 4; Newitt, 1997). To address the difficulties of plantation owners competing with South African and Rhodesian mining capital for labour, the state intervened with legal regulations and seasonal labour recruitment drives. In central Mozambique, the colonial state sought to build an abundant reserve of cheap labour serving big plantation capital (Brito, 1980; Wuyts, 1980), rather than stimulating the development of small African peasants through capital accumulation that would enable them to create independent lives based on agriculture.

However, from the late 1950s onwards, due to the marketing of surpluses to supply the growing urban centres, a number of medium-sized local farmers began to emerge, particularly in areas close to cities or with high agricultural potential. Because of economic factors related to capitalist development itself (namely the need for urban supply and balance of trade, and to increase exports), the state began to promote the development of peasants specializing in certain commodities (corn, rice, potatoes, cotton, etc.). At the same time, in a context of emerging African nationalist movements, the colonial government sought to build alliances with local power structures – integrating them into the colonial system, providing assistance to emerging producers, producers' cooperatives and community leaders (with inputs, storage conditions, transport and access to markets) – seeking to contain any independent popular movements.

This political and economic process contributed to increasing differentiation among the rural African population, strengthening the position of the medium-sized farmers (Bowen, 2000, p. 5; CEA, 1983b, p. 14). Along the main roads and the coast, in the river basins and in the central and northern plateau areas of the country, and with significant stimulus from commercial capital, an important group of farmers emerged. Their production was no longer mainly based on self-sufficiency and family reproduction: they changed their productive structure and the technology they used to focus on the market according to capitalist patterns (Mosca, 2017). This group of farmers consisted of those who often benefited from colonial support, essentially a few assimilated Africans (who were viewed as second-class Portuguese citizens); the richest peasants, who owned draught animals, ploughs and other mechanized equipment (sometimes acquired with capital earned abroad) and who hired seasonal workers (Bowen, 2000, p. 3); and finally, the traditional rulers and chiefs (Isaacman, 1987, p. 54), the colonial administration officials in rural communities who were also local producers.

On the Cabo Delgado Plateau, and due to Portuguese government and local missionaries' support, the Sociedade Africana Algodoeira Voluntária de Moçambique (SAAVM; the African Voluntary Cotton Society of Mozambique) had gained, as of 1960, more than 5,000 members (Hedges, 1999, p. 235). The majority of producers were essentially family farmers, but a small group with greater access to capital was able to farm larger areas using salaried workers, who

were usually paid in salt, a scarce commodity on the plateau. Lazarus Nkavandame was famous for working areas of more than 4 hectares and producing large cotton harvests. This period saw a process of land division and social stratification that benefited particular lineages and families in the colonial class structure (Hedges, 1999, pp. 233–237).

On the plateaus of Zambezia, Tete and Lichinga or in the north of Cabo Delgado, a group of small local producers was formed, who invested in their own production, assisted by a network of Portuguese producers and rural shops. They supplied inputs (seeds and fertilizers) in exchange for products delivered at the end of a season (CEA, 1983b, p. 15; O’Laughlin, 1981, p. 21). In Upper Zambezia, rich peasants were able to acquire the status of farmer; like Portuguese farmers, they were exempted from forced labour and allowed to hire workers (Bowen, 2000, p. 5). On the Angónia Plateau, the presence of settlers producing and marketing the same crops as the peasants, the increase in demand for these food products, and easy access to Malawi’s market set the conditions for the emergence of a group of producers who were tied in with the markets, increasing social differentiation. Some bought mills and sewing machines and opened stalls to serve the rural population, expanding and diversifying agricultural production and employing non-family labour (CEA, 1983b, pp. 14–15).

Similarly, along the Limpopo River valley, the settlement process included Mozambican farmers. This, even under disadvantageous conditions compared to Portuguese settlers (Hedges, 1999, p. 165), allowed the growth of a rural petty bourgeoisie, who integrated into the pre-existing local elites and developed alongside them (Bowen, 2000, p. 5).

South of the Save River, remittances from migrant labour in South Africa also led to social differentiation (CEA, 1998, pp. 116–121). In addition to enabling tax payments and the purchase of consumer goods, migrant remittances allowed the accumulation of capital and the purchase of livestock, cashew trees and agricultural machinery.¹ As a result, the position of migrants in the community was strengthened, which allowed the payment of *lobolo* (bride price) and facilitated the mechanisms of social reproduction needing a cash income (CEA, 1998, pp. 112–115; Covane, 2001, pp. 128–132; Lubkemann, 2004, p. 260). The considerable increase in rural production in the last years of the colonial period was only possible because of the large investment in ploughs and cattle, financed by migratory labour. Migration had an impact on the monetarization of the economy² and the development of a ‘relatively wealthy middle peasantry’ (Newitt, 1997, pp. 433–4).

Among the social groups privileged by the colonial state were the *régulos* (local traditional chiefs). In fact, both the state and concession companies granted local chiefs a number of benefits to ensure their collaboration with the colonial government,³ allowing many to accumulate significant capital. Support ranged from uniforms and shoes to an annual salary as government employees based on the total tax collected, bonuses for support in recruiting local labour, and exemption from paying taxes and providing heavy work (Isaacman, 1987, 1991). The *régulos* were also the main beneficiaries of limited technical assistance offered by the Junta Algodoeira (a government department responsible for developing

cotton production) and concessionary companies, particularly for choosing the best land and supplying high-quality seeds, hoes, shovels and other basic tools, which they sometimes distributed to their subordinates in an informal patronage system. Their land was used for demonstrations on the principles of scientific agriculture and the *régulos* were introduced as model producers who also benefited from compulsory work done by other Mozambicans. The earnings from cotton served to raise the standard of living of many chiefs, enabling house building, water pumps, barns and agricultural equipment in particular. Chiefs also benefited from cotton prices. This income allowed a small number of local elites to invest in sectors previously closed to Africans, opening shops in rural areas, 'investing thousands of dollars in cooperatives that the state brought under its control' (Isaacman, 1987, p. 65), acquiring tractors and employing seasonal workers.

Despite the emergence of these African producers, most remained disadvantaged by discriminatory policies that limited their opportunities to accumulate capital while continuing to favour settlers' agriculture. Peasants were generally driven off the best commercial land, accessible by road or improved by irrigation canals or drainage systems (O'Laughlin, 1981, p. 22). Added to this, they had no access to forced labour, so they could only count on the expansion of the number of people in the household or on traditional sources of work. The colonial farms enjoyed privileges in terms of improved prices (particularly in the case of cotton) and access to subsidized credit. Although privileged in relation to the rest of the population, the conditions of the African rural elite were not comparable to those of European settlers (Hedges, 1999, p. 165; Valá, 2001, pp. 126-127). While the colonial state developed a strategy for the economic development of local medium-sized farmers, it also sought to control their growth.

Being economically stable, increasingly integrated into the markets, and faced with the oppressive colonial machine, confronting the dominant system was a risky option for most emerging producers. Although there are records of *régulos* participating in acts of collective disobedience - cooking cotton seeds before planting them, or even organizing revolts (Isaacman, 1987, p. 69) - evidence suggests that most remained loyal to the regime. Firmly embedded in the Church, the more prosperous peasants of the Angónia Plateau did not develop a nationalist consciousness (CEA, 1983b, p. 16), which explains the difficulty that the Mozambican Liberation Front (Frelimo) had in establishing base-level nuclei in the most populated areas of the district. The relative economic comfort and colonial oppression did not negate the expectation that Mozambique's independence would remove the constraints created by the colonial administration for their economic growth, thus making the group more receptive to the advance of liberation movements (Bowen, 2000, p. 6).

In any case, in northern Mozambique, Frelimo managed to make the most of the popular discontent of the most disadvantaged rural populations, which resulted from forced labour, compulsory crop growing (including cotton) and colonial discrimination. Frelimo gained considerable support in areas where its guerrillas operated (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, p. 102). Using a Maoist guerrilla strategy

(based on the metaphor of water and fish⁴), Frelimo was heavily dependent on the support of peasants for fighting Portuguese colonialism.

The post-independence period: Attempts to socialize the countryside

After independence in Mozambique, the government adopted socialist development policies, converting settlers' agricultural land, machinery and warehouses to state agro-industrial complexes. The private property left by Portuguese settlers and farmers was taken over by the state to create intensive planting systems that specialized in certain products. Thousands of peasants were resettled in hundreds of communal villages, with the aim of establishing a permanent reserve of agricultural labour for the state companies or for production cooperatives (Casal, 1988, p. 180). Frelimo relied on rural populations joining cooperatives voluntarily because of the more advantageous conditions (access to inputs, credit and marketing) compared to family units.

Supported by international technicians and centrally idealized by urban bureaucrats, socialist modernization projects aimed for a rapid and total transformation of Mozambican society. Large amounts of public investment were channelled into the state sector, neglecting small family producers. The state set agricultural prices, sought to control marketing networks, and contained the growth of the private sector. Credit from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD; the Popular Development Bank)⁵ was mainly directed to agricultural cooperatives and the large private sector, ignoring the needs of the medium-sized farmers.

