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*Routledge Advances in International Relations
and Global Politics*

NEUTRAL EUROPE AND THE CREATION OF THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

1958–1968

Edited by
Pascal Lottaz and Yoko Iwama





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Neutral Europe and the Creation of the Nonproliferation Regime

Lottaz, Iwama, and their contributors investigate the role of neutral and non-aligned European states during the negotiations for the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

Focusing on the years from the Irish Resolution of 1958 until the treaty's opening for signatures ten years later, the nine chapters written by area experts highlight the processes and reasons for the political and diplomatic actions the neutrals took, and how those impacted the multilateral treaty negotiations. The book reveals new aspects of the dynamics that lead to this most consequential multilateral breakthrough of the Cold War. In part one, three chapters analyze the international system from a bird's eye perspective, discussing neutrality, nonalignment, and the nuclear order. The second part features six detailed case studies on the politics and diplomacy of Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Austria, and Yugoslavia. Overall, this study suggests that despite the volatile and dangerous nature of the early Cold War, the balance of the strategic environment enabled actors that were not part of one or the other alliance system to play a role in the interlocking global politics that finally created the nuclear regime that defines international relations until today.

A valuable resource for scholars of nonproliferation, the Cold War, neutrality, nonalignment, and area studies.

Pascal Lottaz is Associate Professor for Neutrality Studies at Kyoto University, Japan.

Yoko Iwama is Professor of International Relations at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo, Japan.

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Tokyo, May 2023
Pascal Lottaz and Yoko Iwama

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1 Introduction

Pascal Lottaz and Yoko Iwama

Nonproliferation Matters

Nuclear weapons are now 80 years old and so is the question of how to live with these doomsday devices that could incinerate all of mankind. We cannot wind back the clock to un-invent them, nor is it realistic to expect that suddenly we will muster the global political will to renounce them collectively. Hypothetically, they could be given up, but since there is no example of a military technology that, once developed, was again abandoned voluntarily without being replaced by a more potent version of the same, the chances for global de-nuclearization seem slim. Besides, illegalizing nuclear weapons may strengthen the anathema attached to their use, but would not eliminate the knowledge of how to make them. At least for the foreseeable future, we are condemned to either live with these weapons—or die from them.

Like war, atomic weapons are not a natural phenomenon but the (forbidden) fruit of our collective social ingenuity, and “nuclear safety” is not an issue of technology but of policy. The nuclear logic is deep, and there is a big difference between tactical nuclear weapons that could potentially be deployed in a battlefield scenario and strategic nuclear weapons targeted at industrial and political heartlands, but the main purpose of both is the same; they are supposed to scare adversaries so much that they will never be used in the first place.¹ In this sense, nuclear weapons are akin to an insurance policy; everybody wants to have one but would prefer not to use them. Unlike insurance, however, an accident or overreaction with a single one of them might well trigger a chain reaction, ending in complete mutual destruction. This fundamental condition of potential global suicide became a constant theme of international relations around the late 1950s.

Since then, two broad goals have emerged in global diplomacy: finding some sort of truce in the nuclear arms race by reducing the nuclear stockpile of states that have these weapons, and keeping them out of the hands of as many other states as possible. While on the first point, we have never achieved a global nuclear weapons level that could not destroy all of mankind, the international community has been more successful on the second target. The 1968 Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) became the

landmark agreement curbing the club of nuclear powers to nine countries. It allows only five nations to possess nuclear weapons legally² and constrains the four that possess them illegally,³ while also providing the global regulatory framework for the peaceful use of nuclear technology. In the end, the NPT became a deal between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Nonnuclear Weapon States (NNWS), in which the latter promised to refrain from acquiring their own bombs in exchange for the knowledge of the peaceful use of atomic energy from the NWS, and their commitment to working toward nuclear disarmament. The distinction between the technology's military and peaceful use was artificial from the start, hence the need for strong international inspection was evident from an early moment and became an integral part of the NPT regime, realized through the newly founded International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

With a total of 191 signatories today, the NPT still reigns supreme over the international use of nuclear technology, remaining the most essential feature of the global security architecture. Nearly all other arms control agreements of the Cold War have been either suspended or completely canceled. Hence, understanding the factors for the NPT's success is not an unimportant matter, especially at a time of deteriorating international stability that some have started calling a "New Cold War," with US allies and partners on one side and China and Russia on the other. China seems increasingly determined to catch up with the United States to become a world superpower and impose its vision of international order. In short, the nuclear question is more pertinent today than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

This Book

While the NPT's origins have been researched extensively, most studies focus either on the role of major powers⁴ or the inter-alliance politics of the two blocks.⁵ Neutral and nonaligned (N+N) countries have constantly been overlooked, despite their obvious involvement: The 1958 United Nations (UN) initiative starting the NPT process came from Frank Aiken, the foreign minister of neutral Ireland, the treaty was mostly negotiated in neutral Switzerland with much input from neutral Sweden in the Eighteen Nations Committee on Disarmament (ENCD), its first signatory was neutral Finland, and it strengthened the role of neutral Austria as the seat of the IAEA. At the same time, Yugoslavia developed into one of the leaders of a new form of neutralism through its help in founding the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), in 1961. From the get-go, NAM members argued strongly against nuclear proliferation and for the right of developing nations to benefit from the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, no research has been conducted on the impact of these states on the creation of the nonproliferation regime. This book has been written to fill parts of the gap.

Our study groups Europe's five major neutrals together with nonaligned Yugoslavia to investigate how the alliance-free countries of Europe viewed

their security as the age of mutual annihilation first arrived and how, in turn, their different approaches to neutrality impacted the formation of the nonproliferation regime during the NPT negotiations. Spain, although not a NATO member until 1982, was intentionally left out, as it had a security agreement with the United States, hosted its nuclear weapons, and acceded to the NPT only in 1987. The study equally leaves out European micro-states which—except for the Vatican⁶—had little agency in the nuclear question. However, a shortcoming of this volume is its Eurocentrism. The nuclear question for the global members of the NAM, especially the founding members; India, Ghana, Indonesia, and Egypt, but equally Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa, are very much worth studying but could not yet be integrated into this project beyond the analysis presented by Jonathan R. Hunt in Chapter 4.

Neutrality and the formation of the global nuclear order are the framework of this study. The two aspects tie together a heterogeneous group of states for a discussion and comparison of their nuclear security approaches. The first three chapters in part one of the book are dedicated to the theoretical framework. The subsequent six chapters of part two are country-specific case studies of the neutrals. They are the product of multilingual and multi-archival research, making each chapter a valuable contribution to their respective national diplomatic histories. We hope that by reading them together and in context, this book illuminates the general impact the neutral question had on the formation of the NPT.

Our approach builds on the earlier work of Yoko Iwama and John Baylis on the diplomacy of the NPT, as well as on the pioneering work of Thomas Fischer, who studied N+N states in the context of the successful Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).⁷ One of Fisher's interesting findings was that "(...), the N+N collaboration was less a conscious decision made by the respective governments with a long-term perspective than the result of a combination of various push-and-pull factors (...)"⁸ Although the collaboration of the N+N was neither predetermined nor linear in its development,⁹ there was coordination going on, and the interplay of the N+N with the two blocks was an important contributing factor to the success of the CSCE. This prompted us to ask if the NPT process, too, might have been an instance of Cold War diplomacy when the structural elements of the system and the interests of the non-allied part of the world created explicit or implicit cooperation. After all, the NPT process was an example of successful multilateral coordination across the blocks, in which mutual interests of the superpowers, and many rounds of negotiations among and within the alliances, created global order.

It must be stressed that the term "N+N" only came into existence as a political grouping during the CSCE process in the early 1970s. There is evidence that the eight N+N members of the ENCD were perceived as sharing interests and, at times, working together; however, they were typically lumped together either as "the neutrals" or as "the nonaligned" by eastern and western observers.¹⁰ And while the eight un-allied ENCD members periodically submitted joint memoranda to the ENCD, they did so there and at the UN General

Assembly in the name of their respective countries, rather than all N+N states. The framing of the “N+N” in the NPT process is, therefore, anachronistic, and we are using it only as an analytical category, not a historical description.

The Chapters

Pascal Lottaz begins in Chapter 2 with an overview of the neutrality concept in the early Cold War. He lays out that the immediate aftermath of the Second World War was relatively hostile to the neutrals as the new global order centered around the idea of collective security through the UN system and came to be structured by the ideological rivalry of the two blocks, which also distrusted any attempts of states trying to chart an independent path. Both superpowers only tacitly tolerated neutrality in their spheres of influence when they had to, and actively undermined such efforts when they could. Neither one approved of “neutralism” as a political sentiment when it appeared in places of strategic importance to them. Lottaz furthermore shows how the “nonalignment” of the developing world was a completely new phenomenon, specific to the context of the Cold War, and worried both sides of the iron curtain.

Yoko Iwama, in Chapter 3, theorizes how the NPT process was part of a shift in global international relations from “nuclear anarchy” to a “global nuclear order.” She reviews the major scholarly approaches that stand behind this analysis and how the order functioned in four hierarchical tiers. While all parts of the emerging order plaid distinct roles, the most influential one was the superpower relationship, which, during the Eisenhower administration, took a turn to the now well-known “balance of terror,” where two poles of the Cold War threatened each other and their allies with annihilation should either side take recourse to its nuclear arsenal. Iwama shows how this situation impacted the neutrals of Europe, leading to the diplomatic initiative of Ireland to propose the NPT in the first place and impacted the other neutrals to reconsider their strategic goals toward the nuclear question.

Johnathan R. Hunt, in Chapter 4, shows that among the architects of the NPT, N+N nations were the most ambivalent. While the expanding knowledge of nuclear science brought the acquisition of atomic weapons within their reach, it also raised concerns about the compatibility of a neutralist stance with the possession of such weapons. His chapter examines how N+N nations especially in the Middle East and Asia influenced the formation of a global nuclear nonproliferation regime that reflected their specific interests and perspectives; how the Irish Resolution set in motion efforts by the United States, the Soviet Union, and India to delegitimize the nuclear test conducted by the People's Republic of China; and what initiatives were undertaken by N+N countries at the ENCD and the UN General Assembly. Since these initiatives sought to condition a nonproliferation agreement on the principles of peaceful nuclear development, universal security assurances, and meaningful arms control, the NPT was formulated in a manner that counterbalanced discriminatory elements with provisions that would complement rather than undermine neutrality.

Mervyn O'Driscoll, in Chapter 5, focuses in more detail on Frank Aiken, the Irish minister for external affairs, and his significant contribution to the NPT process. Aiken played a crucial role in generating widespread support for nonproliferation at the UN, between 1958 to 1961, and he even leveraged Ireland's identity and neutrality to support his diplomatic efforts. But the Irish resolutions were only one aspect of his broader attempts to ease Cold War tensions and steer global politics toward cooperative solutions. Aligning with UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld's vision and the concept of middle powers as mediators, Aiken's greatest challenge was to convince the United States and NATO that nonproliferation was in their best interests. Following the landmark UN resolution 1665 (in 1961), Aiken adopted a pragmatic approach, acknowledging that the resolution provided a basic framework for a global agreement, but that the nuclear powers, particularly the United States and USSR, were best suited to negotiate it to an end.

Thomas Jonter, in Chapter 6, portrays the changes taking place in Sweden toward the nuclear question. While Stockholm initially aspired to acquire nuclear weapons in the 1950s, it ultimately abandoned the stance, renounced nuclear weapons, and emerged as a prominent advocate for disarmament and nonproliferation. Following Sweden's ratification of the NPT in 1970, Stockholm continued to play this role throughout the Cold War, leveraging its neutral position to mediate between the superpowers and champion the rights of smaller states in the ongoing talks. Especially under the leadership of Alva Myrdal, Sweden insisted that even the NWS had a responsibility to pursue disarmament. Notably, Sweden, along with Mexico, successfully pushed for Article VI to be included in the NPT, requiring the NWS to make efforts toward disarmament. This achievement was considered a significant victory for Sweden and a compelling reason to abandon its nuclear weapon plans.

Tapio Juntunen, in Chapter 7, analyses Finland, finding that Helsinki went from being a passive observer during the first part of the NPT negotiations to becoming an active mediator at the UN in the spring of 1968. Finland's stance was based on its policy of aspiring neutrality, which was influenced by both its historical experiences and its location in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence. Its approach to nuclear disarmament was focused on reaching a consensus between the leading NWS, rather than demanding more progressive steps toward disarmament like its neighbor Sweden and other neutral countries did. Finnish foreign policy leaders believed that the NPT was politically valuable, as it represented a rare moment of US-Soviet cooperation, which was an outcome Helsinki very much wished to bring about. Additionally, Finland saw the NPT as a way to remove concerns about the possibility of a nuclearized West Germany, which the Soviet Union had consistently used as leverage to apply diplomatic pressure on Finland.

Benno Zogg, in Chapter 8, shows why Switzerland, despite its well-known status as a permanent neutral, and its reputation for promoting international diplomacy and arms control, also explored the possibility of developing nuclear weapons until the late 1960s and did not join the NPT negotiations. He

investigates how Switzerland's perception and attitude toward the NPT were influenced by a variety of factors, including international and domestic political developments, intra-governmental dynamics, societal changes, and military-strategic considerations. Zogg argues that in the 1950s and '60s, opposing political factions in the country disagreed on the meaning of Switzerland's neutrality and hence the defense strategy that should follow. The camp advocating for mobile defense and nuclear weapons initially prevailed, until a series of scandals undermined trust between politicians and the military in 1964. Ultimately, a power struggle between ministries and Switzerland's non-membership in the UN constrained Berne's role to that of a passive observer of the NPT process.

Anna Graf-Steiner and Herbert R. Reginbogin, in Chapter 9, explore Austria's role in the creation of the NPT, which they view as part of the country's post-war efforts to redefine its identity and demonstrate its commitment to international peace and security. To bolster its position as a neutral state, Austria sought to establish international organizations such as the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, and promoted disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, which was a crucial aspect of its diplomatic efforts. The country's self-image as a nuclear-free zone, as established in the State Treaty of 1955, was central to this identity approach to international relations. Hence, Vienna viewed all plans for nuclear demilitarization—even when they came from Eastern Europe, such as the Rapacki Plan—positively, and supported them diplomatically whenever possible.

Marko Miljković, concludes the book with a chapter on Yugoslavia, which, like Switzerland or Sweden, began a nuclear program with the intention of creating weapons as a deterrent against a possible Soviet attack. However, by the early 1960s, the perceived security threats had dissipated and as a leader of the NAM, Yugoslavia began advocating for complete nuclear disarmament as essential for peaceful coexistence among nations. This shift in policy was gradual and despite the rhetoric for international cooperation on equal terms during the NPT negotiations, Yugoslavia's nuclear policy was primarily based on self-interest and national security concerns.

The Findings

The volume uncovers that not being part of a formal alliance, had little impact on the nuclear strategies of the N+N states. Switzerland, Sweden, and Yugoslavia considered their own nuclear options for a long time, while Ireland, Finland, and Austria, pursued multilateral options in European diplomacy to counter the nuclear security threat diplomatically rather than technologically. The approaches the six countries chose had more to do with the way the Second World War ended for each of them, their technological abilities, and the geostrategic situation of the early Cold War. Switzerland and Sweden remained both unharmed from the previous war and had the scientific know-how necessary to contemplate the nuclear option seriously. Yugoslavia, too, emerged

from the previous war in a relatively independent position and had the liberty of considering the nuclear option. For resource-constrained (and only recently independent) Ireland that was never an option. Nor could Finland and Austria—both belonging to the losers of the previous war—ever aspire to acquire the know-how to develop such capacities or count on the understanding of the superpowers if they tried. Hence, all three saw more chances in constraining the nuclear aspirations of other states.

Examining the perceptions of these countries about international society reveals the fundamentally changing nature of the Cold War during the 1960s. Very often, the *détente* between the superpowers is perceived as the result of their changed threat perceptions after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. But just as important were the large structural changes that took place in international society. The wave of newly independent countries had become a distinct feature from the mid-1950s onwards. The 1955 Bandung Conference was the first indication of the emergence of such a grouping, growing substantially when more African states joined in the 1960s. It may be a mere coincidence that this new block developed precisely at the time when also the consciousness of the global danger of nuclear weapons emerged, but, if so, it was lucky timing since the N+N world was important in greasing the wheels of UN diplomacy toward the NPT.

The study also reveals that had it been only for the European neutrals, disarmament and arms control might not have come as far as they did in the 1960s. Jonathan R. Hunt in Chapter 4 convincingly shows that the voices of nonaligned countries outside Europe expressing their wish for nonproliferation as a bloc was a crucial component. The ENCD in Geneva became an important venue for bargaining between the nuclear haves and the have-nots especially during the later stage of the negotiations. The shift from the East-West Ten Nations Committee on Disarmament (TNCND) to a more North-South (neutralist) inclusive ENCD in 1960/61 is symbolic of the shift.

Furthermore, the examination of the European neutrals shows that their threat perception concerning nuclear weapons changed by the 1960s. While in the previous decade, nuclear weapons were still viewed as tools that could guarantee the security and survival of neutral countries, which by definition could not rely on allies, by the 1960s, the fear of an all-out thermo-nuclear war overshadowed such reasoning in addition to the realization that possessing nuclear weapons might actually increase the risk of becoming a target of aggression (as Sweden realized) and that the weapons would cause intolerable harm to the country itself under a doctrine of strict self-defense inside its borders (as for Switzerland). Therefore, even the neutrals that started out with nuclear programs of their own came to agree that proliferation had to be avoided—they included.

As mentioned in the beginning, the NPT is often portrayed as a regime forced on the weaker members of the international society by the superpowers, especially the United States. However, the examination of the origins and the making of the NPT reveals a history of international relations, which is

much more varied and complex than the bi-polarity model of the Cold War suggests. The superpower deal model only constitutes half the story. N+N countries played a bigger role in the ultimate outcome than historiography has hitherto been aware of. This is probably in line with the increasing tendency to rewrite the Cold War from a global perspective. Hopefully, this book will contribute to the understanding of this rich and complex process and be of help to future diplomatic endeavors in a world where political gravity is shifting away from the Euro-American world.

Notes

- 1 See the various contributions in Roman Kolkowicz, ed., *The Logic of Nuclear Terror*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2021).
- 2 USA, Russia, China, Britain, and France.
- 3 Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.
- 4 See, for example, Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigg, *Avoiding Armageddon: Europe, the United States, and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation* (London: Praeger, 2004); Shane J. Maddock, *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Nuclear Supremacy from WWII to the Present* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).
- 5 Efforts include Liviu Horowitz Popp and Andreas Wenger, *Negotiating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Origins of the Nuclear Order* (New York: Routledge, 2017); John Baylis and Yoko Iwama, eds., *Joining The Non-Proliferation Treaty* (New York: Routledge, 2019). See also the recent work by Jonathan R. Hunt, *The Nuclear Club: How America and the World Policed the Atom from Hiroshima to Vietnam* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2022).
- 6 Maryann Cusimano Love, “The Church and the Bomb: Holy See Diplomacy and Nuclear Weapons,” in *The Vatican and Permanent Neutrality*, eds. Marshall Breger and Herbert Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022); Saho Matsumoto, “Vatican’s / Holy See’s Approach to Nonproliferation: The United States and Japan,” in *The Vatican and Permanent Neutrality*, eds. Marshall Breger and Herbert Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022).
- 7 Thomas Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE—the N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009).
- 8 Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE—the N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975*, 371.
- 9 Fischer, *Neutral Power in the CSCE—the N+N States and the Making of the Helsinki Accords 1975*, 18.
- 10 See Chapter 4 by Jonathan R. Hunt in this volume. See also Hunt, *The Nuclear Club: How America and the World Policed the Atom from Hiroshima to Vietnam*.

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Part I

The Global View



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2 Neutrality, Neutralism, and Nonalignment in the Early Cold War

Pascal Lottaz

When all is said and done, neutrality is by no means the easiest foreign policy. It is easier to obey than to stand on one's own feet. Neutrality cannot be pursued passively and there is no simple formula which will always and unfailingly give the desired answer regardless of situations and circumstances.¹

— Urho Kekkonen, 1965

Introduction

The early years of the Cold War were a period of fundamental changes in Europe, and the neutrals were part of that process. At the height of World War II (WWII), neutral Europe was made up of Portugal, Spain, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, and Turkey (plus the microstates of the Vatican, Lichtenstein, Andorra, and San Marino).² However, in 1949, Portugal became a founding member of NATO, Turkey joined in 1952, and Spain dropped most references to neutrality in the 1950s.³ At the same time, Finland was neutralized—or “Finlandized”—through a security treaty with the Soviet Union (1948). Austria accepted neutrality as an informal condition to end the Allied occupation (1955), and Yugoslavia, albeit not formally neutral, became a standard bearer for the Nonaligned Movement (NAM), which it helped create in 1961.⁴

I will repeat here my claim that neutrality is a fuzzy concept.⁵ It has many meanings and is, as constructivists put it, “what states make of it.”⁶ At the same time, neutrality is also deeply rooted in realism. The policies of neutrals have as much to do with geopolitics as with Great Power configurations. At its most fundamental level, neutrality is the idea of remaining in harmony with those who are in conflict with each other. In international relations, it denotes remaining at peace with states that are at war. From this fundamental logic of neutrality, many implications follow, which are explained elsewhere.⁷ In this chapter, I will focus on the idea itself and various strains of the neutrality debate for the first 20 years of the Cold War. The aim is to show with concrete examples how the concept developed theoretically and what that meant for the global politics of the Cold War.

The chapter will first outline how the end of WWII was a critical moment, hostile to the idea of neutrality but innovative regarding its conceptualization.

While in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, neutrality was mostly treated as a legal term under international law, the Cold War broke the neat categories, introducing the neologisms “neutralism” and “nonalignment” that began haunting both superpowers. In the second part, the chapter will outline the political predicaments Europe’s neutral and nonaligned states found themselves in, arguing that their neutral paths depended heavily on individual circumstances, which in turn informed their judgments about what their version of neutrality allowed them to do and what not.

The following pages will pull together different strains of the fragmented neutrality debate, attempting to structure the terminology and offer a narrative understanding of conceptual developments. That is not to claim neutrality was perceived at the time in a coherent manner or that there was an agreement about the way the different terms were used. The framing this chapter proposes should help to understand how neutrality was embedded in the early Cold War and how it related to its politics.

Post-War Neutrality: Unwanted and Reframed

As WWII drew to a close, the fault lines of the post-war order remained blurry for several years. When the first institutions of the new order were created, it was anything but clear that it would transform into a contest between the superpowers. One only needs to appreciate the famous picture of the Bretton Woods delegates M. S. Stepanov (USSR), John Maynard Keynes (United Kingdom), and Vladimir Rybar (Yugoslavia) in discussion on July 6, 1944,⁸ when the idea of the delegates was still to create a global economic infrastructure to rebuild the devastated Eurasian continent (Figure 2.1). Only a few years later, the USSR and the United Kingdom would end up on opposite sides of the Iron Curtain and Yugoslavia somewhere in between. Retrospectively, the effort to include the communist regimes in the post-war financial system might seem blue-eyed, but at the time, it was attempted in all seriousness. The great split was not a given.⁹ After all, George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” was still two years away, and so was Churchill’s “Iron Curtain speech.”

Bretton Woods is also instructive regarding the nations that were *not* invited. Obviously, Germany, Italy, and Japan, but also Europe’s WWII neutrals, were missing and so was the still colonized part of the world. Most of Central and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines) was absent, and the entire African continent was represented only by Egypt, Ethiopia, and Liberia. The new world order was planned almost exclusively by the colonial victors of WWII. This was even more true for the United Nations (UN), the other pivotal institution of the post-war order. To be invited to its founding conference in 1945, a country had to fulfill at least one of two conditions: either be a signatory to the UN declaration of 1942—which set up the wartime alliance against the Axis Powers in the first place—or have declared war on them before March 1945.¹⁰ The irony for the neutrals was, in the words of historian J. M. Gabriel, that those who “had remained at peace now had to declare war



Figure 2.1 USSR, United Kingdom, and Yugoslavia delegates, Bretton Woods Conference, New Hampshire, USA.

Source: United States Office of War Information in the National Archives/World Bank. License: CC BY NC-SA 4.0.

Note: From left to right: M. S. Stepanov (USSR), J. M. Keynes (United Kingdom), and V. Rybar (Yugoslavia).

in order to join an organisation intent upon abolishing war and preserving peace!”¹¹ Only Turkey followed suit, declaring pro forma war on Germany “on time” in late February. The other neutrals remained committed to their policies and were hence not invited to San Francisco.

Unsurprisingly, the early UN was born hostile to the idea of neutrality, enshrining *radical internationalist* ideas, as Gabriel calls it.¹² The French delegation even proposed a passage in Chapter I (Article 2) of the Charter that membership was incompatible with permanent neutrality, thus attempting to exclude countries like Switzerland as long as they had neutrality statutes on their legal codes. The suggestion was only dropped because the other delegations agreed that the current Charter formulation was sufficiently clear to that extent. Consequently, legal scholars argued for years that neutrals could not become members of the UN.¹³ However, realpolitik soon trumped legal dogmatism as the first WWII neutrals, Afghanistan, Iceland,¹⁴ and Sweden were accepted into the UN in 1946.¹⁵ It was certainly helpful that none of them had “hard” neutrality clauses in their constitutions. They had been neutral in the previous war only by virtue of not fighting in it.

Around the same time, a reframing of neutrality began that introduced a major shift in the way the concept would be discussed for much of the Cold War. Classic neutrality was a (European) tradition born from maritime law, with earliest traces going back to the *Consolato del Mare*, a thirteenth-century

collection of maritime trading practices, outlining accepted norms of commerce in the Mediterranean Sea.¹⁶ Together with practices for neutrality on land—formulated a few centuries later—a body of neutrality norms emerged that, over time, became international customary law and even treaty law.¹⁷ That process culminated in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which were the largest-ever attempts at multilateral codification of the laws of war, peace, and neutrality. During this development, neutrality had mostly been treated as a commercial, military, and most of all, a legal issue concerning states that happened to be at peace with both sides of a third-party war. Neutrality in this sense was a concept open to all states at all times on an ad-hoc basis. In fact, the neutrality law of the Hague Conventions was written for cases of “occasional neutrality” of any small or great power. “Permanent neutrality” of the sort Switzerland started practicing after 1815—promising to *never* join a war on anyone’s side—was an exception at the time, reflected in the fact that the Hague Conventions do not even mention the duty of neutrals to remain outside of military alliances during peace times. Rarely had neutrality been treated as a permanent issue outliving the existence of war. Even less commonly was it discussed as an ideological issue. This changed in the late 1940s when the term “neutralism” took root, and neutrality suddenly came to be conceptualized as a third “-ism” among the rivaling social dogmas of the twentieth century.

The novelty of neutrality as an “-ism” can be traced through Google’s *Ngram Viewer*, a software able to statistically analyze all the words inside the millions of English language books the company has scanned over the past two decades (Figure 2.1). It plots a search term on a time axis against its frequency of appearance using a yearly count of n-grams. The application has its shortcomings,¹⁸ but it can function as a useful heuristic to approximately understand a concept’s prevalence in the English language.¹⁹ Searching for “neutral country” shows the term appeared most often over the past 200 years around the time of general wars (or shortly thereafter), like the Napoleonic Wars, the Crimean War, and of course the First and Second World Wars. “Neutralism” and “non-alignment,” on the other hand, were almost unknown to the English language before 1945. They only emerge in the dataset to a significant degree after WWII and then grow rapidly in popularity in the 1950s (Figure 2.2).

It is often assumed that “neutralism” and “nonalignment” are synonymous and that both hark back to the emergence of the decolonized world as an international political actor, especially the so-called Afro-Asian block.²⁰ While it is true that Western commentators often spoke of nonalignment *as* neutralism after the founding of the NAM in 1961, the Ngram graphic clearly reflects that the concept of “neutralism” appeared before that. In fact, it first became popular as a term to describe political sentiments in the West. Ironically (considering later developments), one of the first instances in which “neutralism” was used in a major newspaper was in 1916 by a British journalist describing the popular sentiment of the Americans toward Europe during the First World War. The unnamed journalist explicitly came up with this term to distinguish the “popular attitude” of US citizens from their government’s official




Figure 2.2 Usage of the terms “neutral country,” “neutralism,” and “non-alignment” over time.

Source: Google Ngram Viewer, <http://books.google.com/ngrams>.

policy of neutrality.²¹ However, the concept only took off in popularity after WWII to describe anti-alliance tendencies in Eurasia's former Great Powers that had just been brought into Washington's security fold, most importantly Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. The first *New York Times* article featuring it in a title was published in the summer of 1950, and the first thorough treatment in an English language academic journal dates to 1951. Both referenced political forces on the left and right of the political spectrum in France and West Germany that opposed political or military alignment with the United States while not falling in line with Soviet goals for Europe either.²² Similar forces existed also in Japan, where the political left kept advocating against the security arrangement with the United States and for a neutrality policy until the early 1960s.²³ This might explain why the NAM countries opposed that framing—neutrality, like neutrality, were both inherently European concepts and thereby colonial language. Both terms were also connotated negatively in the United States and the USSR, as the next section will show. Babaa and Crabb, discuss this point in a 1965 publication as follows:

Nonalignment and neutralism tend to be used synonymously, except when the latter denotes “neutrality” in its legal or ethical connotations. To avoid such connotations, a majority of nations in this group prefers nonalignment as the term best describing its viewpoints and policies toward the great powers.²⁴

Hence, by the mid-1950s, there were three interrelated, yet distinct concepts floating in the ether of foreign policy vernacular: *classic neutrality* in the sense of permanent peacetime neutrals that would not join military alliances but might have clear ideological preferences, *neutralism* as a political inclination to oppose not only alliance making but also refusing the ideological and morally connotated dichotomy between Western capitalism and Eastern communism, and *nonalignment* as a term preferred by the recently decolonized states of Asia and Africa plus Yugoslavia to distance themselves from both terms while not committing to the dichotomy either.

US Attitudes Toward Neutrals and Neutralism

In the United States, views about neutrality were ambivalent. There were politicians, diplomats, and military leaders for and against neutrality as a way to achieve foreign policy goals. From the summer of 1945 to the fall of 1946, the State Department under James F. Byrnes developed plans for a neutral Germany,²⁵ General MacArthur advocated for a neutralized Japan until the early 1950s, and President Eisenhower was inclined to ponder the neutrality of Germany and ultimately signed off on the one for Austria. George Kennan, the State Department maverick, was even publicly speaking about the benefits of a neutral belt between NATO and the Soviet sphere—including a neutralized Germany—as late as 1955, shortly before West Germany's integration into the alliance.²⁶

At the same time, voices dismissing neutralization as unrealistic or even communist plots to subvert US interests were never in short supply. Especially after the founding of NATO (1949), and the US-Japan alliance (1951), some strategists worried about political forces that could break the young coalitions. In 1952, Daniel Learner, a social scientist (and IR spin doctor), published a study of British and French neutralist tendencies, revealing typical contemporary disdain and distrust toward them in his framing:

Neutralism indicates a failure of shared purpose in the America-centered Free World coalition, which today stands opposed to the Soviet-centered Comintern coalition in the struggle for world power. The failure is this: that people who were counted as members of the Free World coalition, in fact decline to identify themselves with it and to share its purposes. Neutralists are those who refuse to join either coalition.²⁷

Lerner immediately psychologizes the issue, offering a dubious explanation for these political minority tendencies:

The psychological mechanism underlying neutralist sentiment is neither apathy nor apoplexy, but ambivalence. Ambivalence is the inability to make a satisfying and durable choice between alternatives. When this inability to choose persists against all considerations of greater good or lesser evil in an actual situation, a new conception of reality may be internalized which ignores or denies the need to make a choice at all.²⁸

Lerner's worries were shared by the hawks of the foreign policy establishment, who had a hard time reconciling the idea that there might be political tendencies that were not communist but would still refuse US leadership to confront that threat. In 1955, the National Security Council (NSC) requested a report from the State Department on "Neutralism in Europe." Although this remarkable analysis introduces a useful distinction between neutralism and classic (permanent) neutrality—depicting the latter as a government policy or status not necessarily opposed to US strategic goals—it picks up on Learner's framing of neutralism, describing it as a "psychological tendency" leading to a "disinclination to cooperate with U.S. objectives in the cold war and in a possible hot war."²⁹ This was seen as a serious problem since the report also described the stubborn anti-American neutralism as being "on the rise" (inside political parties and intellectual circles abroad). The historian Jussi Hanhimäki succinctly summarized that what the hawks

worried about was that the success of neutrality would encourage Europeans into thinking that the USSR's talk of peaceful coexistence was for real; that there was indeed a strong case to be made for cooperating, if only in a limited fashion, with the USSR.³⁰

In most of Western Europe and Japan, pro-neutralist forces were not able to win over the political process, and even the two Germanies ended up inside the Cold War alliances. The decolonized world, however, was another story. The Bandung Conference of 1955 was the first time a major multilateral conference on economic and—in a limited manner—security issues took place outside and without Euro-American colonial powers. While the main emphasis of the final communiqué was about the empowerment of former (or ongoing) colonies, it did not mention the East-West split of the Cold War. It did not even make reference to either capitalism or communism. Importantly, one of the ten final principles of the conference included the “abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers” and the “abstention by any country from exerting pressures on other countries.”³¹ As such, the conference placed itself outside of the Cold War framework and included the kernel for the future NAM. Importantly, ever since Bandung, what the Afro-Asian countries opposed was not alliances *per se* (another principle of the conference explicitly respects “the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively”) but the two coalitions of the superpowers.

To most policymakers in the United States who wanted to confront the USSR with strength, the neutralist sentiments of the decolonized world were perceived as blue-eyed at best and camouflaged communism at worst. Especially after some limited comeback of classic neutrality in the mid-1950s, and some positive remarks by President Eisenhower about the ability of neutrals to serve as mediators, John Foster Dulles, his secretary of state, felt it necessary to dispel in unequivocal terms the impression that the United States had a favorable view of neutralism. In 1956, at a much-cited foreign policy address, he described neutrality as a notion

which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others, (...). This has increasingly become an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.³²

Ironically, Dulles used the very same speech to argue against himself when the neutralist tendencies came from the other side of the Iron Curtain. “We also think it prudent to help Yugoslavia, so long as it remains determined to maintain genuine independence.”³³

It took the United States until the late 1950s to dispel most worries about neutralism in its sphere of influence. West Germany joined NATO in 1955, and Japan revised and cemented its security alliance with the United States in 1960. However, in 1961, the official formation of the NAM in Belgrade showed that the problem had merely shifted, not disappeared. This left many Americans puzzled to the point where it took Hans J. Morgenthau, one of the most prominent international relations scholars at the time, to explain this

“most pervasive trend in world politics” in a *New York Times* article.³⁴ As a lifelong observer and commentator on neutrality,³⁵ Morgenthau possessed a nuanced view of the phenomenon, outlining several motivations for states to join the NAM. His conclusion, however, was typical for the father of modern realism and revealing about the popular framing of neutralism inside the bipolar contest between the superpowers:

(...) neutralism is but a function of the power of the United States. Neutralism, like peaceful coexistence, is for the Soviet Union but a stepping stone towards communization. A nation can afford to be neutralist, not because this is what the Soviet Union wants it to be, but because the power of the Soviet Union is not sufficient to absorb it into the Soviet bloc. (...) For neutralism in the cold war, like neutrality in a shooting war, depends upon the balance of power. It is a luxury which certain nations can afford because the power of one antagonist cancels out the power of the other.³⁶

Soviet Attitudes Toward Neutrals and Neutralism

Moscow, too, was ambivalent when it came to neutrality. While there were important Soviet strategists like Maxim Litvinov, a former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States who, in 1944, internally promoted the idea of setting up a neutral belt between the USSR and the US-British alliance (made of Norway, Denmark, Germany, Austria, and Italy), there is, in the words of historian Vladislav Zubok, little evidence that “this idea had ever received serious hearing in the Kremlin.”³⁷ Especially during the Stalinist era, the top ranks of the Soviet leadership were staffed with people who, for ideological reasons, thought genuine neutrality in the epic struggle between historical forces was unfeasible. In an argument similar to the one Dulles would make a decade later, Andrei Zhadanov, a close confidant of Stalin, remarked at the founding of the Communist Information Bureau in 1947 that the division of the world into two hostile camps with the Soviet Union representing the forces of peace and the United States those of imperialism was irrevocable and that neutrality in this situation was utterly impossible. States that still tried to be neutral were obviously displaying malevolent inclinations.³⁸

Nevertheless, the USSR became at times supportive of neutral solutions, especially when they aligned with its goal of hindering European West integration and the spread of NATO. The most prominent examples were again Germany and Austria. Although only for the latter did neutrality become the solution to ten years of occupation, the idea of a neutral and unified Germany was not only entertained but actively nourished by Moscow between 1952 and 1955.

Historians are still divided on whether the Soviets were ever serious about a unified but neutral Germany—especially Stalin’s early design, offered in the so-called “Stalin Notes.” The Sovietologist, Peter Ruggenthaler, concluded Stalin’s

offer was but a “propaganda ploy” to subvert the Western alliance by playing mainly to the German public.³⁹ He and others who studied Soviet archives interpret the complete lack of records that would attest to Moscow’s serious planning for a neutral Germany as well as contradictions in Soviet statements as indicative of the proposal’s dishonest nature.⁴⁰ For instance, the later Austrian chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, who was one of the delegates in Moscow when the negotiations over Austria’s neutrality took place, recounted that Anastas Mikoyan, a long-served official, and politburo member, had very clear ideas about the limits of neutrality policy: “Neutrality,” Mikoyan reportedly said,

was guaranteed solely by that piece of paper on which it was declared. A small state was aware of the consequences that would result from infringement of the treaty. For a large state of the magnitude of a reunited Germany that same piece of paper might easily become obsolete.⁴¹

As such views were neither uncommon nor unreasonable, the “ploy-thesis historians” view Stalin’s offer as intended to sow discord inside Germany but not as a proposal Moscow would have followed through.

Other researchers disagree. Wilfried Loth still judges that precisely “because Moscow knew that the Western powers did not want to negotiate, they wanted to create pressure by mobilizing the (West) German public.”⁴² Michael Gehler, who wrote the most comprehensive study about the connection between the Austrian and German neutrality proposals, agrees that the initiative was probably a serious—yet poorly executed—attempt at creating a more Soviet-friendly central Europe without a hard contact line between the two blocks.⁴³ He argues that reducing the neutrality offer to a question of honesty misses the point that Stalin (and after him other Soviet leaders) had several good reasons for the offer, only one of which was propaganda, and that it was a risky, yet pragmatic proposal. In fact, the American, French, and British addressees of the note saw it that way, too, as they discussed its content seriously. Had Konrad Adenauer, the West German chancellor, not been categorically against the idea, negotiations might well have moved forward.⁴⁴ Finally, there is real-world proof of Soviet attitudes in the form of the Austrian case. When discussions about its troop withdrawals in return for Austrian permanent neutrality finally were negotiated, in the spring of 1955, Moscow took a leap of faith and accepted the word of Vienna’s delegation that Austria would “out of its free will” declare neutrality since the Austrian’s did not want the policy imposed on them as part of the soon-to-follow State Treaty. That design of Austria’s grand bargain finally took shape when the other three occupation forces signed off on it—much to the chagrin of Adenauer, who still believed neutralization meant sovietization. When Austria, in the end, lived up to its promise and really did declare neutrality right after the Soviet troop withdrawal, Khrushchev interpreted the solution as a great strategic victory.⁴⁵

With the benefit of hindsight, the neutral framework was not a bad one. Contrary to Adenauer’s fears, the USSR never intervened in Austrian internal

politics, the country was not divided, and Vienna became one of the few international cities of the Cold War, serving as a hub for conferences, spies, and a plethora of multilateral organizations. The two German states, in contrast, became a hard and dangerous border. It is no coincidence that the first real European crisis of the Cold War happened over Berlin, not Vienna.

However, these observations should not lead to the conclusion that the USSR harbored any genuine appreciation for neutrality. Stalin, and later Khrushchev, were just as opposed to indigenous neutralist sentiments in their core sphere of influence as the United States turned out to be in the territories it controlled. Case in point; only a year after the successful neutralization of Austria, Hungary went through a political change that brought forces to power trying to democratize and follow the Austrian example by ditching the Warsaw Pact and declaring neutrality. This was utterly unacceptable to Khrushchev, who ordered the Pact to invade and stamp out the opposition to communist rule.⁴⁶ Similarly, Tito's split with Moscow and his newly found love for nonalignment was a point of great contention and fierce opposition by the Kremlin as long as Stalin was alive.⁴⁷ Alvin Rubinstein argued that even after the Soviet change of heart years later, it never lost its suspicions about Yugoslavia's potentially hostile nature to the USSR's version of socialism.⁴⁸ The same is true for Finland. Stalin was highly distrustful of Helsinki's drive toward neutrality as a means to gain political distance from Moscow and enjoy more freedom in foreign and domestic policymaking than Eastern European states had. Hence also Finnish–Soviet relations only relaxed under his successors—albeit with ups and downs.⁴⁹

The Cold War Neutrals and the Dictates of Necessity

Neutrals, as so often, could not put much hope in the benign understanding of the dominant powers for their aspirations and predicaments, which were, after all, very diverse. Looking at the situation from their perspectives, we find a variety of reasons for the adoption of neutrality (or nonalignment) and just as many interpretations of what that meant.