However, contemporary analyses of this process of socializing the countryside reveal a number of obstacles and contradictions. In addition to management and planning problems - in terms of maintenance and the supply of inputs and equipment (CEA, 1983a) - state companies faced difficulties resulting from a dependence on seasonal labour inherited from the colonial period (Wuyts, 1981, p. 41). The most labour-intensive times in state-owned companies overlapped with times when labour was needed on family farms. So these firms had to ask the local administration to organize the population's working hours, which were normally unpaid, sometimes provoking strong resentment against state companies (CEA, 1983b, p. 21).

State companies frustrated many small peasants' expectations of recovering land expropriated by the colonial government (Casal, 1988, p. 180; CEA, 1983b, p. 21). Various state companies closed their shops renting equipment or selling fertilizers, seeds and consumer goods, keeping these for their workers. State companies deprived small and medium-sized farmers of access to inputs (CEA, 1983b, p. 22). This generated resentment, resistance and demands from the population, and in several places led to strong opposition to the state in various sectors of the peasantry⁶ (Bowen, 2000; CEA, 1983b; Hermele, 1988).

The process of setting up cooperatives also suffered a number of difficulties. Frequently, the association with cooperatives was led by Frelimo militants, by elements who hoped to gain advantages in terms of access to consumer goods or by individuals who sought to recover land that had been appropriated by former

settlers (CEA, 1983b, p. 29), with former emerging farmers often standing out for their leadership and management role. These individuals rarely saw the cooperative as an alternative route, as they were already integrated into the colonial market economy and had a capitalist consciousness (investing profit in the means of production), so they were more concerned with organizing their private economic universe⁷ (CEA, 1983, pp. 29–31). Most state resources were channelled into state companies, to the detriment of cooperatives, thus depriving cooperative members of access to credit and inputs. Without state investment, they gradually abandoned collective production, knowing that their family farms would be more efficient and productive (Bowen, 2000, p. 10). On the Tete Plateau, most cooperatives were accumulating debts to the BPD and when, in the early 1980s, the State Agricultural Marketing Company (AGRICOM)⁸ began to transfer the cooperative's income to the bank in order to cover the accumulated debt, the number of cooperatives fell sharply (CEA, 1983b, pp. 28–29). Without financial and technological support, which the state could not provide, the profitability of cooperative production was very low, and rarely a valid alternative to family production (Hermele, 1987, p. 227; Casal, 1988, p. 187).

Although the establishment of communal villages had a positive impact on access to education and health services, enabling emergency aid to be channelled into food and drinking water, it also had negative effects. Greater distances between housing and production sites, increased travel times, the agglomeration and scarcity of land, and decreasing production areas contributed to the impoverishment of many families. Population concentration was an obstacle to livestock farming. The remoteness of grazing areas resulted in a decrease in the number of cattle, affecting the economy and household diets (Casal, 1988, p. 186). Thus, the supply difficulties resulting from the dismantling of rural trade (due to the closure of rural shops after independence), the lack of banking support, and the decrease in migratory work to South Africa (especially in the south) and consequent decrease in financial remittances contributed to the drastic restriction of the conditions for the replacement and renovation of inputs. In 1980, there was an estimated shortage of more than 2,000,000 hoes and 700,000 machetes, as well as shortages of ploughs (Casal, 1988, p. 158), making agricultural production problematic.

Against this backdrop, between 1977 and 1985 there was a progressive decrease in agricultural production and productivity of more than 50 per cent. The production marketed by the family sector fell by 55.9 per cent (Casal, 1988, pp. 162–5), with food insecurity becoming more acute. The spread of the military conflict transformed the process of rural socialization into generalized chaos, with attacks by armed groups, looting, kidnappings and killings, during which the impoverished populations could not always distinguish who assaulted them from who defended them (Casal, 1988, p. 190).

In short, the strategy of concentrating support on the large state sector and collectivizing the means of production was not favourable to much of the rural sector. Policies of countryside socialization clashed with the capitalist expectations of emerging farmers in the colonial period who, after independence, had clear expectations of the liberation movement and the possibility of eliminating

obstacles to social mobility. In turn, for many small farmers, there were no other options left than to choose between increasing the number of wage earners in state companies with management problems (CEA, 1983a), joining cooperatives with financing problems (Bowen, 2000, p. 2), or concentrating on communal villages with problems in providing basic resources and services. Frelimo's agricultural strategy completely denied what independence meant to farmers, namely abolishing discrimination in obtaining funding and the possibility of recovering the land expropriated by the Portuguese. As the revolutionary transformations took place, the initial enthusiasm (Casal, 1988, p. 158) cooled, increasing the differences between the state and different strata of the rural population.

After the guerrilla period, during which it was closer to the peasantry and dependent on its surpluses to sustain the armed movement, Frelimo evolved from a popular and victorious liberation movement to a bureaucratic and modernizing party, often at odds with the peasants (Bowen, 2000, p. 8). The new ruling group, many of whom had studied in Eastern Bloc countries or maintained ties with their respective communist parties, was influenced by their orthodoxies and opposed to supporting the existing small rural elite. Either because of mistrust or in an attempt to destroy their legacy, this group sought to highlight the threat of this kind of Mozambican *protokulak*⁹ class (Bowen, 2000, p. 7), categorizing rich peasants and capitalist farmers as enemies of the revolution, especially in the aftermath of the conflict between Samora Machel and Lazarus Nkavandame, the latter personifying the group of 'new exploiters'¹⁰ (Hermele, 1988, pp. 23-24).

In proposing the collectivization of the means of production as a rural development strategy, Frelimo's development policy entailed the destruction of the former emerging producer class, thus frustrating the expectations of thousands of producers, not only from the Cabo Delgado Plateau (where Nkavandame had prospered from cotton production) but also from large areas of central and southern Mozambique. The economic interests of the Nkavandame group in the northern provinces of Mozambique were shared by rich peasants from vast areas of the country (namely Upper Zambezia, the Tete Plateau and the Limpopo settlement) and members of cooperatives in the Zavala District of Inhambane and Josina Machel Island in Manhiça District (Bowen, 2000, p. 7). These small farmers aspired to be small capitalist farmers, with no restrictions from the colonial government.

Frelimo's modernizing policies were also related to the support given by many rural sectors to the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). Although this movement started out as an external mechanism of aggression, the truth is that Renamo capitalized on popular discontent, resulting from the marginalization of local authorities after independence (they were accused of collaborating with the colonial regime and representing a feudal and backward type of society, which was understood as an aggression against their cultural models); or from the processes of rural socialization and concentration of populations in communal villages, dismantling living conditions and social, economic and political reproduction (Casal, 1996; Geffray, 1990); or from the failure to re-establish rural trade networks.

Despite attempts to socialize the countryside, in the mid-1980s the organization of agricultural production remained differentiated. According to contemporary

literature (CEA, 1983b, pp. 56–58; Hermele, 1987), the determinants of this peasant differentiation were essentially based on access to five resources: land, livestock, means of production, salaried labour and opportunities for migratory labour. In terms of land, this meant the unequal access to arable land, which was strongly dependent on customary use (Casal, 1988), acquired through marriages or involving population displacements. For example, on the Tete Plateau, the most prosperous peasants cultivated 4–5 hectares, with other producers having even larger areas to grow cash crops such as potatoes, vegetables and tobacco (CEA, 1983b, p. 56). In terms of livestock, because of its importance as a source of income and savings, for agricultural work, for the payment of *lobolo* and as a source of prestige (particularly in southern Mozambique), cattle farming was an important factor in social differentiation. On the Angónia Plateau, cattle ownership was restricted to ‘less than a quarter of district families’ (CEA, 1983b, p. 58). Similarly, the 1986 census conducted by the Instituto Nacional de Investigação Agrária (INIA; the National Institute for Agricultural Research) (cf. Hermele, 1987, p. 233) found that 70 per cent of the 6,400 people surveyed in Chókwè District had no access to livestock, in contrast to a restricted group of 57 cattle farmers (1 per cent of the total) with 20 or more cattle (see Table 10.1).

The same survey showed that 75 per cent of the cattle farmers did not own working animals, with a small group of 5 per cent owning three or four cattle and only 1 per cent of the respondents owning five or more working animals (see Table 10.2).

Table 10.1 Cattle ownership in the family sector in Chókwè District, irrigated area, 1986 survey

No. of cattle	No. of cattle farmers	%	Total no. of cattle	%	Average no. of cattle per farmer
0	4,475	70	0	–	–
1 or 2	818	13	1,267	13	2
3–5	553	9	2,153	21	4
6–10	347	5	2,654	25	7
11–20	130	2	1,945	18	15
> 20	57	1	2,483	23	44
TOTAL	6,380	100	10,502	100	

Source: INIA (cf. Hermele, 1987, p. 234).