Sweden, for instance, had not been part of a war for nearly 150 years when the Cold War started but had also never written neutrality into its constitution or laws. It was—and would remain—only a foreign policy principle. Certainly, Swedish leaders like the long-served elite diplomat and Foreign Minister Östen Undén understood the value of the policy very well. Although he had been an ardent advocate for global collective security through the League of Nations in the 1930s, he was utterly disillusioned and forced to abandon the approach when the League started falling apart in 1936.⁵⁰ Henceforth, Undén advocated for neutral solutions to buffer the Great Powers, even going as far as suggesting to NATO in 1955 to accept the Soviet design for a reunified but neutral Germany.⁵¹ Ideologically, however, it became quickly clear on whose side Sweden would be neutral on. West integration began early: first economically through Sweden's participation in the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, and its

(unofficial) adherence to COCOM export controls. Militarily, too, Stockholm was never ambiguous about its preferences. Despite strong public support for the neutrality policy, it was well understood that Sweden was building up its defenses against the USSR, not the West, or as Michael af Malmberg put it “anyone with the slightest acquaintance with Swedish military planning (...) knew that there was never talk of more than one enemy.”⁵² It was an open secret—and after 1950 even welcomed by the US State Department—that Sweden’s domestic defense strategy was built for putting up resistance against a hypothetical Soviet attack to buy time for Western support to come in. Especially after the failure of the Nordic Defense Union and the Danish and Norwegian decisions to join NATO, Sweden’s pro-Western neutrality was more or less set in stone.⁵³ However, in case of wars between third parties, Stockholm’s official security credo remained “non-participation in alliances in peacetime with a view to neutrality in war” until well into the next millennium. In this regard, Sweden came to play the role of a neutral shield to the Western alliance, much like Finland was forced to serve the same purpose to the USSR. Hence, both had little dogmatic qualms about joining the UN (Sweden in 1946, Finland for external reasons only in 1955). Neither viewed their pragmatic neutralities as standing in the way of participating in an international organization made of both superpowers.

Switzerland’s view of its neutrality was another story. Although like the Swedes, the Swiss had been a founding member of the League of Nations and were also quickly integrated into the Western economic system through the same mechanisms (especially the Marshall Plan), they understood their neutral obligations in a much more legalistic way. Already in November 1945, they drew the same conclusion as the French: UN membership, a government report proclaimed, was not impossible but highly difficult to reconcile with constitutional neutrality.⁵⁴ That assessment only grew more pessimistic over time. Influential legal voices inside the Federal Administration started arguing in the early 1950s that if international organizations

(...) are of a political nature, participation is only possible if they have a certain universality. The main representatives of the political groups in question must take part, in particular both parties to a possible conflict. (...), Switzerland must avoid taking sides.⁵⁵

Since Switzerland also judged the UN to be the club of the winners of WWII—the occupied former Axis Powers were not part of it yet—it could hardly be called “universal” from Berne’s perspective. Parliament and the voting population agreed, and Switzerland refrained from joining the UN until well after the end of the Cold War (in 2002). Nevertheless, Berne happily provided the Palais des Nations, in Geneva, the former premises of the League of Nations, as a second seat to the new organization. This promised economic benefits to the city and diplomatic prestige for the country, although it also created the somewhat paradoxical situation that Switzerland did not take a seat at the UN

negotiating table while still hosting venues for it. The Swiss attitude contrasts strongly with that of the soon-to-follow new neutrals—Austria, Finland, and Ireland⁵⁶—all of which joined the UN on December 14, 1955, as part of a Great Power package deal admitting four Eastern European communist states in return for 12 non-communist countries.

Austria is particularly interesting in this respect because it had regained its sovereignty less than two months prior. For several years, the main obstacle to Austrian independence had been the Soviet objection to ending the Allied occupation. Only in the spring of 1955 did a window of opportunity open when Moscow signaled its willingness to let go of Vienna in return for its promise to become a neutral (i.e., not a NATO member). The deal was struck in the so-called Moscow Memorandum of April 15, in which the country's top diplomats promised Austria would immediately "make a declaration in a form that commits Austria internationally to exercise perpetual neutrality of the kind practiced by Switzerland."⁵⁷ It was a point of considerable importance to the Austrians that neutrality was not imposed on them externally but that they could choose neutrality out of their free will. Hence, the State Treaty of May 15, 1955, between all Allied Powers and Austria that ended the occupation does not mention neutrality at all. Nevertheless, Vienna dutifully lived up to its promises, enacting a constitutional law of neutrality on October 26—the (supposedly) first day without foreign troops on its soil. Interestingly, despite the clear understanding that Austria would follow the Swiss model, Vienna, with the blessing of the United States and the USSR, immediately opted for joining the UN.

Ireland, too, was eager to participate in the multilateral organization. Like Austria or Sweden, it had few legal concerns, since its neutrality had been relatively young and mostly policy based. Although Eamon de Valéra, the leader of Sinn Féin and future Taoiseach proposed Irish neutrality as early as 1920, as a way to appease the British (promising Ireland would never endanger British security) only when the United Kingdom entered WWII in 1939, de Valéra officially declared Irish neutrality for the first time.⁵⁸ He did so not out of sympathy for Germany but because it would have been unthinkable for the independence leaders to join a war on the side of the power that still colonized the northern part of "their" island. Irish wartime neutrality was first and foremost a form of political pragmatism, conditioned on national political feelings toward the British, not on ideological or cultural affinities toward the concept itself. Hence the Irish leadership contemplated joining NATO in 1949 but connected the accession question to a unified Ireland, which the United Kingdom and the United States rejected,⁵⁹ leaving Dublin little option but to continue an uneasy neutrality policy. Only when de Valéra came back to power in 1957 and brought with him Frank Aiken as his foreign minister did the latter reinvigorate a sense of political purpose in Irish neutrality as a way of bridging the East-West gap at the UN, especially in questions of common interest. Most importantly, as explained in Chapter 5 by Mervyn O'Driscoll, Aiken capitalized on Irish neutrality at the UN to increase the security of small neutral states by proposing a pathway to nonproliferation.

While Irish neutrality was the outcome of an attempt at maintaining an arms-length distance from the United Kingdom, Finnish neutrality came to serve the same purpose toward the USSR. For Helsinki, too, neutrality was nothing it chose out of enthusiasm for the principle, but it was a direct result of the geopolitics of WWII. After losing parts of its territory in the Winter War (1939–40), Helsinki capitalized on the German attack against the USSR, re-joining the fray in the Continuation War (1941–44) on the Axis side. As such, Helsinki ended up as one of the losers of WWII, had to accept dictated terms of peace from the Soviet side in 1947, and, a year later, was forced to sign an “Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance,” which gave the USSR strong leverage over Finnish security. Article 1 of the treaty obliged Finland to resist any third-party attempt at attacking the Soviet Union through Finnish territory and receive Soviet help to do so. Article 2 allowed for consultations with the USSR to establish if the treaty would be activated and Article 4 prescribed “not to conclude any alliance or join any coalition directed against the other High Contracting Party.”⁶⁰ The treaty became the core of what in the West came to be referred to pejoratively as “Finlandization.” Although Finland was spared from joining the Warsaw Pact, the treaty made sure it was off-limits to NATO, and ear-marked for military cooperation with the USSR should an attack through its territory occur—thereby securing Moscow’s north-western flank.

The treaty and Finland’s vulnerability vis a vis the USSR put Helsinki in a special geopolitical pickle for the entirety of the Cold War. In response, the country’s strongman leader, President Urho Kekkonen (1956–82), developed a neutrality policy aimed at preventing the treaty from being activated in the first place and a foreign policy “to remove tension from Europe with lasting effect.”⁶¹ Kekkonen and his diplomats understood Finland’s neutrality first and foremost as a (compelled) security guarantee to Moscow, which meant its own security depended on the absence of serious threats to the USSR. Hence, Helsinki was keen on diplomatic activities reducing tensions among the superpowers and it was antagonistic to anything that might upset them. This was most obvious in the process for creating the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, but,⁶² as Tapio Juntunen shows in Chapter 7, it had already been its guiding principle during the NPT negotiations. In fact, Kekkonen was probably the most “realist” of all neutral leaders when it came to connecting the dots between neutrality and nonproliferation. In a 1964 speech given at a dinner in honor of Yugoslavia’s Josip B. Tito, he stated explicitly:

Although in this situation primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace belongs to the great power (sic) in whose hands are the most terrible means of destruction of our time, no state should underestimate its opportunities for affecting the cause of world peace—for or against. The neutral and non-aligned states in particular can by their own example demonstrate that open-minded and constructive co-operation across the front lines of the Cold War and ideological differences is not only possible, but in accordance with the vital interest of all parties.⁶³

Cognizant of the fact that any action by the neutrals might backfire, Kekkonen's idea of Finnish neutrality was an attitude of prudent helpfulness to Great Power de-escalation. To him, neutrality politics meant first and foremost not doing harm to the superpower constellation, which required an active neutrality as expressed in the initial quote of this chapter.

His guest, however, might not have entirely agreed with Kekkonen. Tito, too, had been connecting the dots between a neutral position—nonalignment in his case—and disarmament, but he had different ideas about the role of non-aligned states in challenging the superpowers. After breaking publicly with Stalin in 1948—something unthinkable for Finland—he formulated a first attempt at a neutral position when the Korean War forced his hand. The Associated Press reported a speech of his on June 1, 1950, in which he called Yugoslavia “the only neutral and independent country that has no obligations toward either East or West” and that he intended to remain outside “any bloc.”⁶⁴ Hence, Yugoslavia, which was a Non-Permanent Security Council Member at the time, abstained from voting on Resolution 82 about the Korean peninsula, which served as the basis for the US and UN interventions in the unfolding war. Some researchers assessed that nonalignment and Tito's interest in the developing world go back to these early days when, for the first time, Yugoslavia interacted closely with Egypt and India in the Security Council.⁶⁵

The nonaligned ties grew deeper between 1954 and 1956 when Tito, Nehru, and Nasser met several times and started formulating common policy positions, rooted in the final declaration of the Bandung Conference and a shared understanding of nonaligned and decolonized interests. Most insightful is a joint declaration published after a meeting between the three leaders on the Yugoslav Island of Brioni on July 19, 1956—less than a month after Dulles' dismissive statement on neutrality—holding that

[t]he division of the world today into powerful blocs of nations tends to perpetuate these fears. Peace has to be sought not through divisions, but by aiming at collective security on a world basis and by enlarging the sphere of freedom and the ending of the domination of one country over another.

All three men also clearly connected their nonalignment with the question of nuclear and conventional disarmament, because right after that passage, the statement continues that

progress towards disarmament is essential in order to lessen fears of conflict. This progress should be made primarily within the framework of the United Nations and to include both nuclear and thermonuclear weapons and conventional armaments, and adequate supervision of the carrying out of the agreements made. (...) fissionable material should in future be used only for peaceful purposes and its further use for war purposes should be prohibited. The three Heads of Government are deeply interested in full and equal cooperation among nations in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy.⁶⁶

The statement also discusses the German question and peace in the Middle East. It serves as a good example of how intimately the founders of the NAM contemplated the dissociation from the “block mentality” of the early Cold War with the desire to reign in also the threat of nuclear weapons—at least officially. Marko Miljković, in Chapter 10, explains how at the same time, Tito remained highly ambivalent about the domestic Yugoslav nuclear program,⁶⁷ and we know today that also India eventually went a different route. However, in the mid-1950s, the Brioni statement was an uncontroversial position paper that the (future) leaders of the NAM could rally behind. Within weeks, Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia and President Sukarno of Indonesia also affirmed their commitment to the Brioni declaration.⁶⁸ The meeting and the understanding it produced was doubtlessly an important step toward the formal inauguration of the NAM five years later in Belgrade.

The Return of Neutral Principles to World Politics

In short, despite the suspicions and distrust of the superpowers toward neutrality and neutralism, the 1950s became the decade when the principle—in its various garments—returned to the world stage. And that had not only to do with the gradual strengthening of the nonaligned idea. To a significant part, it was also due to the enduring reality of international armed conflict—the thing the UN sought to finally abolish. Just like its precursor, the League of Nations, the UN, too, could not bring an end to warfare. The Korean War was a watershed moment in this respect, when, due to the absence of a Soviet veto, the UN itself became a belligerent facing off Soviet-backed North Korean forces and, ultimately, mainland Chinese forces in the second phase of the operation. The war brought back not only unilateral assertions of neutrality—the Swiss informed the UN within a month that as a neutral and non-member, it did not wish to make any public declarations about it⁶⁹—but gave birth to the first post-WWII, UN-sponsored, multilateral neutrality initiative. In 1953, after two years of negotiations, the “Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission” (NNSC) and the “Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission” (NNRC) were formed as a result of an armistice agreement to serve as its supervisory bodies. The agreement mandated that each side (the UN and communist China) would choose “their” neutrals to sit in the committees and that for the NNRC an additional fifth “umpire” would sit in the commission—a neutral among neutrals, so to speak. The UN chose Switzerland and Sweden, while China opted for Poland and Czechoslovakia. For the NNRC, both parties agreed to choose India as a tiebreaker. This was a major success for Indian diplomacy and the first time in Colonial Europe’s history a non-European state would serve a neutral function in an ad-hoc international commission. It also became a successful arrangement. While the NNSC, which was made only of the two Western and two Eastern neutrals, was deadlocked soon after its inception, the NNRC successfully implemented its mandate, largely thanks to the role of the Indian umpire.⁷⁰ Nehru’s success in offering India’s impartial arbitration in the Korean War was part of its road to Bandung.

Furthermore, in 1956, the UN would itself incorporate a neutral principle into its catalog of activities through the newly invented “peacekeeping”—which was not only a new term for international law but also uncharted terrain for the UN. Peacekeeping mandates were only created in reaction to the Suez Crisis and came to demand that UN “Blue Helmets” were (a) accepted among all parties of a conflict, (b) neutral and impartial, and (c) that they would use force only for self-defense. All three conditions were necessary to be recognized as an impartial task force—as opposed to a belligerent, as was the case in the Korean War.

The practical realities of armed conflict and the operational challenges in dealing with them re-introduced neutral principles into the post-war order and provided new diplomatic space for the neutral idea. By the early 1960s, the Great Powers and the UN had come full circle, beginning to embrace again even “neutralization”—the act of externally imposing a neutral and usually also demilitarized status of certain plots of land. U Thant, the third UN secretary-general even saw a clear connection between neutralization and non-proliferation. In a 1962 speech, he explained,

(...) The reality is that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union will deliberately seek a nuclear war, though they may be plunged into one by accident, and the sensible course is to try to prevent accidents by limiting the arms race and reducing the areas of dispute. Neutralization of certain areas seems to be a welcome trend in international negotiations. In 1955, the great powers, including the Soviet Union, signed a treaty which neutralized Austria. In 1960, they signed a treaty neutralizing Antarctica. A year later they were prepared to guarantee the neutralization of Laos. The importance of neutralization does not lie solely in the creation of buffer states, valuable though that is. Neutralization is a form of territorial disarmament, a partial dismantling of the great military machines whose destructive powers have now become so terrifying. Each act of neutralization, therefore, is a kind of pilot project for the comprehensive disarmament that alone can rid the world of fear and suspicion. These are among the great issues of the 1960s which were never thought of when the United Nations was founded.⁷¹

That even neutralization made a comeback in the 1960s was unexpected, but for Laos,⁷² Cambodia,⁷³ and even Vietnam,⁷⁴ neutral solutions were either agreed on or discussed seriously. Although they failed to contain and end the wars in Indochina, they inspired a new wave of research⁷⁵ and were some of the intellectual precursors in Southeast Asia to an initiative that followed in 1971, spearheaded by Malaysia, and one of ASEAN’s first coordinated multilateral foreign policy concepts, the so-called “Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality” (ZOPFAN). Although the initiative angered Indonesia, which had been one of the five founding members of the NAM and viewed ZOPFAN as a rival concept, the policy nevertheless became a pillar of ASEAN’s joint foreign policy for roughly a decade.⁷⁶

Conclusion

The early Cold War order was a hostile place for neutrality. Both superpowers distrusted it greatly and only gave support to neutral solutions or neutralist sentiments when those were either undermining their opponent or when other options would have been too costly. However, the concept did not go away, it only shifted forms. Permanent neutrality, the way Switzerland had practiced it, used to be exceptional in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when most states only practiced occasional neutrality like Sweden or the USA before 1941. They were neutral (sometimes) by virtue of not joining certain wars. The Cold War transformed this, largely eliminating the occasional version, making permanent neutrality the normal meaning of the word and the abstention from joining one of the superpower alliances its hallmark. While this did not imply ideological, political, or economic neutralism, it did determine the military options of Europe's neutrals.

Second, the reframing of political tendencies to avoid the bipolarity of the Cold War as “neutralism” and “nonalignment” was a genuinely new phenomenon and the outcome of the new way international conflict was being thought about. Since the nature of conflict always determines the nature of neutrality, a system in which war is not only a political state of affairs of people violently fighting each other but also denotes a “cold” ideological struggle, it is only natural that concepts emerge to describe actors trying to avoid commitment to either. “Neutralism” became the term used foremost by Western powers to describe such sentiments, most often in a negative way, since no ideologically committed actor could possibly view non-commitment in a positive light—a trend repeating today.⁷⁷ “Nonalignment” emerged as the preferred description the decolonized world (and Yugoslavia) chose for its attempts at maintaining friendlier ties to both sides than the other side would have thought appropriate. Finally, the neutral idea experienced a popular revival in the 1960s, after some actors like the UN and the United States, but also the leaders of aspiring neutrals themselves, found use in the concept again.

Notes

- 1 Urho Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (London: Heinemann, 1970), 179.
- 2 See Neville Wylie, ed., *European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War*, vol. 6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
- 3 Glennys J. Young, “Spain and the Early Cold War: The ‘Isolation Paradigm’ Revisited,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 24, no. 3 (2022), 46.
- 4 Natasa Miskovic, Harald Fischer-Tiné, and Nada Boskovska, eds., *The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War: Belbi – Bandung – Belgrade* (London: Routledge, 2014); Lorenz M. Lüthi, “The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961–1973,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016), 98–147.
- 5 Pascal Lottaz and Herbert R. Reginbogin, eds., *Notions of Neutralities* (Lanham: Lexington, 2019).
- 6 Christine Agius, *The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality: Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 32.

- 7 Pascal Lottaz, “The Logic of Neutrality,” in *Permanent Neutrality: A Model for Peace, Security, and Justice*, eds. Herbert Reginbogin and Pascal Lottaz (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020); Pascal Lottaz, “The Politics and Diplomacy of Neutrality,” *Oxford Bibliographies in International Relations* (2022).
- 8 USSR, United Kingdom and Yugoslavia delegates, Bretton Woods Conference, New Hampshire, USA. See https://archivesphotos.worldbank.org/en/about/archives/photo-gallery/photo-gallery-details.5911386?id=5911386&os=0&rows=10&qterm=bretton+woods&x=0&y=0&lang_exact=English&os=0&rows=10&ref=true&os=0&rows=10.
- 9 Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 108.
- 10 Jürg Martin Gabriel, *The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941: Update and Revised 2nd Edition* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 70.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Jürg Martin Gabriel, *The American Conception of Neutrality after 1941* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 226.
- 13 Howard J. Taubenfeld, “International Actions and Neutrality,” *The American Journal of International Law* 47, no. 3 (1953), 385.
- 14 Iceland had still been in a loose union with Denmark at the beginning of WWII when the government in Reykjavik declared its neutrality. It was invaded and occupied in 1940 by Britain, and later US troops took over the island. The semi-independent government of Iceland never declared war on the Axis.
- 15 Angela Kane, “Neutrality in International Organizations I: The United Nations,” in *Neutral Beyond the Cold: Neutral States and the Post-Cold War International System*, eds. Pascal Lottaz, Heinz Gaertner, and Herbert Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), 92–93.
- 16 See Thrassyvoulos Mitsidis, “Consolato del Mare, the Medieval Maritime Code and its Contribution to the Development of International Law,” *Revue Hellénique de Droit International* 22, no. 1 (1969).
- 17 Stephen C. Neff, *The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
- 18 Most limitingly, one cannot distinguish between different meanings of words. For instance, since the term “neutral” also has various meanings in everyday language it, a more precise proxy for its meaning in international relations is necessary. That, however, might result in undercounts of the concept. Nor can we be sure the dataset is complete since the sources are not listed. The dataset also includes only books and not academic journals or popular magazines.
- 19 See also Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,” *Science* 331, (2011): 176–82, DOI:10.1126/science.1199644.
- 20 See, for instance, the conceptual framings of Henry William Brands, *The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third World, 1947–1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); Sandra Bott et al., eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War between or Within the Blocs?* (New York: Routledge, 2016), 1–14.
- 21 The first instance known to the author stems from a British correspondent in the United States” “What America Thinks: ‘Neutralism’ as a Policy. How Allied Criticism Strikes the States,” *The Manchester Guardian*, March 7, 1916.
- 22 Anne O’Hare McCormick, “Abroad: The European Backwash of the American Move in Asia The Spread of Neutralism Europe Answers a Question,” *New York Times*, July 1, 1950. See also Marina Salvin, “Neutralism in France and Germany,” *International Conciliation* 472 (June 1951).
- 23 J.A.A. Stockwin, *The Japanese Socialist Party and Neutralism: A Study of a Political Party and Its Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

- 24 Khalid I. Babaa and Cecil V. Jr. Crabb, "Nonalignment as a Diplomatic and Ideological Credo," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 362, issue 1 (November 1965): 11.
- 25 Ivan. I. Morris, "Japanese Foreign Policy and Neutralism," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 36, no. 1 (1960); Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, "America and Japan's Permanent Neutrality," *World Affairs* 112, no. 2 (1949).
- 26 Michael Gehler, *Modellfall für Deutschland? Die Österreichlösung mit Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1945–1955* (Innsbruck: StudienVerlag, 2015), 1155–58.
- 27 Daniel Lerner, "International Coalitions and Communications Content: The Case of Neutralism," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 16, no. 4 (1952): 682–83.
- 28 *Ibid.*, 684. Lerner suggested firmer and more positively connotated public messaging to resolve the issue.
- 29 White House Office, "Neutrality in Europe, Summary Report," *National Security Council Staff Papers*. As cited in Michael T. Ruddy, "U.S. Foreign Policy, the 'Third Force,' and European Union: Eisenhower and Europe's Neutrals," *Midwest Quarterly* 42 (2000): 70.
- 30 Jussi M Hanhimäki, "Non-aligned to what? European neutrality and the Cold War," in *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: between or within the blocs?* eds. Sandra Bott, et al. (London: Routledge, 2016), 21.
- 31 Principle 6, "Final Communiqué of the Asian-African Conference," April 24, 1955. http://www.cvce.eu/obj/final_communique_of_the_asian_african_conference_of_bandung_24_april_1955-en-676237bd-72f7-471f-949a-88b6ae513585.html.
- 32 *New York Times*, "Dulles Declares Neutrality Pose Is Obsolete Idea," June 10, 1956.
- 33 *Ibid.*
- 34 *New York Times*, Hans J. Morgenthau, "Critical Look at the New Neutralism," August 27, 1961.
- 35 Morgenthau was an international lawyer who already in the 1930s observed and wrote about European neutrals. See Hans J. Morgenthau, "The End of Switzerland's Differential Neutrality," *The American Journal of International Law* 32, no. 3 (July 1938); Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Problem of Neutrality," *University of Kansas City Law Review* 7, no. 2 (1938): 109–28; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe," *American Political Science Review* 33, no. 3 (June 1939).
- 36 Morgenthau, "Critical Look at the New Neutralism."
- 37 Vladislav Zubok, "The Soviet Attitude towards the European Neutrals during the Cold War," in *The Neutrals and the European Integration 1945–1995*, eds. Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger (Vienna: Böhlau, 2000), 31.
- 38 Mark Kramer, "The USSR and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe," in *The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe*, eds. Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021).
- 39 Peter Ruggenthaler, "The 1952 Stalin Note on German Unification: The Ongoing Debate," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13, no. 4 (2011): 209.
- 40 *Ibid.*
- 41 Bruno Kreisky, *Zwischen den Zeiten: Erinnerungen aus fünf Jahrzehnten* (Berlin: Siedler, 1986), 461. As translated and cited in *ibid.*, 199.
- 42 Private correspondence with Wilfried Loth. April 21, 2023. See also Wilfried Loth, "Die Entstehung der 'Stalin-Note.' Dokumente aus Moskauer Archiven," *Schriftenreihe Vierteljahresheft für Zeitgeschichte* 84 (2002); Wilfried Loth, "Die deutsche Wiedervereinigung 1952/53," in *Eine andere deutsche Geschichte 1517–2017*, eds. Tobias Winnerling and Christoph Nonn (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2017).

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- 44 Michael Gehler, “Ein Angebot für alle Fälle: Die Stalin-Note für ein neutrales und vereintes Deutschland 1952,” *International*, 2022.
- 45 Zubok, “The Soviet Attitude,” 36.
- 46 See Csaba Békés, “The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Declaration of Neutrality,” *Cold War History* 6, no. 4 (2006).
- 47 Andrei Edemskii, “Soviet-Yugoslav Relations, 1948–1955,” in *The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe*, eds. Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington, 2021).
- 48 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 308.
- 49 Kimmo Rentola, “Soviet Attitudes to Finnish Neutralism, 1974–1989,” in *The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe*, eds. Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler (Lanham: Lexington, 2021).
- 50 Pascal Lottaz and Ingemar Ottosson, *Sweden, Japan, and the Long Second World War 1931–1945* (London: Routledge, 2022), 71–75.
- 51 *New York Times*, “Swede asks move for one Germany: Foreign Minister Unden Bids West Accept Neutrality as Basis of New Talks,” December 26, 1955.
- 52 Mikael af Malmberg, *Neutrality and State-building in Sweden* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 152.
- 53 *Ibid.*, 149–57.
- 54 The Federal Council quickly commissioned reports by military and legal experts on the subject. Their findings were published on November 14, 1945. The report by Dietrich Schindler on the relationship between the UN Charter and Swiss national law and the neutrality principle came to a mixed conclusion. See «Schweizerische Konsultativkommission zur Prüfung der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen. Berichte der Experten vom 14.11.1945» in *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland*, dodis.ch/54229. 1945.
- 55 Rudolf Bindschedler, “Der Begriff der Neutralität,” in *Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland*, 1954. Dodis.ch/9564. The quote is part of the “Bindschedler Report” outlining the principles of Switzerland’s Cold War neutrality. The Federal Council never officially endorsed the report, but it became so widely circulated and referenced in the administration that it was called the “Bindschedler Doctrine.”
- 56 Ireland was also neutral in WWII, but since it had only gained its independence from Britain in the 1920s, the policy was barely 30 years old when Dublin joined the UN.
- 57 “Memorandum über die Ergebnisse der Besprechung zwischen der Regierungsdelegation der Sowjetunion und der Regierungsdelegation der Republik Österreich.” As published by the University of Luxemburg’s CVCE institute for contemporary history https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/memorandum_uber_die_besprechungen_der_sowjetunion_und_osterreich_15_april_1955-de-63977731-04e8-4657-87fa-1d48c3ea6a18.html.
- 58 Thomas E. Hachey, “The Rhetoric and Reality of Irish Neutrality,” *New Hibernia Review* 6, no. 4 (2002): 28.
- 59 *Ibid.*, 36.
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3 The Making of the “1968 Global Nuclear Order”

Yoko Iwama

Concepts of the Global Nuclear Order

To reach the concept of a “global nuclear order,”^{1,2} it is probably meaningful to first define the word “order.” Hedley Bull thought of it as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states, or international society.”³ Bull listed three goals as being most basic: security against violence, keeping of promises and agreements, and assurances of private property.⁴ Bull’s definition suits the purpose of this chapter since the basic goal of the nuclear order is clear: avoidance of suicidal all-out nuclear war to guarantee the survival of mankind. And as William Walker points out, “[B]eyond basic survival, the achievement of *order* is—and has to be—the pre-eminent and perennial concern of states, and especially of the great powers given the existence of this ultimate instrument of destruction and symbol of state power.”⁵ Walker was probably the first person to make clear use of the concept of nuclear order despite distancing himself from realist definitions associating “order” with hegemony or the balance of power.⁶ He draws on various thinkers of liberal and British International Relations (IR) theory before reaching his own definition for the atomic age;

Given the existence of nuclear technology, international nuclear order entails evolving patterns of thought and activity that serve primary goals of world survival, war avoidance and economic development; and the quest for a tolerable accommodation of pronounced differences in the capabilities, practices, rights and obligations of states.⁷

Walker’s idea about the structure of nuclear order evolved through the years. In his 2000 article, he states that despite its precariousness, nuclear order did begin to emerge in the 1960s, after the Cuban Missile Crisis. He talks about this order as being fashioned “mainly but not exclusively by the US and the USSR,” involving two linked systems of “cooperative endeavour,” which were called “a managed system of deterrence,” and “a managed system of abstinence.” The former involved the nuclear hardware, its command-and-control

systems, a set of understanding about "deterrence theories," and various kinds of management to provide mutual vulnerability and restraint. The "managed system of abstinence" involved the nuclear umbrellas extended over the allies of the US and the USSR, and the formation of a nonproliferation regime.⁸ In his 2012 book, *A Perpetual Menace*, Walker's system of nuclear order becomes more elaborate. Here he calls the two blocks a "managed system of military engagement with nuclear technology (deterrence plus)" and a "managed system of military abstinence from, and engagement with nuclear technology (non-proliferation plus)." With "connecting instrumental and normative tissue" between the two. Although the 2012 version is more profound, Walker has essentially retained the analysis of nuclear order through his binary structure. About the chronology of nuclear order, he thinks the order was formed from the 1960s to the early 1970s, with two crises between 1973–86, and consolidation of the order in the years 1986–97.

Other scholars also agree that an international nuclear order was formed from the late 1960s to 1970s. Leopoldo Nuti, for instance, combined the historiography of the 1970s with the concept of nuclear order.⁹ He points out that many historians regard this period as the "moment when globalization came of age, shattering the basic features of the cold war era and creating the premises for the transformation that followed."¹⁰ He states that many of the features of the nuclear world in which we live started to take shape in the 1970s, and therefore the end of the Cold War should not be seen as the decisive dividing point.¹¹ In the same special edition carrying Nuti's paper, David Holloway presents a broad definition of the order as "the set of understandings and arrangements that states come to in order to manage the dangers and the opportunities offered by atomic energy."¹²

While thinkers like Walker interpret the nuclear order as based on two footings, Geoffrey W. Knopf identifies even three "strands": strategic stability, the nuclear taboo, and nonproliferation (as supplemented by measures to ensure nuclear security).¹³ While Walker also recognizes the value of "normative tissues" in connecting the two main components of his nuclear order, Knopf places its value at a much higher place. He also presents the goal of the nuclear order in a more prosaic way, "to prevent nuclear explosions that will kill people—and especially to avert escalation that would kill many millions."¹⁴ It is meaningful to define the goal in this way to make clear that just a single use of a small-yield tactical nuclear weapon would not in itself annihilate the global nuclear order—although it would definitely weaken and damage it severely.

Over the years, thinkers have differed slightly on the elements of the nuclear order, as well as the emphasis to be placed on the factors that constitute these elements. While some place greater value on restraint, others place more weight on deterrence. In general, those placing greater weight on restraint tend to emphasize the value question more. This author takes the stance that the two elements of managed system of deterrence or "deterrence plus" and a

managed system of restraint or “nonproliferation plus” are supported by the value system of the nuclear taboo.

“Deterrence plus” includes not only the mutual balance of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia (the Soviet Union until 1991), the military doctrines, but also the extended deterrence offered by the United States.¹⁵ Alliance institutions and structures designed to ensure the credibility of extended deterrence are hence part of this managed system of nuclear deterrence. The United States and Russia have exceptional responsibility in this club, due to the extensive number of nuclear weapons they possess. But smaller Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), such as the United Kingdom and France, are also part of the system in so far as they share the values and restraints of the order as a whole. “Nonproliferation plus” would obviously start with the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself and the associated nonproliferation regime, including the effort to control fissile materials, bomb and missile-related technology, and parts proliferation. It would also include continued efforts for dialogue, information sharing between the adversaries, and disarmament and arms control efforts. The concept relating to today’s arms control actually dates back to the late 1950s, while 1960 marked a watershed year in this regard, with the ‘bible’ of arms control, the fall volume of *Daedalus* as well as the “Summer Study on Arms Control” being published.¹⁶ Simms names the late 1950s as the ‘prehistory’ that set the framework within which the new thinking of arms control could expand.¹⁷ Nicola Horsburgh identifies four core elements of nuclear order in relation to her study about China and the global nuclear order: nuclear deterrence, arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament (Figure 3.1). In her view, the latter three elements can be safely put in the category of “nonproliferation plus.”¹⁸

An increasing number of studies deal with countries outside the original five Security Council Members (P5), giving a picture of the evolving global nuclear order. Although its fundamental structure was set in 1968 (albeit continuously augmented by other nonproliferation-related regimes), there




Figure 3.1 Elements of global nuclear order (based on Walker).

Source: Created by author, developed from Walker, “Nuclear order and disorder.”

was another wave of newcomers toward the end of the Cold War. Many countries had actually tried to develop nuclear weapons and later reversed this process to join the NPT. Thus, South Africa, after long years of working on a nuclear weapons program, finally announced the intention to sign on to the NPT in 1989 and acceded in July 1991. South Africa started its weapons program after 1974 for regional security reasons and completed its first nuclear device in 1978. Although it never officially admitted the presence of a weapons program in these years, its suspected nuclear weapons program as well as its apartheid policy increasingly isolated the country. By 1988, both domestic and international situations had changed, and South Africa saw no more need to continue its weapons program.¹⁹

Brazil is another case where democratization brought a change in attitude toward nuclear weapons. The Brazilian military dictatorship lasted from the 1964 coup d'état until 1985. The regime carried out a secret nuclear weapons program during the 1970s and 1980s. Only in September 1990 did President Fernando Collor de Mello reveal its existence and officially renounce it. Brazil joined NPT in 1998.²⁰

China's relationship with the global nuclear order is examined by Nicola Horsburgh who describes it as having gone “from estrangement to active engagement.” China and France were two nuclear powers already at the time of the making of the NPT, but they remained outside the treaty until the end of the Cold War. However, Horsburgh points out that China's engagement had actually begun already in the period 1976–89. Under Deng Xiaoping, China entered into an era of ‘reform and opening up,’ first stabilizing its nuclear deterrence by formulating its first nuclear strategy and then developing second-strike capabilities. Second, China began shifting its attitudes toward arms control, disarmament, and proliferation.²¹

In short, a wave of new states joined the NPT between 1989 and 2015, 53 in total. This was partly due to the breakup of several countries like the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia but also due to the indefinite extension of NPT on May 11, 1995—another high point of the global nuclear order. By this time, the “non-proliferation plus” side had been strengthened by control regimes like the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), signed in 1987, and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), formed in 1974 (but inactive till 1991). The “Deterrence plus” side was greatly downsized after 1990, but it never disappeared.

Hierarchical Nature of the Global Nuclear Order

Many have repeatedly pointed to the discriminatory nature of the global nuclear order, even calling it “nuclear apartheid.”²² It is very true that the NPT gives special privileges to the five NWS, but it also places the NWS under special responsibility regarding nonproliferation and demands their restraint in the use of nuclear weapons. And although it is not provided within the NPT itself, the regime places special roles on the United States and USSR as the

provider of extended deterrence, since this system was deliberately acquiesced during the negotiation process of the NPT.²³ In fact, the “1968 Global Nuclear Order” is an intentionally hierarchical system with different rights and responsibilities at each level of the hierarchy:

Tier one: At the top of the order are the two superpowers, the United States and the USSR (now Russia): They were the only states world wide who possessed enough nuclear weapons to start a total nuclear war that would render life on Earth almost impossible. By possessing sufficiently invulnerable second-strike nuclear capabilities, they were the ultimate guarantors of the ‘doomsday machine.’ They could just simply by their existence make clear that the common goal of the global nuclear order was the avoidance of a total nuclear war. They were also responsible for providing extended deterrence to the junior partners of their respective alliances. Thereby, they contributed to nonproliferation and to decreasing the risk of nuclear war.²⁴ In order to maintain their status in this top tier, they each maintained tens of thousands of nuclear weapons during the Cold War and several thousand even after its end. To assure their nuclear arsenal remained invulnerable, they had to retain multiple delivery systems, usually including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM), Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and bomber airplanes. Their position was also accompanied by their inherent responsibility not to threaten other Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) with nuclear weapons. This was not always kept, as shown by the Eisenhower administration and most recently by Vladimir Putin.²⁵

Tier Two: The remaining NWS belong to the next group. Officially, they include only the United Kingdom, France, and China (although France and China remained outside the NPT until the 1990s). A common characteristic of these states is that they more or less adopted what is commonly described as the “minimum deterrence” strategy. They conceive the role of nuclear weapons as a last resort, which will protect their independence should it ever be threatened. In general, they possessed only several hundred nuclear weapons, with relatively modest means of delivery. The same is true for the unofficial NWS developing thermonuclear capabilities in breach of the NPT: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel does not officially acknowledge the possession of nuclear weapons, but it is generally believed to be in this club. Although not a member of NPT, Israel acknowledges the importance of the work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and tries to support the institution to the extent possible. India and Pakistan, too, are not members of the NPT but have expressed their wishes to become members of the NSG, and hence partially accept the norms and rules of the order itself. North Korea had been a member of IAEA since 1974 but only became a party to the NPT in December 1985. It announced its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003. Although the

validity of this action can be debated, it is hard to see that North Korea currently is within the global nuclear order, but the possibility remains in some future talks that it may return to its pre-2003 position since the withdrawal has never been formally recognized.²⁶

Tier Three: NNWS covered by the extended deterrence of either the United States or the USSR (Russia) make up the third group. Those are the members of NATO and other American alliances, including ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty), the US-Japan Alliance, and the US-Korea Alliance. Among these, NATO has the most developed institutions for assuring extended deterrence. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangement and its Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) serve to strengthen the alliance's extended deterrence, thereby decreasing the danger of proliferation among its members.

Tier Four: The NNWS that are not members of the superpower alliances form the last group. They are the vast majority of states without extended deterrence. There were isolated attempts, for example, from Britain to extend its nuclear deterrence to commonwealth powers, but this never left the planning stage.²⁷ Hence, these states were left without extended deterrence, but nevertheless many still chose to join the NPT at an early stage. Research on these states has only recently started to emerge, surprising many by how actively they took part in the formation of the nuclear order. It was a European neutral, Ireland, that initially brought up the idea, and Sweden soon became a very active promoter. They were also joined by non-European neutrals and the newly emerging nonaligned states. The 1960s saw the emergence of this group of states, recently independent from their colonial status. Many saw the increased risk of a nuclear war as a major threat that cannot be dealt with by the possession of nuclear weapons themselves. On the contrary, they often embraced the idea of the non-use of nuclear weapons and became active promoters of the emerging arms control regimes. The end of the Cold War brought the second wave of entrance by these states to the NPT regime.

States outside the structure: Of course, there are and have always been states outside the order. As mentioned earlier, some states only joined the NPT after the Cold War. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but announced in 2003 that it will no longer be bound by the treaty (Figure 3.2).

The Superpower Relationship as the Defining Factor of Global Nuclear Order

Although the system of nuclear deterrence is closely associated with the Cold War, it is something different from the Cold War order itself. The clearest proof thereof is that the global nuclear order has survived the end of the Cold War. It even flourished after 1989; 53 of the 189 signatories to the NPT




Figure 3.2 The global nuclear order.

Source: Created by author.

joined the treaty after the bipolarity ended. Also, the starting point is different. The Cold War began in the years 1945–50, the global nuclear order did not take shape until the 1960s. It is well-known that there were efforts even before for the global control of fissile materials and nuclear weapons, but they did not materialize. In fact, international efforts had barely begun when revelations about Soviet nuclear espionage convinced Truman of the impossibility of cooperation with the Soviets. By the time the Baruch Plan was presented, Truman actually had no appetite for international control.²⁸ With the onset of the Cold War, the two superpowers went into a period of intense competition concerning nuclear weapons technology and the number of weapons.

Although Moscow succeeded in exploding its first atomic devices already in 1949, both the United States and the USSR remained undetermined about the role of nuclear weapons in war for a long time. Of all the politicians of the age, Dwight D. Eisenhower is probably responsible more than anyone for the emergence of the “balance of terror,” which influences our thinking about nuclear weapons until today. Eisenhower was responsible for allowing the start of the massive buildup program of US nuclear weapons and the decision for moving them to the front lines.²⁹ The Eisenhower administration’s New Look strategy was implemented as MC 48 into NATO at the end of 1954. The concept of “massive retaliation,” developed in these years, still frames our image of what a nuclear war may look like. In contrast, the Soviet Union lagged behind the US in terms of number of warheads for a long time, but it eventually reached the number of more than 39,000. The US side also possessed more than 31,000 warheads by the mid-1960s.