Table 10.2 Cattle ownership of working animals in the family sector in Chókwè District, irrigated area, 1986 survey

No. of working animals	0	1 or 2	3 or 4	5 or more
Percentage of families	75	19	5	1

Source: INIA (cf. Hermele, 1987, p. 233).

In terms of the means of production, possession of the means of production, processing and transport (bicycles, ploughs, water pumps, carts or mills), whether inherited or bought (using wages or earnings from commercial activity), provided a restricted group of families with situations of pluriactivity and income diversification. In terms of salaried labour, various systems of social differentiation were clear in the recruitment of labour outside the family households. In the Tete highlands (CEA, 1983b, p. 58), the largest producers employed permanent workers, often a family member who received a monthly wage and lived in. Also, in the south (Hermele, 1987, p. 231) a salaried workforce was growing, composed of war refugees and individuals without access to irrigated land, who were forced to sell their labour. In terms of opportunities for migratory labour, these continued to provide an important source of income for a group of families (especially in the south), allowing them to purchase livestock and agricultural inputs, along with their food, health and education needs. The decrease in the hiring of Mozambican miners and the increase in wages in the mines intensified the process of differentiation, as it benefited a more restricted group of families (Hermele, 1987, pp. 230-231). The process of differentiation was also fuelled by donors (such as the United States Agency for International Development [USAID]), who often concentrated their support on the private sector by providing means of production.

The liberal period: The rebirth of Nkavandame?

In the mid-1980s, the government began a process of economic liberalization. In agriculture it promoted the privatization of large state-owned companies, liberalized commercial activity, reduced public spending on subsidies, and eliminated the financial and distribution services that state institutions were still providing. Structural adjustment measures resulted in economy reorientation towards the market, increasing the private sector's dependence on resources provided by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, multinational corporations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As Bowen (2000, pp. 10-11) explains, the largest beneficiaries of the privatization of large agricultural companies were foreign investors, former state enterprise managers, state employees and veterans of the liberation war. While a small group benefited from liberal reforms, most farmers were negatively affected by the programme. In the countryside, peasants were disadvantaged by price liberalization due to poor trading conditions, rising inflation and decreasing purchasing power.

At the same time, there was a change in the tone of official speeches. As Castel-Branco (2016, p. 151) explains, from socialist discourses based on the 'liberation of man and the land', new visions emerge based on 'the possibility that previously colonized peoples could become capitalists', freeing themselves from the blockages that colonialism represented for the development of national capitalism. In political discourses, representations that people are poor through

laziness, reluctance to work and lack of self-esteem or creativity emerge regularly (Chichava, 2009; Feijó, 2018a).

With the end of the sixteen-year war and the development of agribusiness, a number of small and medium-sized commercial producers emerged, focusing mainly on export products – particularly tobacco and cotton – but also on food crops such as beans, maize and soya bean, along with other vegetables. From the 2008 Trabalho de Inquérito Agrícola¹¹ (TIA) and the 2012 Integrated Agricultural Survey (IAI), Smart and Hanlon (2014, p. 49) estimated 51,000 small and 17,000 medium-sized commercial farmers with annual incomes of 17,000–40,000 meticaís (275–650 dollars). Based on the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition that in Mozambique individuals belong to the middle class when they earn more than 23,000 meticaís (370 dollars) per year, the authors conclude that commercial medium-sized farmers represent the new rural middle class. However, this is a small group – less than 2 per cent of all Mozambican agricultural producers. The data revealed that the median income of a rural family was 3,400 meticaís (55 dollars), which meant only 700 meticaís (11 dollars) per person per year.

More than half of the emerging farmers are located in the upland areas closest to Malawi and Zimbabwe, namely on the Angónia Plateau (with the highest gains and average yields of 50,000 meticaís (810 dollars)); in the western part of the Nacala Corridor, including the districts of Niassa, Zambezia and Nampula; and in Manica Province, along the border with Zimbabwe (Smart and Hanlon, 2014, pp. 51–52). These are farmers who developed their production units after the war, in contact with commercial agriculture already established in neighbouring countries, and benefiting from trade and cross-border movement.

About half of the small and medium-sized farmers (estimated by Smart and Hanlon) produce the two main agricultural export products: tobacco (about 20,000 farmers) and cotton (about 10,000 farmers). Among the food crops, beans (produced by 10,000 farmers), maize (10,000) and soya bean (5,000) stand out. More than 3,000 producers grow vegetables and about 2,000 are commercial livestock farmers. About 30 per cent of farmers also have other incomes, although these are lower than provided by agriculture (Smart and Hanlon, 2014, p. 76). The authors distinguish the most successful farmers from the rest by whether they reinvest their profits in production; whether they diversify and distribute risks, costs and income; or whether they have previously been employed by a state or private company.

In an analysis of medium-sized commercial producers along the Beira Corridor, Feijó and Dadá (2018) show that it is a heterogeneous social group, although a number of characteristics can be identified. On the Manica Plateau, proximity to aristocratic families (through which they have access to the largest and most productive land, as well as to external grants) is a decisive advantage for producers. On the other hand, in the areas closest to former settlements or borders, a significant proportion of the medium-sized producers have accumulated work experience in colonial farms or in Zimbabwe, acquiring professional skills and accumulating capital. In a clear continuity with the colonial period, a migratory

path continues to be a source of accumulation and social differentiation, enabling investment in cattle or transport vehicles, especially in the south.

A large proportion of TIA respondents had worked in state-owned companies, thus allowing them access to agricultural land owned by companies that had previously been taken over by the government. Closer to urban centres, a small group of producers consists of civil servants or pensioners (sometimes former combatants). They have little access to technology but this is offset by access to draught animals (particularly on the Manica Plateau) or abundant and cheap labour that is available for permanent or seasonal work. The scenario of widespread poverty thus presents an economic functionality, allowing lower production costs and compensating for low mechanization. With higher levels of education, and by speaking local languages and Portuguese, medium-sized producers tend to assert themselves as gatekeepers between the community and the outside world. Through their involvement in producers' associations, with NGOs, or by carrying out partisan work, these medium-sized producers are able to attract support, either from donor agencies or from the state, often in the form of non-repayable funds. By establishing clientele relations with Frelimo, the producers see themselves as local chiefs, mobilizing the population and constituting a social base of support for Frelimo. As in the colonial period, remaining in the orbit of the centres of power is still an important condition for the emergence of medium-sized commercial producers.

Pérez Niño (2016) analysed the social differentiation phenomena resulting from agribusiness, particularly around contract farming. The author describes the emergence of a set of rural social classes on the Angónia Plateau as a result of participation in the production of specialized commodities, particularly tobacco. Her analysis reveals the concentration of tobacco production around a small group of farmers: 14 per cent of producers are responsible for 46 per cent of the tobacco produced. Distribution analysis revealed that the upper quartile of tobacco producers accounted for 58 per cent of the total production, reflecting a Gini coefficient of 0.43 (Pérez Niño, 2016, p. 1794). The average income of a small producer was 15,269 meticais (250 dollars), reaching 40,891 meticais (660 dollars) among medium-sized producers and 107,285 meticais (1,740 dollars) among large owners (Pérez Niño, 2016, p. 1796).

This situation entails a differentiation in access to consumer goods. Successful small tobacco producers can own a motorcycle and one or two bicycles, as well as some cattle, and the large producers can even buy cars and motorbikes and build houses to rent out. In contrast to seasonal workers, these emerging farmers are able to access solar panels and open bank accounts. A 'prominent academic' interviewed by Smart and Hanlon (2014, p. 89) said: 'I earn more from my pigs than from my salary.' Other respondents left public and private positions to engage in commercial farming.

Despite the emergence of this social group, about half of the rural Mozambican population remains below the poverty level (IOF; the Household Budget Survey). Qualitative surveys (Feijó, 2018b) show that the first three or four quintiles of the population live in serious deprivation, not only in terms of income and

consumption but also in terms of the lack of possession of livestock or durable goods. This is a very vulnerable population, strongly exposed to food insecurity. The poorest of this group stand out because of their indigence, due to being old, physically disabled, widowed or orphaned, making their survival dependent on the support of others. The rest are an abundant and cheap labour force for small amounts of occasional work for a small group of emerging producers, because they do not have access to the best land, irrigation or inputs. 'Too poor to farm' (Bernstein, 2010), these farmers are willing to sell their labour in exchange for food or money, a condition often necessary for the purchase of inputs for farm cultivation.

Conclusion

The emergence of local producers with political and economic power is not a recent phenomenon, having its origins in pre-colonial periods. With the implementation of the colonial regime, and despite the existence of a discriminatory system for local peasants, since the 1950s the state has actively promoted the development of peasants specializing in the production of certain products, accelerating the differentiation between Mozambicans. Despite its privileged status, this group had expectations of Frelimo to abolish the existing discriminatory system. However, after the departure of Portuguese settlers, the new Government of Mozambique was unable to rebuild transport and market networks or provide basic services for rural marketing. The independent state opted for a development model based on collectivization of the means of production, channelling most of the public investment to state companies. This option frustrated the expectations of the medium-sized and more integrated peasants, with whom Frelimo has built a relationship of mistrust. The figure of the entrepreneur was politically opposed or socially denigrated (Mosca, 2002, p. 71). The failure of the large state-owned companies and the lack of support for the family sector resulted in the widespread impoverishment of Mozambican peasants, which was exacerbated by the spread of military conflict. Nevertheless, the socialist period did not fail to create new systems of social differentiation.

With economic liberalization and investment in agribusiness, new producers are emerging, partly as a result of participation in the production of specialized commodities, namely tobacco, soya bean, cotton and cassava. Where contract farming is implemented, there has been an increase in social differentiation, not only among peasants themselves but also between producers and the contracting company, reflecting a new international division of labour. In continuity with the colonial period, in these groups, rulers, individuals with migratory experiences (through which they have accumulated capital and professional know-how), and individuals with the capacity to absorb support from the state (with whom they are involved in patronage relations) and NGOs are over-represented. This group contrasts with the majority of the rural population, who live below the poverty line and experience recurrent food insecurity. In a scenario of a lack of capital

and reduced agricultural mechanization, the existence of an abundant and cheap labour force, with few self-defence mechanisms (with less access to land, natural resources, inputs or political decision-making), ensures the emergence of a small rural bourgeoisie, leading to the semi-proletarianization of agriculture, which is reproduced in following generations. If in colonial times the small peasants were an important support base for Frelimo, today the poor peasants in the centre and north of the country are an important support base for Renamo. The fact that in the south the massive poverty is accompanied by significant Frelimo victories makes a linear relationship between poverty and political–social contestation unlikely, forcing other explanatory hypotheses to be considered. This is a subject worthy of further investigation.

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NOTES

Chapter 1

- 1 <https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/> (accessed 8 April 2021).
- 2 The data presented here were gathered mainly during 2014 since I wanted to assess how legal pluralism was being practised ten years after it was officially recognized in the Constitution of Mozambique (2004).
- 3 According to the Law of Municipalities (Law no. 2/97), towns and cities must fulfil certain demographic, economic, social, administrative and financial capacity requirements to be considered municipalities and hold local elections. That excludes rural districts from this process of administrative decentralization, since they only have small villages and therefore are managed by the local state directorates - which are nothing more than small local delegations of state ministries. Before that law, all the districts were ruled only by the local state institutions.
- 4 Results from Census 2017, available at <http://www.ine.gov.mz/iv-rgph-2017/manica/quadro-3-populacao-por-idade-segundo-area-de-residencia-distrito-e-sexo-provincia-de-manica-2017.xlsx/view> (accessed 8 April 2021).
- 5 Mozambique's Company - a chartered company, established in 1888 by Paiva de Andrada, which was responsible for the administration of the territories that are now the provinces of Manica and Sofala from 1891 to 1941.
- 6 The Civil War period was particularly troubled in Mossurize, as Renamo (the Mozambican National Resistance) occupied vast areas of the district from 1979 onwards for the establishment of its first military bases in Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997, pp. 126-127; Vines, 1991).
- 7 The Magistrates' Court, the District Attorney's Office, the Police Headquarters and its different stations, the Community Courts, the Neighbourhood Secretaries, the Traditional/Chiefs' Courts, and the Traditional Doctors' Association.
- 8 The Office for Women and Child Victims of Domestic Violence.
- 9 Such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, and the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights.

Chapter 2

- 1 Portuguese-speaking Africa, as a group of five countries, achieved independence significantly later than other African countries and all endured authoritarian colonial structures heavily influenced by the dictatorship of António de Oliveira Salazar. Angola was the last country to achieve independence: Angola (11 November 1975), Cape Verde (5 July 1975), São Tomé and Príncipe (12 July 1975), Mozambique (25 June 1975), Guinea-Bissau (25 September 1973).

- 2 At least ninety military campaigns were fought by and against the Portuguese between 1890 and 1922 to gain territorial supremacy (Broadhead, 1992, p. 19). While the precise dates are disputed, the final territorial occupation would not occur until the mid-1920s or 1930s (Oliveira and Taponier, 2013, p. 168; Paige, 1978, p. 211).
- 3 In Portuguese: a Comissão de Apoio e Dinamização de Cooperativas.
- 4 In Portuguese: a Direcção Nacional de Organização da Produção.
- 5 According to the Organização Cooperativista dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (the Cooperative Organization of Portuguese-Speaking Countries) website: <https://www.portalocplp.org/organizacoes/unaca> (accessed 21 November 2019).
- 6 Personal interview with agronomist and NGO worker, 4 August 2017, Lubango. The interviewee requested anonymity to be able to speak freely.
- 7 This discourse assumes that the labourers hired by the owner would have to pay the owner more to work the land as his or her estate grows, a gross misunderstanding of African economic practices at the time, according to Manuel Ferreira (1999). *A indústria em tempo de guerra (Angola 1975–1991)* Lisbon: Ed. Cosmos/Instituto de Defesa Nacional, as cited in Pain 2008, p. 190.
- 8 This reliance on oil production has continued until today, creating one of the world's most concentrated economies (CMI-CEIC, 2014, pp. 1–3).
- 9 See Hodges (2004, p. 203); Messiant (1994, pp. 199–200); Oliveira (2007, pp. 608–609), Oliveira and Taponier (2013, pp. 35–38); Pereira (1994, p. 10).
- 10 The economic transition was enacted through the 1987 Programme for Economic and Financial Restructuring (Ferreira, 2006, p. 26).
- 11 Historically, the role of resolving land conflicts had been left to the *sobas* (local leaders). With the modernization of the Angolan political state, however, the *sobas* have seen their power and prestige drastically reduced, replaced by local party officials.
- 12 The World Bank (2019, p. 63) notes that up to \$2 billion have been invested in the sector, but 'policy development is severely constrained by limited availability of data.' The report then goes on to list the vast challenges facing the agriculture sector today (World Bank, 2019, pp. 64–67).
- 13 The Land Tenure Center arrived in Mozambique in the mid-1980s, creating a *núcleo* (study group) focused specifically on land issues, later partnering with the University Eduardo Mondlane and integrating national researchers and academics (personal interview, João Carrilho, 29 May 2018, Maputo).
- 14 For Angola, there was no official land commission per se. The information collection began within the Huíla Land Network and its loose, semi-formal network, which counted more on the donor support of NGOs than major institutions. This information collection would culminate in the Land Forum held in Lubango in 1999, organized at the initiative of the civil society actors. The baton for information collection would be taken up by Rede Terra after its formation in November 2002.
- 15 Including the Ministries of Agriculture and Fisheries, Environmental Cooperation, State Administration, Planning and Finance, Justice, Natural Resources, Public Works and Housing, Sport and Cultural Affairs, Defence (observer status), and the Institute for Rural Development.
- 16 The founding members were UNAC; Associação Rural de Ajuda Mutua (ORAM, the Rural Association for Mutual Assistance); Associação Moçambicana para o Desenvolvimento da Mulher Rural (AMRU, the Rural Women's Union); Action Aid; Centro de Serviços de Cooperação para o Desenvolvimento (KEPA, the Centre for Cooperation Services for Development); MS (the Danish Association of International

- Cooperation); Oxfam UK/Ireland; Oxfam's Joint Advocacy Programme; Centro de Estudos Africanos (CEA, the Centre for African Studies); Centro de Estudos de População (CEP, the Centre for Population Studies); and Núcleo de Estudos da Terra (NET, the Study Group for Land and Development) of Eduardo Mondlane University (Maputo).
- 17 The principal themes of the Campaign were the following: (1) Land Rights; (2) Demarcation of Land; (3) Women and Land; (4) Land: Together in Partnership; (5) Urban Land Rights; (6) Conflict Resolution (Negrão, 1999, p. 2).
 - 18 For a deeper analysis of the financial situation of Angola and its loan negotiations, see Oliveira (2015, pp. 53-57) and Brautigam (2010, pp. 273-277).
 - 19 Namely Umbundu, Quicongo, Cuanhama, Quimundo and Nhaneca-Humbe (Rede Terra, 2008, p. 11).
 - 20 Interview with Allan Cain, director of Development Workshop, 27 July 2017, Luanda.
 - 21 The concept of the 'stalled transition' comes from Tony Hodges' book, *Angola from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism*, chapter 4, pp. 43-88, which follows the description of a 'blocked society' first evoked by Christine Messiant in her 1983 PhD dissertation, later a book (2006, pp. 163-149).