During the second half of the 1950s, global opinion turned gradually against nuclear weapons. The realities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki became known, and the magnitude of hydrogen bombs developed by the United States and the USSR was growing out of useful proportion. At least the US is known to have contemplated the use of nuclear weapons several times in the 1950s, in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and in Vietnam.³⁰ Although Eisenhower

did put forward proposals for general disarmament and a nuclear test ban treaty, he ended up sanctioning "the biggest expansion of the American nuclear stockpile, approved the deployment of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and authorized more nuclear explosions than any president in history."³¹

With the emergence of a mutually vulnerable strategic situation of the two superpowers after the Sputnik Shock of 1957, the precondition for a global nuclear order was already emerging. Eisenhower in his later years of the administration was much more worried about nuclear weapons than earlier and was sincerely hoping for a better relationship with the Soviet Union, leading up to the 1960 Mayday incident which dashed his hopes about disarmament.³²

US attitudes toward the bomb started changing after the arrival of John F. Kennedy. His administration had negative attitudes toward nuclear weapons from the beginning, but only after the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 did they manage to set a new start to the superpower relationships on this subject. The US and USSR became acutely aware of the shared interest in survival under the mutual nuclear annihilation scenario. This led first to the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and from there to the process of negotiating the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. However, the superpowers were not only dealing with each other but had their respective alliances to manage, as well as domestic politics to care about. And increasingly, the neutral and nonaligned powers also joined the fray. This aspect has not been taken into account until now—something this book tries to remedy partially.

Enhancement of Extended Deterrence: Change of Perception and Strategy on the Side of European Neutrals

The year 1954 was when the world moved into the thermonuclear age, with the famous US nuclear test "Castle Bravo" conducted over the Bikini Atoll. Besides annihilating the beautiful islands, the unfortunate Japanese tuna fishing boat "Lucky Dragon" was contaminated by the nuclear fallout. All 23 crew members suffered from acute radiation syndrome, and eventually, a crew member died. This led to the first wave of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan and the creation of the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuibaku Kinshi Nihon Kyogikai) a year later.³³ Anti-nuclear movements in other countries followed in the coming years.³⁴

The news of the Bikini Atoll spread to the world and caused reactions in many countries. In Britain, around 100 Labour MPs launched the Hydrogen Bomb National Campaign, collecting over a million signatures for its petition.³⁵ The famous Russel-Einstein Manifesto was published in London on July 9, 1955, which eventually led to the first Pugwash Conference in July 1957.³⁶ That year became a watershed moment in many ways when it comes to the history of nuclear weapons. It was the year when Sputnik went into orbit, thereby marking the start of the space age. But even before that, more and more people started speaking up against the bomb, and the movement

was spreading from being an elite affair to a more widespread social movement. On April 24, 1957, Albert Schweitzer delivered a statement titled “Declaration of Conscience” on Radio Oslo. He concluded by saying “The end of further experiments with atom bombs would be like the early sunrises of hope which suffering humanity is longing for.” In Norway, 225,000 Norwegians responded by signing a petition to stop nuclear testing.³⁷ More anti-nuclear movements sprang up in Britain, among them the National Council for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapon Tests (NCANWT) and the Direct Action Committee Against Nuclear War. They eventually merged into the Campaign for Disarmament (CND), which successfully carried out the Easter March to the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment at Aldermaston. From West Germany came the Göttingen Manifesto on April 12, 1957, with 18 preeminent scientists raising their voices against arming the West German Bundeswehr with nuclear-capable weapons.³⁸ In the United States as well, the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) began its work that year and its New York Times advertisement on November 15, 1957, drew a lot of attention. George Kennan held his renowned Reith Lectures on BBC from November to December 1957. The Polish foreign minister, Adam Rapacki, delivered his speech to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly on October 2, 1957, presenting a plan for demilitarization and nuclear disarmament, including a nuclear-free zone in central Europe.³⁹ These were the signs of the gradual emergence of what we nowadays call the “nuclear taboo.”⁴⁰ Anti-nuclear feelings started to grow, and national governments became aware of the cost of a nuclear war.

It was the European neutrals who first changed their strategies for how they responded to the new awareness. Ireland was the country to first raise the issue of nuclear nonproliferation at the General Assembly of the UN. On October 17, 1958, the Irish minister of external affairs, Frank Aiken, made his historic speech, but his efforts had already started in 1957. It is interesting to note that from the time Aiken started his tenure, he aligned himself with India on the issue of China’s representation at the UN.⁴¹ In the years 1957–58, one can actually observe neutral, nonaligned, and some of the smaller socialist countries coming closer together on some issues, which included nuclear weapon-free zones and other disarmament initiatives. This probably reflected a changed perception about the utility of nuclear weapons when it comes to the security of a nation.

Sweden’s case reveals this most prominently. At first, nuclear weapons were seen as a useful tool to guarantee the security of the relatively isolated country, but in the 1960s, this perception changed. Nuclear weapons started to be seen as a source of danger, and a perception emerged that Swedish security would be served better by fewer nuclear weapons in the world, not more.⁴² As the 1960s progressed, European neutrals, especially Sweden and Finland, became active propagators for nuclear arms control and disarmament. Alongside the nonaligned countries, they became increasingly active in the Geneva negotiations of the NPT, reflecting their changed attitude toward nuclear weapons. It

is true that not all of the neutral and nonaligned countries were converted to this kind of attitude in these years. Many kept the view that nuclear weapons will help them defend their security. But increasingly these countries were isolated, as exemplified by the South African case. It was not until later that the majority of neutral and nonaligned states became convinced enough to join the NPT in large numbers. Active engagement of some core members was crucial in the early years of the global nuclear order. Their activity was closely connected with their later engagement in the effort to convene the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other initiatives to lessen the Cold War tensions and make Europe safer.⁴³

This newfound role of the European neutrals was, among others, made possible by a fresh attitude from the Soviet Union. After Nikita Khrushchev established power within the Politburo, and the Warsaw Pact was established in 1955, the USSR gradually rediscovered the value of neutrality. The beginning of the Nonaligned Movement after the Bandung Conference of 1955 was definitely a factor influencing Khrushchev's thinking. The USSR had a vast possibility to extend its influence through the socialist model in the newly independent countries by valuing their independence. Moscow actively propagated neutrality for northern European countries, it also pushed neutralism in countries like Japan, West Germany, Italy, Greece, and Turkey. Between the years 1961 and 1968, Mueller claims that the Soviet Union pursued two goals of

preventing the neutrals' rapprochement with the European Economic Community (EEC) and encouraging them to promote Soviet ideas, in particular the recognition of the GDR and the convocation of an all European conference designed to legitimize the postwar order, foster detente, and weaken the cohesion of NATO.⁴⁴

The making of the NPT and the global nuclear order fits well into this context but was hitherto little researched.⁴⁵

Establishment of the Tier-Two Group

It was also during the formative years 195–68 that tier-two countries formed and consolidated their attitude toward the global nuclear order. A central actor in this group was Britain. By 1957, it had successfully secured its position as a nuclear weapon state. It then worked hard on consolidating its position as one of the few in the privileged club. It did so by persuading and convincing the United States and partly also the Soviet Union of the merits of keeping the nuclear club small and finding acceptable compromises for the superpowers. That Britain was willing to remain a relatively small nuclear power, being reliant on US assistance to keep its position, rather than trying to compete with the superpowers probably helped the formation of the order as a whole. Concrete steps taken by the British were first the banning of nuclear weapons tests and then going on to securing the NPT to hinder newcomers from joining the club.

British effort began right after the Sputnik Shock in October 1957. By this time, Britain was working hard to consolidate its nuclear alliance with the United States. Sensing the emotional shock waves Sputnik caused, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan headed to Washington that month. He later recalled this trip as a “honeymoon in Washington.”⁴⁶ His visit started the negotiation leading to the US-UK Mutual Defense Agreement of July 3, 1958, which “was almost embarrassing in that it favored the UK so much.”⁴⁷ As a result, Britain could rely on technical data from the United States and gain access to the Nevada underground test site.⁴⁸ This enabled the UK government to push for the nuclear test ban treaty negotiations. The United Kingdom and the United States had already agreed not to make any proposals about nuclear test limitations or fissile material production bans without consulting each other at the March 1957 Bermuda conference.⁴⁹

At the same time, as noted earlier, anti-nuclear campaigns were heating up within the United Kingdom. Britain conducted a series of hydrogen bomb tests between 1957 and 1958 and only then was ready to go into serious negotiation about the test ban. Macmillan soon started pushing strongly for that idea, even going so far as convincing his skeptical US colleagues by offering help in developing seismic monitoring technology.⁵⁰ After achieving the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Britain actively played the role of interlocutor between the Soviet Union and the United States. In this context, the NPT served multiple purposes to Great Britain. London would benefit from reduced tensions between East and West, and it shared Moscow’s interest in denying the West Germans a national nuclear option.⁵¹ This was in tune with the Soviet Union as well as some neutral countries by the early 1960s.

Macmillan also played a crucial role in the rearrangement of extended deterrence within NATO in 1957, when the NATO secretary general also came to Washington, DC, while Macmillan was still there. A decision was made to convene the first NATO summit later that year in Paris, where leaders made a series of agreements to strengthen the deterrence of the alliance as a whole. The search for a proper way to share nuclear weapons in the alliance started here, continuing throughout the 1960s. Strengthening alliance deterrence was also a way of avoiding other countries, especially West Germany and France, turning to their own nuclear weapons programs. Hence, from the late ’50s to the end of the ’60s, nuclear sharing negotiations, the search for NATO nuclear consultation arrangements, and nonproliferation treaty negotiations were, as D. J. Gill puts it, “interwoven, rather than separate, components of British nuclear diplomacy.”⁵²

Furthermore, Harold Wilson’s government also came up with the so-called Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) idea in December 1964. Although this was an idea to submit its nuclear forces to the alliance, command and control for the firing of the weapons and the political need for multilateral political control posed an irreconcilable dilemma. Also, by 1964–65, British negotiators were acutely conscious of the need for nonproliferation. Germany would need to commit to not owning or controlling its own nuclear weapons, and other states should also renounce their ownership.⁵³

As the difficulty of meaningful and feasible nuclear sharing arrangements became apparent to all negotiating parties, it also became clear to both, Britain and the United States, that the NPT was a better means of controlling nuclear proliferation. During the years 1965–66, although MLF (Multilateral Force) and ANF (Atlantic Nuclear Force) were still on the table, they were superseded by the US secretary of defense. Robert McNamara instead proposed nuclear consultations, sharing information instead of weapons themselves.⁵⁴ Until the summer of 1965, the United States tried to retain the possibility of majority control of a future multilateral nuclear force. But Washington dropped that position by the time the final negotiations on Articles I and II of NPT began. US conditions were downsized to exempting the transfer of nuclear delivery vehicles from the prohibition as long as there was no transfer of nuclear weapons or control over them.⁵⁵

In contrast, France stayed away from the NPT process but partially acted within the broader regime. The EURATOM-IAEA agreement on safeguard provisions of 1973 would not have been possible without French acquiescence, and France actually participated in the Nuclear Suppliers' Group negotiations from 1974 onward.⁵⁶ Later it also actively supported the creation of the MTCR in 1987. Although it did not integrate its nuclear weapons operationally with NATO the way the United Kingdom did, France nonetheless remained politically committed to the alliance, and the presence of nuclear weapons on French soil probably did have political significance for West Germany simply by virtue of its geographical proximity. Paris also contributed to the global nuclear order by providing clear doctrines for smaller NWS. Although Britain and France ended up having a similar nuclear posture, French nuclear thinkers provided a much clearer idea about what purpose a minimum deterrence force would serve. Through those, France probably contributed to the stability of the nuclear order in an indirect way since the later NWS—most importantly China, India, and probably Israel—imitated the French prototype of possessing a relatively small nuclear force, sufficient for self-defense purposes in worst-case situations.

Tier-Three Powers Settle on Extended Deterrence

The years 1957–68 were also decisive for the NNWS possessing sufficient resources and technology to pursue individual nuclear capabilities. Most of the states having an alliance treaty with the United States chose to settle under the US "nuclear umbrella," rather than pursuing their own nuclear forces. The main countries in this group were West Germany, Italy, Japan, and South Korea, all of which at least theoretically thought about possessing nuclear weapons of their own at certain stages. The reasons they did not choose the French option were multifold. Most decisive was probably US foreign policy. By the time the Kennedy administration arrived, they were quite determined to push against nuclear proliferation, especially countries like West Germany and Japan were under stronger pressure to conform to American wishes because of their past.

West German elites were particularly divided about giving up their national nuclear option. The Gaullist wing of the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), with strong leaders like Konrad Adenauer and Franz Joseph Strauß, shared the French president's mistrust about the American commitment to use nuclear weapons for the sake of Europeans. Realistically, they were aware that the Germans possessing nuclear weapons would only create more problems than it would solve. But they were also quite disinclined to give up all future options, including becoming a nuclear weapon power through a future European political union. They also felt that the French nuclear weapons were much more reliable in case of their own need, simply because of the geographic proximity of France. Although the United Kingdom was ready to "assign" its nuclear weapons to NATO, its prime minister retained final decision-making authority when it came to the use of these weapons.⁵⁷ Since the United Kingdom, is geographically removed from the rest of the continent, there was much reason to doubt that its deterrent would be used to serve West German interests. In the end, it took a change of government and a decade of domestic debate for the Germans to come to terms with the idea that a non-nuclear status served their interest.⁵⁸

The debate was comparatively subdued in Japan's case. Essentially, the mainstream elites in politics and bureaucracy knew from the beginning that there was no alternative to relying on American extended deterrence. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato sought confirmation from President Johnson on this point at the time of his American visit in the year 1965.⁵⁹ The discussions within the Cabinet Office rendered the opinion that although Japan did possess technical capabilities to detonate several bombs in a relatively short time, that would not give much protection to the country and was not worth trying in the face of strong American opposition. In the Foreign Office, a small number of diplomats centering around Hisahiko Okazaki wished to keep the Gaullist options open for Japan, but they never succeeded in attracting wider support.⁶⁰

Similar to West Germany, there was strong opposition to the NPT in the right wing of the ruling conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which was part of the reason that after the signing of the treaty in February 1970, ratification was deferred until June 1976.⁶¹ During this period, Japan followed closely the negotiation between the IAEA and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) concerning the safeguard treaty, and it was the government's stated goal to achieve inspection conditions as beneficial as those obtained by the EURATOM.

Other American allies like Italy, South Korea, and Australia did at certain times consider nuclear options,⁶² but by 1968, they had all come to the similar conclusion that the price of going nuclear against explicit American wishes was not worth the political and financial costs. On the other hand, keeping up the credibility of extended deterrence was never a simple task. Political and military-strategic consultation arrangements and information sharing, stationing of American tactical nuclear weapons, and sharing arrangements for the use of these weapons in times of war (what later came to be known as "nuclear

sharing” in NATO) were combined for different partners according to their political requirements and domestic opinions. At first look, NATO allies with institutionalized consultation mechanisms and nuclear sharing arrangements and allies like Japan or Australia with minimal consultation arrangements may seem quite different, but in reality, their discrepancies are not as big as they look. In essence, among the Western third-tier powers, nuclear weapons remained American, and their deterrence credibility rested on the commitment that the United States would use them when necessary to protect its allies. All other arrangements were only responding to the political necessity of convincing the allies that this will be the case.

Maturing of the Global Nuclear Order 1975–95

As noted earlier, this global nuclear order is discriminatory from the beginning. It is a compromise among the participating actors based on the recognition that although different participants in different tiers have different rights and responsibilities, keeping the number of NWS as small as possible is essentially in the interest of them all. The extent of an all-out nuclear war at the beginning of the 1970s was such that the value of agreement was widely accepted, and a lot of effort went into the attempt of strengthening this order. The system of NPT review conferences was initiated soon after the entry into force of the treaty in 1970. This was not foreseen in the original treaty, and neutral powers played an important role in this process. This was followed by the creation of the NSG. By the mid-1970s, tier-three and tier-four powers had become strong supporters of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Although the 1980s saw a return of tensions between the superpowers, there were by that time a strong group of specialists working in the field of nuclear disarmament, arms control, and various nonproliferation-oriented export control regimes. These institutions did not stop their work, and the existence of the regime contributed to the end of the Cold War. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of December 1987 became the first breakthrough in the field of nuclear disarmament. It was followed by superpower agreements to limit the number of their strategic weapons, and the breakup of the Soviet Union was managed without having Ukraine, Belarus, or Kazakhstan emerging as newly independent nuclear weapon powers.⁶³ In fact, the 1990s became the Golden Age of the global nuclear order, which the nonproliferation regime was a part of. China and France chose to join the NPT, and it was extended indefinitely in 1995.

Toward a Slow Demise or Adaptation?

Since then, the global nuclear order is facing a renewed challenge. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and President Putin’s repeated threat of the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine is undermining the norms of the order itself. The United States and Russia have special privileges, as well as responsibilities. For

Russia to threaten the use of nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapon state is to violate the spirit of the NPT. The original signatories of the NPT agreed that they have a stake in having fewer NWS and less nuclear weapons in this world. They are not supposed to incentivize the use or possession of nuclear weapons, but this is precisely what Russia is doing. By weakening the “nuclear taboo,” President Putin is weakening the entire architecture that secured stability through global architecture.

Second, many of the disarmament and arms control agreements that existed between the United States and the Russians are now in tatters. The INF has gone out of force, and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (new START) looks destined to go into history as well. The cumulative effect will be the weakening of the “nonproliferation +” pillar of the global nuclear order.

Third, the Chinese are showing signs of catching up in order to prove themselves equal if not superior to the United States. This is another fundamental challenge that may jeopardize the order itself. North Korea has also made clear its intention to acquire ICBM capabilities, as well as increase its non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenal. We have yet to see if these are to materialize and what effects they will have. But the increasing nuclear arsenal of both China and North Korea poses grave dangers not only for the region but also for the global nuclear order.

We need to understand better how the world nuclear order which reached its high point in the 1990s was meticulously constructed out of many components. Perhaps it is not possible to sustain this order as it was since the global order itself is shifting. But even if we need to adjust and rebuild a new kind of order, we are better equipped with the knowledge of the working of the world order.

Notes

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4 Neutral and Nonaligned Nations in the Making of the Postcolonial Nuclear Order

Jonathan R. Hunt

Introduction

September 1963 was a busy time for relations between the Kingdom of Sweden and the People's Republic of China (PRC). On Friday, September 13, a PRC military delegation featuring General Peng Shao-hui and Major General Hsieh Fang embarked for Stockholm from Beijing Capital International Airport. Three days earlier, the Swedish ambassador, Lennart Petri, had thrown a banquet for the military mission at his Beijing embassy, where the Riseberga-born diplomat, fresh from a posting in Morocco, would have reminded his guests that Sweden had been the first Western country to recognize the People's Republic in May 1950.¹ Petri also met Soviet Ambassador Stepan V. Chervonenko that autumn. In August, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev had concluded a blockbuster deal with the United States and the United Kingdom to ban nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. The Moscow Treaty implicated military nuclear programs in Sweden and Beijing, whose comradeship with Moscow had soured since Khrushchev disavowed his predecessor Josef Stalin in 1956. Soviet nuclear assistance to Mao Zedong's regime was terminated three years later. Over the course of Petri and Chervonenko's tête-à-tête, the two men debated Finnish President Urho Kekkonen's proposal for a Northern European nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). The zone would encompass Sweden, Norway, and Finland, but not North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member Denmark or the Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. Petri explained Stockholm's view that a regional NWFZ

should be signed by all northern countries of Europe including the Soviet Union that possesses nuclear weapons. As for the general treaties such as, for example, the [Moscow Treaty], we would be the first to put our signature if the treaty is of global significance.²

From 1958 to 1970, neutral and nonaligned nations such as Sweden played ambitious yet ambiguous roles in the negotiation of another such global accord—the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). On

the one hand, neutral and nonaligned states were instrumental not only in dictating the final text of the treaty but in providing the initial spark. The presence of delegations from four neutral and four nonaligned nation-states on the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC), which convened from 1962 to 1969, ensured that viewpoints from outside the Cold War blocs were heard, if not always heeded. US-Soviet disagreement about the meaning of proliferation strengthened the hands of neutral and nonaligned states in the ENDC and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA); they promoted nuclear ordering compatible with their interests and those of nations like them. As the French observer in Geneva noted in 1967, their caucus had served as these groups' "first responders."³

On the other hand, neutral and nonaligned countries were central and often primary targets of this nascent nonproliferation regime. When the Irish foreign minister, Frank Aiken, tabled proposals for a "nuclear restriction" at the UNGA in the fall of 1958, he did so for fear that spreading atomic weaponry, whether homegrown or imported, risked World War III. When he distinguished between industrialized societies "with much to lose and little to gain in a nuclear war" and those "with much less to lose," his audiences would have intuited what he meant by the latter: "Third World" states in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. While European neutrals such as Sweden and Switzerland qualified as "highly developed," most non-allied states called the Global South their home and possessed less-advanced economies.⁴ Between the categories of responsible, advanced societies and immature, transitional societies lurked residues of racialized discourses that had legitimated civilizational hierarchies via, among other structures, "unequal treaties" that powerful colonizers had imposed on such colonies as British India, protectorates as pre-revolutionary Cuba, and supine powers as Qing China. With these indignities in mind, Argentina's Mario Amadeo warned in 1958 that a non-dissemination pact would grant "a judicial stamp of approval to this situation of equality" in a world otherwise made level by air travel, telecommunications, and the UN Charter's principle of sovereign equality.⁵

Although European states occupied privileged positions, neutral and nonaligned countries across all regions viewed a future nonproliferation regime as a double-edged sword—one capable of both empowering and disempowering them, at times simultaneously. To embrace the idea—let alone the institutions—of global nuclear order was at bottom a choice between the vicissitudes of power politics and reliance on an uneven mesh of transcontinental alliances, international institutions, interstate clubs, and emerging norms of conduct among sovereign nation-states. Decades later, Soviet arms control negotiator Semyon Tsarapkin would attribute Sweden's abandonment of an independent military nuclear program to a combination of indigenous antinuclear sentiment and opposition from its neighbors. "[F]or its part," the Soviet Union, he recalled, had "unambiguously made it understood that there [could] be no 'neutral' weapon, and that a government which possessed it could not be neutral."⁶ Was the NPT a "leonine treaty," the bargain that the lioness inflicted on her

prey? The experience of neutrals mixed universalistic and local concerns, not least of which whether it was better to aspire to great-power status with its attendant risk and responsibilities, or to accept nuclear-power superintendence.⁷ Neutral and nonaligned states, the former committed to impartiality in international disputes, the latter to bending the world's arc toward justice after empire, embraced active engagement in global ordering. In doing so, they availed themselves of whatever levers could tilt the rules of the game in their favor.

The Irish Resolution

The relationship between neutrals and nonaligned and a closed nuclear club was present from the beginning. With his first proposal for “nuclear restraint,” Frank Aiken sought to neutralize “areas where the interests of the two great-Power groups are entangled and where there is the greatest danger of stumbling into war.”⁸ From 1958 to 1961, when the UNGA endorsed the resolution, referring it to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (TNDC) in Geneva, its more transformational content had been excised, shifting the program from a sweeping extension of the principles of non-aggression and collective self-defense inscribed in Article 2 and Article 51 of the UN Charter to a US-Soviet atomic condominium over Europe and, to a lesser extent, the world.

The quest for a nonproliferation accord was launched in the summer of 1958 amid geopolitical earthquakes in East Asia, the Levant, and central Europe. These developments traced back to the 1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had pummeled two Republic of China (ROC) controlled offshore islands with artillery; the Suez Crisis of 1956, when Britain and France were disciplined by US economic pressure and Soviet nuclear threats; and the Sputnik launch of 1957, when the vulnerability of the continental United States to ballistic missiles was laid bare. Afterward, extended deliberations within NATO culminated in NATO document MC/70, which expanded theater nuclear capabilities under central allied command. The result of US-Soviet mutual vulnerability would thus be a NATO stockpile of atomic weaponry nominally owned and controlled by the US executive branch as per the 1954 amended Atomic Energy Act but nonetheless releasable to the national military units of NATO allies in the event of war.⁹

As European countries across the Iron Curtain, including those with neutral or nonaligned foreign policies, digested the accumulation of nuclear forces in the region, the Middle East and East Asia showcased the perils of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race amid postcolonial territorial disputes. In Iraq, the Hashemite dynasty's overthrow by Baathist forces friendly toward Moscow triggered US and British interventions in Lebanon and Jordan, respectively, destabilizing an already volatile region. One month later, in the narrow strait separating Taiwan from mainland China, PLA artillery on orders from Mao shelled ROC positions on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu. The second Taiwan Crisis in three years carried ominous overtones for the Chinese civil war

and the Cold War in Asia, as well as the Sino-Soviet alliance and PRC relations with the Afro-Asian and nonaligned worlds. The sailing of a multi-carrier US Navy armada combined with Khrushchev's reaffirmation of a Soviet nuclear umbrella over communist China indicated that peripheral quarrels could trigger escalation up to and including all-out thermonuclear war.

The crisis also highlighted growing cracks in the communist, Western, and nonaligned camps. Mao's order to commence shelling came hours after Khrushchev embarked for Moscow from an official visit to Beijing. Along with the societal catastrophe caused by the Great Leap Forward and Mao's ambitions to chart a more independent path diplomatically, the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis cemented the Sino-Soviet split.¹⁰ Renewed nuclear tensions in East Asia also raised questions about how US equities across the Pacific affected its trans-Atlantic commitments. The PLA bombardments even unsettled nonaligned countries, who envisaged a middle course between the Cold War blocs. Mao and Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai had associated the PRC with the Afro-Asian movement, whose membership largely overlapped with a non-aligned grouping featuring Yugoslavia, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, and India. In time, Beijing's willingness to confront Western powers, back communist revolutionaries, support national liberation, and contest borders would strain relations with Afro-Asian powers ranging from India and Egypt to Indonesia and Algeria, the latter two of whose left-leaning governments would fall by 1965.¹¹

The nuclear question had offered a vital issue for major powers to plead their cases for global leadership since 1945, often with neutral and nonaligned nations as their main audiences. The Baruch and Gromyko proposals had been presented in 1946 to the UN Atomic Energy Commission, whose membership included Brazil, Australia, Poland, Egypt, Mexico, and the Netherlands in addition to the five permanent members—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China—plus Canada. While neither proposal could survive a UN Security Council (UNSC) veto, they established nuclear arms control and disarmament as focal points over which countries explored zones of possible agreement, scored points against rivals, and burnished their credentials as responsible members of a community, whether the communist bloc, the "Free World," the Afro-Asian movement, the nonaligned group, or the UN. For the CCP, for instance, the World Peace Movement—a Soviet-sponsored international organization—served an evolving set of purposes. Signature drives on behalf of the 1950 Stockholm Appeal instigated by the communist French physicist, Frédéric Joliot-Curie, drummed up popular support for Chinese intervention in the Korean War. After the 1955 Bandung Conference, Beijing touted its connection to the World Peace Council in pursuit of a leadership position in the Afro-Asian movement.¹² Even the appeal's origin—the World Peace Conference in Stockholm—illustrated the dual role that neutral countries played as authors and audiences both. After the disastrous US Castle BRAVO thermonuclear test in 1954, European neutrals, Japanese protestors, and Indian grandees advocated for nuclear test bans and NWFZs as US, British, Soviet, and

French test shots at colonial and quasi-colonial proving grounds contaminated local and global environments. Meanwhile, the Ghanaian president, Kwame Nkrumah, who had joined India's Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Indonesia's Sukarno at the 1955 Bandung Conference, championed a pan-African denuclearized area, rallying African and African American demonstrators on peace marches from Accra toward Saharan sites where France fired its first fission explosive in February 1960.¹³

The Irish Resolution was therefore one of many proposals when Aiken introduced it in 1958. Superficially simple, it offered a holistic, conservative framework to make gradual strides toward general and complete disarmament and also world peace under law. Aiken extracted the idea from his more ambitious attempt to neutralize the Middle East and other areas of the world where exercises in colonial mapmaking by retreating European empires had seeded territorial disputes. As part of an emergency UNGA session from August 8 to 21 to discuss the Anglo-American military interventions, the former Irish Republican Army commandant and committed internationalist proposed establishing an "area of law" in "the Arab States of the Middle East and Israel."¹⁴ On August 14, he asserted that neutralization would defuse Arab-Israeli disputes over Israel's founding and Palestinians' evictions, which risked eliciting superpower intervention. The scheme, according to Aiken, would constitute "recognition that the right of self-determination ... includes the right of all States in this region either to maintain their separate existence or to unite or federate with one another" and thus "the neutrality of the whole region, guaranteed by the United Nations and recognized by the great Powers." While Aiken dwelled on issues particular to the Middle East—Arab unification, Palestinian compensation and repatriation, and a regional development organization—he maintained that internationalization would unlock progress on grander aims—a general convention on civil, religious, educational, and cultural rights; free commerce, communication, and movement; and, most momentously, norms or laws, or both, discouraging the supply, receipt, or manufacture of "atomic weapons or long-range bombers or missiles." He drew a direct connection between nuclear weapon use and international neutrality:

Neutrality would be obviously in the interests of the people of the region itself, for if this vital strategic area does not become neutral, it cannot hope to escape immediate devastation in time of war, involving the destruction of its cities, communications and productive centres, and the radio-active poisoning of its scanty agricultural and water resources.

He went on to assert that the neutralization of the Middle East would, akin to that of Austria in October 1955, benefit both superpower blocs. Although each would be deprived of the oil-rich area as a military or economic base in the event of general war, neither would need to fear its capture by the other. He went on to recommend the conclusion of a non-aggression pact among the region's powers and, if possible, those outside the region as well.¹⁵

The Second Taiwan Strait Crisis's outbreak on August 23, two days after the special session disbanded, refocused attention on what Aiken would later dub "flash points"—territorial disputes capable of triggering superpower intervention, nuclear brinkmanship, and general war.¹⁶ Notwithstanding supportive remarks by representatives of Nepal, Morocco, Lebanon, Spain, Greece, and New Zealand, the area of law proposal failed even after the neutralization and denuclearization pillars had been removed. The troubles in the western Pacific led Aiken to generalize the "nuclear restriction" pillar in a speech on September 19, when he called on humanity's parliament to "preserve a Pax Atomica while we build a Pax Mundi," that is, world peace under law. Calling the nuclear question "the dominant factor of our time," he challenged the four franchise holders (France had been pre-authorized) to pledge not to supply atomic weaponry to those outside the club, who would reciprocate by pledging neither to acquire nor manufacture them. His plea ended on a sacred note:

[I]f this Assembly is in present circumstances to recognise [sic] to certain Powers the privileged status of being the only countries entitled to possess nuclear weapons, these Powers should undertake not to supply such weapons to any other country. I would appeal to them in God's name not to spread these weapons around the world.¹⁷

The response to Aiken's "Irish Resolution" was mixed. The anticolonial character of his government, its advocacy on behalf of neutral and nonaligned nations, and its reputation for fair play—not least Aiken's support for UN recognition of the PRC—lent the initiative credibility across international divides. It nonetheless risked being lost among a raft of existing arms control and disarmament initiatives. India's defense minister, Krishna Menon—perhaps to twist the Western democracies' noses—contrasted the threat of nuclear proliferation to that of "authoritarian and monolithic forms of government." In comparison to the perils of totalitarianism, he teased, "the decentralization of the capacity of destruction in this way," most recently by two colonial powers, the United Kingdom and France, "presents a far greater danger to the world than otherwise." The Indian delegation was not totally opposed. Arthur Lall, India's permanent UN representative, explained that New Delhi's reticence was in part procedural: it was already co-sponsoring three competing resolutions, including one for a nuclear test-ban treaty.

Kantian notions of "world peace under law" underlay Aiken's belief in the UN system and, more specifically, a classical, gradualist, and structuralist understanding of international politics. First, he believed that arms races existed downstream of politics; as such, disarmament—whether general and complete or confined to nuclear weapons—should "follow, not precede, the reduction of the political tensions which cause wars to break out." In lieu of grand schemes, he placed his faith in "the political foundations of peace."¹⁸ Second, and relatedly, his "area of laws" and "nuclear restriction" proposals typified his

belief that negotiated disengagements would lead to neutralization and thus to peace. One of his earlier initiatives had been symmetrical NATO-Warsaw Pact withdrawals from central Europe—one inch west for every inch east.¹⁹ Lastly, he predicted not only linear growth in nuclear risks proportional to the absolute increase in the nuclear club's size. For him, the arrival of weapons of mass atomic destruction in the hands of "small and poor states but also to revolutionary organisations" would increase risks geometrically because "great power patronage and rivalry" were so often implicated in local disputes. In his final speech that year on October 17, he warned,

All through history portable weapons which are the monopoly of the great powers today become the weapons of smaller powers and revolutionary groups tomorrow. And since local wars and revolutions almost always involve some degree of great power patronage and rivalry, the use of nuclear weapons by a small state or revolutionary group could lead, only too easily, to the outbreak of general war. One obsolete, Hiroshima-style bomb, used by a small and desperate country to settle a local quarrel, could be the detonator for world-wide thermo-nuclear war, involving the destruction of our whole civilization.²⁰

The twin crises in the Taiwan Strait and the Levant illustrated this explosive dynamic. Earlier in 1958, Mao had told the Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, that China would rise from the ashes of thermonuclear war to vindicate communism worldwide. Aiken's retort in September was categorical: "[I]f general war is brought upon the world for any motive ... it will neither democratize nor communize it; it will annihilate it."²¹

The Irish Resolution received general, non-binding approbation in 1959. It was not until 1961, however, that the UNGA instructed the TNDC composed of five communist and five Western-bloc nations to prioritize it and "associated measures."²² Alas, the TNDC would not survive the year—collateral damage from the collapse of the Paris summit between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union in May 1960. The UNGA passed Resolution 1722 (XVI) to constitute a new, larger ENDC, adding to the fold eight neutral and nonaligned states: Brazil, Burma (Myanmar), Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic (Egypt plus Syria). Neutral and nonaligned countries now had standing over a portfolio of remedies to the Cold War and its side effects, most notably nuclear testing, the developmental costs of militarism, and nuclear terror. With respect to a nonproliferation agreement, the ENDC resembled a Goldilocks solution: exclusive enough to enable consensus, diverse enough to represent international opinion, and balanced enough to transcend, at times, the Cold War. Ahead of its first meeting in 1962, Irish diplomats enjoined Nigerian officials to support the Irish Resolution, relating the "great prestige" they would win in world councils as they firewalled sub-Saharan Africa from superpower interference.²³ Historians Albert Legault and Michel Fortmann later credited

these eight for serving as a “stabilizing factor” in the enterprise. And while US and Soviet delegates’ service as co-chairmen elevated their own importance, it also laid the groundwork for US-Soviet détente based on atomic condominium.²⁴ Their first order of business would be the marginalization of a PRC on the threshold of nuclear status from the rest of the international community, starting with neutral and nonaligned states.²⁵

The China Syndrome

The impulse to restrict the atomic franchise intensified as the PRC nuclear program sprinted ahead. Pressure issued from multiple international processes in the Cold War’s middle years. The first was the Sino-Soviet split, as Moscow and Beijing battled for ideological supremacy over the international communist movement, with Mao’s restless empire pitting wars of national liberation against Khrushchev and his successors’ preference for socialist development via peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world. The second was racial anxieties among US political elites centered on revolutionary movements in populous, non-white nations. The third was the superimposition of regional rivalries with ideological characteristics atop the solidaristic elite networks that had arisen from shared experiences of European and Japanese colonialism, as territorial revanchism and nuclear proliferation drove wedges between prominent members of the Afro-Asian world and the Nonaligned Movement.

The Sino-Soviet split challenged neutral and nonaligned parties by intensifying fissiparous trends in the communist world, boosting CCP-backed leftist insurgencies throughout Asia, and driving US-Soviet détente. The cracks had first stemmed from personality clashes, ideological rifts, status competition, domestic challenges, and geographical propinquity between China and Russia that had long sowed distrust between the contiguous empires. Whether the rift was the fruit of internecine discord or reemergent rivalry, the nuclear question metamorphosed from a source of fraternal cooperation to one of discord.²⁶ Mao’s revolutionary willingness to court general war worried Khrushchev. After years of technical assistance to the PRC’s nuclear infrastructure, the Kremlin terminated exchanges of technicians, fissile materials, machinery, and blueprints in 1960. Khrushchev’s embrace of “peaceful coexistence,” which envisaged a world where capitalist and communist societies competed in the fields of economic development, scientific exploration, and technological advancement rather than on battlefields, was broadly compatible with nonalignment. The phrase had first been unveiled in a Sino-Indian joint declaration in 1954. While in practice this declaratory policy did not rule out Warsaw Pact assistance to Cuban and Algerian revolutionaries or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, among other anticolonial struggles, it also provided a compelling rationale for Khrushchev’s visit to the United States in 1959, superpower summitry, test-ban diplomacy, and outreach to France and West Germany.

Before its embrace by the Warsaw Pact, peaceful coexistence had been a centerpiece of the inaugural Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia,

from April 19 to 24, 1955. Featuring delegations from 29 newly independent African, Asian, and Middle Eastern nations, the proceedings centered on the relationship between the Cold War and the “Third World,” in particular international economics, decolonization, wars of national liberation, racial apartheid, and the past and present of European imperialism. The “Ten Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” or “Bandung Principles” that the conference adopted were a composite of the UN Charter and the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:” “respect for fundamental human rights” and the “sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; [r]ecognition of the equality of all races and ... of all nations large and small”; international non-interference; right to self-defense without great-power pressure; opposition to “acts or threats of aggression or the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country”; peaceful settlement of disputes; reciprocity and mutually beneficial cooperation; and “[r]espect for justice and international obligations[.]”²⁷ Fresh off a star turn at the 1954 Geneva Conference, Zhou led the organizing with Indonesia’s Ruslan Abdulgani and President Sukarno and India’s Nehru, accentuating China’s *bona fides* as an Asian power committed to anti-imperialism and anticolonialism. Zhou’s moderate tone and endorsement of politico-economic self-determination eased mistrust in the CCP’s communist internationalism. Shortly thereafter, the “Five Principles” were written into the PRC’s Constitution.²⁸ When the CCP pronounced “peaceful coexistence” a pillar of communist foreign relations ahead of the International Meeting of Communist and Workers Parties in November 1957, it referenced the 1954 Sino-Indian joint declaration and the 1955 Bandung Conference.²⁹

In the years ahead, the CCP’s interpretation of “territorial integrity” and “non-interference” to exempt co-ideologues gave rise to quarrels with neighbors. Peaceful coexistence increasingly attracted broadsides from the CCP. Mao and his Chinese comrades questioned Moscow’s credentials and credibility in representing Marxist-Leninist thought internationally, which upheld the necessity of worldwide communist revolution and dovetailed—according to more radical voices on the international left—ever more with the problem of the color line—the historical subjugation and exploitation of non-white societies as sources of cheap commodities and captive markets by countries of the Global North, including Russia and Eastern Europe. The Chinese question jarred with nonaligned, Afro-Asian, and capitalist-communist grammars. For the nonaligned world, Beijing’s atomic breakthrough stood outside of the grouping’s typical preoccupations: decolonization, neo-colonialism, unequal development, racial prejudice, and foreign interference. For the Afro-Asian movement, Beijing’s blast threatened to worsen relations between the two premier capitals, New Delhi and Beijing, notwithstanding Zhou’s efforts to cast the achievement in pan-Asian terms. For the East-West dispute, the prospect of a rabble-rousing CCP wielding the “absolute weapon” cast in sharp relief a shared interest in international stability across the ideological walls dividing the Industrial North.

Although October 1962 is mainly remembered for the Cuban Missile Crisis, equally significant was a concurrent border conflict in the Himalayas between the PRC and India. The twin crises consolidated two ongoing shifts in world affairs. First, the successful US effort to reverse Khrushchev's forward deployment of nuclear weapons cemented an unequal nuclear relationship between Moscow and Washington. At the start of the crisis, US secretary of defense Robert McNamara and President John Kennedy had observed that atomic forces in Cuba did not fundamentally alter the US-Soviet balance of terror, as Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles already held North America at risk.³⁰ The Kennedy administration had itself embraced a forward-positioned posture featuring Thor and Jupiter medium-range ballistic missiles in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey; B-52 Stratofortress bombers in Danish Greenland; and theater nukes in West Germany and South Korea. McNamara and Kennedy discussed the desirability of such weapons in Iran, South Vietnam, and India as well.³¹ Khrushchev, therefore, spoke the truth when he claimed that Operation Anadyr would give the Americans "a little of their own medicine."³² With his retreat in the face of Kennedy's brinkmanship, Khrushchev acknowledged that his archrival enjoyed a right of which his superpower now stood denied: to station nuclear forces on the territories of willing allies across the Atlantic. By association, US willingness to intervene militarily to remove nuclear weapons from a non-belligerent added a new criterion to *de facto* definitions of non-belligerence—non-nuclear weapon status. Castro's fury at Khrushchev's unilateral withdrawal of all nuclear-capable systems amplified the predicament of small and middle powers as a global nuclear order started to take form.³³

The Sino-Indian border war redrew the mental geographies of Cold War nonalignment and Afro-Asian solidarity. Even as Moscow and Washington ignored Castro's five demands on October 28, 1962—termination of US economic warfare, surveillance overflights, covert operations, blockade, and occupation of the Guantánamo base area—PLA troops advanced across the British-drawn McMahon Line separating Chinese-held Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Burma and West Pakistan, from India's northeastern frontier. At altitudes as high as 13,000 feet, PLA and Indian Army forces battled for control of parts of the Aksai Chin region and India's North-East Frontier Agency—modern-day Arunachal Pradesh. The PRC's unilateral declaration of ceasefire and the return of PLA forces behind a "line of actual control" reset the *status quo ante bellum*. Even so, the month-long struggle was the culmination of worsening Sino-Indian relations since Nehru had granted asylum to Tibet's Dali Lama in April 1959. Territorial tensions would prove more powerful than Afro-Asian solidarity or the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, with Nehru reaching out over the objections of Krishna Menon to both Moscow and Washington for military supplies during the conflict.³⁴

The war further isolated the PRC amid the Great Leap Forward and the resulting Great Famine while catalyzing geopolitical realignments across Asia. As Islamabad reached out to Beijing, resulting in the China-Pakistan Border

Treaty of December 1963, New Delhi leaned toward Moscow. The influx of US military aid and strategic interest in India meanwhile culminated in an Air Defense Agreement with the United States and joint exercises with US, Australian, UK, and Indian air forces in November 1963. Zhou sniped that the “non-aligned country has become an aligned country” and that nonalignment itself had become a “laughing stock.”³⁵ Indian nonalignment was indeed less and less defined by opposition to the US-Soviet confrontation than by equipoise between Moscow and Washington in search of military and development assistance.