Chapter 4

- 1 From the Anthropology Department of the State University of Campinas, Brazil, with financing support from Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (2011/17122-6 - FAPESP) and Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq). 'Tem um espírito que vive dentro dessa pele': feitiçaria e desenvolvimento em Tete, Moçambique (Dias de Andrade, 2016).
- 2 I later found out that the NPA continues to finance institution-strengthening programmes. Despite Dórica's fears, in 2013, the NPA was considering a possible extension to the UPCT's project. However, since the changing methodology of international organizations and their disregard for beneficiaries' expectations are the focus of this article, Dórica's speech seems a good starting point for the discussion.
- 3 In June 2020, Vale, along with fourteen other mining companies, suspended their activities in Mozambique because of the Covid-19 pandemic. This also helped the company to restructure its extraction plans and cut expenses. In August 2020, the Mozambican subsidiary of Vale announced that it had registered an operational loss of \$145 million. As a result of these continuing losses, the company shifted from mining thermal coal to mining coking coal (used in the production of steel). The price of thermal coal has been falling for several years, in large part due to international electricity companies moving away from coal-generated power to renewable energy. It also suffered a severe drop due to the world's economy plunging into a recession (<https://www.macaubusiness.com/mozambique-vale-revises-coal-business-down-by-e1-45-bln/>). Although Vale stated that they planned the return of activities and investments in 2021, with the shutdown, 200 Brazilian workers and their families went back home, and local employees were told to stay inside their houses without being paid, leading to a severe economic depression in Tete.
- 4 According to Kirshner and Power (2015), Mozambique's current twenty-year National Development Strategy (Ministério da Planificação e Desenvolvimento, 2013) regards the resource boom as a starting point to reduce poverty and promote the country's

- industrialization. The strategy seeks to improve living conditions through the structural transformation of the economy's production base. In Tete, however, the plans for reconfiguring the rural space and regulating populations and their flows 'coexist as the developmental apparatus is applied differently to segments of national space and discrete populations contained within the nation state and as articulations between territory, accumulation/development, and sovereignty are reworked, producing a galaxy of differentiated zones unevenly integrated into the structures of state power and global capital' (Kirshner and Power, 2015, p. 77). For those authors, as a peripheral economy, Tete is witnessing the rapid emergence of several distinctive spatialities and a 'new metageography of development' given the proliferation of enclaved sites, privatized infrastructures, and 'urban spaces of enclosure.' Addressing what they call 'enclavic spaces of post-development', Kirshner and Power argue that the new development era, 'built on the ruins of Frelimo's post-colonial nationalist and socialist projects (...) [is] shaped by the colonial legacies of underdevelopment and by histories of privatized and securitized administration by colonial concession. They reveal much about the changing political economy of contemporary Mozambique, and given their heavy orientation towards the needs of export markets and foreign investors, they appear to offer little hope for the future reduction of poverty and inequality, increased mobility of local people, or the rebuilding of urban spaces ravaged by decades of conflict' (Kirshner and Power, 2015, p. 77). For a more detailed account of Tete's development scenario, see also Dias de Andrade (2016, 2019).
- 5 BBC News (2013). Mozambique residents 'hurt by' Rio Tinto and Vale mines, 23 May. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22646243> (accessed 3 April 2021).
 - 6 Polgreen, L. (2012). As coal boosts Mozambique, the rural poor are left behind. *New York Times*, 10 November. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/world/africa/as-coal-boosts-mozambique-the-rural-poor-are-left-behind.html> (accessed 3 April 2021).
 - 7 BBC News (2013). Mozambique protesters at Brazil-owned Vale coal mine, 17 April. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-22191680> (accessed 3 April 2021).
 - 8 From 2010 to 2014, an estimated \$5 billion was invested in the exploitation of mineral resources in Mozambique (*Mozambique Rising: Building a new tomorrow*, IMF Report, 2014). According to the Ministry of Mineral Resources, the coal industry employs 7,500 Mozambicans directly and, in the short term, mine construction created up to 25,000 temporary jobs. This massive international input into Tete produced several years of uninterrupted economic growth. From 2010 to 2019, Tete's gross domestic product (GDP) grew by 3.8 per cent to 12 per cent per year, when it was below 5 per cent in 2016 and 2017 (INE, 2019).
 - 9 The Mozambican post-colonial development project should have led to the socialization and modernization of the countryside. According to Geffray (1990), Borges Coelho (1993), Chichava (2013) and others, the plan involved the implementation of communal villages, collective plots and cooperatives, the prohibition of initiation rites, and the abolition of traditional authorities. 'According to Frelimo, the official objective was to "organize the people" who lived in an isolated and dispersed manner, and to create a "new man": Portuguese-speaking, not superstitious, not religious, not alcoholic, not polygamous, and inhabiting a communal village. In summary, it involved the construction of a "modern man", free of all vestiges of what was considered "feudal and archaic society" (including traditional power structures) and of capitalist colonial society' (Chichava, 2013, p. 112). According to Geffray (1990), this modernization strategy brought neither

considerable social nor economic progress: the population lived without basic infrastructure, potable water or arable land. Moreover, the authoritarian and paternalistic nature of the Mozambican government, which did not respect the traditions and social relations of the peasantry, provoked reactions and conflicts with the displaced population that lived in poorer conditions than it did before. For Geffray (1990), Borges Coelho (1989), West (2005) and Chichava (2013), it was thanks to this discontent that a considerable part of the rural sector started to support Renamo, a guerrilla army created by the Rhodesian secret service that was later supported and armed by the South African apartheid regime. According to these authors, without denying the importance of exterior dynamics, it was the social, economic and cultural suppression of important aspects of the daily lives of Mozambique's rural population that would create the internal social base for Renamo during the Mozambican Civil War.

- 10 'Theoretically, a human settlement was considered to be a communal village when it satisfied the following conditions: collective or cooperative production formed (or was on the way to forming) the basis of the economy; it had a planned physical setting with distinct residential and productive areas; and it had institutions of local administration that ran village development and life in general. A communal village could be reported by government sources as in one of three different stages: those being planned (and therefore not yet established); "embryonic" villages, i.e. those that had partially filled the above conditions; and those that met all the criteria. Frequently, particularly after 1980, the will to report great achievements to the higher levels of the state, or simply a confusion between plan and reality by intermediate authorities, led to the designation of villages still being planned as completed. These are relatively easy to discern, but the differences between the several intermediate stages that the "embryonic" villages went through before completion were rather more complex. In Tete, this issue was further complicated by the existence of former *aldeamentos*, some of which were being transformed into communal villages, and therefore in some sort of "embryonic" stage during the period under focus' (Borges Coelho, 1998, p. 65).
- 11 'Both sides were aware of the limited experience and technical capacity of the Nordic countries concerning African agriculture. For this reason, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) was inducted into the enterprise from the beginning. It was felt that the FAO could provide the technical expertise that the Nordics lacked. It was also decided to focus Nordic support on those sectors of agriculture in which the Nordic countries had the most experience: livestock, milk production, and forestry. There was an evident shift over time from the livestock (...) and forestry projects, which had been intended to match Nordic expertise and were mostly implemented by large-scale state enterprises and organizations, to projects aimed more directly at the small-scale or family sector. It is evident that, at any point in time, MONAP supported a diverse range of types of activities. It also supported a large cadre of expatriate technical assistance staff from many parts of the world, relatively few of them Nordic nationals. At its peak, at the end of 1982, MONAP employed about 200 foreigners in Mozambique. Around 600 foreigners have at some point worked for MONAP' (SIDA, 1991, p. 12). In its early years, the programme was the major source of hard currency for the Ministry of Agriculture. In the period 1977-1984, 80 per cent of the Ministry budget came from the Nordic countries. However, MONAP was not only a collection of agricultural development projects or a merely a source of money. For many (see, for instance, Adam, 1996 and Bowen,