The impending PRC test intensified superpower efforts to marginalize Beijing. The US State Department viewed the development with apprehension, having solicited reports from embassies in Burma, Cambodia, Japan, and Thailand that China’s nuclearization would encourage neutralist trends, although elsewhere consular staff expected the event to “strengthen ties and defense alliances [with the] US.”³⁶ A US Air Force report warned that the psychological impact would be “very large;” the PRC would “acquire overnight the stature of a nuclear power in [Asian] minds.”³⁷

As the Kennedy administration discussed nuclear arms control measures in the summer of 1963, a limited test-ban treaty stood out as well-suited to two major, related goals: to foster US-Soviet détente and to build a collective front against a nuclear-armed, communist China. A test ban would have the added virtue of ending global fallout whose infiltration of industrial food chains, most notably dairy milk, unsettled US families. At American University on June 10, Kennedy acknowledged that a “nuclear exchange” would spread “deadly poisons ... carried by wind and water and soil and seed to the far corners of the globe and to generations yet unborn.” The fallout issue had potency among neutral and nonaligned states as well. Kennedy added that a ban would “place the nuclear powers in a position to deal more effectively with one of the greatest hazards which man faces in 1963, the further spread of nuclear arms.”³⁸ Three days later, a US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) analysis endorsed the organization of a globe-spanning coalition to brand as international pariahs those testing anywhere save underground. It would be composed of “the United States, the Soviet Union, major US allies, and many of the key non-aligned countries.”³⁹ Two months later, US ambassador-at-large Averell Harriman, British science advisor Lord Hailsham, and Khrushchev finalized the Moscow Treaty. Although Khrushchev was loath to explicitly admit that Beijing was a driving factor, Lydia Gromyko, the wife of the Soviet foreign minister, praised such a universal agreement “so that when those Chinese have their first nuclear explosion, we will have a basis on which to call them to account.”⁴⁰

India’s efforts were bending in the same direction. On September 29, 1964, Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that Beijing would test “in the near future.” Fearing a loss of standing in the Afro-Asian and nonaligned movements, Indian diplomat B. K. Nehru requested that Rusk publicly “praise India’s policy against making nuclear weapons” and “redress the psychological

balance.” His request came on the eve of the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Cairo, Egypt, from October 5 to 10.⁴¹ There in Cairo, Shastri implored those gathered to extend nonaligned principles to the atomic realm, assuring them that he had personally ordered Indian scientists “not to make a single experiment, not to perfect a single device which is not needed for peaceful uses of atomic energy.” The final communique called attention to “the great danger in the dissemination of nuclear weapons,” urging “the Great Powers to abstain from all policies conducive to the dissemination of nuclear weapons and their by-products among those States which do not at present possess them” and “all States ... to conclude non-dissemination agreements and to agree on measures providing for the gradual liquidation of the existing stock-piles of nuclear weapons.”⁴² Although the second admonition singled out “those possessing nuclear weapons” as “particularly” responsible, the Cairo Resolution contradicted CCP polemics against the nuclear test ban and nonproliferation negotiations, going so far as to embrace nuclear forbearance as a basic tenet of nonalignment:

As part of these efforts, the Heads of State or Government declare their own readiness not to produce, acquire or test any nuclear weapons, and call on all countries including those who have not subscribed to the Moscow Treaty to enter into a similar undertaking and to take the necessary steps to prevent their territories, ports and airfields from being used by nuclear powers, for the deployment or disposition of nuclear weapons. This undertaking should be the subject of a treaty to be concluded in an international Conference convened under the auspices of the United Nations and open to accession by all States. The Conference further calls upon all nuclear Powers to observe the spirit of this declaration.

This declaration was in clear contrast to the unwillingness in 1962 of Afro-Asian partners, save Egypt, to condemn the PLA incursion across the “Line of Actual Control.” Nonaligned gatherings were constitutionally less mindful of the views of the PRC, a non-member. Even so, when Egypt’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Mohamed Awad El Kony, deposited the text of the 2nd Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Nonaligned Movement to the UN General Assembly on October 29, items related to the “prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons and abolition of all nuclear weapons” had been added to sub-section VI dealing with disarmament and related issues. What was more, the Cairo summit endorsed universal adherence to the Moscow Treaty “in the interests of peace and the welfare of humanity.”⁴³

The strategy of enlisting “key non-aligned countries” against Beijing’s nuclearization was not ineffectual. Although China went on to fire its first test shot on October 16, 1964, the minimal objective had always been “exerting effective pressure on Red China ... to limit its nuclear testing and nuclear weapons development to demonstration of an initial capability.” That same

day in Moscow the CPSU Central Committee ousted Khrushchev from office; in London, British voters replaced Harold Macmillan's Conservative Party with Harold Wilson's Labour. Mao's nuclear program thus outlived the three heads of government who had signed the Moscow Treaty. The effectiveness of Shastri's endeavors to discredit Beijing was likewise mixed. On the one hand, according to historian Tanvi Madan, Indian attempts to "turn the test against China in the developing world," let alone "stop the Chinese nuclear program" altogether, had gone "nowhere."⁴⁴ On the other hand, Zhou reckoned that India and its partners had succeeded in furnishing a compelling narrative to counter his own claims to have achieved atomic fission on behalf of all Asians. In fact, the potential reputational damage was deemed sufficiently detrimental that Mao and Zhou considered calling the whole thing off. While it would only take the PLA three more years to perfect a thermonuclear device, a decade would pass before PLA Rocket Forces amassed enough warheads and delivery vehicles to form even a minimal nuclear deterrent.⁴⁵

The ENDC

The neutral and nonaligned ENDC delegations had allies within the US government. From its early days, the Lyndon Johnson administration embraced arms control as a counternarrative to US covert operations and military deployments in the "Third World." For both Kennedy and Johnson, nuclear treaty-making could shore up electoral prospects in America's booming suburbs as well as neutral and nonaligned sympathy without restricting executive war powers. In his first State of the Union address on January 8, 1964, Johnson pledged new arms control initiatives. Under Bill Foster, ACDA moved expeditiously to add pieces to the "Geneva kit"—a fissile-material cutoff accord (FMCT), a comprehensive testing ban (CTBT), and strategic arms limitation talks (SALT), in addition to a nonproliferation agreement—for the higher purpose of general and complete disarmament. Foster exhorted non-allied listeners to view such "collateral measures" as stepping stones rather than as substitutes for loftier ambitions.⁴⁶ Measures that would have nuclear powers incur real liabilities, such as universal safeguards on civilian nuclear facilities, correspondingly emerged as key criteria of neutral and nonaligned support. Meanwhile, the Americanization of the civil war in Southeast Asia heightened the value of multilateral diplomacy. By July 1965, National Security Council staffer Bob "Blowtorch" Komer would extol how "positive and constructive initiatives in the field of disarmament" could mollify "the Afro-Asian world as well as Europe" as the Johnson administration escalated US military involvement in Vietnam.⁴⁷

Neutral and nonaligned countries left imprints on international arms control diplomacy from December 1965 to January 1968, most consequentially an association between nuclear nonproliferation and broader efforts to maintain "international peace, security and stability" en route to nuclear disarmament.⁴⁸ The stalemate between Moscow and Washington over a NATO multilateral

nuclear force (MLF) handed neutral and nonaligned delegations the initiative in Geneva and New York. As the superpowers bickered over language permissive of a trans-Atlantic atomic fleet over which West German officials would share control, the ENDC worked as a mid-level venue where US and Soviet arms controllers could trade barbs and exchange views. In one co-chairman meeting between Foster and Semyon Tsarapkin, the Soviet ambassador praised US-Soviet détente up to the point of condominium, taking the

line that all other countries including France, China, India, UAR, ... even [the] G.D.R., were playing [the] U.S. and U.S.S.R. against each other and were trying to obtain advantage from differences and contradictions between them; they could do it in present circumstances but if [the] U.S. and U.S.S.R. were to agree with each other everybody else would have no choice but to fall in line.⁴⁹

Once back in Washington, DC, Foster conveyed the Soviets' "strong opposition" to the MLF, only for Rusk and Under Secretary of State George Ball to prevail on Johnson to maintain the MLF "hardware option." Consensual definitions of "transfer" and "acquisition" would continue to elude Soviet and American negotiators for another two years.

The first sign that East-West disputes had cleared the way for non-bloc contributions came in late 1965, when the UN delegations representing the non-allied ENDC members advanced what would become UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX). Among other guidelines, the motion called for "an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations" in any future nonproliferation pact. Passing on November 27, 1965, the resolution was built on two memoranda that neutral and nonaligned delegations had circulated in Geneva two months earlier. The first (ENDC/158) "placed on record their basic approach:" a "treaty on [the] non-proliferation of nuclear weapons [was] not an end in itself but only a means to an end:"

The eight delegations are convinced that measures to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons should, therefore, be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery.⁵⁰

Resolution 2028 (XX) signaled that the eight countries approved of nuclear nonproliferation as a concept, albeit in the context of "[g]eneral and complete disarmament, and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament" in addition to NWFZ talks (Latin American states were meeting in Mexico City to establish one in their neighborhood). The resolution went on to describe a future agreement that would be "void of any loop-holes" and feature "acceptable and workable provisions to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty."⁵¹

Given the tenor of debate in Geneva, the language in the resolution was a clear endorsement of maximally universal safeguards and corollary measures

to circumscribe existing arsenals, in particular an all-environments test ban. After all, the second nonaligned ENDC memoranda (ENDC/159) had pertained to “a comprehensive treaty banning all tests of such weapons.” It claimed that a CTBT would “constitute a measure towards non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.”⁵² When Mexico’s Gomez Robledo introduced the memoranda on September 15, he described them as calling “for a brake to be put, once and for all, to the increase *and* spread of nuclear weapons.” At the same session Nigeria’s L. C. N. Obi relayed nonaligned and neutral members’ request that the ENDC report set a deadline of January 31, 1966, to reconvene.⁵³ Eastern and Western-bloc memoranda to the same UNGA session received neither commendatory votes nor extended deliberation. Resolution 2028 (XX) was therefore a testament to mounting neutral and nonaligned influence in world councils, whose complexion and politics the accession of more than 50 Caribbean, African, and Asian states over the course of the 1960s were in the process of transforming.⁵⁴

As neutral and nonaligned countries redirected nonproliferation talks, geopolitical alignments in South and East Asia also shifted. In 1965, New Delhi’s fears of Beijing’s “marriage of convenience” with Islamabad were realized when Pakistani incursions into Jammu and Kashmir ignited 17 days of combat hostilities. Although India would continue to eschew formal alliances, Nehru’s “basic policy” of rejecting nuclear weapon development and foreign military assistance had been weakened. That same year, a failed coup targeting anti-communist officers on the Indonesian Army General Staff brought General Suharto to power, deposing Sukarno’s regime in which the Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI) had enjoyed influence and unleashing a tide of mass violence against PKI members, ethnic Chinese, and disfavored groups. CCP views of Sukarno had been ambivalent: as the political and ideological forces that would explode into the Cultural Revolution took hold, the PKI appeared increasingly revisionist. The PKI nonetheless received material support, including military arms and training, from the CCP, whose complicity in the initial September 30th coup set the stage for the involvement of the United States, Britain, and Australia in the counterrevolutionary massacres. Indonesia’s importance to PRC foreign policy was such that Beijing opted not to break relations with Suharto; even so, the most populous Southeast Asian country had effectively switched sides in Asia’s Cold War.⁵⁵

The friction among Indian, Indonesian, and Chinese elites froze the Afro-Asian movement as an effective grouping with second-order effects on nonaligned politics. New Delhi turned to a new, two-pronged strategy: closer relations with the superpowers combined with indigenous research and development into atomic energy inclusive of peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements with advanced states.⁵⁶ Connections were drawn between these courses of action. Homi Bhabha, Nehru’s nuclear czar, explained early in 1964 that only credible security guarantees from both superpowers could replace even a small nuclear arsenal. Tsarapkin responded in Geneva by acknowledging an “intimate link” between global peacekeeping and nuclear nonproliferation.⁵⁷

UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX) established an enduring association in world affairs among nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Clear differences had nevertheless arisen within the non-allied grouping in Geneva, where Sweden, Mexico, and India were emerging as leaders. The three nonetheless pursued distinct and imperfectly compatible lines of effort in the ENDC. Officials from India, the largest and most insecure of the three, also exhibited the most ambivalence. Indian delegate V. C. Trivedi had challenged the conventional meaning of nuclear proliferation on August 12, 1965, insisting that a nonproliferation treaty first apply “to those who are in a position to proliferate, and only secondarily to those who may subsequently be doing it.”⁵⁸ The consensus neutral and nonaligned memoranda and UNGA 2028 (XX) therefore amounted to a watering down of India’s position that international law should not distinguish categorically between existing and prospective nuclear arsenals. This equivocation would manifest as skepticism toward discriminatory formula and a preoccupation with security guarantees, culminating in an increasingly intransigent attitude toward nonproliferation proceedings in Geneva and New York.

In championing a “package approach” to arms control and nonproliferation, Sweden’s Alva Myrdal underscored equality in pitching a nuclear regime that would govern all nuclear powers. Her position entailed three demands and, correspondingly, a broader critique of an emerging “hegemonic nuclear order.”⁵⁹ First, she stressed the need to complement any nuclear nonproliferation pact with a CTBT or FMCT, or both, which she once described “as parts of one comprehensive pattern.”⁶⁰ Second, she submitted a Swedish version of Article III, which laid out guidelines for a truly universal safeguard regime, in which IAEA controls would be applied on importers as well as exporters of fissile material regardless of whether they were NPT states party. Relatedly, she would hand the IAEA jurisdiction extended to civilian nuclear activities in the United States, Britain, France, and the Soviet Union. In this campaign for “obligatory and non-discriminatory control,” she was joined in the ENDC by Egypt’s delegate, Hussein Khallaf, whose government’s concern centered on Israel’s unsafeguarded Dimona Reactor.⁶¹ Third, she insisted that NPT adherence be conditioned on the limitation, reduction, and ultimate elimination of all nuclear arsenals. What was more, she insisted on legal consequences under the banner of nuclear nonproliferation. In April 1968, she would assert that Article VI’s requirement for nuclear club talks “in good faith” for “general and complete” and “nuclear disarmament” were in fact a “promissory note” that could void the contract between Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS).⁶² In the aggregate, these demands reflected wider dissatisfaction with the emerging nuclear order. Myrdal elaborated on this broader judgment in a 1967 speech:

[T]he test-ban as well as the cut-off would effectively stop the have-nots from starting nuclear weapon production. At the same time they would have involved mutual obligations on the part on the nuclear-weapon countries, thus effectively halting the arms race and improving beyond

comparisons the climate of confidence in our world's future. It remains a riddle for me why the Great Powers have chosen the strategy of giving priority to such an ineffective measure as a non-proliferation pledge, particularly as it draws the thunder of political criticism over their heads.⁶³

She expounded on this point before the ENDC one year later: "How can we—the non-nuclear-weapon States—be expected to enter into an interminable obligation to remain non-nuclear if the nuclear-weapon States are engaged in an interminable nuclear escalation?"⁶⁴

With India unconvinced that an NPT would assure its security and Sweden worried that a two-tier order would contradict UN principles, Mexico emerged as the chief reconciler. In August 1967, US national security adviser Walt Rostow advised Lyndon Johnson that "the game" in Geneva would "move to the non-nuclear powers" now that the superpowers had in coordination with European and East Asian allies agreed drafts of the non-transfer, non-acquisition, and safeguards articles. In the autumn of 1967, the non-allied eight made various presentations on the matters of IAEA safeguards, peaceful assistance, non-military explosives, withdrawal and entry into force provisions, arms control and disarmament conditions, and preambular language. Mexican officials viewed nonproliferation proceedings from the standpoint of a neutral Latin American country whose Institutional Revolutionary Party needed to balance relations with its giant neighbor, the United States, and conservative and radical regimes throughout the region, including Fidel Castro's Cuba. Mexico's leadership of NWFZ talks in Latin America and the Caribbean buoyed their moral leadership.⁶⁵

Deputy Foreign Minister Alfonso García Robles, a European-trained international jurist, later characterized the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Latin American NWFZ named after the Mexico City square where it was signed on February 14, 1967, as a "gadfly and inspiration to the NPT."⁶⁶ The superpower draft included a new Article IV that stipulated an "inalienable right" to "research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes" as well as international exchanges of data and technology. According to US diplomats, the article had "been originally derived from the Treaty of Tlatelolco."⁶⁷

Mexico's ENDC delegate, Jorge Casteñeda, offered further additions on September 19. These Mexican amendments would usher in major revisions to Article IV and three new articles. Casteñeda began by proposing two changes to the "peaceful uses" concept. First, the text should outline not only a negative "inalienable right" but a positive expectation that states party with advanced nuclear infrastructure assist NNWS technically. In short, for those who renounced nuclear research and development whose military uses could bestow non-military advantages, NWS should make good their losses. This principle applied equally to peaceful nuclear explosives (PNEs), which the US Atomic Energy Commission had long promoted for mega-projects such as blasting harbors and canals under its Project Plowshare. Although conceding PNEs were "nothing other than nuclear bombs," Casteñeda maintained they held "enormous economic potential ... in the execution of vast engineering

projects.”⁶⁸ A new Article V would therefore stipulate the speedy creation of a cheap and reliable international PAE service. Next, a preambular statement in the draft treaty that NPT states party would not hamper the negotiation of NWFZs would be slotted into the operative body in the form of a new Article VII. Finally, Castañeda advocated for more substantial NWS disarmament obligations. Although “an imperfect obligation,” he maintained it should be “more than a statement of intention.” The draft submitted by the US and Soviet co-chairmen included language calling on the nuclear club “to pursue negotiations in good faith for nuclear arms control and disarmament as well as general and complete disarmament.” The Mexican diplomat argued to integrate this statement into the treaty’s body, which would elevate a hortatory statement into a binding Article VI. Meanwhile, the formulation, “with all speed and perseverance,” would clarify what was meant by “good faith.”⁶⁹ It was this clause that Myrdal would later characterize as a “promissory note.”

The Mexican amendments received approbatory comments from representatives from Egypt, India, Burma, Sweden, Brazil, and Romania. Those from India and Brazil, both of whose home governments increasingly worried that the prospective nuclear order would hamstring their national ambitions, emphasized “vertical proliferation”—the growth and improvement of the NWS arsenals. They along with Myrdal stressed the importance of a comprehensive test ban or a fissile-material cutoff treaty complementing the agreement. Myrdal also pushed for the universal application of IAEA safeguards on nuclear-material transfers and also civilian nuclear installation in the nuclear club. The neutral and nonaligned delegations were not alone in wanting to enhance the treaty’s equality and accountability. Japanese foreign minister Takeo Miki weighed in on September 22 in support of quinquennial conferences to assess the treaty regime’s function once it entered into force.⁷⁰

The importance of positive and negative security assurances mounted as a accord came into view. Even before Castañeda’s presentation, neutral and non-aligned ENDC members had tried to rectify the omission. One year after the passage of UNGA 2028 (XX), Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, and the United Arab Republic tabled in New York another “resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.” This one, which received support from 46 neutral and nonaligned states, built on competing superpower proposals for negative assurances. Although the superpowers were reluctant to internationalize their nuclear strategy, planning, and targeting, Moscow and Washington took the issue seriously enough to put forth conditional guarantees. In late 1966, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin proposed that the NPT include a “clause on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states party to the treaty, which have no nuclear weapons on their territory.”⁷¹ The language pointedly excluded countries such as West Germany that played host to NATO’s nuclear stockpile.⁷² While the Soviet Union remain focused on NATO nuclear sharing, US policymakers additionally worried about escalatory dominance in East and South Asia.⁷³ For now,

the Soviets won the diplomatic tug-of-war. What would become UNGA Resolution 2153 (XXI) enjoined “all nuclear-weapon Powers to refrain from the use, or the threat of us, or nuclear weapons against States which may conclude treaties” consistent with UNGA Resolution 2028 (XX), and went on to ask the ENDC “to consider urgently” such assurances to “non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories.”⁷⁴

While neutral and nonaligned countries advocated in Geneva and New York for negative assurances to accompany a nonproliferation treaty, positive assurances emerged as a major consideration for Indian officials. In February 1967, Indira Gandhi’s close advisor, L. K. Jha, traveled to Moscow, Paris, London, and Washington, DC, to request promises to defend India against nuclear blackmail or attack by Beijing. Gandhi’s desire for a nuclear umbrella in compensation for its nuclear forbearance contradicted major policies in Washington, Moscow, and also New Delhi. For the United States, a security guarantee would limit escalatory options in various Asian theaters. The compromise emerged as a UNSC resolution that would accompany the NPT. In Moscow, Gromyko counseled Jha that in the event of an “unprovoked nuclear ... attack” against a NNWS state party to the NPT nuclear-armed UNSC, permanent members would “act quickly through the Security council.” Jha asked that the word “threat” be added to cover blackmail. The proposal was greeted with enthusiasm when Jha landed in Washington, with Rostow writing Johnson to praise such a “major change in the Soviet position.” While to him the Soviet proposal did not “look too onerous, at first glance,” he cautioned Johnson that it would “preclude us from first use of nuclear weapons in either North Korea or Vietnam.”⁷⁵ More generally, the use of US security guarantees to entice countries to join a nonproliferation regime would stretch US armed forces past their breaking point. As Rusk observed when the White House reviewed the question in May 1968, “[W]e have enough allies as it is.”⁷⁶ For its part, notwithstanding the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union could not commit in advance to taking India’s side in a future conflict with the PRC. And as for India, military alliance remained incompatible with nonalignment. As one Indian commentator noted, this constraint meant that any “nuclear umbrella” that might be extended to New Delhi would come “without a handle.”⁷⁷

The submission of a full draft NPT to the ENDC in January 1968 generated discussion but few changes, as India in particular expressed reservations about a discriminatory nuclear order. Security assurances and concrete arms control commitments remained sticking points. Foster, UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, and US Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford consequently sought presidential authorization to state that the United States would spare those without nuclear arms or nuclear-armed allies from atomic-backed threats, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff worried this would damage US military credibility and limit options “such as in South Vietnam.”⁷⁸ The Johnson administration would ultimately opt to refrain from further pledges. Nonaligned concerns about the treaty’s value persisted. In mid-April, diplomats

from Yugoslavia—a founding member of the Nonaligned Movement—shared an aide-memoire with India and others calling on “nuclear powers to initiate nuclear disarmament negotiations at [the] earliest possible date as a mean[s] of attracting non-aligned support to [the] NPT.”⁷⁹

The NPT could not survive a UNGA vote without the support of neutral and nonaligned states, particularly those from Latin America, with 24 votes, and Africa, with 32. Citing his belief that the current draft treaty lacked too many of these votes, Mexican Deputy Foreign Minister García Robles recommended targeted revisions to the superpower delegations before addressing the UN First Committee on May 16. This second set of Mexican amendments was more limited; even so, their fate was symptomatic of the NPT’s reliance on superpower deterrence architectures rather than international institutions. He called for preambular reference to the prohibition on wars of aggression in the UN Charter, “the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy” in Article IV, and the creation of an international PNE service “as soon as possible.” He also petitioned for the disarmament language in Article VI to reference the “manufacture and perfection” of existing arsenals, which he argued would help redress the NPT’s constitutional inequality. For this reason, he stated, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which he more than any other individual had brought into existence, was “much more complete.”⁸⁰

Superpower resistance to making alterations to the draft treaty dissipated as the depth of Latin American and African skepticism grew clearer. At the beginning of the special UNGA session, Rusk had been informed that these two continental blocs held the “balance.”⁸¹ Notwithstanding the extent of US-Soviet cooperation—observers in Geneva had joked that spring that “the only thing they didn’t do was hold hands”—neutral and nonaligned nations, especially those whose economies remained underdeveloped, felt ambivalent about a treaty that would amount to multilateral nuclear disarmament for potential nuclear powers in their region but also for themselves. While Goldberg believed there were 80 reliable votes, and Soviet UN ambassador Vasily V. Kuznetsov countered with 60, García Robles contended that his revisions would drive the number over 100. Ultimately, Foster, Goldberg, Kuznetsov, and Soviet ENDC co-chairman Alexei Roshchin agreed to the new preambular clause citing the UN Charter, as well as the adjustments to the language in Article IV and Article V. The insertion of “manufacture and perfection,” which would have been tantamount to a nuclear freeze for NWS, was nixed. Instead, Johnson and Kosygin would announce the launching of SALT in the near future. Superpower summitry, coordinated with treaty allies, would bend the arc of the US-Soviet nuclear arms race, not UN meetings or NPT Review Conferences. These adjustments dispelled most reservations, especially those of the Latin American countries. The UNGA resolution was also amended to “commend” rather than “endorse” the NPT so as not to imply any commitment to sign or ratify it. On June 10, the UN First Committee commended the treaty, and two more votes were added on June 12, resulting in a final tally of 94 in favor, 4 against, and 21 abstentions, with 12 Latin American delegations serving as co-sponsors.⁸²

Conclusion: Neutralizing the Bomb

State-led globalization combined with the Third World Cold War spurred over the course of the 1960s tensions among neutrality, nonalignment, and nuclear proliferation. The spread of nuclear arms, whether forward-deployed Soviet warheads in Cuba or Chinese gravity bombs in East Asia, illustrated the limits of territorial sovereignty and sovereign equality for nations large and small, allied and un-allied; as Indian envoy L. K. Jha had informed Leonid Brezhnev, it was not only the use but the threat of atomic destruction that darkened India's horizons.⁸³ While the constant, latent pressure that nuclear deterrence radiated had been recognized since 1945 by strategists, national command authorities, and international lawyers—the latter by referring nuclear questions to political forums such as the UN Security Council rather than humanitarian instruments such as the Geneva Conventions—nuclear proliferation sharpened the geopolitical implications for nonaligned and neutral nations. While the global non-proliferation regime has been characterized as a creation of nuclear powers, as noted by the French observer to the UN special session where the NPT had been commended, “[n]on-nuclears, the majority of which don’t have the means to make nuclear weapons, like the idea of not having their neighbors build them either. Some see it as a gateway to real disarmament.”⁸⁴ The omission of Robles and Myrdal's preferred nuclear freeze and comprehensive test ban, respectively, reflected the real limits of neutral and nonaligned influence. In the end, the tacit threat of nuclear terror rather than lofty principles of non-discrimination bore most heavily on their attitudes and behaviors.

The basic inequality at the heart of nuclear nonproliferation had been recognized from the word go. At the 1958 UNGA special session where Aiken unveiled his notion of a closed nuclear club, Spanish delegate Félix de Lequerica had compared the Irish proposal to the inferior status of the Third Estate in the French *ancien regime* in defense of sovereign equality versus passing such “an official seal to the clique of atomic aristocrats.” His Argentinian counterpart, Mario Amadeo, reached back even further. In ancient Roman law, he explained, the idea of *capitis diminutio* had referred to times when individuals or groups lost standing to sue in court. To separate the world into those quick to build nuclear armaments and those damned to survive without them would confer “a judicial stamp of approval to this situation of inequality.”⁸⁵

Even if states such as Sweden, India, and Mexico were to be on the outside looking into the now formalized nuclear club, throughout the NPT's negotiation they won important concessions, often in league with key US and Soviet allies. The eleventh-hour debate over negative nuclear assurances was symptomatic of the contested and contingent nature of the negotiations, but most of all how the NPT would inscribe nuclear threats, conceivably including fissile material—the indispensable fuel of weapons of mass atomic destruction—as *ipso facto* incompatible with neutrality, nonalignment, or even non-belligerence. In the end, neutral and nonaligned states accepted a degree of international and thus great-power superintendence over their nuclear security because they faced a real dilemma: nuclear proliferation impinged on their freedom of action and their freedom from fear even as nonproliferation measures infringed

on their cherished sovereignty. As French foreign ministry lawyers noted (and Indian officials demonstrated by not signing), the NPT “constitute[d] a revision of the [UN] Charter:” by discriminating against NNWS; by “hierarchizing” nuclear and conventional “forms of aggression”; by inaugurating in international law “the ambiguous concept of ‘threat of aggression’”; by distinguishing NWS who were UNSC permanent members from those outside the UN, namely communist China; and by “depart[ing] from the established jurisdiction of the [UN] Security Council, whose decision have always applied to specific problems.”⁸⁶ If neutral and nonaligned states had hoped to inaugurate Frank Aiken’s “pax Mundi,” what they got instead were Soviet and American hegemonies re-consolidated through atomic centralization.

However ambivalent, their active participation in international nonproliferation diplomacy nonetheless shaped the contemporary nuclear order. Most notably, neutral and nonaligned nations were instrumental in inscribing scientific and technological equity and a constitutional linkage between nuclear nonproliferation and arms control institutionalized through the UN and the NPT Review Conferences. In this, they were architects as well as prisoners of their device. While ensuing events have substantiated the benefits and perversities of the NPT regime, they made their bet on nuclear nonproliferation with open eyes. When neutral and nonaligned supporters—and even some opponents—acquiesced to the NPT’s opening for signature, the die had not yet been cast on the international order. Even today, as shown by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons’ entry into force, the neutral and nonaligned caucus retains the power to promote the NPT’s original intents—nonproliferation, disarmament, and development—not just as discrete functions, but under the banner of the United Nations and in furtherance of world peace under law.

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5 Ireland

Frank Aiken's Early Steps to Contain Nuclear Proliferation

Mervyn O'Driscoll

Introduction

The Irish minister for external affairs Frank Aiken's crusade for a nuclear non-proliferation resolution (1958 and 1961) was a component of his wider policy of addressing critical international problems, but it was also an assertion of Ireland's role as a middle power. Military neutrality enabled Ireland to act entrepreneurially to propose solutions to global problems, such as horizontal proliferation, and adopt a constructive posture. This chapter explores the general rationale and techniques adopted by Frank Aiken.

Ireland was a late arrival to the UN (1955) owing to the Soviet Union's embargo on Western-leaning states. But on gaining entrance to the body, Aiken was intent on consolidating on Ireland's previous internationalism at the League of Nations, as expounded by Aiken's mentor, the elder statesman, Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera. He built on Irish military neutrality (non-membership of military alliances), which was first declared in 1939. After the Second World War, neutrality accreted a new instrumentality. It was possible to project a constructive image of Ireland as an independent neutral dedicated to improving the global commons. In this way, it could augment Ireland's profile and influence, but this stance was contingent upon the government and minister for external affairs in office. This technique came to a climax under Aiken at the UN after 1957. He embraced positive neutrality to a great extent and recognized the UN's utility. Under his leadership neutrality became firmly associated with the message of Ireland, the independent broker building bridges, easing bipolar tensions, and appealing to the intensifying Afro-Asian voice (after the Bandung Conference of 1955). Aiken leveraged neutrality as a diplomatic and mediating asset at the UN.

Most international scholarship delivers a rather limited account of the origins of the idea for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). It notes the significance of Ireland's formative role at the UN from 1958–61 in distinguishing the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons as an international problem demanding attention and proposing the case for an international treaty between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. However, the scholarship generally lacks an understanding of Aiken's motivations, Irish

interests, and contexts and is usually heavily informed by UN perspectives or more US-centered accounts.¹

The chapter is critical of claims that Ireland was an insincere opportunist seeking exposure at the UN in the late 1950s for national advantage or profile.² This is an understandable perspective. There was an ancillary benefit to Ireland adopting a high-profile global role. But, as this chapter shows, Aiken was an adherent of what Paul Kennedy called the “the parliament of man” image of the UN—viewing it as the legitimate forum to advance solutions to global problems.³ A brand of Aiken-de Valera Fianna Fáil neutral internationalism prevailed over many Western-inclined voices and predispositions in Irish politics and society. What is notable is Aiken’s commitment and unquenchable perseverance in advancing nonproliferation. This is a part of his wider commitment to the notion of the United Nations as the one global organ possessing the authority to address common problems.

Aiken was informed by the Swedish ‘middle power’ paradigm and inspired by the rhetoric of the Swedish secretary-general of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld. Ireland took advantage of the UN’s widening membership during the age of decolonization. The indefatigable Aiken was the primary architect of Ireland’s advocacy of nonproliferation and a norm entrepreneur. Labeling him the ‘father of the NPT’ is appropriate, given his steadfast resolve to place nonproliferation on the international agenda. It was conjoined with Aiken’s regional disarmament proposals and ideas of developing ‘areas of law’ to manage the Cold War regulating issues of common interest and concern. His reading of Cold War developments convinced him that the proliferation tipping point was near, after which Pandora’s Box would be wide open with inestimable consequences. It was imperative to act, and tenacity was essential.

The chapter draws on published UN records to supplement Irish archives. Unlike previous accounts, it benefits from US State Department records compiled by William Burr for the National Security Archives.⁴ The latter fill in America’s role in setting the attitude of the Western-oriented or -associated states and, in particular, those of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), toward Aiken’s nonproliferation campaign. The account delineates how the US-NATO nexus was axiomatic to the resolution’s success: Afro-Asian support and the emergent nonaligned sentiment were insufficient. The small corpus of Irish literature which details Aiken’s nonproliferation travails underplays the importance of Aiken navigating the NATO nuclear sharing discussions after 1958 and his will to find common ground with the United States.⁵ The reason for this lacuna in Irish-based research is its dependence on Irish archives. That research was produced in the 1990s after the Irish archives first became available. For Aiken, America was the hinge on which sealing the nuclear weapons cupboard and securing near complete UN backing for nonproliferation relied, as he appeared to understand that the Soviet Union was instinctively antiproliferation, and the Afro-Asians were supportive. He contended that both superpowers’ self-interest lay in minimizing proliferation.

A sub-theme in the analysis is the previously unacknowledged or underappreciated British dimension. A deep reading of the Irish archives reveals Britain's background role in assisting Ireland to transcend US and/or NATO objections to the Irish resolutions at key moments. First, however, the chapter attends to the knotty nature of Ireland's foreign policy after 1922, with a particular emphasis on post-1939 Irish neutrality.

The Origins and Development of Irish Neutrality

Ireland confounded the bipolar calculations of its Euro-Atlantic neighbors and the Eastern bloc in the postwar world. That reflected its formation, political history, and national culture. Irish postwar policy was influenced by a blend of military neutrality, recent independence (1922), democratic convictions, and religiosity (Catholicism). These were decisive influences on Aiken after 1957 and merit explanation.

First, neutrality was of recent vintage and emerged in response to the outbreak of World War Two.⁶ A discernible aspiration to neutrality existed in Irish nationalism historically, but it was not practicable to implement it upon the attainment of Irish independence in 1922, as the British retained control of three strategic ports in Irish territory until 1938. Its immediate origins also lie in Irish disenchantment with the impotence of the interwar collective security of the League of Nations, the partition of the island (the rationale for not allying with Britain or joining NATO), involuntary membership of the British Commonwealth (until it formally left in 1949), and Irish defenselessness. A domestic consensus emerged as the international situation deteriorated in the late 1930s. Wartime neutrality was termed the 'Emergency' (a national emergency 'in a time of war'). Neutrality's architect was Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera, who held the external affairs portfolio from 1932 to 1948. He was stoutly supported by Aiken, with whom he forged close links during the national revolution (1919–22) and Civil War (1922–23). Aiken was the minister for defense from March 1932, and de Valera appointed him minister for the coordination of defensive measures when the war broke out. Aiken implemented strict censorship to prevent partiality toward either of the belligerents. The Irish media were prevented from expressing opinions about the justness of the Allied or Axis causes. One critic spoke of censorship as a 'Frank-aikenstein monster.'⁷ The state was relatively insulated from direct involvement in the war, excluding those 100,000s who emigrated and worked in the British war economy or those enlisted in the British armed forces.

Domestically, all democratic parties supported neutrality, despite the vocal opposition of the deputy leader of Fine Gael (the main opposition party), James Dillon. He resigned his position in 1942 on facing the threat of expulsion from the party for his pro-Allied, anti-neutrality line. The national consensus was remarkable, considering the polarized party system produced by the Civil War (1922–23). Fianna Fáil was the progeny of the defeated anti-Treaty side in the Civil War and was led by the elder statesman de Valera until 1959.

It nearly, but not quite, monopolized government after 1932. It celebrated a more republican character than Fine Gael, the faction of the revolutionary movement that won the Civil War but lost power in the 1932 general election. An overt republicanization of society then commenced under de Valera.⁸

Instinctive survivalism underlays the declaration of wartime neutrality, and neutrality's success generated national cohesion for the first time since the Civil War. When the war tilted against the Axis (1942/43), the republican-ideological differentiation of Ireland from Britain became central. This was partially, but not wholly, a response to the Anglo-American press' assailing of neutrality's legitimacy and scolding of de Valera for betraying fellow democracies. The propaganda war pitted the allies, depicted as fighting a just war, against de Valera's neutrality, as a defender of national and positive virtues.⁹ Aiken was probably more rigid in his defense of neutrality than de Valera, as he held a 'deep-rooted' Anglophobia, according to the eminent Irish historian Ronan Fanning.¹⁰

Regardless, neutrality under de Valera became identified with independence and self-determination. Swathes of the public and the political elite construed World War Two as the latest war among self-interested Great Powers, rather than a war for democracy and liberty against fascism and Nazism, pointing to the incongruity of the Anglo-American alliance with the totalitarian Soviet Union.¹¹ Communism was an anathema to Irish Catholics. Irish republicans critiqued Britain's democratic virtues, viewing it as an imperial power frustrating the goal of a one-island Irish republic. De Valera refused to follow the example of other neutrals, particularly in Latin America, who joined the allied bandwagon in 1944 and 1945. That placed Ireland solidly in Sweden and Switzerland's camp. That may have granted Sweden an enhanced function to play in defining Ireland's international posture, at least from Aiken's perspective, after Ireland joined the UN. After all, Sweden played a prominent and leading role in the organization in the late 1950s and 1960s.

It was not automatic that Ireland would retain neutrality in the longer term, although nationalist antipathy to involvement in a military alliance involving Britain was notable. Despite neutrality during World War Two, Irish benevolence to British and American security interests was notable.¹² The maintenance of neutrality during the war depended on some conciliation of Allied interests that was covert and plausibly deniable. It maintained a close and covert intelligence relationship with Britain's MI5 after 1945 and set up a regular liaison with the CIA after 1954, exchanging information about subversives, counterespionage, and communists.¹³ When developing Shannon Airport as a transatlantic hub on the Western seaboard, it partially impeded the access of Eastern bloc carriers after 1945.¹⁴ Dublin was ardently anti-communist and fearful about the advances of international communism.¹⁵ It was ideologically anti-Communist. Not surprisingly, Ireland applied for UN membership in 1946, encouraged by the United States and Britain. But it encountered a Soviet veto citing Ireland's wartime neutrality and claiming it was pro-German in the late war. For nine years, America and the Soviet Union engaged in a

standoff, blocking membership to one another's perceived friends. To all intents and purposes, Ireland was regarded as an informal member of the Western bloc, at least ideologically.

Notwithstanding this, a watershed was passed in 1949 that had far-reaching consequences. America invited Ireland to join NATO in 1949, appreciating its instinctive anti-Communist and Western sympathies. But Ireland rejected the offer for nationalist reasons. The inexperienced pro-American and anti-communist minister for external affairs, Seán MacBride, miscalculated. A committed Irish republican, he supposed he could secure American assistance to convince Britain to acquiesce to the island of Ireland's unification in return for NATO membership. This was inconceivable for Washington. Close Anglo-American relations remained globally essential to American interests.¹⁶ The problem for Irish politicians after MacBride's misstep was that no Irish government was prepared to join NATO if unification was not advanced either symbolically or in reality, as it would encounter accusations of national betrayal.

With the elapse of time, Irish postwar military neutrality became embedded in the Irish mind and body politic. It was explicable as an organic extension of the wartime stance. MacBride explored a bilateral defense pact with the United States after 1949, and Aiken also did so in 1952. They argued that Ireland's division was the sole reason for not joining NATO. The United States rejected these feelers, as it was committed to regional defense pacts (NATO).¹⁷ The longer Ireland remained outside the Western mainstream, the greater the opportunity for the normalization of neutralist thinking in peacetime. Neutrality was validated in the popular mind as enabling the nation to survive World War Two intact. It fueled popular complacency that Ireland could repeat the maneuver in a future war, as Ireland was not strategically vital in the Cold War. According to one commentator, what was novel about neutrality was not that it was based on realpolitik during wartime but "the illusions which afterwards grew up about the moral basis of Irish foreign and defence policy."¹⁸

In any case, the costs of joining an alliance became unaffordable during the 1950s. Ireland's material priorities were heavily domestic and socio-economic, while its international symbolic priorities were irredentist. An unprecedented economic recession afflicted the country during the 1950s. Mass unemployment, rural depopulation, and emigration characterized the period. Ireland's persistence with economic protectionism and its fixation with national sovereignty restricted its openness to international economic cooperation during this dark decade. Its population declined by 400,000 falling to 2.8 million in 1961, its lowest level for a century. There was no popular demand for Ireland to join NATO.