- 2000), the programme was a long-term cooperative relationship that started during the liberation war. In this sense, MONAP had a special role in agricultural policy-making in Mozambique. Although it never exceeded the direct individual input of each member nation, MONAP became the country's longest development project, lasting from 1977 to 1990. Hence, even before the war and the need for humanitarian help for dislocated populations, MONAP established a long-term relationship between the Mozambican state and international development organizations.
- 12 Initially, according to Borges Coelho (1998), the government intended cooperatives to be the main form of production in the communal villages. In this sense, there was no connection between communal villages and state farms, in which the villagers were integrated as wage workers. In the communal villages, household agriculture was expected to develop into cooperative farming. However, this distinction was '(...) often contradictory because of poor statistical work and the blurred distinction between mere collective *machambas* [fields] and effective cooperatives' (Borges Coelho, 1998, p. 75). In Tete, the communal village programme was launched later than elsewhere; thus, cooperatives only appeared after Frelimo's Third Congress, a period when decisions taken centrally were becoming dominant. In the early phase, the basis of production in the new villages consisted of *machambas* and 'pre-cooperatives' that were collectively cultivated by farmers; however, the cooperative work was eventually converted into staged activities undertaken by politically mobilized Frelimo partisans (Borges Coelho, 1993).
 - 13 The two plans were organized within the framework of MONAP. The first phase of the programme, known as MONAP I, focused on the emergency transference of agricultural equipment, seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, water pumps and technical assistance, while MONAP II covered the following period, 1981–1983, and focused on the restructuring of Mozambique's rural policies (Adam, 1996; Borges Coelho, 1998; Ofstad and Brochmann, 1990; SIDA, 1991).
 - 14 'The first sector was the main immediate beneficiary of MONAP I projects. Two others, the cooperative and the family sectors, were considered to be the indirect beneficiaries. In MONAP II a set of projects [CO-1; CO-2; FO-7] were devised that targeted the cooperative sector as the immediate beneficiary and the family sector as the indirect beneficiary' (SIDA, 1991, p. 61).
 - 15 The efficiency of the cooperatives was extremely low – they were much less effective than the supposedly backward and unproductive traditional agriculture (Adam, 1996). Between 1977 and 1982, the number of cooperatives grew from 180 to 370 and the number of members increased from 25,000 to 37,000. However, the area cultivated in the 1981/2 season was 11,500 hectares, 1,700 hectares less than in the 1978/9 season. During the same period, production fell by half, from 11,200 tonnes in 1979 to 6,500 tonnes in 1982 (Tarp, 1984). In 1984, the FAO reported that only 2 per cent of state investments between 1977 and 1982 had been allocated to the cooperatives programme. As a result, the cooperative production accounted for less than 1 per cent of the country's total agricultural production.
 - 16 Associative work is a labour regime widely encouraged by international cooperation agencies in which small producers are organized through democratic principles. According to this methodology, the farmers should work in collective organizations. In Tete, most of the programmes envisaged training workshops for selected villages on 'modern rural techniques', followed by courses on democracy and cooperative organization. Once the peasants were organized into 'democratic groups', the international projects would begin to deliver seeds, pesticides, fertilizer, cattle and

- water pumps to the cooperative's members, for them to manage and redistribute on democratic principles.
- 17 It is important to note that this was a major change in the Mozambican official policies toward rural production, the peasantry and development. After independence, peasants were conceived as a transitory class within the framework of orthodox Marxism. The policies of the time intended to transform them into proletarian workers by organizing them into cooperative systems. Any official policy in support of small producers was politically criticized and sanctioned. João Mosca (2012) describes the attempt of the Provincial Direction of Agriculture (DPA) of Cabo Delgado to organize rural production in small family plots in 1977. For the provincial DPA, the concentration of the activities in family units would facilitate technical support, the sale of surpluses, and the exchange of production, among other benefits. The initiative, however, was criticized because it was supposedly promoting the development of individual production, stimulating peasants to become capitalists. On these grounds, Frelimo's Provincial Committee concluded that the new system of production was reactionary and terminated any attempt to change government methodology to rural production.
 - 18 The Ministry of Finance of Mozambique, supported by the United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) and Copenhagen University, produced a comprehensive analysis of poverty and well-being based on the 2014/5 Household Budget Survey, conducted by the country's National Statistics Institute (INE). According to the document, at the national level, welfare levels improved compared with the prior survey undertaken in 2008/9. Using official data, the research estimated that poverty had declined by more than 5 per cent when compared with the 2008/9 survey. However, substantial differences in welfare levels persisted. The gap between rural and urban areas was large, and living conditions in the south were much better than those in the north and the centre. However, for some specialists, the exaggerated attention given to official statistics can lead to incorrect analyses. According to Carlos Castel-Branco (2011), despite high GDP growth and relatively low rates of inflation, economic policies have been unable to promote and organize food production for the domestic market on a large scale and at low prices. That is to say, the national economy, measured by the size of the GDP, has grown rapidly over the past two decades, but this growth does little to provide basic consumer goods at low cost and to support production processes. Instead, the focus has been on producing primary products for export. In this context, although between 2003 and 2009 real GDP per capita grew by 41 per cent, real food production per capita fell by 9 per cent. Thus, although the monetary inequality measured by the Gini coefficient did not change significantly during this period, the inability of the economy to provide basic consumer goods at low cost to the domestic market and to generate decent jobs on a large scale has meant that economic growth is highly ineffective in reducing poverty. According to the author, in global terms, the percentage of the population living in absolute poverty has not decreased in recent years, but has increased instead.
 - 19 By looking at the developmental phenomenon through an institutional critique of its practices and denouncing the ethnocentric origin of its concepts, development anthropologists came to conceive international NGOs, government agencies and other cooperation organizations as an integral part of a global governance system that delimited the geographical space and the discursive field of the Global South. In this sense, focusing on the institutional complex created by the developmental discourse, anthropologists sought not only to disassemble the historical process by

- which certain countries were idealized as places for specialized intervention but also to understand the practical effects of these widely disseminated policies. This critical view of development, inspired by the works of Ferguson (1990) and Escobar (1994), produced numerous contradictory reactions, and some anthropologists pointed to alternative paths to what they considered a homogeneous and stereotyped view of a broader and much more complex process. For Gardner and Lewis (1996), for example, although development at a discursive level may have a hegemonic role of bureaucratic de-politicization, the everyday reality of the development workers, agencies, offices and projects that constitutes the institutional structure of development is much more heterogeneous and contradictory than deconstructionist studies have described. Thus, by analysing processes inside and outside the developmental institutions or describing modes of resistance and subversion of international projects, some anthropologists shed light on the multiplicity of agents, institutions, world-views and actors involved in maintaining this structure (Mosse and Lewis, 2006). In the same manner, other authors - many of whom are also participants in the development apparatus - sought to reconfigure the discussion and the intervention practices of development by including local voices and world-views in the technical corpus of institutions of its structures (Gow, 2008). Some favoured concepts such as brokers and mediators to focus on political disputes inside and outside the institutional apparatus and analyse the correlation between the different actors and processes involved. Often, these perspectives overlapped (Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Olivier de Sardan, 2001). In this sense, the discussion oscillated between supporters of a reform of the aid system - in which anthropologists would have a fundamental role - and analyses the ineffectiveness of such attempts. However, for this article's purposes, i.e. to demonstrate how recent mining activity has shaken the institutional structures of development created over the past few decades, I will focus my arguments on Ferguson's deconstructionist view, which I consider most useful for revealing the problems addressed. For a more detailed discussion on the multiplicity of anthropological approaches toward development, please refer to Dias de Andrade (2018).
- 20 According to Wiegink (2018), 'the coupling of "development" with the extractive industry can be situated in a larger shift in international development thinking and practice that increasingly privileges trade over aid, and in the "ethical turn" of big businesses, in which corporations are transformed into agents and architects of "development" (...). It is through these terms and others that "development" and the potential wealth of resource extraction projects become intertwined in a range of specific ways, creating differentiated futures, encompassing diverse timelines, and contradictory visions of social and historical inevitability'.
 - 21 According to the World Bank's collection of development indicators, compiled from officially recognized sources. Mozambique's Official Development Assistance (ODA) received per capita, which reached \$120 in 2003, has constantly decreased over the years. In 2008, the ODA per capita received was about \$90 and \$60 in 2018 (<https://tradingeconomics.com/mozambique/net-oda-received-per-capita-us-dollar-wb-data.html>, accessed 19 November 2020).
 - 22 In the area, Embrapa (the Brazilian company for agronomic research) and the Mozambican government were planning an agricultural modernization programme along the railway built by Vale for coal transport.
 - 23 The UPCT was founded in 2003 with sixty members. The organization currently has 166 associations registered in eleven of the thirteen districts of Tete Province. It has 4,433 members, of whom 1,883 are women and 2,550 men.

- 24 Although long-term official evidence indicates that Tete Province is Mozambique's fastest-growing province and one of the regions with the highest poverty reduction (22.5 per cent), short-term analyses that exclude high poverty rates induced by the sixteen years of Civil War (Castel-Branco, 2010) and ethnographic investigations centred on everyday reality and the perception of the region's inhabitants seem to indicate the opposite. Although overall poverty has declined, the absolute number of poor people has increased and extreme poverty rates have risen considerably. Higher food prices (which may have increased by 55–70 per cent between 2014 and 2016) and rising social inequality have further contributed to maintaining or worsening poverty levels in the general population (MFE, 2016).
- 25 In the FAO Programme for Mozambique, a document that sets out the FAO's priorities in support of the Government of Mozambique's Programme for the period 2012–2015, the UN described Mozambique as a country that 'faces the challenge of transforming low-productivity subsistence farming of smallholder farmers into high-productivity, market-oriented agriculture' (FAO, 2016, p. 4). According to the UN, about 80 per cent of Mozambican families depend on subsistence agriculture. Likewise, for all the NGOs I worked with, one of their project's primary objectives is to transform small family gardens into intensive, market-oriented production units. In the detailed food security programme description of Jugend Eine Welt, an Austrian organization that was in Tete during my fieldwork, the NGO staff highlighted the lack of access to agricultural inputs and field-tested knowledge, and the low agricultural productivity in Tete's farmers' crops. In order to address the problem, Jugend Eine Welt implemented a food security project to enhance production through extension services, enabling farmers to access local food markets (Jugend Eine Welt, 2015). In 2010, World Vision started a different food security project in Tete that is still active. According to them, Tete was 'one of the most isolated and underdeveloped regions in Mozambique', a country where 'two-thirds are subsistence farmers who rely on favourable weather conditions to feed their families and make a living'. In this sense, the project aimed to reduce food shortages and starvation in an area with many poor peasants whose last resource was 'eating leaves, wild fruits, and berries to sustain themselves and their families' (worldvision.com.au/global-issues/work-we-do/famine/delivering-food-aid-to-mozambique, accessed 20 November 2020). In the same way, the UPCT's strategic five-year plan and its annual reports produced in partnership with NPA state that their main objective was to lift peasants in Tete Province, women, men and their children, out of absolute poverty and create a situation in which peasants and their families have free access to land and will be able to produce more than is necessary only for food security and marginal livelihood (UPCT, NPA, *Melhorar os meios de sustento através da segurança alimentar*, Relatório Annual, 2010).
- 26 A goat, which used to cost about 250 meticaís (four dollars) before the development surge, can be sold today for 1,000 meticaís (sixteen dollars).
- 27 I am not trying to suggest that Tete's farmers became part of international development projects for restricted utilitarian reasons. Actually, the truth is quite the opposite. As I have suggested elsewhere (Dias de Andrade, 2019, 2020), for many farmers I spoke to, the failure of developmental promises is directly linked to an unseen spiritual realm that precludes the development of African black populations. In this sense, the local idea of development, based on the local experience of African populations and their centuries of coexistence with Portuguese colonialism, is encoded by a rigid and hierarchical perception of race and spirituality that is expressed in the language of witchcraft.

Chapter 5

- 1 This definition was provided in the course Land Acquisition, Resettlement, and Social Sustainability, which I attended in August 2019 in Maputo.
- 2 See Performance Standard 5 of the IFC https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability-at-ifc/policies-standards/performance-standards/ps5 (accessed 17 December 2019).
- 3 For a methodological reflection on the problematic issue of conducting research in resettlement villages, see my blog entry (2017) on [resourceworlds.org](http://resourceworlds.org/2017/01/20/the-creation-of-a-lessons-learned-place-notes-on-doing-research-in-the-coal-mine-area-of-tete-mozambique/): <http://resourceworlds.org/2017/01/20/the-creation-of-a-lessons-learned-place-notes-on-doing-research-in-the-coal-mine-area-of-tete-mozambique/> (accessed 5 April 2021).
- 4 Conversation with Agua, Mualadzi, 1 November 2016.
- 5 Conversation with a *curandeira*, Mualadzi, 20 November 2016.
- 6 The community relations officers (or managers) of the mines I visited in Tete are in charge of the corporate social responsibility efforts of the company in the area around the mine and for the implementation of the resettlement process. They are the company's public-facing employees in the area around the mine.
- 7 Conversation with community relations officer of coal-mining company, Tete, 25 March 2017.
- 8 Interview with female resident of Mualadzi, 1 November 2016.
- 9 See Fontein (2011, p. 714) for a similar argument on the politics of belonging in relation to resettlement for the Mutirikwi dam in 1961 (Zimbabwe). Fontein details how people who were removed from their lands for the building of the dam continue to make demands for fishing rights and irrigation schemes, legitimizing their claims by the presence of the graves of their kin under the water's surface.

Chapter 6

- 1 For the purposes of this work, the concept of 'local community' used is the one in Mozambican land legislation. Thus, the term 'local community' refers to a gathering of families and individuals living together in a territory at the level of a locality (a smaller area); they have common interests in the protection of living areas, farming areas, forests, places with cultural value, water sources, areas of expansion and their livelihoods (Mozambique, 2014, 1997).
- 2 Capitalism instilled by the multinational companies changes the *modus vivendi* of the local community.
- 3 Interview conducted during my fieldwork in Topuito in 2016.

Chapter 7

- 1 Contracts under which producers commit to providing a predefined quantity of a crop to a buyer (usually a processing firm). This may imply that the firm provides inputs and technical assistance to the producers, depending on the type of contract.
- 2 It should be noted that PEDSA mentions the Gender Strategy of the Agricultural Sector, approved in September 2005, which had already highlighted the importance

- of 'establishing partnerships between the public and private sectors to increase investment in support to small farmers and women in particular, sharing the costs and risks of assistance in adopting new technologies and new cash crops through programmes aimed at food security and poverty reduction' (Republic of Mozambique, 2005, p. 20). However, due to some of the changes that have occurred with the recent wave of land-related investments, the Gender Strategy seems unsuited to addressing the gender-related issues emerging from these ongoing dynamics.
- 3 At the time of writing, it is still unclear whether the Ministry of Agriculture will release an updated PEDSA.
 - 4 <https://fews.net/southern-africa/mozambique/food-security-outlook/july-2016> (accessed on 8 April 2021). Food insecurity remains a chronic problem in Mozambique: in the Global Hunger Index (GHI) the country ranks 103rd out of 107 countries, with a score of 33.1, indicating serious levels of hunger.
 - 5 Interview at the Centre for the Promotion of Commercial Agriculture, 19 September 2011.
 - 6 F.D., 15 September 2011.
 - 7 M.R., 18 September 2011.
 - 8 Interview with A.J. of the producers' organization of Nhamatanda, Sofala Province, 2 September 2011.
 - 9 We have seen several cases over the years (e.g. in Nhamatanda District in Sofala Province and in Vanduzi District in Manica Province) of small producers' associations that may partially compensate for this.
 - 10 Interview with international NGO officer E.G. in Sofala Province, 2 September 2011.
 - 11 20 September 2011.
 - 12 Ministério da Agricultura (MINAG), Trabalho de Inquérito Agrícola, Departamento de Estatística, Direcção de Economia, MINAG, República de Moçambique, Maputo.
 - 13 This was also stressed by I.J., the representative of a producers' association in Sofala Province, 2 September 2011.
 - 14 A situation where several sellers compete to sell to one single buyer, who therefore retains the power to set the price.
 - 15 Interviews in Vanduzi (Manica Province) and in Nhamatanda (Sofala Province) in 2011.
 - 16 20 September 2011.
 - 17 5 September 2011.
 - 18 E.C., the project officer of a local civil-society organization, Nhamatanda (Sofala Province), 2 September 2011.
 - 19 Some institutional stakeholders have described the work relationship between women and men in agricultural production as being like that between a worker and a manager.
 - 20 <https://svilupporuralemozambico.helpcode.org/indicatori-cambiamento/> (accessed 8 April 2021).
 - 21 Focus group in the farmers' association Bloco 48, Moamba, June 2019.
 - 22 December 2018.
 - 23 Corn production significantly reduced in the 2017/8 season due to the effects of the fall armyworm in southern and central Mozambique. <http://www.fao.org/mozambique/news/detail-events/en/c/1151626/> (accessed 8 April 2021).
 - 24 6 September 2011.
 - 25 <https://maputo.aics.gov.it/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Mozambico-Pubblicazione-PESED-AID-10401-final.pdf> (accessed 8 April 2021).

- 26 There are six associations in Belas and five in Rotanda. At the time of our fieldwork, the associations were involved in the process of being legally recognized, a necessary step to obtain the land title. It is the president of the farmers' association who decides on the membership, on the basis of the criteria established in the constitution and agreed with the company.
- 27 Interview with the human rights resources manager and the quality manager, 14 December 2011.
- 28 Interview with Z.J., 16 December 2011.
- 29 Interview, 14 December 2011.
- 30 The investment is also accompanied by a non-profit component directed to social goals and to the promotion of sustainable value chains. See also Sutton (2014).
- 31 Interview with the District Union of Farmers, November 2019.
- 32 Moamba, focus groups with a farmers' association, June 2019.