The entry to the UN was achieved belatedly in December 1955 when the Soviets dropped their decade-long veto.¹⁹ American (and British) support was instrumental in surmounting the Soviet boycott (1946 to 1955). Washington's barter deal with Moscow secured Irish UN membership, in which an equal number of Western and Eastern oriented states were admitted on December 16, 1955. Initially, a Fine Gael-led coalition government directed

Ireland's fortunes in the UN; the historical consensus is that it adopted a pro-Western orientation that disappointed uncommitted states outside the Cold War bloc system, in particular the growing number of Afro-Asian states, and led the authoritative history to conclude it was "an ally of the West."²⁰ That changed after Fianna Fáil returned to power in March 1957, with de Valera as taoiseach again and Aiken as minister for external affairs.

Aiken's General Approach

Aiken had an "almost symbiotic relationship with Mr. de Valera."³⁰ The pre-eminence Aiken attached to the UN as an organ of world opinion was unequivocal. His willingness to stay in New York for many weeks at each session during his long tenure as minister for external affairs (1957 to 1968) was remarkable. From the outset, Aiken, intended to propose "some quite concrete proposals of a rather far-reaching character," securing general outline approval from the government for his signature initiatives.²¹ The minister quickly informed Ireland's permanent representative to the UN (PRUN), Frederick Boland, that he was "strongly critical" of steering close to reflexive anti-Soviet and anti-Communist American and Western opinion.²² UN membership imposed a responsibility "to take up positions on many critical international situations, some of which might previously have appeared of only rather remote or academic interest as far as Ireland was concerned."²³

Aiken found a willing collaborator in Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, who led the recently created UN section in Iveagh House, Dublin—the Department of External Affairs (DEA) headquarters.²⁴ O'Brien and young Department members aspired to emulate neutral Sweden's independent line—something Thomas Jonter explains in this volume.²⁵ Aiken resolved to pursue a line supportive of the 'moral authority' of the UN and Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld.²⁶ Tensions existed between the more Western-inclined Frederick Boland and Éamon Kennedy, the counselor of Ireland's UN Delegation, on one side, and Conor Cruise O'Brien and younger Irish diplomats on the other. The energetic Aiken guaranteed that the independent line prevailed, resulting in a flurry of activity that is memorialized as Ireland's 'golden age' at the UN.²⁷

Aiken drew inspiration from Ireland's good citizen posture in the League of Nations. He was well-versed in de Valera's performance there after 1932 when the country was a high-profile supporter of international society, collective security, disarmament, human rights, and the rule of law. After 1932, de Valera, previously on record as an outspoken advocate of the League Covenant, won universal respect for a constructive and engaged approach.²⁸ Ireland's League activism and de Valera's unfulfilled vision had a formative impact on Aiken. Norman McQueen astutely identifies Aiken's championing the discussion of Chinese representation at the UN from 1957 as connected to de Valera's 'small nation idea' in the League. The nexus between de Valera's 'heyday' at the League (1932–35) and Aiken's zenith at the UN (1957–61) is also recognized in the

work of Skelly.²⁹ And Aiken could cite de Valera's precedent of advocating the Soviet Union's admission to the League in 1934 when he raised the China representation problem in 1957.³⁰ Aiken's annual campaigning for a UN discussion on Beijing's membership epitomized his mien. He did so in the face of American hostility, as such a discussion endangered Taipei's occupation of China's permanent seat on the Security Council. Aiken had already proven his mettle in his defense of wartime neutrality against Washington's criticisms. Likewise, he withstood the vitriol from Ireland's instinctively anti-Communist society in the same way he had the domestic criticism of his draconian censorship during 'the Emergency.' In the late 1950s, Aiken and some key officers in the department of external affairs agreed that Ireland, in rejoining the international community after its enforced absence, would make a positive contribution.

Aiken and the Birth of Nonproliferation

Aiken's nonproliferation proposal originated as part of a package of concrete measures to build respect for "a world rule of law" "in the shadow of the atom bomb" in conformity with the spirit of internationalism underlying de Valera's example in the 1930s.³¹ Aiken's priority in 1957 was to avoid the escalation of tensions into a superpower conflict in Central Europe and the Middle East. In his maiden address at the UNGA (September 1957), he recommended mutual phased troop withdrawals in Central Europe and the Middle East to "lay the political foundations of peace." He urged the elimination of regions of tension, creating 'safety zones' until general and complete disarmament was attainable.³²

Drawing back forces by a few hundred miles East and West of the Iron Curtain would take the Soviet Union out of six satellite states and leave the United States in Wales, England, much of France, and much of Italy.³³ He informed the US ambassador that any phased mutual withdrawal (even 100 miles) would mitigate the dangers of proximity. He expressed concern at forces in Central Europe possessing short-range tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons.³⁴ The scheme was founded on his apprehension that nuclear deterrence could fail with catastrophic consequences in this pressurized Cold War cockpit. Aiken fretted that ballistic missiles annihilated space, eliminating time for diplomacy. The Irishman termed his Central European scheme a 'radical' disarmament approach,³⁵ and it dismayed NATO and West Germany. Comparisons with Poland's Rapacki Plan fueled automatic Western disapproval. The episode displayed Aiken's willingness to incur Western censure. But he gauged there was no near-term prospect for general disarmament, and immediate remedial actions were urgently required.

On this premise, he framed an incremental Irish approach to nuclear disarmament and non-dissemination, contradicting Boland's advice to Aiken's predecessor not to intervene in general disarmament debates owing to the complexity of the issues and the high degree of contention.³⁶ The deterioration in the atmosphere in late 1957 demanded action in Aiken's mind. With East-West disarmament negotiations deadlocked, the launch of Sputnik in

October 1957 amplified East-West tensions to a fever pitch. Sputnik triggered a crisis of NATO confidence and nourished doubts about Washington's willingness to defend Western Europe. Extended deterrence was mistrusted.³⁷

Dag Hammarskjöld encouraged constructive proposals to cultivate consensus and progress,³⁸ and Aiken was of a like mind. His line was that

in international affairs at times of terrible tension like the present with the world on the brink of nuclear war. Ireland's role is that of the peacemaker. She should use her influence to assuage acerbities to moderate opinions, and ease tension. Her representatives could do this by studying both sides of particular problems under discussion in the United Nations and seeking to place detached, objective and realistic views before the Assembly.³⁹

Although records have not revealed the precise genesis of Ireland's non-dissemination proposal, it was Aiken's personal initiative immediately preceding the 13th session of the UNGA. One clue is a tantalizing mention by Conor Cremin, the secretary-general of the DEA, on September 5, 1958—Aiken was “working very hard, and been for some days, on his principal speech at the Assembly” whose “main theme is likely to be a proposal that the nuclear club should not be further extended and that countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake not to supply them to other countries.”⁴⁰

Aiken's ruminations were displayed in his UNGA address on September 19, 1958. He placed his observations on the disarmament gridlock center stage and argued that passivity and fatalism were not options. Isolation and self-defense were unattainable in the nuclear age. This underlay his belief that all states, including small, non-nuclear, and neutral states, had a grave stake in nuclear security. Arguing that nuclear weapons made a world order based on the rule of law an imperative, the challenge was “to preserve a *Pax Atomica* while we build a *Pax Mundi*.”⁴¹

This line of thinking was probably founded on Aiken recognizing that Irish neutrality was no guarantee of survival in the next war. Ireland, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, had perhaps smugly reverted to its pre-war practice of neglecting investment in its defense with military forces not exceeding 10,000 poorly equipped regulars. That might be described as a token defense or even a gendarmerie. It had worked before, and so had neutrality. Irish defense policy relied on good neighborly defense relations with Britain and NATO. National defense expenditure was a low political priority. Ireland occupied a benign geopolitical position, at least compared to its Western European neighbors. It had an understanding with Britain to not allow itself to be a base of attack. Dublin had proven this to London during the Second World War.⁴² In that sense, it is correct that Irish governments had their cake and ate it, avoiding joining NATO, standing on moral principles, and not investing in the credible defense of neutrality.⁴³

But by the mid-1950s, global, and particularly European security, space evolved in an ominous direction. Dwight Eisenhower nuclearized NATO,

reducing conventional expenditure (the New Look policy), and was under pressure to respond to Nikita Khrushchev's bellicosity from 1956 onwards. The exponential growth in destructive power (signified by the shift into the H-Bomb age), the move to replace bombers with missiles, and an erratic and bellicose Khrushchev engaging in periodic nuclear missile diplomacy exploded any Irish misconceptions that neutrality offered security. After a decade of Irish complacency and self-absorption, it could no longer ignore the global nuclear age.

And Aiken had grave misgivings about the prospects for general and complete disarmament.⁴⁴ His skepticism was informed by the League's disarmament failures, which he referenced in UNGA speeches, but it was also a response to the unproductive disarmament discussions since 1946. In a world where general disarmament was unattainable in the near-term, Aiken reasoned that any expansion of the nuclear club added to the knotty strategic calculus and compounded the fragility of the atomic peace. He informed the UNGA that it was in all states' 'urgent' mutual interest to address the danger of nuclear use. The prerogative was to contain the club's membership to the United States, USSR, United Kingdom, and France. He contended the "gravest threat to stable peace" during the "nuclear stalemate between the major Powers, is the contest between them for the adherence and control of the non-attached and the detachable States."⁴⁵

Moreover, "the antagonisms between small Powers ... are so bitter that one side or the other might not hesitate to use such weapons." He sketched a global agreement based on 'mutual consent' and a reciprocal pledge between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. Aiken viewed this limited measure as "one important element" in an incremental approach to nuclear abolition. To Aiken, restriction complemented his disengagement schemes for Central Europe and the Middle East. It accorded with his insistence in all UN sessions from 1957 into the early 1950s to expand what he termed "areas of law" for common benefit in a shared global space. Aiken's intuition was that atomic club restriction enclosed proliferation and made the search for a solution more manageable, while averting the strategic complications of uninhibited nuclear spread.⁴⁶

Following positive feedback, an encouraged Aiken developed a preliminary draft,⁴⁷ supplying it to the Americans on October 8. It called on nuclear states to refrain from providing nuclear weapons or technical assistance to non-nuclear states that would reciprocate by renouncing nuclear weapons. The UN secretary-general would invite members to state their intentions regarding a nonproliferation convention drafted by an ad hoc committee by March 1, 1959.⁴⁸

US Opposition, the Retreat and Post-Mortems

Henry Cabot Lodge, the US ambassador to the UN, was 'initially receptive' but then declared that it was 'unacceptable' after consultations with the State Department,⁴⁹ and the British followed the United States' 'inflexible attitude.'⁵⁰ Some NATO and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) delegations

privately insinuated agreement with Aiken's aims, but would not vote for or co-sponsor a resolution opposed by America.⁵¹ America's objections were informed heavily by its negotiations with its NATO allies to store nuclear weapons on their territories. These were designed to implement a NATO decision in December 1957 and reassure NATO allies after Sputnik. Although US law stipulated that Washington retained control and ownership of nuclear warheads, John Foster Dulles anticipated public criticism, claiming that atomic stockpiles in NATO states amounted to spreading nuclear weapons.⁵² Dulles contended that the United States shared Aiken's 'basic objectives' and opposed the 'uncontrolled' spread of nuclear weapons,⁵³ but submitted that the 'context' was not ripe for Aiken's resolution.⁵⁴ Cabot Lodge fretted that Aiken's concept possessed 'great appeal.' He recognized that Aiken had "got hold of a proposition that is a real bell ringer in international politics."⁵⁵ Fortunately for the Americans, the disappointed Aiken recognized the political realities,⁵⁶ even though he was not informed that nuclear sharing was at the root of the American objections.

Recognizing Western antipathy, Aiken improvised. He called for a separate roll call on paragraph 2 of the resolution at the UN First Committee on October 31. The paragraph was a straightforward statement recognizing that increased numbers of nuclear states aggravated tensions and militated against general disarmament. The outcome was a vote of 37 to none in favor with 44 abstentions, leading Aiken to state satisfaction at the lack of opposing votes. Fortified, he withdrew the resolution and noted he was not insistent on a particular method to address proliferation. He hoped that a reconstituted UN Disarmament Commission might address the matter.⁵⁷

The Irish dissected the roll call vote and of the four European countries who voted in favor (Sweden, Finland, Iceland, and Ireland), one was Sweden. Stockholm had the potential to manufacture nuclear weapons, however, the Swedes confirmed their support of the Irish Resolution before the vote. The Soviet bloc's vote in favor was unexpected. The DEA encountered one explanation: Aiken's sudden roll call wrongfooted that bloc, which had no time to develop a common position. In Irish estimations, the fact that Poland voted first was to Ireland's advantage since it was "more favorably disposed" than any of the other Communist countries to Ireland "for historical and religious reasons." Therefore, the Irish calculated that the remainder of the 'uncertain' Soviet bloc followed the Polish example in an effective free vote.⁵⁸

Irish-Polish accord had arisen around the necessity for Central European disarmament in 1957, as espoused in Warsaw's 1957 Rapacki Plan and Aiken's disengagement proposal. In late 1957, Poland informally told Irish sources that Ireland's 'non-bloc policy' was "very welcome to Poland." A Polish diplomat observed that Ireland was "in an enviable position, to be able to take a straight line at the UN, and it is the desire of Poland to be in the same position, a desire not likely to be realized with the crowding-in of her heavy neighbors."⁵⁹

The DEA was heartened that six Latin American countries (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Haiti, and Venezuela) voted in favor too. Latin American countries typically followed the lead of the United States. Likewise, support was given

by the entire Afro-Asian bloc, except for a few closely aligned to the West (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Philippines, and Japan).⁶⁰ This chimed with DEA analyses, particularly on the part of O'Brien and other progressives, that Ireland could rely on the support of the growing Afro-Asian bloc and some Latin Americans. Ireland's profile as an independent that was anti-Communist, Catholic, anti-colonialist, and supportive of national self-determination held some appeal.⁶¹

It was also striking that Australia intervened in the First Committee to justify its abstention because it did not favor the creation of another ad hoc committee (in this case to deal with the spread of nuclear weapons) but recognized that Aiken performed a significant service in raising the issue. That may hint at Ireland's diasporic and ex-Commonwealth links with more progressive Dominions such as Australia (and later Canada). A NATO member, Norway, echoed Australia's explanation.⁶²

Aiken next contemplated putting down a motion on nuclear restriction if the 82-Disarmament Commission was reconvened. Hammarskjöld and the Indian representative tentatively suggested Ireland would make an excellent chair for the Disarmament Commission. However, since Dublin had not exchanged diplomats with the USSR,⁶³ Moscow objected.

In sum, though, Aiken had salvaged a moral victory. The 13th UN session revealed that nonproliferation had international allure. It might be feasible to build a coalition. Ireland's profile as an anti-imperialist, neutral, European democracy and former British Dominion resonated with diverse constituencies. Some NATO countries were reluctant to incur the displeasure of international opinion favoring nonproliferation. This reflected intensifying concerns about the dangers of the arms race and nuclear testing. The international context was favorable.

Opportunities, 1958–59

East-West rapprochement commenced when Khrushchev talked about 'peaceful coexistence,' and British prime minister Harold Macmillan promoted East-West mediation. A voluntary test moratorium involving America, the Soviet Union, and Britain began in November 1958. Efforts to resolve Berlin's status led to a conference of the foreign ministers of the four powers from May to August 1959 in Geneva. The thaw enabled the four foreign ministers to found a Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee (TNDC) to grant the Eastern bloc parity with the West in line with Soviet wishes.⁶⁴

Dublin, therefore, engaged in a broad campaign proselytizing antipathetic capitals.⁶⁵ The intensifying Ban the Bomb movement in Britain was encouraging.⁶⁶ In February 1959, Aiken instructed O'Brien to contact British newspapers to plug nonproliferation and military disengagement in Central Europe.⁶⁷ Links were consolidated with the *Manchester Guardian* leading to a 'well-informed' article on May 7, 1959, extolling the virtues of Aiken's restriction proposal.⁶⁸ The British Labor Party's discussions on unilaterally renouncing the bomb (the 'non-nuclear club idea') were auspicious,⁶⁹ and connections were made in Washington with George Kennan who praised Aiken's 'valiant effort.'⁷⁰

The British developments (media interest, Labor Party discussions, the rise of the CND) encouraged Aiken to inscribe nonproliferation on the UNGA agenda in June.⁷¹ This gave Ireland ample time to canvas for a draft resolution. Early responses from the Eastern bloc were favorable. While Canada, Norway, and Australia expressed sympathy and were willing to offer a “degree of limited and discreet help,” they remained reticent. The Irish task was to frame a ‘mild resolution’ to allow concerned Western allies to vote for it or abstain.⁷² Aiken wanted to secure American support.⁷³

Overcoming the Main Objections

US Objections

However, Irish probes revealed little substantive change in Western attitudes despite expressions of sympathy.⁷⁴ At this point, the Irish registered the obstacle was the nuclear sharing agreements the US was negotiating with selected NATO allies (West Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Turkey, Canada, and Greece) in 1958 and 1959. These were brought to Irish attention by Senator Hubert Humphrey, chair of the Sub-Committee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. For the senator, the US executive’s bilateral agreements with selected NATO countries jeopardized disarmament.⁷⁵ The bilaterals were components of Eisenhower’s efforts to reassure allies about the US nuclear umbrella. The administration planned to allow the armed forces of NATO states to train for the future use of American nuclear weapons but the weapons would nominally remain under American control and under NATO’s rubric. This was a bid to undercut demand for independent nuclear deterrents. The administration was “walking on a tight-rope.”⁷⁶ Unless both houses of Congress voted to disapprove of the agreements 60 days after they were filed, they would come into effect.⁷⁷ Humphrey’s high profile, but ultimately futile, campaign to veto the bilaterals captured headlines in July 1959.

Aiken instinctively expressed concern to the American Ambassador about the ‘potential adverse effects’ on non-dissemination efforts.⁷⁸ However, he recalibrated after his officials advised against an “unbalanced & indeed inaccurate” reading of the deals. Regardless, Aiken was advised “a ‘strong’ denunciation on our part could lead only a rebuff & a ‘mind your own business.’”⁷⁹ Conversations with Canada revealed that access to NATO nuclear weapons on Canada’s territory was non-negotiable.⁸⁰ If the United States failed to reach agreements with skittish NATO states, they might follow Gaullist France to develop national deterrents. Dublin also understood Stockholm would not support action against NATO nuclear sharing.⁸¹ Aiken changed tack and offered assurances that non-dissemination would not jeopardize the United States’ right to deploy nuclear weapons in Allied territory if the host agreed not to manufacture nuclear weapons.⁸²

Aiken also tackled US concerns about inspection by revising the draft resolution to request the TNDC consider dissemination, including monitoring.⁸³

By September 24, Christian Herter ruefully concluded it was impossible to oppose Ireland. He preferred no resolution, but it was “essentially [a] referral resolution” to the TNDC, so voting for it “would not involve [a] commitment on substance.”⁸⁴ Aiken was ‘greatly pleased’ when Lodge finally informed him on October 23 that the United States would support the draft.⁸⁵ The United States estimated there was no choice but to accept the resolution, and it was preferable to alternatives that “might attempt to put UNGA squarely on record against any transfer or spread of weapons.”⁸⁶ Britain followed the United States, as it fit Harold Macmillan’s efforts to reduce tensions. The rest of NATO fell into line.

French Objections

However, the French president, Charles de Gaulle, presented a dilemma. France held a special sentimental position in Irish nationalist memory. In a material sense, France was also a core member of the European Economic Community (EEC; founded in 1957). The EEC was crucial to Ireland’s trade relations as it moved toward export-led economic recovery under the new taoiseach, Seán Lemass. De Gaulle had returned to power in 1958 to restore French ‘grandeur,’ and a national deterrent was central to this. Aiken “assumed all along” that it was “unrealistic” to prevent France’s acquisition of atomic weapons.⁸⁷ He informed the French and other delegations during the 13th session (1958) that there was no intention to exclude France from the club.⁸⁸ Aiken name-checked France as a member of the nuclear club in his milestone speech to the UNGA on September 19, 1958,⁸⁹ but most governments overlooked this, dictating reinforcement of the Irish message in 1959 to defuse French doubts.⁹⁰ Aiken was levelheaded, recognizing the absence of French public opinion in favor of restricting nuclear tests and nonproliferation.⁹¹ The Irish underscored to the Quai d’Orsay, in July 1959, that nuclear restriction would not apply to France.⁹² The Irish draft resolution in 1959 included France as a nuclear club member in anticipation of French tests in Reggane,⁹³ but France still reserved its attitude until the final vote in the UN.

Neutral and the Nonaligned Objections

The essential problem was that the first French test was scheduled for early 1960, and the buildup to it was a spoiler for Ireland’s non-dissemination proposal in the 14th session in late 1959. An Afro-Asian campaign against the Sahara tests gained momentum, placing Ireland in the horns of a dilemma. Ireland did not wish to alienate the French or the Afro-Asians. The Irish solution was that for health reasons it would have preferred no tests, but it qualified this to state that it did not question the French right to test, acknowledging the French were on the cusp of achieving nuclear status. Instead, Aiken appealed to France for restraint, to take all necessary health precautions, not to test in the atmosphere, and to conduct tests underground. This fragile balance

allowed Ireland to support the Moroccan-led, 22-power Afro-Asian resolution in the First Committee calling for France to protect public health.⁹⁴

The Irish also had to monitor Sweden's intentions. Not only was Sweden a policy entrepreneur in the field of constructive middle power politics, but it was a nuclear threshold state that potentially possessed the means to manufacture atomic weapons.⁹⁵ Irish estimates were that Sweden occupied a "very special position," and they noted how elements of Swedish opinion were advocating crossing the Rubicon.⁹⁶ However, the Irish were buoyed when in mid-November 1959 the government party's (Social Democrats) Atomic Weapon Committee postponed a decision.⁹⁷ As Thomas Jonter has concluded, there was no technological urgency about a Swedish decision to acquire nuclear weapons until 1961 when plutonium became available.⁹⁸

At long last, Ireland's diligence was rewarded. The UN First Committee adopted the Irish resolution (by 66 votes to nil with 13 abstentions) on 16 November. The latter group consisted of the Eastern bloc (excluding Yugoslavia), France, Spain, Peru, and Nationalist China, concerned about NATO nuclear sharing.⁹⁹ Aiken's posture at the plenary on 20 November was that the resolution was a limited step. Even if a global non-dissemination deal failed to deliver or was breached, the nuclear powers and the world had nothing to lose and much to gain from seeking to stabilize the nuclear order. Support for the resolution increased to 68 in the plenary vote, so the landmark Resolution 1380 passed.¹⁰⁰

Setbacks and Renewed Hopes, 1960

Next, Irish attention turned to the TNDC in the expectation that it would consider the question in line with the desire of Resolution 1380 (XIV). The TNDC convened on March 15, 1960. Unproductive discussions of the Eastern and Western plans for general and complete disarmament dominated before the TNDC went into recess and the Four Power Summit in Paris commenced in May.¹⁰¹ The ignominious collapse of the East-West summit on foot of the shooting down of Gary Powers U-2 photographic reconnaissance plane scuppered the fleeting Cold War thaw. The TNDC collapsed. In the estimation of Dag Hammarskjöld, any possibility of progress on disarmament and a test ban was put on hold until after the US presidential elections and the settling in of a new US administration.¹⁰² Khrushchev was in a combative mood, taking advantage of American embarrassment over the U-2 incident and the final lame-duck months of the Eisenhower administration.

Regardless, the Irish were not discouraged. In July, Boland counseled for a 'major intervention' as the developments underscored the advantages of partial disarmament and confidence-building proposals, until 'the tremendous obstacles' blocking general and complete disarmament were overcome.¹⁰³ Then, on September 20, 1960, Boland was elected president of the UNGA's 15th session.¹⁰⁴ The United States, most West European countries, and NATO

backed him, as did many Latin American and moderate Afro-Asian states.¹⁰⁵ This wide level of support was an endorsement of Ireland's acceptability as a moderate uncommitted state. Therefore, in September 1960, the DEA put forward a draft resolution that went "considerably further" than the limited 1959's Resolution 1380. It was time "to register progress" in the campaign to negotiate a nonproliferation agreement. To facilitate this, nuclear powers should voluntarily pledge not to hand over control of nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear powers to not acquire them.¹⁰⁶

The outlook was positive when the British ambassador, Sir Ian MacLennan, informed Cremin on September 13 that London had "become rather more favourable." MacLennan claimed this arose from estimations "it might help Mr Khrushchev in his dealings with Mao Tse-Tung if, in replying to any request from the latter to give China the bomb, he (Mr. Khrushchev) could allege an international undertaking not to do so."¹⁰⁷

Aiken's address to the UNGA on October 6, 1960, underlined that non-proliferation was an indispensable element of his incrementalism. Invoking the memory of the paralysis of the League in the mid-1930s, he envisioned the UN had to surmount Cold War polemics. The UN's function was to restrain the forces of "anarchy and violence," but it could only achieve that gradually. To that end, 'smaller countries' had a responsibility to cooperate with the nuclear powers to prevent a superpower confrontation during the Congo Crisis (which erupted in July 1960) and to prevent 'indiscriminate destruction' and minimize 'further flash points.'¹⁰⁸ Speaking at the First Committee on 28 October 1960, Aiken's graduated approach was at the forefront. The task was to "live with the bomb" by negotiating a reciprocal restriction agreement between nuclear and non-nuclear states and creating disarmed regional zones. On these foundations, progress would follow.¹⁰⁹

By this point, the text of the Irish draft resolution was advanced. It lamented the TNDC's failure before it had time to consider proliferation in line with Resolution 1380 (XIV) and urged all governments to pursue a pact appealing for "a temporary and voluntary" pledge between nuclear and non-nuclear powers.¹¹⁰ Reinforced by British advice on the draft's language, and London's intercessions with Washington, on October 31, 1960, Ireland submitted the resolution for UN consideration.¹¹¹ To assist London's intermediation with the United States, the Irish amended the draft resolution again on November 1 to add nuance to the draft's request that nuclear powers refrain from transmitting nuclear information. To this end, they employed the word 'relinquish' instead of 'handing over' information or weapons. The British intimated they intended to vote for the resolution.¹¹² Simultaneously, the Americans informed the Irish UN delegation that they would not oppose it. Calculations were that the Soviets would abstain, but Poland might support the resolution.¹¹³ On foot of this, Japan, a firm American ally with a staunch anti-nuclear population, felt empowered to co-sponsor the resolution in mid-November.¹¹⁴ The Irish position gained three additional co-sponsors, Ghana, Mexico, and Morocco.

But almost as soon as the tantalizing prospect of NATO and US support materialized, on November 16, the mortified MacLennan informed Cremin, that contrary to earlier indications, opposition persisted among NATO partners, noting the United States “particularly had objections.” MacLennan expressed “deep personal regrets,” but Britain could not vote for the resolution after all; it would find itself “out on a limb.” It would abstain in line with the United States and NATO, although “the idea behind the resolution is good.”¹¹⁵

Irish probes of the US delegation in New York shed no light on the US *volte-face*. Irish speculation was that the United States wanted to “hold the threat of a nuclear-power West Germany against the Soviets.”¹¹⁶ Bohlen, the special assistant to the secretary of state and the acting assistant secretary for international organization affairs, informed the Irish embassy in Washington on December 14, 1960, that while the United States would not act contrary to the spirit of Aiken’s resolution, the Russians were not negotiating in good faith in talks on testing, so the administration could not commit to a new policy when a new administration was about to enter office. In addition, Bohlen pointed to a new State Department proposal, the NATO multilateral nuclear force (MLF). The aim was to reassure partners by creating a centralized NATO force to diminish demands for national deterrents. Bohlen talked about the ‘unification’ of all Western nuclear forces in NATO under SACEUR as “the greatest safeguard of all and it will remove the probability, almost the certainty, of Western Germany having to be admitted to the so-called Nuclear Club.” The State Department was nervous that Aiken’s resolution could thwart this.¹¹⁷ Secretary of State Herter and Under Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon disliked Ireland’s shift away from the simple deferral procedure of 1959.¹¹⁸ They prevailed over the US mission in New York, which favored support for the resolution noting a positive vote would position the United States “on [the] side of [the] angels” on an issue possessing “tremendously emotional overtones.”¹¹⁹

So, while the UN plenary passed the Irish-led Five Power resolution on December 20 with 68 votes to 0, the number of abstentions increased to 26 compared to the 1959 vote. That reflected that the resolution went further than the 1959 referral tactic.¹²⁰ The voting pattern had reversed, with the United States and many NATO members, in addition to the Philippines, South Africa, China, Australia, France, and many Latin American countries, abstaining. But the Soviet bloc now voted for the resolution. The vote consolidated the rising tide demanding nonproliferation after the ill-fated TNDC. Revelations about a possible Israeli nuclear weapons program involving French assistance added to international anxieties.¹²¹

Despite US efforts to pull rank and enforce a unanimous NATO abstentionist line, a handful of Western-aligned states voted in favor. In retrospect, this was a departure. The Eisenhower administration believed that Aiken was misdirected, although well-intentioned. Moreover, Ireland had a powerful sleeping partner, Britain, who could not declare publicly in favor of the resolution. This was evidence of submerged differences between Britain, the junior

partner in the Special Relationship, and the United States concerning nuclear matters and Cold War management under Macmillan.

Following the General Assembly's adoption of the resolution in 1960, Aiken planned for the Irish-led Five Powers to persuade other governments to make simultaneous voluntary and unilateral declarations to abide by the operative part of the resolution.¹²² But the co-sponsors' response to the Irish proposal was generally slow, reluctant, and tepid,¹²³ while Japan politely refused.¹²⁴ Unless the United States shifted course, unilateral declarations were a 'non-starter,' as Japan's reaction pointed to the response of the US bloc.¹²⁵

The Kennedy Administration and the Adoption of Resolution 1665

The arrival of John F. Kennedy (JFK) in January 1961 with a more 'hopeful' message in favor of relieving international tensions and expressions for progress on arms control augured well.¹²⁶ But the abortive intervention in the Bay of Pigs (April) followed by Khrushchev's savaging of Kennedy at the Vienna Summit (June), the building of the Berlin Wall (July), and the Soviet Union's announcement of the ending of its voluntary test moratorium (August) prevented steps forward.¹²⁷ Unperturbed, Aiken requested the item's inscription on the agenda of the 16th UNGA rather than suspending the matter of non-proliferation, estimating that the matter was too important.¹²⁸

The Irish retreated from the 1960 resolution's language in a key respect, neglecting British advice, with unintended effects. The 1961 draft invited nuclear powers "not to give" weapons to non-nuclear powers instead of "not relinquishing control." The change almost scuttled the effort, even though the United States was prepared to back the Irish resolution as it was.¹²⁹ By the early autumn, the Kennedy administration had defined its defense and alliance policies after months of reviews. It renovated the US attitude to nonproliferation. Gone was ambivalence toward the nuclearization of allies. Kennedy and his secretary of state, Dean Acheson, adopted an unmistakable nonproliferation philosophy. A reinforcement of centralized American control to prevent allies from effectively using American nuclear weapons, information, and technology emerged in 1961. The US presidency took the unprecedented step of establishing an arms control agency (in September 1961).¹³⁰ The import of this US makeover became apparent to the Irish by degrees in late 1961.

What it would mean was that the critical impediment to Aiken now was not the United States, it was its NATO allies.¹³¹ As the Berlin Crisis mounted, many Western Europeans reasserted their need to access NATO nuclear weapons under sharing arrangements. They fretted about abandonment by the United States and worried about the implications of the Irish proposal for the MLF concept that the Eisenhower administration had introduced. In simple terms, MLF was a projected multinational, integrated NATO nuclear force involving broad European participation. NATO as an organization would control the deterrent, and the decision to use it would be with NATO SACEUR as originally proposed in 1960. It could hedge against a US strategic

retreat from Europe and obviate demands for national deterrents. The Kennedy administration intimated that it was favorable to the MLF concept in 1961.¹³² But this was a feeble commitment for political rather than military reasons. (The aim of the conjuring trick was to erode proliferation by granting allies token access or symbolic involvement in a multinational nuclear force that no European state controlled independently).

NATO secretary-general, Dirk Stikker; Belgium; and the Netherlands contended that the Irish resolution was in 'basic contradiction' with US efforts to develop NATO as a multilateral nuclear power. In contrast, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the Department of State contended the resolution applied to national forces and not multinational entities such as NATO's MLF.¹³³ The problem was less about the Irish amending their resolution in any fundamental or important way. It was more about manufacturing consensus among NATO members on an American or British interpretation of it.¹³⁴

Washington was categorical: the resolution was "not inconsistent with [the] participation of NATO's non-nuclear nations in either present stockpile arrangements for any multilateral arrangements that might be envisaged."¹³⁵ Despite this, most of NATO would not support it without amendment.¹³⁶ The United States went along with a UK stratagem of proposing a limited amendment to the Irish to allay allies' fears, although many wanted a more extensive revision of the Irish resolution than the United Kingdom's minimal finessing.¹³⁷ The other NATO members 'reluctantly' accepted the UK amendment on October 25 as the solution, except for France and Portugal, who still saw it as perilously ambiguous.¹³⁸

There was no indication that Irish sources were aware of the large-scale internal NATO deliberations until the Anglo-American missions to the UN met with Seán Ronan on October 27 to secure the necessary revision to satisfy NATO.¹³⁹ The Canadians and Dutch made similar points to the British and Americans.¹⁴⁰ All four delegations attached 'considerable importance' to the unhelpful ambiguity of the word 'accept,' which would store up complications in the parliaments of NATO states.¹⁴¹

Aiken instructed that the resolution should instead read that non-nuclear states "undertake not to make or acquire possession of such weapons."¹⁴² This initially triggered 'concern' for Rusk, who surmised it would displease allies and US policy. Moreover, US nuclear law referred "to acquisition of control rather than possession."¹⁴³ Notwithstanding that Aiken and the Irish had played the game sufficiently well to make the resolution palatable so that when it circulated to the First Committee on November 17, it "commanded wide if not unanimous support."¹⁴⁴ To deflect France's intention to abstain, the Irish delegation adopted a 'procedural legerdemain' of proposing the resolution's adoption by acclamation at the General Assembly plenary, to which the French grudgingly agreed.¹⁴⁵ Resolution 1665 (XIV) was passed on December 4, 1961.

The entire episode in 1961 reveals that Dean Rusk's power as secretary of state was indispensable in supporting the Irish resolution throughout October 1961 against the dissenting views of most US allies, including France, West

Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. It illustrated a sea change in the Kennedy administration, as JFK was the first president to strongly underline the dangers of nuclear proliferation. But it was Rusk and the United States, supported by Britain, together with measured accommodation by Aiken that eventually surmounted the objections in several NATO capitals.

Aiken and the NPT Negotiations 1962–68

Aiken's prognosis remained after 1962: the international community had to identify and solve problems 'one by one', constructing 'areas of law' (functional or regional), and uphold the United Nations as a global institution as the guarantor of international order and peace. In this way, tensions could 'subside.'¹⁴⁶ He was matter-of-fact—general and complete disarmament was not imminent but the window of opportunity to stop nonproliferation was closing rapidly. He regarded resolution 1665 (XIV) as 'definitive,' but there was "no magic wand" to bring it about.¹⁴⁷

At first, the prospects for nonproliferation appeared to rally. The Eighteen-National Disarmament Committee (ENDC), which was endorsed by the UNGA, following the urging of Washington and Moscow, had begun its work in March 1962, and nonproliferation was part of its agenda. The "US was keen on" Ireland becoming a member, but Aiken politely declined.¹⁴⁸ The Department of External Affairs was underfunded and understaffed and had no Disarmament/Nonproliferation section; it simply lacked the capacity to engage in detailed and prolonged disarmament negotiations. The United States and USSR were co-chairmen of the ENDC, and both of their draft treaties on general and complete disarmament included nonproliferation as one of the first steps toward disarmament.¹⁴⁹ Thus, there was a vital bipolar convergence that could serve as a basis. Aiken, rather than making a formal request to the ENDC, directed Irish diplomats to make representations to the members of the ENDC to fulfill UNGA Resolution 1665 (XVI).¹⁵⁰

East-West détente developed in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962, impelled by the dramatization of the sobering consequences of nuclear brinkmanship. Aiken welcomed the resulting Moscow Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) as "the first break-through" in the "long search" for some nuclear weapons agreement. He qualified that it was of "psychological" value, but it was not an intractable barrier to proliferation. He prognosticated a spread of nuclear weapons "in geometrical progression in ever widening circles throughout the world." Referencing the Missile Crisis as a demonstration of the ease with which the "uneasy balance of power" could be upset, he said it accentuated the need to give immediate effect to resolution 1665 (XVI) in a global pact.¹⁵¹ He reasoned that such a pact would make the next logical step to the LTBT.

Regardless of some hopeful outward indications in 1963 and 1964, according to the Irish DEA,¹⁵² the insoluble disagreement between the United States and USSR about the MLF remained. That made progress on

nonproliferation ‘most difficult,’ despite the atmosphere of détente and a mutual agreement on the importance of pursuing nonproliferation.¹⁵³ Aiken was, therefore, diffident in expressing views on the MLF publicly. He was in no mood to be drawn into a most divisive controversy between the US/NATO and USSR: did resolution 1665 (XIV) permit the US to transfer nuclear weapons to the proposed MLF? Instead, he sidestepped it. There was no advantage in becoming entangled in the interminable wrangle. In 1964, all Irish missions were directed on Aiken’s behalf that the MLF was a ‘hypothetical proposition.’ Irish representatives should limit themselves to the observation that all states ought to comply with Resolution 1665 (XIV) immediately. Any arrangements agreed upon as part of that should not breach the resolution. Time did not allow “to delay action because of a future possible contingency.”¹⁵⁴ Abstract problems should not obstruct the search for and implementation of practical solutions, in effect.¹⁵⁵

In any event, the MLF did not come into being, owing to a lack of enthusiasm among America’s European partners, including eventually West Germany. The first Chinese test on October 16 refocused US and international attention on the presumed perils of proliferation, leading to the Gilpatric report to President Johnson in January 1965. Gilpatric advised the prioritization of nonproliferation as a strategic priority necessitating a retreat from the MLF and the establishment of the Nuclear Planning Group, which unblocked the US-Soviet logjam over the NPT. In that sense, Aiken was in tune with the new undercurrents when he urged the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1965 that the nuclear powers proceed to negotiate the NPT with all haste. That would reduce the chances of nuclear weapons “being used somewhere at some time by a lunatic national leader or revolutionary.”¹⁵⁶ He pressed nuclear powers to offer non-nuclear states positive security guarantees.¹⁵⁷ If the efforts to negotiate a treaty succeeded, it would have a positive effect on reducing tension in the international security environment comparable to the LTBT.¹⁵⁸ He grew more insistent at the UN First Committee in November 1966 and declared it might be feasible to keep the peace between five nuclear powers. But at some point, beyond that, a calamity was inevitable as the uneasy strategic balance would be destabilized by proliferation.¹⁵⁹

Aiken greeted news of the opening of the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing an Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in Latin America for signing in June 1967 as a ‘psychological stimulant’ to impel the finalization of the ongoing nonproliferation talks and adding to the Antarctic Treaty (1959), LTBT (1963), and Outer Space Treaty (1967).¹⁶⁰ The ENDC met the deadline of March 1968 set by the UNGA to produce a draft NPT, and it opened for signature on July 1, 1968. In remarks to the First Committee of the UN on May 6, 1968, Aiken commended the United States, USSR, and Britain for resolving their differences and displaying wisdom. Acknowledging that some delegations may not have been fully satisfied with all the clauses, he counseled self-control and repeated the advice of his Canadian counterpart to “put progress before perfection.”¹⁶¹ He reckoned that there was a “growing realization” that acquiring nuclear weapons increased risk, not security. In recognition

of Aiken's catalytic role in articulating the proliferation hazard and putting forward an outline solution with the unanimous backing of the UN, he was invited to sign the treaty in Moscow on June 30, 1968.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, Irish neutrality was a critical component in the eventual success of Aiken's campaign that led to the General Assembly Resolution 1665 (XIV). It endowed Ireland with credibility among the strengthening decolonized contingent of independent states at the UN after 1955. Decolonization transformed the Western "old [white] men's club" and the automatic US majority, requiring a retuning to the new balance in the UNGA. Ireland could claim affinity as a postcolonial state. Aiken, a former republican revolutionary, and the unrepentant defender of wartime neutrality possessed cachet, although he had renounced political violence decades earlier. His steadfastness in forging an uncommitted outlook also won respect in the Soviet bloc.