Chapter 8

- 1 The paper by Joala et al. (2016) described the changes in the diet of small producers in Gurué District provoked by the implementation of soya bean production on large tracts of land acquired from producers by soya bean-promoting companies. Producers were resettled in places where they faced difficulties in accessing the trees, fruit trees and medicinal plants that they had access to in their former lands. The producers claim that given the agro-ecological conditions of the place where they were resettled, they now have to cultivate wild vegetables such as *thuli-thuli* and *mtikwa*.
- 2 Central, Fajardo, Xipamanine, Xiquelene, and Zimpeto.
- 3 Central, Chingussura, Maquinino, Mascarenha and Praia Nova.
- 4 Central, Matadouro and Waresta.
- 5 According to Pereira and Heemskerk (2012), more than 70 per cent of producers in Mozambique store their own seeds, and informal exchanges account for more than 20 per cent of the total seed sector. These seeds in the informal sector do not usually undergo a quality and guarantee testing process. The formal seed acquisition and distribution sector, at most 10 per cent of it, operates through public and private organizations dominated by the companies SEMOC and PANNAR, which have contracts with the Ministry of Agriculture for the production and marketing of certified seed of improved hybrids and varieties of open-pollinated maize, at subsidized prices.
The same authors explain that, as a way of reducing the disparities in the acquisition and quality of seeds, the commercialization has been outsourced to small-scale seed-selling companies and agri-dealers. These emerging commercial entities operate on the market, in the space left between the large seed companies and the producers who save their seeds, meeting the needs of producers in terms of the supply, local varieties, and quality.
- 6 There is no single formal definition of this concept. Anseeuw et al. (2016) said that the term 'emerging farmer' has been used to designate producers who were previously less well-supported, particularly as a result of colonial policies, and those who are making the transition to commercial agriculture.
- 7 Although the 1997 Mozambique Land Law means that it is easier for women to obtain a DUAT, due to cultural norms, especially in rural areas, its transfer and registration have favoured men, because the latter are culturally seen as the legitimate holders of land titles. In general, women suffer more land ownership insecurity.

- 8 As an example, this plan resulted in the National Agricultural Mechanization Programme (PNMA), which in its implementation created the Agrarian Services Delivery Centres (CPSA), with public and private service provision.
- 9 One examples is the exchange rate policy: the national currency has been losing value over the years, compared to the US dollar and the South African rand, which created difficulties for exporters and benefited food imports (especially from South Africa), with effects on national production.
- 10 The concrete actions of this strategy can be seen in the implementation of the PICA.
- 11 An example of the implementation of the PICA was the construction of silos and warehouses for the Mozambique Commodity Exchange in eight regions considered to have the greatest agro-ecological potential. The construction of the silo complexes was an investment by the Mozambican government, through the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and started in 2009.
- 12 Around 94 per cent of the maize farmers produce in an inter-cropping system, mixed with other basic crops or with market-oriented crops, and only 6 per cent adopt a monoculture system (Food and Agriculture Organization, 2019).
- 13 The competitiveness of maize is related not only to the market price but also to its quality. The maize produced by small and medium farmers is mostly of low quality, due to the weak infrastructure and quality/conditions of storage, and the storage period. The lack of use of inputs, such as improved seeds and agrochemicals, also contributes to the harvested product not being of high quality. In turn, quality is seriously affected when post-harvest storage methods are limited, exposing the maize to mould and wastage (Elim Serviços, 2011).

Local traders are informal street sellers and or those in small shopping centres, which sometimes provide wholesalers, who then sell the product on to the processing factories and retailers, or sell directly to final consumers.

In the commercialization process, maize bought by farmers is of varying quality and the actors have no ways of classifying it (Jasse, 2013).

- 14 Mozambique benefits from the Lomé preferential agreements, signed between the European Union and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, in which sugar is exported at prices above those on the international market, and the government applies surcharges to sugar imports, which are designed to protect producers against the low and volatile price on the international market.
- 15 The authors Dadá, Nova and Mussá (2019) showed that the sugar cane producers in the Muda Massequesse irrigation system in Nhamatanda District (Sofala Province) increased their income from 33,000 meticais (\$550) in the first year to 70,000 meticais (\$1,166) in the third year.

Chapter 9

- 1 For more details on the methods used, see referenced articles.
- 2 'Assimilated' Mozambicans were 'gainfully employed, had oral and written knowledge of Portuguese, [...] no longer practised "native customs", [and] were entitled under Portuguese law to [...] all the rights and privileges of Portuguese citizenship'; see Roesch, 1991.
- 3 This was the case at least until mid-2017, when I conducted my final fieldwork.
- 4 The 'occupied' sites were usually areas that were not being cultivated due to being not very good (for example, their poor drainage capacity leading to longer periods of flooding). These sites could be cultivated at most once a year, instead of twice.

- 5 It was unclear whether farmers had to pay their contracted debt or whether their bills had been cancelled.

Chapter 10

- 1 As Newitt (1997, p. 433) illustrates, Samora Machel's father is an example of this process: '[H]e went to work for the mines for the first time in 1912 and worked in them several times until 1926. In 1917 he got married and in 1921 bought a plough. He ended up accumulating enough capital to buy a herd of several hundred head of cattle and work 30 hectares of land.'
- 2 It should be noted, however, that migratory movements to South Africa also appear to be factors explaining low agricultural production. In the 1940s, between a quarter and a third of the male labour force in Inhambane Province was absent due to migrant work (CEA, 1998, p. 137; Newitt, 1997, p. 432), depriving the rural economy of an important labour force, which, in theory, could have contributed to increased production and market development. Predominantly male, migration had effects on the family economy and on the restructuring of the social division of labour, and in fact there was a strengthening of family self-exploitation to finance external capitalist interests through the practice of low wages (Mosca, 2005, p. 112).
- 3 Faced with numerous constraints (difficulties in accessing abundant and cheap labour or transport), an alternative used by the colonial state was to transfer the burden of supervising cotton production to state officials and local rulers and chiefs, who had already been made responsible for registering the hut tax and recruiting labour, as well as a wide variety of police and judicial functions.
- 4 In the Maoist guerrilla strategy, the guerrilla depends on the population (for camouflage, access to logistics and information) in the same way that fish depend on water to survive.
- 5 The BPD was the smaller of the two government banks that dominated Mozambique's financial markets and was responsible for promoting development. The BPD dealt with a larger number of smaller businesses and had many longer-term loans in its portfolio. Though smaller than the Bank of Mozambique in terms of volume of transactions, the BPD had an extensive network of branches and offices throughout the country, giving it an advantage in servicing an agricultural clientele.
- 6 Several years before Bowen's book (2000), this feeling of 'state against the peasantry' had already been identified in the analyses of the Centre for African Studies (CEA, 1983a, 1983b). Questioned on 'What is CAIA for you? [the answer given by a peasant was] CAIA is our opponent. CAIA is the government' (CEA, 1983b, p. 31). Compulsory recruitment systems, a lack of shops for inputs and other consumer goods, and land occupation problems, aggravated by control measures such as the hunt for small hauliers at the border, united the peasant farmers in their anti-state position (CEA, 1983b, p. 26).
- 7 Associated with the opportunism of the new political leaders, Angónia's cooperatives were usually seen more as a 'Frelimo *machamba*' (Frelimo agricultural land), rather than a project to transform the organization of family farming. The party faced a class structure shaped by colonial capitalism. Often, the village secretaries were also medium-sized farmers and traders, more concerned with the organization of their economic universe than with party matters (CEA, 1983b, pp. 28-31).

- 8 Created in 1981 and supervised by the Ministry of Commerce, AGRICOM purchased surplus from peasants on an exclusive basis and fixed prices.
- 9 *Kulak* is a pejorative term used in the former Soviet Union to refer to medium-sized peasants who owned large areas and used salaried labour. They were the product of the Czar's government's economic reforms to form a political support group. After the Bolshevik revolution, the *kulaks* were seen as the last bastion of capitalism in the countryside and were the target of Stalin's collectivization policies.
- 10 According to official propaganda, Nkavandame, the Frelimo secretary in Cabo Delgado, exploited the work of peasants on his own land as well as in cooperatives for his personal benefit (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983, p. 96). In the propagandistic discourse, the Nkavandame group fought for independence to replace the Portuguese settlers with a Mozambican capitalist elite, unlike the Machel group, whose political project was to transform these production relations.
- 11 Trabalho de Inquérito Agrícola is a survey carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture every five years or so. Data on agricultural production are collected from a national sample of peasants.

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‘The main issue in today’s Mozambique is not gas but land and family farming. This is one of the strengths of this book: it is not only about agriculture, but the multisectoral and multi-disciplinary analysis it delivers revolves entirely around the agricultural issue and, from a social point of view, the peasant issue. The book has a rich mix of Mozambican and non-Mozambican authors, both academic and NGO experts; and really does produce knowledge and will be useful even to people who think they know Mozambique well.’

Michel Cahen, Sciences Po Bordeaux, University of Bordeaux, France

With contributions from both Mozambican and non-Mozambican scholars of multi-disciplinary backgrounds and approaches, this book provides a range of new perspectives on how Mozambique has been characterized by profound changes in its rural communities and places.

Despite the persistence of poverty in Mozambique, significant investments have been made in rural areas in extractive industry or agribusiness, resulting in both the transformation of these areas, and a new set of tensions and conflicts related to land tenure and population resettlement. Meanwhile, the Mozambican rural landscape is one dominated by smallholders whose livelihoods depend on both farming and non-farming activities, and who are often extremely vulnerable to shocks and pressure over resources. The emergence of new civil society organizations has led to clashes within the interests of local political, administrative and economic powers, creating fresh social conflicts.


Transformations of Rural Spaces in Mozambique examines the process of transformation across a range of settings; from the impacts of large-scale industries and the transformation of agriculture, to relations between state and non-state actors and issues related to land.

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