Simultaneously, Ireland's Western links granted it the ability to negotiate with the Americans and it retained ties with many countries of the British Commonwealth, even though it had left that body. Its idiosyncratic, but intimate, relationship with Britain was a diplomatic asset that assisted Aiken's efforts to assuage Washington and NATO's apprehensions about nonproliferation and finesse the texts of resolutions. To that extent, to borrow from the contemporary lexicon, Aiken's neutral Ireland possessed 'soft power' at a hinge point in global governance. The UN was transforming from a restricted body dominated by the Northern Hemisphere. Aiken and O'Brien recognized Ireland's latent power and actualized it to transform Ireland into a bridgebuilder and a catalyst for change. Aiken captured and articulated the intuitive, but as yet inchoate, concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons. He was impelled by his profound anxieties to mitigate a conspicuously crisis-ridden phase in the Cold War, occasioned by the Soviet Union's erosion of American nuclear superiority and the temptation of allies to engage in nuclear hedging.

Overall, although Ireland was not prepared to invest a significant proportion of its diplomatic resources in the interminable discussions about nuclear weapons after 1961, Aiken's foreign policy propelled the nonproliferation campaign before then. He estimated this to be in Ireland's enlightened self-interest. Operationally, Aiken recognized the interests of the United States and NATO had to be accommodated and realized that some modulation of the resolution was necessary to overcome their criticisms. In that, he displayed realism and unquenchable patience and perseverance. He succeeded in securing a nonproliferation resolution in 1961, although Ireland possessed only restricted diplomatic resources. Finally, he estimated that the crucial final steps to unblocking the path to a pact lay with the nuclear powers because the key to nonproliferation was uniting Moscow and Washington who would, in turn, convince their allies and non-nuclear powers to accept the NPT. That came after the Chinese test of 1964, which occasioned Washington's prioritization of nonproliferation and its abandonment of the MLF.

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6 Sweden

Nuclear Acquisition or Disarmament?

Thomas Jonter

Introduction

During the 1950s, Sweden had extensive plans to acquire nuclear weapons. Heavy investments in a dual-use program were launched which, step by step, advanced the capability to produce them. Leading military and politicians argued that Sweden needed to have atomic bombs to defend its neutrality in the event of a war. These plans did not go unchallenged and from the mid-1950s the nuclear weapons plans came under heavy criticism. Social Democratic prime minister Tage Erlander, who initially was in favor of acquiring nuclear weapons, had to strike a balance between proponents and opponents in parliament and within his own party. A compromise with the political opposition was made at the end of the 1950s, to the extent that Sweden would wait to make a final decision on whether it should acquire atomic bombs or not. The underlying idea was that Sweden should study the security situation in the years ahead and conduct defense research at the same time. A “wait-and-see policy” started to emerge where the military and the Conservative Party supported an acquisition, while the Social Democratic Party, the Liberal Party, and the Centre Party argued that the international political development would decide whether Sweden should say yes or no to nuclear weapons.¹

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Social Democratic government under the leadership of Tage Erlander had, however, in practice, started to back down from its nuclear weapons ambitions and deployed a strategy that promoted international disarmament. At the United Nations and through regional cooperative efforts, Sweden advanced proposals aimed at creating nuclear weapon-free zones, banning nuclear testing, and achieving nuclear disarmament. The disarmament policy evolved therefore as a Swedish policy priority in parallel with the Swedish nuclear weapons debate in the 1960s. Finally, even the military and the Conservative Party gave up their support of acquiring nuclear weapons. In 1968, Sweden signed the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and since then disarmament has remained a core feature of Swedish foreign policy,² which laid the basis for a new and successful Swedish foreign policy during the Cold War. Under the leadership of Olof Palme, who replaced Erlander as prime minister in 1969,

Sweden gradually embraced a highly profiled “active foreign policy” in the interest of East-West détente, North-South dialogue, and so-called Third World solidarity. The core of this policy was to defend “small state interests” as a discursive alternative to the bipolarity dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In this context, the Swedish disarmament policy based on the nation’s neutrality played a key role in defining and developing this active foreign policy.³

The aim of this chapter is to outline how Sweden invested much political will into creating an international legal framework for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The signing of the NPT in 1968, and the ratification of it in 1970, meant that the concept of security had undergone a significant change. During the 1950s, nuclear weapons were seen among the political and military elite as tools for protection and deterrence. At the end of the 1960s, nuclear weapons were considered threats to international security, humanity, and Sweden’s own survival as a nation.⁴ This chapter will show how the reversal process evolved and how Swedish foreign policy underwent a transition from deterrence to a policy that was based on détente and an active role to support the emerging NPT regime.

The Nuclear Weapon Plans – A Brief Background

When NATO was established in 1949, Sweden continued its traditional non-aligned policy: non-participation in military alliances in peacetime aiming at neutrality in the event of war.⁵ Against this background and in line with the goal of the Swedish security policy of building a strong and independent military defense, Sweden started to look into the possibility of manufacturing nuclear weapons. The initiative came from the military in the first place; however, these plans were also supported by a small faction within the Social Democratic government that stayed in power all through the 1950s and 1960s. The prime minister, Tage Erlander, and the defense minister, Torsten Nilsson, were clearly in favor of Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition in this early period. The main arguments in favor of Swedish nuclear weapons were that they would be necessary for deterring the Soviet Union from attacking Sweden and for upholding Sweden’s policy of political nonalignment.⁶

During the 1950s and 1960s, Sweden invested heavily in this military program. Two reactors were built in order to produce plutonium of weapons-grade quality, a uranium plant and a fuel element facility were set up, and a program for weapons carrier systems was designed. As early as 1955, the responsible organization for this dual-use program, the Swedish National Defense Research Agency (FOA), drew the conclusion that it was technically feasible from then on for Sweden to produce a nuclear weapon, given access to plutonium. Technically, the plutonium question had been solved, although it would be modified over time. It was equally clear to FOA what steps would have to be taken in the production process and approximately what the project as a whole would cost in terms of capital and scientific and technical expertise. A nuclear

weapons program with the goal of producing 100 so-called tactical nuclear weapons emerged on the FOA's drawing boards. The weapons carrier systems discussed during the mid-1950s were primarily missiles carried by Swedish-built attack aircraft, such as the A 32 Lansen (the Lans) and A 35 Draken (the Dragon). They could carry nuclear weapons mounted on short-range missiles and were constructed by the Swedish company SAAB, a key actor in the Swedish defense industry.⁷

Plans for Swedish nuclear weapons began to be discussed openly around the mid-1950s. Earlier it had been a question for a smaller circle of politicians, the military leadership, and scientists involved in nuclear weapons research. A serious debate started, however, following a study by the supreme commander that was presented in 1954.⁸ The Conservative Party argued in the parliamentary debate in line with the supreme commander's arguments that Sweden has to be equipped with atomic bombs. This discussion put Prime Minister Erlander in a difficult situation since he wanted to avoid an open public debate because his own party was divided on the issue. In his view, the best option would have been if his party made up its mind and thereafter searched to reach a joint decision with the liberal-conservative opposition. The Social Democratic Party also included a pacifist wing that was against any expansion of the armed forces. It included the Federation of Social Democratic Women (SSKF), which initiated grassroots campaigns against Swedish nuclear weapons as soon as the public debate started. The issue was further complicated for Prime Minister Erlander, and those in the political leadership who were in favor of nuclear acquisition, by the resistance of one of the government's most powerful members, Minister of Foreign Affairs Östen Undén. The foreign minister started to act against an acquisition arguing that it would be better for Sweden to strive toward international nuclear disarmament. According to Undén, Swedish possession of nuclear weapons would create a more unstable security political situation since such possession could provoke a preventive nuclear weapons strike against Sweden by the Soviet Union.⁹

Hence, Erlander wrestled with how to handle the nuclear weapons issue to avoid too divisive conflicts within his own party. The prime minister started to build support for a "freedom of action" strategy, buying time to prepare for a later decision. He convened meetings in different Social Democratic power groups to gain support for this "wait-and-see" approach. A strategy emerged where the intention was to postpone the decision on nuclear weapons acquisition until 1958. There were two reasons why Erlander thought this would be preferable. First of all, there was no need to make a decision before 1958 since additional knowledge about the technical prerequisites for nuclear weapons production was needed anyhow. Second, international nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union were ongoing, and Erlander did not want to make these talks more complicated by deciding Sweden would produce nuclear weapons, too, which he thought would likely lead to further global proliferation.¹⁰ The Liberal and the Centre Parties supported Erlander's and the Social Democratic government's line to wait and

see until the political and technological basis for a decision became clearer. Conservative Party Leader Jarl Hjalmarsson claimed that he supported the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons, but because of the party's agreement, they would not seek a decision on the matter.¹¹

The evolution of the debate changed Erlander's mind, as he had doubts about the nuclear option toward the end of the 1950s.¹² He increasingly saw his role as responsible for backing down from the nuclear weapon plans and, consequently, reached out to Östen Undén and started developing a disarmament strategy instead.

The Disarmament Policy Emerges, 1961–1963

As a part of the disarmament strategy that aimed at steering Sweden away from the nuclear weapon path, Undén came to play an active role.¹³ One of his initiatives was to create an "Atom-Free Club," of which the idea was to convince states that did not have nuclear weapons to further commit themselves to abstain from developing, acquiring, or storing such weapons.¹⁴ By establishing a common ground among the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), Undén's intention was to pressure the existing nuclear powers to enter negotiations on a nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which he considered an important first step on the path toward complete nuclear disarmament.¹⁵

In 1961, Undén intensified Sweden's disarmament efforts by asking Alva Myrdal, who had recently returned from serving as the Swedish ambassador to India, to investigate the possibility for developing a Swedish disarmament program.¹⁶ Her work resulted in several reports listing potential actions on behalf of Sweden.¹⁷ In her view (which became an essential pillar in the emerging Swedish active foreign policy), small states, especially nonaligned states, could not avoid taking responsibility given their position between the Eastern and Western blocs. In fact, a small Western neutral state such as Sweden could present proposals to the United Nations (UN) that could find solutions or, at least, reduce the risks of war.¹⁸ Earlier, the government considered disarmament to be an affair of the great powers only, hindering small states like Sweden from taking the initiative.¹⁹ However, this negative assessment started to change in the early 1960s as a part of Sweden's emerging active foreign policy. The traditional, more strict neutrality policy started to give way to a more engaged nonaligned foreign policy.

When the UN General Assembly (UNGA) met in October 1961, Foreign Minister Undén opened his address by stating: "No issue on the agenda of the General Assembly is of greater importance than disarmament."²⁰ Even though many of the Western allies opposed what has come to be called the Undén Plan, the UNGA adopted a resolution based on his proposal on December 4, 1961. The Undén Plan has to be understood as part of a more ambitious strategy aimed at full and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. After the adoption of the resolution by a majority vote in the UNGA, it was sent back to all UN governments for a written response.²¹ The initiative met with strong opposition

from the United States and NATO members (with the exception of Canada, Denmark, and Norway), causing it to lose momentum.²² However, 58 states voted in favor of the proposal, among them the Nordic Countries, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and the Eastern European states.²³ Undén and Myrdal had understood from the beginning that the proposal had small, if any, chances of success. The initiative was taken with the aim of pressuring the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to start negotiations on a Test Ban Treaty and to place Sweden as an important actor in the discussion. In Undén's view, by combining undertakings of the NNWS with measures that would limit the freedom of action of the NWS, even small states could have an impact. This strategy would become a central pillar of Sweden's subsequent engagement and was soon strengthened further when, on June 20, 1961, the United States proposed that Sweden should be one of the nonaligned states to be included in the enlarged Disarmament Conference in Geneva.²⁴

One reason for the US proposal was that getting Sweden engaged at the international level, would strengthen the forces in the country working against nuclear weapon acquisition. The United States feared that Sweden could otherwise embark on a program and become the world's fifth nuclear weapon state.²⁵ Stockholm accepted the invitation in March 1962, seeing it as an opportunity to have a greater impact on ongoing and future negotiations. In fact, Sweden became the only Western nonaligned country included in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. Alva Myrdal, who headed the Swedish delegation, was also appointed minister for disarmament, which demonstrated that disarmament was a highly prioritized area of Swedish foreign policy at the time.²⁶ In addition to Myrdal, the Swedish disarmament delegation at the ENDC came to include Rolf Edberg, Carl Henrik von Platen, MP Manne Ståhl, lieutenant general G.A. Westring, Special Adviser on international law to the Foreign Ministry Hans Blix (who later became secretary-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency) and Jan Prawitz, a research engineer from the FOA.²⁷

Later that year, the Cuban Missile Crisis and its diplomatic repercussions at the UN gave Sweden a golden opportunity to use its position as the only Western neutral state at the ENDC to influence the superpowers to start real negotiations on a Test Ban Treaty. Myrdal and the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Torsten Nilsson, presented the first proposals on the issue in late October and early November 1962.²⁸ From the Swedish perspective, the Cuban Missile Crisis had to be viewed from a broader perspective, including the superpower's unwillingness to make real efforts to negotiate, formulate, and sign a treaty against nuclear weapons testing. This led to a dangerous and unpredictable situation where the line between war and peace was hanging on a loose thread. Furthermore, the reluctance toward a treaty on nuclear tests had the consequence that other states continued exploring ways to acquire nuclear weapons in their security-seeking ambitions. In other words, the world had to expect more and more NWS in the future if the superpowers, especially the United States and the USSR, did not take on the responsibility for a ban on

testing nuclear weapons. In fact, both Myrdal and Nilsson made public statements that Sweden could be one of these new NWS if the superpowers failed to agree on a legally binding treaty against further nuclear weapons tests.²⁹

In Myrdal's view, a successful proposal had to take three criteria into consideration. First, it had to be seen as advantageous to both the United States and the Soviet Union, second, it needed to unblock the current negotiation stalemate, and third, it had to establish an agreed control system (the verification aspect). At least two of these three criteria had to be fulfilled, she argued in a 1961 memorandum.³⁰ This approach became a leading principle guiding Swedish disarmament policy, enabling it to play a mediating role between the United States and the USSR. The Swedish active foreign policy was considered at times too confrontative from a Finnish perspective, according to Tapio Juntunen.³¹ On the other hand, Sweden did not have to pay attention to the views of the Kremlin as closely as Finland had to, given its special relationship with the Soviet Union. In that respect, the active foreign policy gave Sweden more room for maneuver to push for initiatives that not always were appreciated by the two superpowers. In the Swedish strategy, a ban on nuclear tests was the first stepping stone on the way to a general and complete nuclear disarmament, and Sweden could play an active role to make that happen. Swedish diplomats and leading politicians invested a great deal of resources and political prestige to convince the superpowers to enter negotiations with the goal of reaching concrete results, which previous talks (ongoing since 1958) between the United States and the USSR had not been able to achieve. One of the stumbling blocks was the disagreement on how to control each party's compliance with a potential treaty. The USSR argued, initially, that a kind of self-inspection should be used with a minimal role for an international supervisory body. The United States, on the other hand, insisted that a control system had to be established, where other nuclear states and neutral parties were responsible for the inspections. Moreover, the US administration also held a detection system with the capacity of remote surveillance control, albeit such a technology did not currently exist. Therefore, the US administration was not willing to sign an agreement.³² Against this background, Sweden started to talk to both sides, aiming at unlocking the situation, especially since Stockholm had developed fairly advanced technological know-how in the nuclear field, leading Swedish scientists to the conclusion that it would, in fact, be possible to implement a functioning remote detection system. This competence was used successfully by the Swedish delegation under the leadership of Myrdal, assuring Sweden a key role in the ENDC.³³ Several useful contacts were deployed in this lobbying process. For example, the husband of Myrdal, the world-famous economist Gunnar Myrdal, called his friend, the vice president of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, and other influential figures in the US administration, informing them about the latest scientific developments in the field of detection technology that the US disarmament delegation seemed to ignore.³⁴ These efforts bore fruits. The US position changed during this period, starting to favor Sweden's approach and the resolution proposal of the 30 nonaligned

states presented in 1962 and 1963.³⁵ As a result, the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963. It would, however, be naive to maintain that Washington changed its mind solely due to Stockholm's diplomatic influence. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself had served as a wake-up call, teaching the US administration that a well-functioning ban treaty was in its own interest. But it is fair to say that the Swedish mediation efforts supported by 29 other non-aligned states helped to unlock the stalemate between the superpowers.

In fact, Sweden used its scientific and technical know-how at different meetings and negotiations throughout the 1960s. As George H. Quester noted, “[T]he Swedish delegation at Geneva saw itself as an independent source of expertise.”³⁶ Myrdal saw Sweden's role within the ENDC as having to aid poorer neutral states with technical assistance. In a letter to Sweden's UN representative, she wrote, “Since most of the non-nuclear delegations have hardly any knowledge of these topics, the Swedish delegation felt it necessary to (...) take greater responsibility to be oriented in these topics, a duty mostly born by our experts.”³⁷ According to the International Relations scholar Emma Rosengren, this role was also motivated by Sweden's view of itself as a technical and politically superior power, leading to a sentiment of duty toward other nonaligned states that were less developed and enjoyed less political influence.³⁸ The main reason for this was the ambitious Swedish nuclear weapon program that had given its scientists their competence in nuclear research and development. They were subsequently used by the Swedish delegation as experts and advisors. At various international forums, the Swedish government launched scientific initiatives particularly aimed at developing tools and methods that could detect and identify underground explosions. In May 1966, for example, Sweden organized a conference on detection technology with participants from the NNWS. The conference became an important part of the work to establish a “detection club,” which was one of Sweden's disarmament priorities at the time.³⁹ As a part of this engagement, the Swedish Defence Research Agency set up a seismological detection station in 1969 in the municipality of Hagfors. The nuclear tests carried out by the Soviet Union were, for obvious reasons, of great interest, but also activities conducted by the United States, United Kingdom, China, and France were investigated.⁴⁰

Sweden Joins the PTBT: 1963–68

Despite Sweden's active engagement in Geneva, its own signature on the PTBT was not a foregone conclusion since it meant that its own “freedom of action policy” would be harder to follow, disenchanting several parts of Stockholm's political class. Myrdal and the Social Democratic government were in favor of signing the treaty, while the military leaders and the Conservative Party still insisted on the acquisition of nuclear weapons. They argued that the signing had negative consequences for a real freedom of action policy. In theory, it was of course still possible for Sweden to manufacture nuclear weapons, even if they joined the PTBT, since underground nuclear weapons tests would

still be allowed under the agreement. In practice, however, it implied a clear limitation of Sweden's chances to gain nuclear weapon capabilities. On top of that, the entire Swedish disarmament policy launched by Undén and Myrdal was based on the idea that it would replace the nuclear weapons option in Swedish security policy. In 1963, the entire Social Democratic leadership stood behind this approach. It was not clear, however, whether the Liberal Party and the Center Party—unlike the Social Democrats—had completely abandoned the nuclear weapons plans. It was a difficult situation for the Social Democratic leadership. At the decisive meeting of the Committee of Foreign Affairs on August 6, 1963, Foreign Minister Nilsson, who had replaced Undén shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis, had to walk a tightrope between the proponents of Swedish nuclear weapons (who, however, did not advocate for nuclear weapons as strongly as before) and opponents who felt that they had the wind in their back. In his introduction, Nilsson wanted to indicate that freedom of action was still a possible posture and a valid policy. In the end, even the Conservative Party agreed to sign the treaty.⁴¹ Even though the Swedish government was not completely satisfied with the PTBT (since it did not include underground nuclear weapons tests), it held a symbolic meaning, showing that international unity could be reached on issues related to the great power's security.⁴²

When Ireland presented its resolution on a nonproliferation agreement at the UNGA, the Swedish government approached this proposal with a great deal of skepticism. In Swedish eyes, the proposal was too one-sided on preventing further proliferation, which would only cement the NWS's monopoly on their nuclear arsenals. Myrdal and the Swedish government believed that an international treaty needed to include a long-term goal of nuclear disarmament.⁴³ However, Stockholm would, step by step, reconsider its position and started to work for amendments to the treaty with the goal of increasing the balance of commitments between the NNWS and NWS. It was critical to Stockholm that the disarmament aspect—meaning the elimination of all, or at least most nuclear weapons—became a central aspect of the treaty. Sweden was willing to give up its nuclear ambitions, but only if the NWS demonstrated their commitment to making sacrifices, too. In a way, Sweden used a double-track policy in the following NPT negotiations to push the NWS to accept disarmament as a central aspect of an international agreement. Myrdal and Nilsson went as far as to argue that Sweden might be forced to acquire nuclear weapons if the NWS were not willing to include disarmament commitments in the treaty.⁴⁴

On August 6, 1963, the Irish resolution was discussed at a meeting with the Swedish Committee of Foreign Affairs. Nilsson briefed the committee on the government's position,⁴⁵ stating that the cabinet had positive views on the agreement that the United States, the USSR, and Great Britain had now started negotiating and that Sweden should sign and adhere to it as soon as possible. Nilsson continued, however, that joining such a treaty required the government to take a position on the proposal since it would have to be

ratified. It was true, the foreign minister emphasized, that the treaty's scope would be limited since the focus of the negotiations was on nonproliferation. However, he stressed that the start of the great powers negotiations must be viewed as a major success and should be interpreted as "the first step on the path to detente."⁴⁶ Furthermore, he argued, it was in Sweden's interest to support such negotiations since more substantial agreements might follow, possibly leading to real disarmament efforts.

After the foreign minister's opening speech, Prime Minister Erlander continued by saying that before the government had taken a position, the military leadership's assessment had been obtained. The military leadership's representative at the meeting, General Almgren, argued that if real freedom of action were to continue, it would be better if Sweden did not sign the treaty. The opposition parties, however, were more willing to sign the treaty than the military leadership. That the Liberal Party leader, Bertil Ohlin, and the Center Party chairman, Gunnar Hedlund, supported the government's position was not strange because they, like the Social Democrats, had become increasingly skeptical of nuclear weapon acquisition. Together, the three parties were the architects behind the freedom of action position. What was sensational was that even the Conservative Party's new chairman, Gunnar Heckscher, claimed he and his party also supported the disarmament policy.⁴⁷

Hence, when the issue of the test ban was addressed in parliament, in November 1963, the government had the support of several members of the Conservative Party,⁴⁸ who argued the treaty did not rule out Swedish acquisition of nuclear weapons in the future if the global security situation deteriorated and favored such a decision. This view was not shared by Social Democrats, Liberals, and Centre parliamentarians, who stressed that Sweden should do everything in its ability, together with other states, to create a world where nuclear weapons would play a minor role and eventually be eliminated altogether. Both chambers of parliament approved the proposal.⁴⁹

Signing the NPT

In the internal discussions that followed on how Sweden should approach the Irish proposal to set up an international treaty on reducing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, it was argued that it is not enough to just sign the treaty without pushing for additional requirements for comprehensive disarmament. The United States, the USSR, and Great Britain could be content that their goal of preventing other states from acquiring nuclear weapons was achieved, while at the same time, they retained the privilege of keeping their weapons of mass destruction. It was, therefore, important for an international agreement on nonproliferation that the nuclear weapons powers seriously demonstrated their commitment to reach the final goal. Against this background, Nilsson argued in a speech at the UNGA, in early 1965, that a nonproliferation treaty should be combined with a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the halt of the production of fissile material for military purposes.⁵⁰ After the failure of the

NWS to negotiate a treaty covering all nuclear weapons tests, excluding underground explosions in the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Swedish government found it urgent to prohibit nuclear testing altogether. Myrdal followed up on the foreign minister's proposal at a meeting with the UN Disarmament Commission in May 1965. She held that the nonproliferation treaty "should make the sacrifices incurred more equitably distributed."⁵¹ In another speech to the ENDC in August of the same year, Myrdal again emphasized that "a non-dissemination treaty would in reality curtail only the freedom of action of the hitherto non-nuclear nations" and that "[a] comprehensive test-ban, on the other hand, would have an impeding effect not only on the nuclear have-nots but also on the nuclear haves."⁵² Myrdal, therefore, suggested a "three-fold package: non-dissemination + comprehensive test ban + cut-off of the production of fissionable material," saying that this "represented a fair measure of balances and counterbalances."⁵³ The same year, Sweden and seven other nonaligned states that were part of the ENDC presented a joint memorandum on nonproliferation, where they recognized that a nonproliferation treaty had to "be coupled with or followed by tangible steps to halt the nuclear arms race and to limit, reduce, and eliminate the stocks of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery."⁵⁴ The implicit question posed by Sweden was, Why would states like Sweden and other so-called threshold countries, like India and Switzerland, refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons if the existing nuclear weapon powers were not willing to disarm? What Nilsson and Myrdal called for was that even the NWS must be willing to accept commitments. If Sweden was to agree to have restrictions imposed on itself, they argued that "also the Great Powers must obviously put a limit to their nuclear armaments."⁵⁵ In a speech delivered to the ENDC in 1966, Myrdal somewhat dramatically stated,

I believe that we must be much clearer as to what the arguments really are why a non-proliferation treaty should endeavor to cancel the nuclear option just for states which at present are non-nuclear. If there is to be something of an eleventh commandment: Thou shalt not carry nuclear weapons—why should it only be valid for some?⁵⁶

Echoing this view in his address on foreign policy to the Swedish parliament in 1966, Foreign Minister Nilsson stressed that a nonproliferation treaty would have substantial consequences for "those countries that do not possess nuclear weapons but which can produce them, which are requested to relinquish their option in the interest of general security."⁵⁷ According to him, if Sweden was to agree to have restrictions imposed on itself, then "the Great Powers must obviously also put a limit on their nuclear armaments."⁵⁸ If not, then the countries that had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons—countries like Sweden—might not have wanted to sign the treaty, or worse, might have acquired their own nuclear arsenals. Through such statements, the Swedish government sent the message that it was not fair that some states were trusted with nuclear weapons while others were not.

Although the Swedish proposal was supported by many states at the UN and the ENDC, the superpowers did not accept it. The United States and the USSR took into account only the nonproliferation aspect. Over the course of 1965, both presented draft agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons that were fairly similar but differed in one essential respect. While the United States wished to allow agreements between the states within an alliance to deploy nuclear weapons, the USSR opposed this, arguing that it was an indirect form of nuclear proliferation. The background was that the United States had plans to establish a multilateral nuclear weapons force within NATO. The following year, Washington announced such plans were no longer relevant, breaking the deadlock in the negotiations. On August 24, 1967, the two superpowers presented their respective identical drafts of the treaty. However, they failed to address the verification issue since they could not agree on how it should be done. It would take until January 1968 before a deal on verification could be reached between them, despite Sweden and other states making suggestions on how inspection activities could be improved to strengthen the NPT's effectiveness.

In the final negotiations, Sweden tried to raise the level of ambition from just nonproliferation to include disarmament as well. References were made to Mexico's proposal that "the nuclear weapon powers would undertake to pursue negotiations with speed and perseverance to arrive at further agreements, notably a comprehensive test ban and a cut-off agreement." Myrdal wanted the Swedish delegation in Geneva to call for balance regarding the sacrifices of the nuclear and NNWS. If the NWS would not commit to anything, countries considering nuclear weapons—like Sweden—had good reasons not to sign the treaty. Myrdal stressed three things during the final negotiations that the Swedish government wanted the NPT to guarantee: disarmament obligations on behalf of the NWS, control measures, and the right to peaceful use of nuclear energy by all state parties.⁵⁹

In the end, even though the NPT did not become the package deal envisioned by the Swedish government, the foreign minister argued that a balance had still been reached.⁶⁰ The inclusion of Article VI in the final treaty text, which states that all parties' responsibility to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" represented an attempt to find a balance and was an important reason for a skeptical Sweden to sign a treaty it did not fully support.⁶¹ On May 22, 1968, the Swedish government presented a defense proposal in parliament, where it became evident that it was not in the country's interest to acquire nuclear weapons.⁶² The proposal leaves open a back door, however, stating this situation might change: "If long-term development should lead to nuclear weapons becoming a normal part of a small nations' armed forces, the question of Swedish nuclear devices can come into another position."⁶³ In the ensuing debate, there were no members of parliament who argued that Sweden should acquire nuclear weapons. When Myrdal described the international NPT negotiations and the Swedish government's stance that seeks disarmament, she was backed even by the liberal-conservative opposition.⁶⁴

Ratification of the NPT, 1968–70

When parliament was going to vote on whether Sweden should ratify the NPT, in December 1969, two motions were brought up, which required Sweden to act more forcefully to pressure the superpowers for tangible results on disarmament. The motion of the Liberal Party's parliamentary leader, Hans Lindblad, required that unless the nuclear weapon powers agreed on a clarification of the disarmament ambition at the first so-called Review Conference (which was to be held five years after the NPT went into effect), Sweden should terminate the agreement.⁶⁵ The Conservative Party had formulated a second motion to the same end. In the ensuing debate, that argument was rejected on the grounds that such requirements would be useless.⁶⁶ The Social Democratic member of parliament, Arne Geijer, argued Sweden could not have acted more forcefully and more efficiently than it did during the final negotiations in Geneva. According to him, it would be five years until the first Review Conference took place, before judgment could be passed on whether "the development has gone in the desired direction or not," and then Sweden would have "the opportunity to put forward the views and potential criticisms that can be justified." Myrdal, on her part, stressed that it would be important that the decision to ratify the NPT was made in unity and consensus because it "is of great importance for Sweden's efforts in the international disarmament efforts." She provided parliament with the background of how the general public's assessment of nuclear weapons shifted from a possible yes to a forceful no during the past decade. While in the late 1950s, opinion polls showed that most Swedes were for nuclear weapons, in 1967, a staggering 73 percent were against them and only 19 percent for their acquisition. "Behind this shift in the general public opinion, there is also a shift in the military assessment of the relative value of a Swedish nuclear weapons system." This was due to the international technological developments in the field of nuclear weapons, which would have resulted in the superpowers having nuclear weapons arsenals that smaller states could hardly obtain: "That is why neither Sweden nor similar countries in reasonably similar situation as us—that could become embroiled in a superpower conflict—can consider the possession of nuclear weapons now to be positively valuable." Against this background, it was in Sweden's interest to ratify the NPT and at the same time consider the nonproliferation treaty as a milestone toward general disarmament.⁶⁷ In the end, both motions were rejected, meaning that Sweden finally, in a formal sense, gave up its nuclear weapons plans; in January 1970, Sweden ratified the treaty.

Conclusions

During the 1950s, Sweden had extensive plans to acquire nuclear weapons. The political elite, led by Social Democrat Prime Minister Tage Erlander, supported this policy. However, the plans met with strong opposition in the political debate as opinions began to grow stronger against Sweden becoming the fourth nuclear weapon state. The opposition to acquisition grew even within

the Social Democratic Party and in the government. Consequently, the cabinet changed course and started to take initiatives to promote disarmament efforts in the UN. Under the leadership of Foreign Minister Östen Undén, a disarmament policy was launched in the early 1960s with the aim of steering Sweden out of the nuclear weapon plans. Under Ambassador Alva Myrdal who was appointed to lead the national disarmament policy, Sweden became a leading voice in the disarmament negotiations leading to the PTBT and the NPT. Its neutral position enabled Sweden to play a mediating role between the superpowers and at the same time act as a defender of small states' rights to have an influence in the ongoing negotiations. This role was strengthened when Sweden became a member of the ENDC, where it could play a leading role using its position as the only Western state and its technical competence in the nuclear field to put pressure for concessions on the superpowers. As a neutral but potential nuclear weapon state, Sweden argued that even the NWS must have obligations and make efforts to bring about disarmament. It is not just NNWS that have to make sacrifices. In the negotiations that led to the signing of the NPT, Sweden, therefore, argued that the agreement must contain aspects highlighting strongly the obligations of NWS. The United States and the USSR both resisted, emphasizing only nonproliferation aspects. In various contexts, Sweden used the argument that if the nuclear powers were not willing to make concessions, Sweden and other nuclear threshold states could end up in a situation where they felt compelled to acquire nuclear weapons. In the end, the superpowers agreed to the demand from Sweden and Mexico that the treaty should also contain a disarmament aspect, namely Article VI stating,

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

This concession was considered a success, although Sweden initially preferred stronger commitments. As a result, the government signed the NPT in 1968, and its nuclear weapon program was finally terminated in 1970 with the ratification of the treaty.

Notes

- 1 For the most thorough analysis of the processes leading up to Sweden's decision not to acquire nuclear weapons and to work for international nuclear disarmament, see Thomas Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons during the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). See also Thomas Jonter, "Sweden and the Bomb. The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1972," *Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate Report (SKI Report)* 1:33 (September 2001); Thomas Jonter, "Sweden and the Bomb; Nuclear Weapons Research in Sweden. Co-operation Between Civilian and Military Research, 1947–1972," *SKI Report* 02:18 (May 2002); Thomas Jonter, "The

- Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 1945–1968: An Analysis of the Technical Preparations.” *Science and Global Security* 18, no. 2 (2010): 61–86; Thomas Jonter, “The United States and Swedish Plans to Build the Bomb, 1945–68,” in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, ed. Knopf, Jeffrey W. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 219–45; and Thomas Jonter & Emma Rosengren, “From nuclear weapons acquisition to nuclear disarmament – the Swedish case,” *Medicine, Conflict and Survival* 30, no. sup1 (2014): 46–63; Emma Rosengren, “Gendering nuclear disarmament: identity and disarmament in Sweden during the Cold War” (PhD diss., Stockholm University, 2020).
- 2 See, for example, Johan Bergenäs and Richard Sabatini, “The rise of a White Knight state: Sweden’s nonproliferation and disarmament history,” *Nuclear Threat Initiative Issue Brief*, February 9, 2010, accessed October 2022, www.nti.org/e_research/e3_white_knight_state_sweden.html; Jonter, *The key to nuclear restraint*, 1–2; Jan Prawitz, “Det svenska spelet om nedrustningen,” *Framsyn* 1 (2004): 30–34; Jan Prawitz, “Non-nuclear is beautiful or why and how Sweden went non-nuclear,” *Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift* 198, No. 6 (1994): 49–113; and Jan Prawitz, *From Nuclear Option to Non-Nuclear Promotion: The Swedish Case* (Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
 - 3 There is an extensive literature on the Swedish active foreign policy. See, for example, Ulf Bjereld, Alf W. Johansson, & Karl Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred. Svensk utrikespolitik under kalla kriget* (Stockholm: Santérus förlag, 2008); Ulf Bjereld, “Critic or mediator? Sweden in world politics, 1945–90,” *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 23–35; Ann Marie Ekengren, “How ideas influence decision-making: Olof Palme and Swedish foreign policy, 1965–1975,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 2 (2011): 117–34; Mikko Kuisma, “Social democratic internationalism and the welfare state after the ‘golden age,’” *Cooperation and Conflict* 42, no. 1 (March 2007): 9–26;
 - 4 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, page?
 - 5 On the Swedish nonaligned policy in the early Cold War period, see Bjereld, Johansson, and Molin, *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred*, 60–117.
 - 6 For example, in his memoirs, the Swedish Social Democratic prime minister, Tage Erlander, writes that for several years in the late 1940s and early 1950s, he supported a nuclear weapons program for Sweden, Tage Erlander, *1955–1960* (Stockholm: Tiden, 1976), 75 et passim.
 - 7 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 75.
 - 8 The Swedish Defense Staff *Alltjämt ett starkt försvar. ÖB-förslaget 1954* (ÖB 54) [Strong Defence Preserved. The Supreme Commander’s proposal 1954 (ÖB 54)], *Kontakt med krigsmakten* (1954): 9–10.
 - 9 For example, Undén wrote a memorandum where developed his arguments against a nuclear weapons acquisition which were distributed to the members of the government. “Press Release about the so called tactical nuclear weapons,” in *Labour Movement’s Archive and Library (ARAB)*, Erlander’s archive F III.
 - 10 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 125–93.
 - 11 Karl Molin, “Party battle and party responsibility. A study of the social democratic defense debate,” in *Social Democratic Society. 16 Researchers on Social Democratic Policy, and Society*, eds. Klaus Misgeld, Karl Molin and Klas Åmark (Stockholm: Tidens förlag, 1989), 336.
 - 12 In his memoirs, Erlander writes about his change of mind, Erlander, *1955–1960*, 89.
 - 13 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 125–93.
 - 14 Annika Norlin, *Undénplanen. Ett lyckat misslyckande* [The Undén plan, a successful failure] (Göteborg: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen 1998), 38.
 - 15 Stellan Andersson, *Den första grinden: svensk nedrustningspolitik 1961–1963* (Stockholm: Santérus Förlag, 2004), 86.

- 16 Östen Undén, *Anteckningar 1952–1966* (Stockholm: Kungl. Samfundet för utgivandet av handskrifter rörande Skandinaviens historia. Handlingar del 25, 2002) 663–64.
- 17 Alva Myrdal, “P.M. angående vissa utgångspunkter för eventuellt deltagande i debatt om nedrustningsfrågan i FN,” [Memo on some benchmarks for eventual participation in the debate on disarmament in the UN], August 29, 1961, Utrikesdepartementets arkiv [Archive of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, hereafter UD], Politiska avdelningens ärenden, Förenta Nationerna, Mål V, HP 48:441.
- 18 Andersson, *Den första grinden*, 105.
- 19 See, for example, a statement by Östen Undén in early 1960 where he saw disarmament as area where the nuclear weapons states are the main actors. Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Statement by the Foreign Minister in the debate on foreign affairs in both Chambers of the Riksdag; 30th March 1960,” in *Documents on Swedish foreign policy* (Stockholm: Sweden Utrikesdepartementet, 1960) 17.
- 20 “Statement by the minister for foreign affairs, Mr. Östen Undén in the First Committee,” October 26, 1961, UD HP 48:443.
- 21 Andersson, *Den första grinden*, 120.
- 22 Norlin, *Undénplanen*, 38.
- 23 Andersson, *Den första grinden*, 120.
- 24 Sverker Åström, “‘P.M.’ Ch.tel. Washington, FN-repr. 20.6.61,” UD HP 48:441.
- 25 Jonter, “The United States and Swedish Plans to Build the Bomb, 1945–68,” 219–45.
- 26 See, for example, Bergenäs & Sabatini, “The rise of a White Knight State”; Jonter, “The Swedish Plans”; Prawitz, “Det svenska spelet om nedrustningen” Prawitz, “Non-nuclear is beautiful.”
- 27 “Pressmeddelande måndagen den 5 mars 1962, ang. Medlemmar i den sv. del. i nedrustningskommissionen,” March 5, 1962, UD HP 48:445.
- 28 Andersson, *Den första grinden*, 201–04; Jonter, *The key to nuclear restraint*, 215–26.
- 29 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 245–46.
- 30 Norlin, *Undénplanen*, 18.
- 31 See Tapio Juntunen chapter in this volume, “Finland: From Curious Observer to Active Accommodator of the NPT Process.”
- 32 Glenn T. Seaborg, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Test Ban* (California: University of California Press, 1981), 15–16.
- 33 George H. Quester, “Sweden and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 5, No. 1 (1970): 52–64.
- 34 Jan Prawitz, “FOA och kärnvapen. The FOA and nuclear weapon,” *Documentation from seminar 16 (November 1995)*: 97. Jan Prawitz, who served as a scientific expert in the Swedish disarmament delegation at the time, confirmed this when the author talked to him on the phone August 18, 2013. In her diary, on November 4, 1962, Alva Myrdal also wrote that the Cuban Missile Crisis, the efforts made by the ENDC, and her interventions (including her speech at the UNGA, on October 31) had a positive impact on the US position. Even though it can be argued that Alva Myrdal had reasons to exaggerate her own impact on the positive outcome, there is no doubt that the US modified its views during the negotiations and in the end came very close to the Swedish position, with the result that the resolution was adopted. See Alva Myrdal, “Alva Myrdals archive,” *The Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library (ARBARK)* volume 3.1.4:014.
- 35 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 215–23.
- 36 Quester, “Sweden and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.”
- 37 Rosengren, *Gendered Disarmament*, 126.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid., 125.

- 40 Ingvar Nedgård, *Hagforsobservatoriet, seismologisk verksamhet* (Stockholm: Systemteknik, Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI), 2005).
- 41 Andersson, *Den första grunden*, 275.
- 42 Sverige. Utrikesdepartementet, "Government statement in the Riksdag debate on foreign affairs; 8th April 1964," in *Documents on Swedish foreign policy* (Stockholm, Allmänna förlaget, 1965), 20.
- 43 Alva Myrdal, *Spelet om nedrustninghen* (Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1976), 212.
- 44 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 246.
- 45 The entire discussions at meeting in the Committee of Foreign Affairs is taken from Andersson, *Den första grunden*, 274–81.
- 46 Andersson, *Den första grunden*, 274.
- 47 The entire discussions at meeting in the Committee of Foreign Affairs is taken from Andersson, *Den första grunden*, 233–35.
- 48 Ibid, 281–84.
- 49 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 226.
- 50 Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Speech given by the Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Torsten Nilsson, at the United Nations' General Assembly on Friday January 22, 1965," in Utdrag ur Aide-mémoire, Bilaga 6, Alva och Gunnar Myrdals arkiv, Handlingar från Alva Myrdals verksamhet: Fred och nedrustning [Excerpt taken from the Aide memoires, Attachment 6, Alva and Gunnar Myrdal's archive], *Documents from Alva Myrdal's activities: Peace and disarmament, 1961–1980*, Vol. 4.1.16:108, ARAB.
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- 52 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Sverige. Utrikesdepartementet), "Speech by Mrs. Myrdal at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva," August 10, 1965, *Documents on Swedish foreign policy 1965*, (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1965).
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Joint Memorandum on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," *Documents on Swedish foreign policy 1965* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1965). The other neutral states were Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, and United Arab Republic (UAR).
- 55 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Government statement in the foreign affairs debate; 23rd March 1966," *Documents on Swedish foreign policy* (Stockholm: Allmänna förlaget, 1966), 20. See also Alva Myrdal, "Speech by Mrs. Myrdal at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva; 10th August," *Documents on Swedish Foreign Policy 1965*, 104–10.
- 56 Alva Myrdal, "Speech by ambassador Mrs. Alva Myrdal, Swedish Delegation, 24th of February 1966," UD HP 48:477.
- 57 Sverige. Utrikesdepartementet. "Government statement in the foreign affairs debate; March 23, 1966," *Documents on Swedish foreign policy 1966* (Stockholm, Allmänna förl. 1966), 20.
- 58 Ibid.
- 59 "Press release, 30th May 1966," *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*, 1966.
- 60 "Government statement in the Riksdag foreign affairs debate; 21st March 1968," *Documents on Swedish foreign policy*, 1968, 24.
- 61 *United Nations*, "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," accessed <http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml>.
- 62 Proposition no. 110, Swedish parliament, 1968, 65.
- 63 Ibid.

- 64 Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint*, 248–49.
- 65 Motion no. 1131, Första kammare, First Chamber, December 2, 1969.
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7 Finland

From Curious Observer to Active Accommodator of the NPT Process

Tapio Juntunen

Finland has always been like a docile sheep in the fold of power politics, a role usually destined for small powers.

— Risto Hyvärinen¹

Introduction

Finland was a late bloomer in the field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy. Until 1963, when the country proposed a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone (NNFZ), it avoided taking an active stance in matters related to nuclear weapons politics and disarmament. However, even this first shy proposal by President Urho Kekkonen was effectively a non-starter and it did not lead to any serious political consultations between the Nordic countries, not to mention the United States. Nevertheless, this opened new avenues to participate more forcefully in multilateral nuclear disarmament at the United Nations (UN). As the focus in international disarmament diplomacy shifted to questions of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear test ban, key officials in the Finnish Foreign Ministry started to redirect their interest toward multilateral disarmament policies from 1964 onwards.

Unlike its older brother Sweden, who joined the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC) already in 1962 and took an active role there with the lead of Alva Myrdal (see Thomas Jonter's chapter in this volume), Finland had to settle for its position as an observer state in Geneva. This position, however, was used rather extensively when certain new generation key officials from the Foreign Ministry such as Ilkka Pastinen, Max Jakobson, and Risto Hyvärinen realized that it was vital to increase expertise on issues related to disarmament and the arms race. It was thought that this could also turn out to be a ticket for Finland to improve its international status and credibility of its policy of neutralism. Indeed, Finnish representatives in Geneva participated actively in informal discussions with other delegations representing both ideological camps and the group of eight non-allied states within the ENDC.²

During the early 1960s, Finland's expertise on nuclear weapons and disarmament was nowhere near that of Sweden, which was able to use the know-how it got from its nascent nuclear weapons program diplomatically in Geneva.³

Documents from the archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry show that Finnish diplomats kept a particularly close eye on Sweden's activities and its role as a leader of the group of eight non-allied states at the ENDC. The practical conclusion made by the Finnish foreign policy elite was that Finland needed to develop its own disarmament profile—discernible enough from Sweden's disarmament activism—and put that into practice should the opportunity arise. Thus, from the mid-1960s onwards, Finland strove toward a more active role in multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy. In fact, whereas Sweden was critical of the profound power asymmetry and lack of equity in the architecture of the NPT (permanent division between recognized Nuclear Weapon States [NWS] and the rest), Finland focused on solidifying the international order led by the recognized nuclear powers, especially the two superpowers.

The main argument of this chapter is that Finland's policy line in the process leading to the signing of the NPT can be characterized as great power accommodation—or, in more abstract terms, accommodation of international order based on the key principle of *great power responsibility*. This policy objective can be traced back to the period after Finland's accession to the UN in 1955–56. During this period, key Finnish diplomat Ralph Enckell formulated a doctrine that would come to define Finland's stance toward multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy for years to come. The so-called Enckell Doctrine emphasized prudence and reticence; it was reasoned that Finland should abstain from taking a stance in any disarmament initiative that could likely cause friction between the great powers. During the 1960s, following President Kekkonen's turn toward more active foreign policy, the doctrine was implicitly reformulated—the idea was not anymore only to abstain from processes that might provoke great power confrontation but to actively support and strive toward processes and initiatives that would solidify great power consensus and, thus, stabilize the bipolar international order.

Indeed, the NPT process goes on to show that although the Finnish policy of neutrality was based on rather conservative tenets of great power accommodation, it did not necessarily lead to an evasive or overly cautious role. Finland did not accommodate great power interests at any cost. It based its policy on principled support for the rule-based international order and stabilization based on great power responsibility, albeit with a clear hierarchical understanding of status in international politics.⁴ It must be noted, though, that the stability-seeking and support for gradual disarmament were also tied to Finland's key national security interests. Especially important in this regard was that the NPT promised to solve the so-called German issue—that is, the prospect of nuclearized West Germany, something the Soviets had used as a boogeyman argument to coerce Finland by appealing to the 1948 Agreement of Friendship Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (FCMA Treaty).

On the domestic political level, the debate on Finnish foreign policy was tightly controlled by President Urho Kekkonen.⁵ The “harsh geopolitical realities”—that is, being de facto located in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence—meant Finland's latitude to maneuver was limited.⁶ In many ways,

its balancing between disarmament advocacy and great power accommodation during the NPT process was a result of practical reasoning stemming from a rather unique combination of small-state realism and liberalism.⁷ The evolution of Finland's role in the NPT negotiations is clear evidence of that. Helsinki changed from being a silent observer in the ENDC negotiations to a bridge-builder along two axes: in addition to supporting great power consensus, Finland served as a mediator between the "nuclear haves" and the "have-nots" in the final round of the negotiations at the UN in 1968—although with a clear ambition to support the joint US-USSR position against "the rest." This begs the question (especially when juxtaposed with the active and progressive style of diplomacy exercised by Sweden in the field of nuclear disarmament) of whether Finland truly was a 'neutral' country in the NPT process after all.

In conceptual terms, this harks back to the issue of what neutrality is and how it should be defined.⁸ On the basis of this analysis, Finland's policy of neutralism can be labeled as "aspirant" in nature, in contrast to constitutional, traditional, or political neutrality, for example. The maturity of the Finnish policy of neutralism was loosely anchored to the political undercurrents of great power politics, especially the general state of East-West relations, as well as Finland's own historical experiences (or the way the political elite interpreted these experiences). To understand the somewhat conditional status of Finnish Cold War neutralism, one needs to approach fuzzy concepts⁹ such as neutrality as a relational phenomenon that should be analyzed contextually. That is, neutrality is not a substance-like constant in international politics but actualized through the historically stratified interactions of the actors participating in the very practices that define the concrete meaning of the term in any given context.¹⁰

The following analysis of Finland's role in the NPT negotiations is based on existing historiography mostly available only in Finnish, memoirs of key decision-makers, and documents collected mainly from the archives of the Finnish Foreign Ministry. The chapter first explains the (geo-)political context of Finnish foreign policy during the first half of the Cold War. Then follows a chronology, explicating the first formulations of Finnish nuclear disarmament policy (the so-called Enckell Doctrine) after Finland's accession to the UN in the latter half of the 1950s. Finally, the chapter describes how Finland's nuclear disarmament policy gradually evolved into a more active phase after President Kekkonen's 1963 NNFZ initiative, shifting Finnish diplomacy toward the multilateral arena from 1965 onwards. The "highlight" of this process was Finland's chairing of the group of sponsors for the joint US-USSR resolution at the UN, in 1968.

Finland's Policy of Neutralism in the Cold War

The Finnish conception of political neutrality always had pragmatic undercurrents. However, it did not fully mature into a shared element of societal identity.¹¹ Especially when compared to Sweden, the notion of political neutrality was more conditioned and instrumental in nature.¹² One can even discuss

whether Finland was a neutral country in the traditional sense, or merely ‘neutralized’ amid the post-World War realities.¹³

One of the key aspects of the conditional, instrumental, and aspirant nature of Finnish Cold War neutralism was the way its credibility as a political doctrine relied heavily on the general state of great power politics. The more dialogical and predictable the superpower relations were, the more credible Finland’s policy of neutralism was. This was mainly due to the FCMA Treaty effectively tying Finland’s geostrategic position to the Soviet sphere of influence and, thus, making Finland’s status sensitive to the fluctuations of great power relations. From the late 1950s onwards, this led to the key realization that Finland should only promote diplomatic processes that might open common ground between the great powers. This, then, would hopefully also increase predictability in Finland’s immediate security political environment.

Finland’s turn toward more active engagement in multilateral diplomacy on nuclear disarmament emerged only gradually during President Urho Kekkonen’s second term as president from 1962 onward. Before that, and under his predecessor, J. K. Paasikivi, nuclear weapons were rarely ever mentioned in public speeches or in Paasikivi’s diary entries.¹⁴ The harsh post-war geopolitical reality and “the years of danger” in domestic policy (stemming from the looming communist threat) forced the Finnish foreign policy leadership to concentrate on more fundamental concerns of small-state survival until the mid-1950s when the so-called Geneva spirit promised a more tranquil period in great power relations. Before the 1960s, there was no room for substantial efforts in the realm of multilateral diplomacy, including issues of disarmament.¹⁵ In fact, Finland was rather an object of disarmament, as exemplified in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty,¹⁶ which stipulated harsh sanctions on Finland, including both territorial concessions and war reparations to the Soviet Union. After the signing of the FCMA Treaty, Finland was also forced to opt out of the Marshall Plan, albeit the wording of the treaty was more favorable to Finland than similar treaties between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries.¹⁷

The FCMA Treaty connected Finland’s right to self-defense with the obligation to repel an attack on or through Finnish territory against the Soviet Union. As historian Osmo Apunen explains, the FCMA “[...] expanded Finland’s traditional defence doctrine [by recognizing] a certain military interest of the Soviet Union in Finland, which had been rejected earlier as incompatible with sovereignty.”¹⁸ This proved to be a crucial political tripwire or “fuse” that linked Finland’s (geo)political position and defense architecture, among other things, to the development of nuclear weapons technology, politics, and strategic thinking throughout the Cold War.

The period from Stalin’s death in 1953 to the second Berlin Crisis in 1958 witnessed a significant change in Finno-Soviet relations; the reciprocally felt suspicion and distrust during the Stalin era were replaced with a less confrontational and distrustful relationship, although the basic set-up remained: the Soviet Union wanted to prevent Finland’s slide toward the west and take care that the country would be on the Soviet Union’s side if a major European war flared

up.¹⁹ Finnish accession to the UN and the Nordic Council in 1955 were concrete examples of the country having gained more latitude in its foreign policy.

When the Soviet Union returned the military base of Porkkala to Finland in 1955, a relieved Paasikivi was finally able to say that a pen had fixed what the sword had shattered.²⁰ The short period of *détente* that followed the Geneva spirit also opened room for novel ideas of neutrality in Europe. This was exemplified by the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the anchoring of permanent neutrality by the Austrians themselves in the country's federal constitutional law. Finland also seized the opportunity; during negotiations on the early renewal of the FCMA Treaty with the new Soviet leadership, Helsinki managed to squeeze out a joint declaration that connected the treaty with Finland's aspirations to follow a policy of neutrality.²¹

But new challenges already loomed on the horizon. When it came to Finland's geostrategic position, the most daunting dilemma was the prospect of a rearmed West Germany—something NATO's plans for establishing a multilateral nuclear force (MLF) would have brought along. On the other side, 1958 brought along the "Night Frost Crisis" with the Soviet Union, when Moscow used economic coercion to force the government of Prime Minister Karl-August Fagerholm of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to step down (Fagerholm's coalition government enjoyed solid parliamentary support despite excluding the election winners, the Finnish People's Democratic League). In Finland, this was understood as an indication of yet another confrontative era and a wake-up call of sorts. For President Kekkonen—whose position in the political structure of Finland was strengthened by the affair—it became evident that Helsinki's passive and circumspect foreign policy posture did not meet the requirements of the day anymore.²²

Paradoxically, the formulation of Finland's "aspirant neutralism" in 1955 also opened a new field of political contestation over the extent of its neutrality. The Soviet Union went on to test Finland's stance several times in the next three decades, causing major diplomatic crises when suggesting joint consultations on military cooperation as prescribed in the FCMA (in 1961 and 1978)—which would have been serious infringements of Helsinki's understanding of its neutrality policy, including the independent status of its armed forces.²³

Origins of the "Enckell Doctrine" and the Initiative to Establish a Nordic Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone

Finland's accession to the UN, besides being a highly significant and symbolic event that marked the end of its post-Second World War foreign political isolation, also increased the scrutiny toward its position amidst the great power competition.²⁴ Finland's positioning to the fledgling field of nuclear disarmament diplomacy was articulated by the influential diplomat Ralph Enckell, the son of the former foreign minister, Carl Enckell. The so-called Enckell Doctrine stated that Finland should (only) support reasonable (that is, conceivable in practice) disarmament initiatives or proposals that both leading great powers

would likely support too. This formulation was already in the instructions given to Finland's first UN delegation in 1956, although the basic rationale of the guidelines still emphasized passivity. The delegation should follow the key principle of avoiding participation in negotiation processes and issues that would maintain or increase the clash of interests between the great powers. Should there be even the slightest of uncertainties over the prospect of achieving great power consensus, the delegation should abstain from voting or taking a stance. Finally, the delegation in New York was instructed to align the Finnish position with other Nordic countries whenever possible.²⁵ In 1957, Helsinki instructed the delegation to support all advanced and progressive disarmament proposals if these would satisfy the principles of equality (between great powers) and fairness among all UN member states—a principle that was still understood in the context of the East-West conflict. Moreover, the delegation in New York was also instructed to support gradual disarmament and in general all processes that might lead to *practical* advancements, especially in the field of nuclear disarmament.²⁶

During President Kekkonen's second term in office (1962–68), Finland started to embrace a more active posture in foreign policy.²⁷ In May 1963, Kekkonen initiated the country's first nuclear arms control initiative by proposing the establishment of a Nordic nuclear weapon-free zone (NNFZ).²⁸ Although the initiative was based on similar ideas of military disengagement as those proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957 and 1958 for Central Europe,²⁹ compared to Rapacki's proposal, Kekkonen's initiative was a rather hastily prepared agenda-setting instrument; it had little or no chance of success due to Norway's and Denmark's NATO membership.³⁰ Although effectively a non-starter, the NNFZ initiative was not completely useless in the political sense. It was used to signal Finland's security political preferences to a wider international audience and to take the initiative on controlling the discussion on Nordic security away from the Soviet Union.³¹ Kekkonen's proposal was also anchored to Sweden's Foreign Minister Östen Undén's proposal of 1962 for establishing a club of states committed to not possessing nuclear weapons (including the placement of foreign nuclear devices on their territory) in exchange for the nuclear powers' commitment to refrain from all further nuclear tests. Thus, despite of not having geographical dimensions in the same manner as the NWFZ initiatives had, the Undén Plan borrowed some elements from the Rapacki Plan and Frank Aiken's initiative to start negotiations on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons.³² In a similar vein, Kekkonen did not suggest a formal treaty between the Nordic states but merely a series of statements or reciprocal political commitments to the cause.³³

Finland followed the Enckell Doctrine quite obediently until the early 1960s. The rationale was to prove that Finland was able to formulate a coherent policy of neutrality at the UN without provoking a Soviet counter-reaction, albeit, in practice, the policy of abstention, at times, turned into a sort of non-policy.³⁴ The internal balancing between political neutrality and active foreign policy

posture led to problematic overaccommodation of Soviet interests within the region and a reflective political culture of appeasement captured by the (in)famous concept often invoked by Western commentators of “(self-)Finlandization.”³⁵ The country only started behaving more actively at the UN from 1962 onwards—as evident in the rising number of speeches and initiatives at the General Assembly in New York.³⁶ The sympathetic response given by the Finnish government to the Undén Plan is a good example.³⁷ The rather circumspect aspects of the Enckell Doctrine were gradually adjusted in practice during the 1960s. Finland slowly established its international status, which gave Helsinki more confidence in engaging in multilateral diplomacy. The turn toward a more active posture (albeit not an activist one like Sweden) was further exemplified by Kekkonen’s 1963 NNFZ idea. That said, Kekkonen and Finnish diplomats were in pains to promote the initiative as a balanced and genuine process that would serve the interests of all Nordic countries and both great powers alike.

Under the Swedish Shadow: Observing the ENDC Negotiations 1965–68

Although Finland was not a member of the ENDC, it had partial access to the negotiation process via its observer status. This proved to be important for later developments, which saw Finland chair the group of sponsor states advocating the signing of the NPT Treaty in 1968. Documents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archives show that Helsinki was not interested in the ENDC just for the sake of disarmament. Finnish diplomats followed closely not only the developments around the ongoing great power rapprochement but Sweden’s status and activities as a member of the ENDC too. Key Finnish diplomats such as Jakobson and Hyvärinen soon reasoned that if Finland would want to become a proactive bridge-builder or accommodator in the disarmament negotiations, it should cultivate its own profile, discernible enough from Sweden.³⁸ This corroborates with the observation that at least in the context of multilateral disarmament diplomacy, Helsinki viewed neutrality in rather pragmatic and relational terms, contrasting it with Sweden’s more activist and principled posture. Sweden’s ambassador Alva Myrdal’s activities were meticulously reported back to Helsinki by Finnish diplomats stationed in Stockholm.³⁹ In addition, the Finnish ambassador to Geneva Pentti Talvitie and Head of Department Risto Hyvärinen, who served as Finnish observers to the ENDC, were also in close contact with other delegations, especially with British and Soviet delegates.⁴⁰

When, in March 1966, Hyvärinen reported his findings from the ENDC to Helsinki,⁴¹ his key takeaway was that the Soviet Union had dropped the criticism of US bombings in North Vietnam from public statements. It was becoming evident that both superpowers regarded the NPT negotiations as too valuable to interlink them with other tensions in great power relations (although this changed briefly in 1967 due to the Middle East Crisis⁴²). Both Talvitie and Hyvärinen reasoned that the great powers had a somewhat

instrumental attitude to the ENDC negotiations—it provided them an arena where they could first and foremost share opinions on issues related to disarmament and international security. The continuation of discussions between the great powers was regarded almost as an intrinsic value itself by Talvitie and Hyvärinen.⁴³ Also in New York, the rapprochement between the United States and the USSR did not go unnoticed. Max Jakobson, the Finnish ambassador to the UN, reported about it in October 1966. It was at this point that key Finnish diplomats started framing the value of the NPT process in terms of positive “general political effects” on great power relations.⁴⁴ This obviously meant that the NPT process started to fit quite nicely with the basic tenets of the Enckell Doctrine.

The nonproliferation agenda also coincided with key political goals the Soviet Union had in Europe—especially preventing Germany from having nuclear weapons and thus solidifying the balance of power in Europe. Hyvärinen noted that although the Soviet Union tried to maintain a strict stance on the question of how the possession and control of nuclear weapons should be defined in the treaty, the Americans held most of the cards at this point. Should the negotiations dry up, Talvitie reasoned, this would effectively remove the legal and political obstacles to the nuclearization of West Germany, something that the Soviets opposed direly. Moreover, the establishment of NATO’s joint nuclear planning group (by making the so-called McNamara Committee permanent) was already a *fait accompli* from the Soviet perspective.⁴⁵

The fact that the stakes in achieving the NPT were so high from the Soviet perspective was perceived as a crucial opportunity for Finland: should the NPT negotiations end in a US-USSR consensus, it would also hinder the possibility of Moscow coercing Helsinki with the prospect of a nuclearized West Germany.⁴⁶ In early 1967, it had become evident that both leading superpowers (and the United Kingdom) had shared interest in getting the deal done, albeit there were still certain frictions about how the monitoring of the treaty should be arranged, and how the status of Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) should be defined. At times, it seemed there were more intra-alliance frictions than issues between the two superpowers. West Germany, for example, criticized the way the United States negotiated directly with the Soviets, and, to some extent, the substance of the negotiation agenda, too. German diplomats thought the treaty would effectively lead to the accomplishment of the “Rapacki Plan” in Central Europe. Reports from their Finnish counterparts show that Helsinki was aware of the stakes for Germany; in the end, Bonn would have to face the cold political facts of great power politics and consent to the developments.⁴⁷

The ambition of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons to “irresponsible nations outside Europe,” as Hyvärinen described the standpoint in a rather ethnocentric manner in 1966,⁴⁸ brought the superpowers closer together. Indeed, Hyvärinen included only scant remarks on the positions of the so-called eight-state group of neutrals and non-allied countries in the ENDC negotiations in his reports. The dissatisfaction expressed by the United States and USSR toward Sweden’s initiative on verification and safeguard measures

was instead reported back to Helsinki in a detailed manner.⁴⁹ The picture emerging is that as a truly politically neutral country with relatively strong and independent defense forces, Sweden did not see as much intrinsic value in great power détente as Finland did, where the positive dialogue between the superpowers was perceived as an opportunity to enhance Finland's security by political means.⁵⁰ Already in July 1967, approximately one month before the United States and USSR presented their first joint draft resolution at the ENDC, Soviet representatives in Geneva hinted to Talvitie that Finland's active endeavors in facilitating great power compromise were "highly appreciated."⁵¹ At this point, Ilkka Pastinen started to include more details on the diverse interests of the eight-nations group at the ENDC in his reports—already hinting at the possibility of playing a "bridge-building role" when the negotiations would eventually move to the UN General Assembly.⁵² Indeed, the "feel of the game" of multilateral disarmament diplomacy acquired from the discussions at ENDC was made full use of when Finland eventually went on to act as the chair of the group of NPT draft resolution sponsors at the UN in the Spring of 1968.

The Patience of a Saint Rewarded? Finland's "Perfect" Role as a Mediator in the UN Negotiations between the Superpowers and the Rest

The eight non-allied states were generally dissatisfied with the fact that the draft resolution presented by the United States and the USSR in October 1967 made demands only to the NNWS, thus already pointing to the fundamental imbalance of the NPT architecture—namely, between international order (stabilization of the status quo, based on hierarchy) and equity among sovereign states.⁵³ More specifically, India and Romania (at the time the latter strived for increasingly autonomous foreign policy within the Warsaw Pact) were disappointed that the issue of negative security assurances was left out of the joint US-USSR draft resolution. Moreover, Sweden increased pressure on the two superpowers by presenting its own draft of the verification measures of the treaty. According to Finnish reports, this irritated both the US and USSR representatives. They had left the issue of verification out of their draft deliberately to continue negotiating it on a bilateral basis.⁵⁴

Despite the mixed response to the first US-USSR draft treaty, Helsinki already saw an emerging great power consensus as an opportunity to profile itself as a status quo-oriented country and, thereby, establish a diplomatic position discernible from that of Sweden. In 1967, at the UN General Assembly, Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen presented the Finnish position that would welcome the signing of the NPT already by the end of that session. Karjalainen did not shy away from highlighting the positive "general political consequences" the treaty would have on great power relations.⁵⁵

Thus, between 1965 and 1967, Finland clearly started positioning itself as a bridge-builder along two axes. First, it was keen on supporting détente

between the superpowers, albeit from a position dictated by its own security concerns (Kekkonen's key idea was that any genuine notion of peace in Europe would not be possible without peace between the two leading superpowers). Second, the tension between the great (nuclear) powers and the rest—the nuclear haves and have-nots—needed to be solved in a way not jeopardizing the emerging great power consensus. This formed the basis of Finland's great power accommodation and led Finnish diplomacy to highlight the need for the institutionalization of the international nuclear order with explicit agreements—something that would concretize great power responsibility.

When it came to the latter question, at the ENDC, the United States and the USSR seemed to be very reluctant to give concessions to the group of non-allied states. Sweden's proposals on a verification regime with linkages to a comprehensive test ban and international control of the transfers of fissile materials were rejected with frustration by both, Moscow and Washington.⁵⁶ The only concession the superpowers seemed willing to make in the fall of 1967 related to Mexico's suggestion that there should be an additional article in the draft treaty articulating binding commitments to nuclear disarmament by the NWS.⁵⁷

More concessions followed in the form of a refined US-USSR joint draft resolution in January 1968, this time echoing Sweden's demands on pervasive verification and a supervision regime. However, the proposed measures concerned only NNWS—something Sweden's proposal had explicitly tried to avoid—and hence caused notable resentment among NNWS. India's long-pursued negative security assurances were also left out of the draft, as the United States and the USSR still had disagreements on the question (e.g., how it would affect the status of East and West Germany). Eventually, shortly after the NPT was approved by the UN General Assembly, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States formulated a joint UN Security Council resolution on the matter.⁵⁸ Finally, almost five years after President Kekkonen's NNFZ initiative, the fact that nuclear weapon-free zones were also mentioned as a separate article (VII) in the latest draft was noted with satisfaction in Helsinki.⁵⁹

In February 1968, it was becoming evident that the latest joint US-USSR draft resolution presented at the ENDC would serve as the basis for the final UN negotiations (only minor tweaks presented by Sweden were added to the final draft resolution before the ENDC deadline in mid-March). Finnish diplomats keenly reported that their country's active use of its observer status in Geneva did not go unnoticed by the superpowers. Of the ENDC members, only India, Brazil, and Romania were considered unlikely to agree on signing the treaty in its present form.⁶⁰

Finally, in April 1968, Finland's consistent presence as an observer at the ENDC negotiations was rewarded when representatives of the United States and the USSR asked Helsinki to lead the group of sponsors for their joint draft resolution at the forthcoming UN negotiations. On April 16, the Finnish ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, who would eventually chair the group of

sponsors, asked permission from Helsinki to take an active role in the negotiation process, including opposing all efforts to postpone it.⁶¹ Hyvärinen, now the head of the Political Department at the Foreign Ministry, sent his agreement the very next day.⁶²

Jakobson presented the draft resolution on behalf of the group of sponsors at the beginning of May 1968.⁶³ In his speech, Jakobson highlighted the “long and complex process of negotiations and debate” since the first proposal presented by Ireland’s Frank Aiken. Finland’s priority was to address any gaps “in the international order relating to nuclear weapons.” He noted that albeit China and France had not participated in the NPT negotiations they, too, would most likely continue acting according to the principles of the treaty in the future. He also recognized the prominent role of Sweden at ENDC, as well as the basic concerns of the nonaligned movement. The NPT was presented as the future cornerstone of the international order that might eventually lead to genuine disarmament. In essence, one can read from Jakobson’s speech that to end the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the international community should put a halt to horizontal proliferation. It elucidates between the lines that Helsinki already had an implicit hierarchical reading of the significance and urgency of what would later be known as the three pillars of the NPT.

Quite interestingly, Jakobson also managed to mention President Kekkonen’s 1963 NNFZ initiative (which he himself had drafted) in his speech, as well as Finland’s status as a “neutral country” seeking security by “promoting the development of a peaceful and rational world order based on the efficient functioning of a universal collective security system.”⁶⁴ Jakobson ended his speech on Finland’s stand in a rather apt manner:

It may be too bold to say that this [the immense political significance of the NPT] foreshadows the transformation on the balance of terror into an internationalized nuclear deterrent within the institutional framework of the United Nations. But it does carry the promise that the collective security system of the Charter, based as it is on cooperation between the permanent members of the Security Council, can be revitalized in the interests of peace and security for all nations.⁶⁵

During the next few weeks, Jakobson actively promoted the draft resolution and tried to get more states to join the group of sponsors.⁶⁶ In his report to Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen, Jakobson highlighted the unprecedented level of cooperation and understanding between the US and USSR delegations over the matter.⁶⁷ At the end of May, Finland (through Jakobson) arbitrated the last minor revisions in articles V and IV of the treaty, mostly to accommodate the demands made by Sweden and Mexico. The basic dilemma remained, though: the political issues that the NPT solved were mostly European and concentrated on the “German question”; this was hard to sell to states outside of Europe, especially to Africa and Latin America.⁶⁸

After the final changes (May–June 1968), several states of the nonaligned movement also joined the group of sponsors in quick succession. On June 6, the NPT was accepted at the UN with 94 votes in favor, 22 abstaining, and 4 voting against the treaty (Tanzania, Zambia, Cuba, and Albania). Sweden had informed Finland already on May 31 that it would vote in favor of the treaty, although with major critical observations and reserving the right not to ratify the treaty.⁶⁹ In an official statement, Finland's Foreign Minister Ahti Karjalainen once again emphasized the "general political significance" of the NPT and the way it exemplified the responsibility felt by the two superpowers on maintaining world peace.⁷⁰ In June, Keijo Korhonen recommended further strengthening Finland's diplomatic profile in the matter by signing the treaty first—something that would be duly achieved.⁷¹

Hence, when it comes to understanding the gradual development of Finland's nuclear disarmament diplomacy in the 1960s, the more proactive interpretation of the Enckell Doctrine was clearly visible in the way Finland participated in the NPT negotiations between 1965 and 1968. Finland not merely supported this process that was evidently based on a certain level of great power consensus, but also tried actively to promote great power interests in negotiations with small powers, especially the counter-hegemonic group of non-allied states. Thus, it can be argued that Finland's Cold War disarmament politics was a rather peculiar amalgamation of small-state realism, idiosyncratic interpretation of Finland's unique geopolitical position within the Cold War international order, and certain liberalist ideals on great power responsibility.

Conclusion

Although the Geneva spirit and accession to the UN in 1955 gave Finland more room to cultivate its agency in world politics, the nature of its more active foreign policy posture and notion of neutrality were always somewhat limited or contested. In theoretical terms, the example of Finland highlights the need to interpret neutrality as a relational and context-dependent concept. This was also evident in Finland's role in the NPT negotiations at least in two related aspects.

First, Finland positioned itself alongside the leading nuclear powers by accommodating their agendas. This was evident already during the preparatory ENDC negotiations when key Finnish diplomats perceived the value of the NPT process in terms of enhancing great power consensus and, thus, strengthening the bipolar structure of international politics, as well as solving the "German question." In the NPT process, Finland strove to position itself as a mediator, accepted by both the United States and the USSR, between the nuclear powers and the rest. This policy of accommodation was not completely unconditional, though, but tethered to the goal of great power "responsibilization."

Secondly, Finland juxtaposed its status and pragmatic policy line with Sweden's more activist and progressive foreign policy habitus. Finnish diplomats

followed Sweden's active role at the ENDC closely between 1965 and 1967, acknowledging the need to cultivate a disarmament profile discernible enough from Sweden. Together with the policy of abstaining from great power rivalries, this led to a rather peculiar, pragmatic gradualism that prioritized the ordering effect of the emerging nonproliferation regime over more ambitious and progressive disarmament agendas favored by the nonaligned movement and other neutrals.

During the latter stages of the hectic NPT negotiations in the spring of 1968, Finland had a short spell in the limelight of multilateral diplomacy when it was asked to join the group of sponsors of the joint US-USSR draft resolution. Moreover, Finland's ambassador to the UN, Max Jakobson, who had been a key architect of President Kekkonen's 1963 proposal to establish an NWFZ in the Nordic region, was offered to chair the group of sponsors—a position in which he took on the role of a persuader more than a neutral mediator. The challenge was to convince most of the UN members, especially members of the nonaligned movement, to accept the NPT, even without ambitious disarmament commitments on the side of the recognized NWS. The concerns of the nuclear “have-nots,” like those related to guaranteed access to the peaceful use of nuclear technology, had to be mediated in a way that would not compromise consensus over shared great power interests.

Hence, neutrality in the case of Finland's diplomacy toward the NPT exhibits strong contextual and relational traits. The Finnish foreign policy elite did go through a lot of trouble to receive recognition for its policy of neutrality both from the East and the West. Unlike Sweden, Finland's status as a neutral state during the Cold War was always limited and tied to the currents of great power relations due to the 1948 FCMA Treaty with the Soviet Union. Hence, during the NPT process, Finland started promoting itself as a diplomatic bridge-builder—or as President Kekkonen had famously said in 1961—as a physician rather than a judge of international politics.⁷² However, the bridge-building capacity was limited to projects with relatively safe expectations about great power consensus, or at least to projects with close to zero prospects of causing conflicts between the United States and the USSR.

Albeit there are no signs in the archives that the Finnish foreign policy elite would have regarded the establishment of a *de facto* codified nuclear duopoly as its goal, the combination of the limited peacetime neutrality and great power accommodation drove it to support the agenda of the two leading nuclear powers. Thus, it was also natural that the Finnish government was among the first signatories of the NPT in the summer of 1968—a symbolic gesture that key Finnish diplomats participating in the disarmament negotiations strongly encouraged.

Of course, Finnish foreign policy genuinely prioritized the importance of nonproliferation, as this was a question very much at the core of the country's national security; the prospect of nuclearized West Germany would have given the Soviet Union a justification for demanding closer military-political cooperation with Finland, based on the FCMA Treaty. This would have effectively

put Finnish aspirations of even limited peacetime neutrality to an end. Thus, the policy of pragmatic gradualism—although something that would most likely not lead to genuine disarmament anytime soon—was quickly perceived as a virtuous choice by the Finnish foreign policy elite. Paradoxically, this meant that Finland was ready to accept it would live with a nuclear superpower as its neighbor for the foreseeable future.

To conclude, Finland perceived the NPT process first and foremost as a logical continuum of great power politics; the accomplishment of the NPT was always as much about the management of international order and “responsibilization” of great power politics as it was about the question of non-proliferation as such—not to mention more progressive notions of nuclear disarmament. This was evident in the way key Finnish diplomats in the process learned to appreciate the negotiations as an intrinsic value and contrasted with Sweden’s position that emphasized the NPT merely as a first minor step toward genuine disarmament. In this sense, Finland’s role as a neutral country should be understood equally as relational—constructing a profile discernible enough from Sweden—and contextual—prioritizing superpower consensus for stability in Europe over rapid advancements in nuclear disarmament.

Notes

- 1 Risto Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehiä, viekkautta ja vakoilua* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 2000), 171. The quote is taken from Risto Hyvärinen’s memoirs when he describes the nature of Finnish disarmament politics during the Cold War. Together with the likes of Max Jakobson, Ilkka Pastinen, and Keijo Korhonen, Hyvärinen was one of the key architects of the Finnish disarmament and arms control diplomacy of the 1960s. Hyvärinen served as an officer in the Finnish Defence Forces, specializing in arms control and disarmament issues, until 1965 when President Kekkonen appointed him the head of the Political Department at the Foreign Ministry—the most influential position within the ministry. The department was responsible for strategic planning of Finnish foreign policy, as well as to follow key trends in the international sphere through the prism of national interests, and it was tightly controlled by the president, not that much by the foreign minister, in the 1960s and 1970s. After a three-year assignment as ambassador to Belgrade, Hyvärinen was selected as the special representative of the UN secretary-general in the Geneva disarmament negotiations—a position he “inherited” from his colleague, Ambassador Ilkka Pastinen. See Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehiä*, 63; Timo Soikkanen, *Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasiainhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella* (Hämeenlinna: Ulkoasiainministeriö, 2003), 273.
- 2 The eight non-allied states’ group consisted of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden, United Arab Republic (UAR). Finnish diplomats of the era generally referred to these states together as a group of eight “non-allied powers” (*liittoutumattomat vallat*), “neutral countries” (*puolueettomat maat*), or simply “the eight states’ group” (*kahdeksan vallan ryhmä*). In contrast, the term “nonaligned states” was not used as often, as it was perhaps regarded a more specific, referring to what was to become known as the nonaligned movement, thus excluding Sweden, for example. The term N+N (nonaligned and neutral states) was not yet used at this point. See, e.g., The Archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland [from here on MFA], 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen’s memorandum “Genèven asestariisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe,” March 23,

- 1966; MFA 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen päätyminen Genevessä," March 30, 1968; Joel Pekuri's telegram from Stockholm, "Geneven aseriisuntaneuvottelut," September 1, 1966. Another term used by the Finnish diplomats was "the group of eight mid-powers." See, e.g., *ibid.*, Ralph Enckell's telegram from Stockholm "Aseidenriisunta Ruotsin valtiopäivien ulkopoliittisessa keskustelussa," April 2, 1968. I would like to thank for the editors of this volume on highlighting the significance of correct terminology in this matter.
- 3 See Thomas Jonter, *The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).
 - 4 Jargalsaikhan makes similar observations on Mongolia's disarmament advocacy. See Enkhsaikhan Jargalsaikhan, "The Role of Small States in Promoting International Security: The Case of Mongolia," *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* 1, no. 2 (2018): 404–35.
 - 5 See Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, "The Role of Public Opinion in Finland's Foreign and Security Policy," in *National Security, Public Opinion and Regime Asymmetry: A Six-Country Study*, eds. T. J. Cheng and W-C. Lee (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2017): 147–73.
 - 6 When it came to weapons of mass destruction themselves, the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947 explicitly forbade Finland from acquiring, possessing, or owning nuclear weapons.
 - 7 I have elsewhere labeled this policy of great power accommodation as small-state liberalism. It can be separated from the more passive and circumspect reading of small-state realism. See Tapio Juntunen, "Harmaantuvaa pienvaltiorealismia: Suomi, ydinaseiden kieltosopimus ja ulkopoliittikan koulukuntavalinnat," *Kosmopolis* 48, no. 4 (2019): 39–63.
 - 8 On the concept and historical evolution of the international practice of neutrality and small-state foreign policy, see further Clive Archer, Alyson J. K. Bailes and Anders Wivel (eds.), *Small States and International Security. Europe and Beyond* (London: Routledge, 2016); Baldur Thorhalsson, *Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland's External Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2019); Christine Ingebritsen, Iver B. Neumann, Sieglinde Gstöhl and Jessica Beyer (eds.), *Small States in International Relations* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006); Herbert R. Reginbogin and Pascal Lottaz (eds.), *Permanent Neutrality: A Model for Peace, Security, and Justice* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020); Pascal Lottaz, Heinz Gärtner and Herbert R. Reginbogin (eds.), *Neutral Beyond the Cold War. Neutral States and Post-Cold War International System* (Lanham: Lexington Book, 2022).
 - 9 See Pascal Lottaz, "Introduction," in *Neutral Beyond the Cold War. Neutral States and Post-Cold War International System*, eds. Pascal Lottaz, Heinz Gärtner and Herbert R. Reginbogin (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2022), xi.
 - 10 See also Christine Agius, *The Social Construction of Swedish Neutrality: Challenges to Swedish Identity and Sovereignty* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).
 - 11 Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, "Neutrality as Identity?: Finland's Quest for Security in the Cold War," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 51–78; Ari-Elmeri Hyvönen and Tapio Juntunen, "From 'Spiritual Defence' to Robust Resilience in the Finnish Comprehensive Security Model," in *Nordic Societal Security: Convergence and Divergence*, eds. Sebastian Larsson and Mark Rhinard (London: Routledge, 2020), 154–78.
 - 12 Already in 1952, then prime minister Kekkonen described Finland's international standing as "a certain kind of neutrality" (*tietyntyylinen puolueettomuus*). The fact that Kekkonen followed ideas that originated from Soviet Union and consulted Soviet diplomats on whether it would be appropriate for him to develop the idea of a Nordic neutrality in his forthcoming speech has been widely documented in Finnish historiography. That said, there are evidence that Sweden's prime minister

- Tage Erlander also might have promoted the idea to Kekkonen in late 1951; it was Sweden, after all, who had made the 1948 initiative to establish Scandinavian Defense Union. See, for example, Kimmo Rentola, *Stalin ja Suomen kohtalo* (Helsinki: Otava, 2016), 212–13; Jukka Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan ja Suomi suomettui?* (Helsinki: Otava, 1996), 65–71; Johanna Rainio-Niemi, *The ideological Cold War. The Politics of Neutrality in Austria and Finland* (New York: Routledge, 2014), 40.
- 13 See Reginbogin and Lottaz, *Permanent Neutrality*, 5.
 - 14 Kari Miekkavaara, *Ydinaseiden uhka Suomen puolustukselle. Päätäjien käsitykset uhkasta ja toimenpiteet sen torjumiseksi vuosina 1945–1971* (Turku: University of Turku, 2004); Jukka Rislakki, *Paha sektori. Atomipommi, kylmä sota ja Suomi* (Helsinki: WSOY, 2010), 31–32.
 - 15 Although disarmament was not a pivotal foreign policy tool for Finland during the inter-war period, Finland did participate in multilateral disarmament negotiations and was an eager early supporter of the League of Nation—at least until the mid-1930s turn toward relying on Scandinavian neutrality (see further Unto Vesa, *Finnish Disarmament Policy* (Helsinki: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 1983), 10–12, 27.
 - 16 Pekka Visuri, *Puolustusvoimat kylmässä sodassa. Suomen puolustuspolitiikka vuosina 1945–1961* (Porvoo: WSOY, 1994), 45–52.
 - 17 Kimmo Rentola, “From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally: Finland in Soviet Policy, 1953–58,” *Cold War History* 1, no. 1 (2000): 75.
 - 18 Osmo Apunen, “Finland’s Treaties on Security Policy,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 15, no. 5 (1980): 255.
 - 19 Juhana Aunesluoma, Magnus Petersson and Charles Silva, “Deterrence of Reassurance? Nordic Responses to the First Détente, 1953–1956,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 32, no. 2 (2007): 183–208; see also Rentola, “From Half-Adversary to Half-Ally.”
 - 20 Osmo Apunen, *Paasikiven-Kekkonen linja* (Helsinki: Tammi, 1977), 95–98.
 - 21 Aunesluoma and Rainio-Niemi, “Neutrality as Identity?” 54; see also Rainio-Niemi, *The ideological Cold War*.
 - 22 Jukka Nevakivi, “Kekkonen, the Soviet Union and Scandinavia — Aspects of Policy in the Years 1948–1965,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 22, no. 2 (1997): 69–76. Kekkonen’s role in the Night Frost Crisis has been one of the most contested issues in Finnish political historiography. What is not contested, though, is that the episode solidified Kekkonen’s status and power both in foreign and domestic politics. Although the Night Frost Crisis was effectively caused by Moscow’s irritation toward certain right-leaning anti-Soviet members of the Social Democratic party in Fagerholm’s cabinet, the period also coincided with rising Soviet resentment toward NATO’s MLF plans.
 - 23 After the so-called Note Crisis of 1961—perhaps the most serious diplomatic crisis between the Soviet Union and Finland during the Cold War—we have to go all the way to the year 1989 when Soviet Premier Gorbachev acknowledged Finland’s neutrality publicly without any reservations.
 - 24 See Juhani Suomi, *Kriisien aika. Urho Kekkonen 1956–1962* (Helsinki: Otava, 1992), 87–88.
 - 25 See MFA, 113 B YK:n yleiskokous v. 1956, “Ohjeet Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokoukseen sen 1. istuntokaudeksi määrätylelle valtuuskunnalle,” November 7, 1956. The doctrine was put into test immediately when Finland abstained from voting in the resolution that condemned Soviet Union’s actions in Hungary in 1956—despite of the fact that domestic opinion in Finland was strongly against Soviet Union in the matter. On Finland’s traditional alignment with other Nordic states, see Hanna Ojanen ja Tapio Raunio, “The Varying Degrees and Meanings of Nordicness in Finnish Foreign Policy,” *Global Affairs* 4, no. 4–5 (2018): 405–18.

- 26 See MFA, 113 B YK:n XII yleiskokous v. 1957, “Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien yleiskokouksen 12. istuntokaudeksi määrätyle valtuuskunnalle,” September 13, 1957.
- 27 Miekkavaara, *Ydinaseiden uhka Suomen puolustukselle*, 42–43; Suomi, *Kriisien aika*, 89.
- 28 See Tapio Juntunen, “Käytännöllistä viisautta vai kaavoihin kangistumista: Suomen alueellinen ydinasevalvontapolitiikka kylmän sodan aikana,” *Kosmopolis* 46, no. 1 (2016): 27–44.
- 29 See Cecilie Hellestveit and Daniel Mekonnen, “Nuclear Weapon-free Zones,” in *Nuclear Weapons under International Law*, eds. Gro Nystuen et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 360. Ryan Musto, “‘A question of survival’: Canada and the Rapacki Plan for the denuclearisation of Central Europe, 1957–59,” *Cold War History* 21, no. 4 (2021): 509–31.
- 30 Finland did eventually go on to support Rapacki plan—a move that caused notable resentment in the West—although Kekkonen’s initial reaction to the plan, according to his diary notes, was more evasive than enthusiastic (see Urho Kekkonen, *Urho Kekkonen päiväkirjat 1. 1958–62*, ed. Juhana Suomi (Helsinki: Otava, 2001), 48.
- 31 See further Juntunen, “Käytännöllistä viisautta”; Osmo Apunen, “Three ‘Waves’ of the Kekkonen Plan and Nordic Security in the 1980s,” *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 11, no. 1 (1980): 16–32.
- 32 See further Katarina Brodin, “The Undén Proposal,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 1, no. 4 (1966): 18–29.
- 33 There is rather convincing evidence that the incentive for the NNFZ initiative came from Moscow already in 1958–59. Moscow’s aim was to use Finland as a medium to increase pressure towards Denmark and Norway due to their somewhat ambivalent nuclear status within NATO. With the Note Crisis still fresh in mind, Kekkonen wanted to wait for the right occasion and formulate the initiative so that it would not be completely associated with the Soviet Union’s foreign policy ambitions within the region. See Nevakivi, *Miten Kekkonen pääsi valtaan*, 211–15; Osmo Apunen, *Linjamiehet. Paasikivi-seuran historia* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 2005), 129–30; Juhani Suomi, *Presidentti. Urho Kekkonen 1962–1968* (Helsinki, Otava, 1994), 123. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the conditions for such an initiative seemed to be more favorable. Moreover, the head of political department at the Foreign Ministry Max Jakobson, who also prepared Kekkonen’s speech on the matter, instructed the Finnish embassies to highlight the independent nature of Kekkonen’s initiative and to associate it with similar ambitions Josip Broz Tito had in the Balkans. See Max Jakobson, *Veteen piirretty viiva. Havaintoja ja merkintöjä vuosilta 1953–1965* (Helsinki: Otava, 1980), 317–19; MFA, 89 H Pohjolan ydinaseeton vyöhyke—December 31, 1968, Jakobson’s telegram to the embassies. See also Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, 131.
- 34 See Max Jakobson, 38. *Kerros. Havaintoja ja muistiinpanoja vuosilta 1965–1971* (Helsinki: Otava, 1983), 44–49.
- 35 Tuomas Forsberg and Matti Pesu, “The ‘Finlandisation’ of Finland: The Ideal Type, the Historical Model, and the Lessons Learnt,” *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 27, no. 3 (2016): 473–95; Tapio Juntunen, “Helsinki Syndrome: The Parachronistic Renaissance of Finlandization in International Politics,” *New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations* 25, no. 1 (2017): 55–83.
- 36 Apunen, *Paasikiven-Kekkonen linja*, 227–30.
- 37 Apunen, *Linjamiehet*, 125–31. Finland’s support for the Undén plan was significant in the sense that the plan involved demands toward the nuclear powers, which they were not ready to concede at the time. Nevertheless, the Finnish response to the plan still fulfilled the key principle of equity between the great powers.
- 38 Although the objective is mostly implicitly present in the reporting, it was also articulated explicitly by Jakobson in his correspondence with Helsinki in 1968. See

- MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimuksen poliittinen sanoma," May 17, 1968. See also Hyvärinen, *Virkamiehii*, 173; Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 141.
- 39 See for example MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Henrik Blomsted's telegram from Stockholm "Geneven aseriisuntaneuvottelut; yhteenveto suurlähettiläs Alva Myrdalin lausunnosta 10.5.1965," May 13, 1965; Joel Pekuri's telegrams from Stockholm "Geneven aseriisuntakonferenssi; suurlähettiläs Myrdalin puheenvuoro 4.8.1966," August 9, 1966; "Aseriisuntaneuvottelut Genvessä; suurlähettiläs Alva Myrdalin puheenvuoro 23.2.1967"; "Aseriisuntakomitea. Ydinsulkuneuvottelut, Ruotsin lausunto," February 9, 1968.
- 40 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pentti Talvitie's telegrams from Geneva, May 5, 1966; February 23, 1967.
- 41 See two key memorandums from Risto Hyvärinen: MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, "Genèven aseistariisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," March 23, 1966; "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966.
- 42 See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, July 22, 1967. When discussing great power relations, the role of China was not at the center of Finland's focus at this point. In other words, great power politics was emphatically observed from the perspective of the competition between United States and Soviet Union.
- 43 See e.g. MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pentti Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, February 23, 1967; Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966.
- 44 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakysymys; YK:n 21. ja 22. yleiskokous, Jakobson's telegrams from New York, October 20, 1966 and November 3, 1966; Jakobson's confidential memorandum to Foreign Minister Karjalainen, January 4, 1967.
- 45 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Aseriisuntaneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," August 15, 1966. See also Ambassador Leo Tuominen's telegram from London, "Englantilaisia käsitäksiä aseriisuntanäkymistä Genèveen kokouksen kynnyksellä," January 28, 1967.
- 46 Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 133.
- 47 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Leo Tuominen's telegram from London "Englantilaisia käsitäksiä aseriisuntanäkymistä Genèveen kokouksen kynnyksellä," January 28, 1967. One representative of West Germany went as far as describing the joint US-USSR draft resolution to Talvitie as a "modern form of colonialism in worst possible sense," see *ibid.*, Risto Hyvärinen's telegram from Geneva, March 17, 1967.
- 48 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Risto Hyvärinen's memorandum "Geneven aseistariisuntaneuvottelujen nykytilanne," March 23, 1966.
- 49 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, telegram from Geneva, August 31, 1967.
- 50 Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 141-42.
- 51 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Talvitie's telegram from Geneva, July 22, 1967.
- 52 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," September 28, 1967.
- 53 See Hedley Bull, "Rethinking Non-Proliferation," *International Affairs* 51, no. 4 (1975): 175-89.
- 54 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen's memorandum "Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen nykyvaihe," September 28, 1967.
- 55 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Pastinen's confidential letter to Hyvärinen, February 16, 1968.
- 56 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, telegram from Geneva, October 4, 1967. Officially Finland had joined other Nordic countries in supporting the "package deal" of nonproliferation, comprehensive test ban, and international control of fissile material transfers in 1965. The agreement as such left open on what

- elements in the three-piece package the countries would emphasize, including the sequence in which the elements should be agreed on in the multilateral arena. Finland clearly emphasized the non-proliferation component of the package as a first step in a process of gradual disarmament, whereas Sweden supported a more holistic and comprehensive approach that would not dissect the elements in a way that would lead to effective gradualism.
- 57 This was reported to Helsinki in October 1967. See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Telegram from Geneva, October 16, 1967.
 - 58 UN Security Council, S/RES/255, June 19, 1968. In the resolution the three NPT depositaries only committed to aid the NNWS should they become “a victim of an act or an object of threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used,” thus merely affirming their UN Charter responsibilities without giving proper negative security assurances. See further John Simpson, “The role of Security Assurances in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” in *Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation*, ed. J. W. Knopf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 57–85.
 - 59 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen’s memorandum “Uusi luonnon ydinaseiden leviämisen estäväksi sopimukseksi,” February 6, 1968. This was also due to the fact that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, or the Tlatelolco Treaty, was opened for signatories already in 1967.
 - 60 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Ilkka Pastinen’s memorandum “Neuvottelut ydinsulkusopimuksesta,” February 23, 1968; Keijo Korhonen’s memorandum “Ydinsulkusopimusneuvottelujen päättyminen Genevessä,” March 30, 1968.
 - 61 The group of sponsors, established in mid-April 1968, advocated and presented the draft resolution of the NPT on alongside United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union at the UN. It consisted of the small European neutral countries (excluding Sweden), states from both NATO and the Warsaw Pact and a group of Arab states. According to Jakobson, the initiative to establish the group came jointly from United States and Soviet Union (United Kingdom was not mentioned). They wanted the composition of the group to be geographically as representative as possible, but the whole of Latin American and Africa, as well as majority of Asian countries, decided, for various reasons, not to support the first draft resolution. Thus, the key task of the chair of the sponsors group was to persuade more states to join the group and probe their possible demands. By the end of April, according to Jakobson’s telegram from New York, the group of sponsors consisted of United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, Denmark, Norway, Iceland Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Iraq, Morocco, Iran, Sudan and Lebanon. MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegrams from New York, April 16, 1968; April 29, 1968. See also Jakobson, 38. *Kerros*, 143–47.
 - 62 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Hyvärinen’s telegram to New York, April 17, 1968.
 - 63 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram from New York, April 29, 1968.
 - 64 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram and draft text of speech from New York, April 30, 1968.
 - 65 Ibid.
 - 66 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s telegram from New York, May 16, 1968.
 - 67 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Max Jakobson’s report “Ydinsulkusopimuksen poliittinen sanoma,” May 17, 1968.
 - 68 In his reporting from New York, Jakobson does not give any details about his negotiations with representatives of specific countries, but on the basis of the reporting, it

- can be reasoned that Jakobson's focus was directed to Sweden's and Mexico's demands in particular, and the remaining Latin American and African countries more generally. Certain countries, such as the "outspoken Albania," who aligned with China, was deemed as a "lost cause" by Jakobson. See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Jakobson's telegrams from New York, May 27, 1968, and May 31, 1968.
- 69 See MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Telegram from Stockholm, May 31, 1968.
- 70 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, "Ulkoasiainministeri Ahti Karjalaisen lausunto ydinsulkusopimuksen johdosta," June 13, 1968.
- 71 MFA, 113 C3 Aseriisuntakys. 3/1162-65, Keijo Korhonen's memorandum "Ydinaseiden leviämisen estävän kansainvälisen sopimuksen allekirjoittaminen," June 24, 1968.
- 72 Urho Kekkonen, *Neutrality: The Finnish Position* (London: Heinemann, 1970), 94. The speech was written by the architect of Finland's disarmament policy, Ralph Enckell.

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8 Switzerland

The Nuclear Path and the NPT

*Benno Zogg**

Introduction

At first glance, Switzerland's position on nuclear weapons and the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) appears riddled with several paradoxes. Switzerland was *the* “permanent neutral” in the center of Europe and, to this day, is proud of its reputation as an actor fostering international peace, diplomacy, and arms control. However, for the longest time, Berne worked on an advanced nuclear program, exploring the option of building the country's own bomb. While the Swiss city of Geneva hosted several negotiations and conferences on nuclear science and disarmament, Switzerland played no role in the negotiation of the NPT and ratified it only in 1977. As a non-member of the United Nations (UN), Berne did not play an active diplomatic role in the NPT process. Even interactions with other neutral states—of which some, like Sweden, were in very similar positions and with similar ambitions—were limited.

Several phases in Swiss foreign policy help explain these paradoxes that led Switzerland from keenly exploring ways to acquire nuclear military capabilities in the 1950s and early 1960s to dismantling the last nuclear working groups in 1988. Switzerland's considerations on the nuclear option were subject to heated domestic debates on military doctrine and financial and technological means around an autonomous defense. At the same time, however, these deliberations were heavily influenced by the international environment, developments regarding technological advancements, and the international discussion on (non-)proliferation. As such, the international community had gone through phases of *détente*: from anticipating exponential nuclear proliferation to establishing the NPT as a multilateral framework for nonproliferation.

This chapter explores how international and domestic political processes coincided with intra-governmental, societal, and military-strategic developments

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to shape Switzerland's attitude and perception toward the NPT. Neutrality will be considered as a concept and rhetorical reference point throughout the chapter regarding the domestic discourse and the limited diplomatic actions Switzerland undertook on the international stage concerning the NPT. Proponents of a nuclear-armed Switzerland stressed that a neutral's autonomous defense required nuclear capabilities because it could not rely on allies. Meanwhile, proponents of a "humanitarian" interpretation of neutrality rejected the nuclear option altogether. Neutrality thus was a concept employable by opposing camps coming to contrarian conclusions, which appears to have restricted Switzerland's potential diplomatic role.

Strategic Assessment and Neutrality: Switzerland after 1945

Switzerland emerged from the Second World War largely unharmed. Its territory had been unviolated, and its militia army saw no combat action. This ostensibly "miraculous" situation in the midst of devastation in surrounding countries is largely considered the result of a delicate mix of good fortune, maintaining independence, wartime diplomacy, and collaboration with both the Axis and the Allies.¹

From the Isolation of World War II to the Cold War

Domestically, two factors were popularly perceived as having been decisive in saving Switzerland from invasion and devastation: the Swiss army and Swiss neutrality. Furthermore, as opposed to the First World War, the Second World War and the threat of a fascist invasion had united Switzerland politically.² As neutrality required prohibiting the stationing and transit of foreign troops on a neutral's soil, permanent neutrality was invariably linked to a strong, autonomous defense of sovereign territory. Permanent, perpetual neutrality as a cornerstone of the Swiss experience in the World Wars and an integral part of its self-perception, extending beyond its original purpose as a foreign policy tool, enjoyed high domestic support.³

Meanwhile, the victors of the war, particularly the United States, perceived neutrality as cowardice and bordering collaboration with its enemies. Neutrality was rejected as immoral, and neutrals were accused of having benefited from the war. With efforts to delegitimize and ban the use of violence and war in international politics, there was no more room for neutrality, as it had been designed as a concept relating to interstate wars, which the emerging UN Charter deemed illegitimate. Consequently, right after World War II, neutrals were largely isolated. They were not even invited to San Francisco for the founding of the UN.⁴

By the early 1950s, however, with the emerging confrontation between the West and the Soviet bloc, pressure on Western-leaning European neutrals like Switzerland or Sweden eased.⁵ A space opened again for neutral states between blocks and defense alliances, and Switzerland could position itself again with

an emphasis on being available with its Good Offices and as a platform for negotiations and conferences.

Apart from redefining its foreign policy in a changed environment after the Second World War, Switzerland had to adjust its defense efforts and doctrine in light of new developments, including the dropping of the atomic bombs on Japan. As such, high-level Swiss military officials called for an analysis of the new security environment and of the potential for Swiss nuclear weapons.⁶

With the emerging East-West confrontation and the renewed space for neutrals, Switzerland could thus carry the foundations of its defense doctrine and its political identity—neutrality and autonomous defense—into the Cold War era largely unchanged. These principles allowed for and would shape the country's approach to the nuclear issue. On top of calls by the army and the federal administration to assess the nuclear option, there were requests from prominent scientists, too, notably Professor Paul Scherrer at the Federal Institute of Technology (ETH), one of the country's leading nuclear physicists, to explore the potential for nuclear energy generation.⁷

Exploring Switzerland and the Atom

The Federal Council—Switzerland's consensus-oriented government consisting of seven councilors from all major political parties—complied with demands by several actors and tried to combine their know-how in 1946 by setting up the *Study Commission on Atomic Energy* (*Studienkommission für Atomenergie*, SKA) with the aim of investigating both the civilian and military potential of nuclear technology. The SKA comprised officials and scientists, and was affiliated with the Ministry of Defense (MoD).⁸ Notably absent at first was the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which was an indication of the military-driven nature of the endeavor and the power relations between the two ministries. It also indicated a lack of understanding of the foreign policy dimension of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons acquisition.

Swiss industrial corporations, while hesitant at first, grew increasingly interested in the potential of atomic energy and the production and export of a Swiss-made reactor.⁹ In 1948, three enterprises formed their own *Industrial Commission on Nuclear Energy* (*Industriekommission Kernenergie*) with the aim of cooperating on the potential development of such a Swiss-built reactor model.¹⁰

In contrast with Switzerland's overall liberal economic policy, the state started funding this industrial consortium heavily from the second half of the 1950s.¹¹ However, between 1947 and 1951, the SKA only spent a bit more than half of its generously allocated budget of CHF 18 million. In 1946, the United States passed the McMahon Act, prohibiting the export of uranium, which prompted Switzerland to explore the mining potential of its own limited uranium resources.¹² A large part of the Commission's expenses were subsequently used to explore the options for the autonomous acquisition of uranium.¹³ The SKA also explored the purchasing of uranium through middlemen

from Chile, India, Italy, Portugal, Taiwan, or the German Federal Republic. Attempts to cooperate on the development of nuclear technology with France, the Netherlands, and Norway failed to materialize.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the MoD undertook a re-evaluation of the country's strategic environment, military threats, and military doctrine. There was an increased conviction that, in the case of another war, the population centers and industries of the Swiss Plateau would have to be protected.¹⁵ A heated controversy ensued about a new strategy to succeed Switzerland's classic *Reduit* (redoubt) strategy, pursued during the Second World War. This debate about the Swiss defense doctrine would also feed into the discussion about nuclear weapons, and vice versa.

Exploring and Opting for Nuclear Weapons: 1950 to 1963

Two interrelated processes marked relevant debates in the 1950s: the question of the potential military and civilian use of nuclear power, and the issue of a new concept and doctrine of Switzerland's defense policy. The issue of nuclear weapons was discussed in narrow military terms in this period. Explicit concerns about the foreign policy impact of certain decisions and about trends in the international environment were largely absent.

The debate had three dimensions: whether the nuclear option was technologically feasible, whether it was desirable in terms of military doctrine, and whether it would find approval domestically.

A Matter of Technology

The SKA's first attempts at exploring the nuclear option continued in similar frameworks throughout the 1950s.¹⁶ Driving forces were the MoD and scientists, notably Paul Scherrer. As investigations grew more intense, a third driving force emerged: the Office for Job Creation (*Amt für Arbeitsbeschaffung*), which had become an important institution during the Second World War.¹⁷ In the post-war period, it identified economic potential in the domestic development of Swiss nuclear capabilities. Overall, the SKA was making headway. Even the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) expected Switzerland to become a nuclear military power at some point. In 1953, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the "Atoms for Peace" initiative to counter the specter of an upcoming cascade of nuclear powers. To Switzerland, "Atoms for Peace" meant a decoupling of the economic aspects of nuclear power from its military use. The International Atomic Conference in 1955 in Geneva, which a Swiss delegation of 16 attended among 1,400 international participants, was showcasing this initiative, including a US-built nuclear test reactor flown in specifically for the purpose of the convention.¹⁸

Also, efforts by the private sector to join the foray became increasingly tangible, driven by the commercial interests of Swiss industry. A consortium of Swiss private enterprises, *Reaktor AG* (Reactor Ltd.), attracted extensive government support. They acquired the very nuclear reactor displayed in Geneva

in 1955 and had it running in 1957.¹⁹ Switzerland's diplomatic power—in particular, the nimbus of Geneva as a seat of international organizations and host of international conferences (including for conferences among the world's leading nuclear physicists during and after the Second World War)—was thus of advantage to the advancement of Swiss nuclear plans.

In 1960, the *Reaktor AG* consortium—again, with a large financial contribution from the state—managed to actuate the first Swiss-built reactor, “Diorit.” Initially—and against the will of the industries involved—the Special Envoy of the Federal Council for Nuclear Energy Matters had pushed for the domestic production of heavy water instead of aiming for (cheaper) imports. The insistence on autarky is a further indication that the government recognized the potential military application of nuclear technology.²⁰ As a matter of fact, the efforts by the private sector and the developments on the international stage, notably “Atoms for Peace,” occurred in parallel with a public debate about Switzerland's military doctrine.

A Matter of Doctrine

In the latter half of the 1950s, the doctrinal argument around potential Swiss nuclear weapons gained traction domestically. The international strategic environment at the time was dominated by events in Berlin and Korea, the uprising in Hungary, and the launching of the Soviet satellite “Sputnik.” This re-emphasized a perception of “threats from the East,” leading to two opposing views in the alpine nation.

The influential Military Officer Society of Zurich argued for a concept of mobile defense, which focused on the defender counter-attacking the enemy to avoid pitched battles, including possibly on enemy terrain. Officers from Basel and Bern, meanwhile, argued along the lines of the prevalent doctrine of area defense, which entailed denying a potential enemy access to a designated terrain rather than the enemy's destruction.²¹

In these debates, the concept of area defense—an essentially defensive strategy for a neutral country—was incompatible with nuclear weapons (besides considerations that such weapons may be beyond the financial means and political feasibility of such a state). However, the concept of mobile defense became intimately linked with the idea of a Swiss nuclear force, exemplified by a series of editorials in the Swiss Military Journal *Allgemeine Schweizer Militärzeitschrift* in the mid-1950s.²² Nuclear weapons were framed as the ultimate deterrent. The military forces it recommended, particularly a strong air force, would be able to deliver potential strategic nuclear explosives.²³

The debate culminated in 1957 in a public report by the Swiss Officer Society, commissioned by the Federal Council, that recommended the procurement of tactical nuclear weapons,²⁴ either to be produced domestically or procured from nuclear powers.²⁵ Another study in 1963 by scientists within the administration concluded that a tactical nuclear armament of Switzerland would be technically and financially feasible.²⁶ At the time, the potentially

devastating short- and long-term health effects of nuclear fallouts were already discussed but did not take center stage.²⁷

The aspect of neutrality was crucial in these debates in two ways: for conventional military doctrine and (a potential) nuclear weapons doctrine. In a consequential logic, it was argued that Switzerland's obligation as a perpetual neutral to defend its territory outside of military blocks was only credible if it was backed by suitable deterrence, which was framed as necessitating nuclear capabilities. An op-ed in the *Swiss Military Journal* in 1963 even suggested a first-use policy for potential nuclear weapons and deemed opponents as largely "unworldly" and "short-sighted."²⁸

An assessment on behalf of the Swiss Foreign Ministry on the matter from a perspective of international law, specifically the inquiry of whether neutrality even obligated a state to acquire nuclear weapons in the nuclear age, was inconclusive.²⁹ On that note, a letter by the Swiss ambassador in the Soviet Union conveyed that the USSR was opposed to the concept of "atomic neutrality."³⁰ The Soviets perceived Switzerland's defense largely as a part of NATO strategy anyway.³¹

A Matter of Politics

Since the early 1950s, the industrial use of nuclear energy had become increasingly important. Between 1956 and 1961, the head delegate of the Federal Council for Nuclear Matters was a representative of the MFA. While this was a reflection of the foreign policy-related dimension of the issue, the role of the MFA remained marginal. As Swiss industry became increasingly interested in developing nuclear technology, the Office of Energy Economics took over and appointed a delegate in 1961.³² At the same time, the nuclear energy issue was centralized, with popular initiatives overwhelmingly approving to transfer decision-making power on this matter from the cantonal (state/prefecture) level to the federal (national) level in 1957.³³

In 1958, the Swiss government stepped forward to publicly take a position on the nuclear issue, which previously had been debated mostly out of the limelight within the MoD and respective commissions. The Federal Council acted out of the perceived need for a fundamental statement, amidst a number of uncertainties around the feasibility and desirability of the nuclear option. It declared the willingness to explore the option of nuclear arms, based on the expectation that nuclear weapons would become a common feature of future battlegrounds.³⁴ This strong declaration was indicative of a broad consensus among the army and Swiss political parties (apart from left-wing parties) to endorse the concept of mobile defense and nuclear weapons as a potential element of it.

Protocols of the internal meeting leading to this declaration show that the Federal Council discussed the issue in detail for the first time. Its members agreed on stressing that such weapons would only be used defensively in emergency situations, that parliament should be involved (where they expected opposition), and that the military and the scientific context, as well as the

feasibility of the proposal, were still being assessed.³⁵ This indicated certain hesitations and that the matter had never been subject to a cross-ministerial assessment. Despite this hesitation, the *New York Times* reported the next day that the “Swiss will seek nuclear weapons.”³⁶

On the side of its opponents, the Social Democrats, and the newly formed *Swiss Movement against Atomic Armament* in particular, launched two popular referenda on nuclear issues. The movement was transnationally connected to similar initiatives globally, but weakly embedded in the Swiss political establishment. In 1962, a two-thirds majority of the [male-only] electorate disapproved of an initiative by a committee to ban nuclear weapons in Switzerland.³⁷ In 1963, a similar [male-only] majority even renounced the requirement of future nuclear weapons to be approved by a popular vote.³⁸ The fact that both referenda passed after the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 highlights the strong political majority behind this issue. The emphasis on “neutrality” and “resistance,” which the committee opposing the initiatives (and favoring a nuclear Switzerland) used in its public campaign, apparently resonated well with a majority of voters and their national identity.³⁹

The two referenda were the climaxes of the Swiss nuclear debate. Discussions around the potential to halt nuclear proliferation and international nuclear disarmament, meanwhile, gained little traction.⁴⁰ On the contrary, some pro-nuclear option voices grew stronger during the referendum years. For example, a declaration by Rudolf Sontheim, military officer and *Reaktor AG*'s director, concluded that the military and civilian use of nuclear technology are inevitably linked, and a ban of nuclear weapons without adequate verification would thus be futile. In a later piece in 1963, Sontheim even pleaded for the development of reactors solely aimed at the production of military-use nuclear material, as opposed to dual-use reactors.⁴¹

Tides Turn: 1963 to 1966

While the idea of Swiss nuclear weapons had gotten considerable and broad traction until 1963, the following years saw the plans crumble. By 1965, it appeared that the Federal Council—while keeping the option open—was unwilling to push concrete initiatives toward nuclear arming.⁴² On the one hand, the international environment showed a general trend toward nonproliferation, which rendered Switzerland's nuclear policy and attempts to domestically develop a reactor more difficult. On the other hand, more importantly, several elements of the domestic context countered the idea of a Swiss nuclear force: The debate about defense doctrine turned, and a major crisis in Swiss defense policy unfolded regarding the procurement process of new fighter jets. The trust and broad coalition between a political majority in parliament and the army leadership eroded. Simultaneously, new technological and industrial developments refocused the debate increasingly around the civilian use of nuclear energy and the difficulty of purely domestic development of nuclear capacities.

These events, struggles around ministerial competence, and a desire to keep the nuclear option “open” (while not actively pursuing it) limited the finding of a unified Swiss position on nuclear nonproliferation and any potential diplomatic role in the leading up to the NPT negotiations.

The International Environment

Deliberations about the Limited Test-Ban Treaty (LTBT) offered the first indications about the new direction of the nuclear issue, even though the treaty had little tangible impact on Swiss nuclear plans. In 1963, Switzerland signed the LTBT, ratifying it in January 1964. In its address to parliament, the Federal Council declared that it expected almost all states of the world to join (thus emphasizing the treaty’s universalist nature), warned of the risk to health and land of nuclear fallout, and referred to Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition.⁴³ At the same time, it declared that signing the treaty would not restrict non-nuclear signatory states in any way in the near future.⁴⁴

The treaty was considered in line with the neutrality policy and a continuation of exploring the option of nuclear armament. The Federal Council considered an abstention as a riskier, more visible stance than signing it.⁴⁵ Overall, the Federal Council’s statement on the LTBT encapsulated the various dimensions of the issue: neutrality policy, the ramifications of the international reputation of the country’s stance on nuclear issues, the desire to maintain the nuclear option, but also—for the first time in official declarations⁴⁶—the growing awareness of health considerations. At the same time, Switzerland was only reacting to these international diplomatic developments.

After the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the events in Berlin in 1963, the general international environment turned toward superpower coexistence and a phase of détente.⁴⁷ As a next step after the LTBT, negotiations at the international level intensified over an agreement on nonproliferation. Despite many related talks taking place in Geneva, Switzerland was notably absent. Nevertheless, the general trend toward nonproliferation had early and very practical effects on Switzerland’s efforts to domestically develop a nuclear program. In 1965, Canada renounced a contract and France abandoned negotiations with Switzerland to deliver uranium, insisting on an accompanying governmental declaration to verify the purely civilian use of uranium.⁴⁸

A National Political Crisis

Several domestic factors accelerated the trend away from the nuclear option. In various votes, or rather postponements of votes, in favor of further exploration and studies, the Federal Council proved lukewarm about the nuclear question in the first half of the 1960s.⁴⁹ In 1965, the MoD—a consistent driver of the nuclear option—recognized its insufficient expertise in nuclear weapons development. The Federal Council thus chose to install a mixed military-civilian working group.⁵⁰

Another important game changer was a scandal about the procurement of *Mirage* fighter jets, which had a profound effect on public perception of the MoD, including its defense doctrine, and on the power relations within the ministry. A crisis of trust ensued between the Federal Council and parliament, culminating in 1964, and pertaining to the procurement process. In 1961, parliament had agreed to spend a record CHF 828 million on 100 Mirage III S fighter jets. However, in April 1964, the Federal Council asked for an additional credit of CHF 576 million and announced the necessity of another, third round of funding. Popular agitation and an unwillingness by parliament to concede followed.⁵¹

A bi-chamber parliamentary working group constituted a lack of expertise and due care in the process on behalf of the Federal Council and the MoD. With an overwhelming majority, parliament demanded scaling down the procurement from 100 to 57 jets and a reorganization of the MoD.⁵² The consensus between parliament and the army was thus broken. Eventually, several high-ranking MoD officials were fired in 1964 and the minister of defense, Paul Chaudet, resigned over the issue in 1966.⁵³

The decreased trust and increased parliamentary scrutiny around defense spending rendered the financing of large defense projects, such as the development of nuclear weapons, increasingly unlikely, and removed a number of proponents of mobile defense and the pursuit of the nuclear option from office. The proceedings of parliament, motivated mostly by fiscal politics, thus had a number of strategic implications. Furthermore, the *Mirage* jets were not only intended to carry potential Swiss nuclear weapons; their procurement from nuclear-armed France was also supposed to facilitate cooperation on nuclear weapons development with the big neighbor.⁵⁴ Thus those plans, too, suffered from the political fallout of the scandal.

The Swiss defense doctrine was to focus on improving conventional and territorial defense. In line with this, the 1966 Defense Posture (a document drafted with the aim of creating a compromise between different doctrinal camps) highlighted the need for adjusting military planning to the needs of the civilian population—something hardly reconcilable with the use of tactical nuclear weapons on Swiss soil.⁵⁵

Commercial and Public Health Arguments

While the state crisis around the *Mirage* procurement and a change in military doctrine had profound implications for potential Swiss nuclear weapons, several events also changed the calculations of commercial and state actors with regard to nuclear technology and the feasibility and desirability of domestic Swiss nuclear projects.

In 1963, three industrial consortia for the development of nuclear reactors formed the National Group for the Advancement of the Industrial Use of Nuclear Technology (NGA). The Federal Council had demanded the formation

of one single funding body with a national outlook instead of three separate competing consortia. The state supported the NGA and provided half of its budget. The NGA mandated the construction of the first nuclear reactor in Lucens in western Switzerland.⁵⁶ Already in 1964, though, several large operators of electricity plants left the project in favor of a cheaper light-water reactor imported from the United States.⁵⁷ The switching to light-water reactors was a heavy blow to the project of a purely domestic development of nuclear reactors, which, in 1966, a Federal Council report even came to consider infeasible.⁵⁸ This indicates an increasing divorce of political and military considerations from commercial interests.

The first indigenously built heavy-water test reactor started operating in 1968. Already one year later, a core meltdown of low intensity put an end to the experiments with the prototype. One reason for the accident was the corrosion of metallic uranium, which had been chosen partially for military considerations.⁵⁹ Even prior to the incident, and in line with similar debates in other countries, concerns about health and the environment became increasingly prevalent. In 1964, the Federal Council tasked the MoD with verifying if nuclear testing on Swiss soil would be possible without damage to human and animal life. The study declared that no particularly difficult conditions would need to be fulfilled for subterranean nuclear testing, as long as the area was uninhabited, and the soil was stable and without much groundwater.⁶⁰

A Reluctant Latecomer on the Way to the NPT: 1966 to 1969

As stated earlier, the tides had turned quite quickly in the 1960s, and the Swiss government dropped the ambition to pursue specific plans for nuclear armament, while there remained a desire to keep the option open. The Swiss National Defense Concept of 1966 only mentioned nuclear arms in passing.⁶¹ Instead, the momentum for an international nonproliferation agreement and the Swiss MFA's approval for it became increasingly apparent. This created tensions with the MoD, which continued to put in place structures and commissions to explore the nuclear option, albeit largely in theoretical terms only.⁶²

The bureaucratic politics of institutions and ministries and how they disseminated information shaped the debates and decision-making both in the federal administration and—given popular votes on the nuclear option—among the general public.

Domestic Struggles for Competence

The path toward the NPT was reinvigorated by disarmament talks held in Geneva in 1966.⁶³ The Foreign Ministry was in charge of its preparation but was challenged by the MoD and the Ministry of Transportation and Energy (MoTE).⁶⁴ In May 1967, these three ministries formed a “Working Group Non-proliferation Treaty.” The decision on its composition took three months,

and it only ended up meeting twice, in August 1967 and March 1969.⁶⁵ During the three years, the Federal Council issued no further statement on potential nuclear weapons, indicating a lack of desire to push for the option while the consequences of the emerging NPT regime were not yet clear.⁶⁶ The Swiss government still initiated research projects to examine the possibility and desirability of acquiring nuclear weapons, yet without ultimately pushing for their acquisition. In fact, Switzerland's nuclear weapons efforts seem to epitomize what international relations scholar Itty Abraham calls "the ambivalence of nuclear histories."⁶⁷

The core proponents of the nuclear option launched another attempt to reinstate the debate and emphasize the need for Swiss nuclear weapons, notably in a study by strategist and two-star general Gustav Däniker. His 1966 book *Strategy of a Small State* advocated for limited nuclear capabilities.⁶⁸ However, eventually, official voices in favor of the NPT gained ground. The Foreign Ministry under Federal Councilor Willy Spühler considered the NPT an important contribution to international détente. Neutrality, in this perception, is obligated to enter dialogue, not abstain. The NPT found additional supporters among the private sector and at the MoTE. In their perception, a Swiss abstention would have threatened the supply of nuclear material for electricity generation.⁶⁹ Furthermore, in 1967, Spühler declared that the harmful and potentially devastating effects triggered by the deployment of nuclear weapons rendered them useless, even in locally limited theaters of war.⁷⁰ In August 1968, even the new minister of defense, Nello Celio, voiced his hope that this "highly civilized country, despite some concerns, can prove its courage and formally agree [with the NPT]."⁷¹

These statements indicate the turn the Swiss administration had taken on the nuclear option and international nonproliferation. However, because it had been pursuing the nuclear option for so long and invested considerable resources into it, apart from some other hesitations, it was a passive "receiver" of international developments around the NPT that had taken place in the meantime.

An Observer in Geneva

Since these debates around the nuclear option had largely been inward-looking and not seen decisive pushes to abandon or follow through with the development of nuclear weapons, Switzerland was late to take part and consider the emerging international debate around nuclear nonproliferation.⁷²

To begin with, the overall setup of the NPT negotiations further limited the involvement of actors like Switzerland. Fundamentally, the Swiss MFA considered disarmament efforts a responsibility of the superpowers.⁷³ The NPT was perceived as largely a deal between the superpowers to which others, nonaligned or neutral states, were invited to contribute only to a limited extent or to whose amendments the superpowers even reacted with anger.⁷⁴ The argument around sovereignty was raised in international debates around the NPT, particularly by emerging powers like Brazil and

India.⁷⁵ Industrialized countries, too, demanded disarmament by the nuclear powers while being afraid of being handicapped on nuclear technology by the NPT.⁷⁶

Switzerland, as a non-UN member, was notably absent from these debates, such as at the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in Geneva, despite sharing similar concerns.⁷⁷ Other neutrals like Ireland or Sweden were attempting to shape the processes, building on neutral states' potential to support normative change in contested areas.⁷⁸ Switzerland was a non-participant, and only the report by a Swiss Ambassador in Geneva fed into debates in Bern. Furthermore, well into 1965, the question of whether the MFA or the MoD would take the lead on the NPT question was still undecided, thus further paralyzing Swiss efforts.⁷⁹

Late Attempts to Shape Debates

The notion that joining the NPT would not restrict economic activity and that not signing the NPT would bring about increasing disadvantages gained traction. Since the experience around the LTBT, the Swiss MFA had anticipated potential punitive measures from the United States. The superpowers had increasingly hinted that non-signatories may face restrictions in the purchase of uranium and nuclear power plants.⁸⁰

These considerations were reinforced when, in 1965, communication with Sweden was established—the first and most tangible instance of exchange among the neutrals—that fed news about the NPT negotiations to Bern.⁸¹ Through the “Swedish channel,” the Swiss government learned that the Geneva negotiations would soon lead to an agreement. This and the general perception of external pressure by the superpowers pushed the Swiss MFA, in consultation with representatives of the industry and the General Staff of the army, to publish an aide-mémoire directed at the international community. Until late 1967, the MoD had been reluctant toward the NPT process given its desire to maintain the nuclear option as an element of general freedom of choice but ended up loosening its opposition, as the joint aide-mémoire indicates.⁸²

The aide-mémoire was the most outright attempt of Switzerland to voice its concerns and to shape the negotiations in which it did not take part. Among other concerns, it declared Switzerland's desire for the superpowers to accompany the NPT with limitations on the arms race and with the guarantee for never to attack non-nuclear states with nuclear arms, and it emphasized the need for universality: Switzerland would make its support contingent on a sufficient number of states endorsing the NPT. Through the “Swedish channel,” Switzerland's considerations were fed into the ENDC process and were received positively, while they could hardly influence the highly evolved and largely superpower-driven negotiations at this stage.⁸³ A second aide-mémoire by the Swiss MFA, this time directed at the United States and the USSR, largely repeated the arguments made in 1967 but indicated a general support for the spirit of the NPT.⁸⁴

A Reluctant Signature

At the same time, these efforts indicate an increasingly positive Swiss stance toward the NPT, spearheaded by the MFA, which started considering the NPT an important potential contributor to international détente. This perception found support also among industry representatives and the MoTE, who were concerned about access to relevant technology and uranium were Switzerland not to sign the NPT.⁸⁵

The latency of the NPT proposal proved an important factor in garnering support for the treaty among these actors. Most of the so-called near-nuclears had no immediate plans to acquire a nuclear arsenal. A report in 1967 by the Study Commission for Strategic Matters declared that the civilian use of nuclear technology could fully be pursued without a loss of relevant technology and research in case of a cessation of the military option and that the NPT would not restrict any branch of the Swiss economy.⁸⁶ Latency was also a factor given the fragility of the international environment, as exemplified by the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia in May 1968, which eroded trust in the Soviet Union and in multilateral agreements in such an environment.⁸⁷

Despite these considerations, perception of development around the NPT rather reinforced Swiss endorsement of the process. The Swiss MFA was ready to approve the NPT from mid-1968, even before the final draft of the NPT was available.⁸⁸ This was not just supported by a desire to contribute to détente but also by fear of potential sanctions, isolation, and condemnation by the international community in case of a refusal.⁸⁹ In June 1968, for example, the Swiss Ambassador to the USSR warned of the potential perception that Switzerland would make its stance too dependent on the Federal Republic of Germany and may thus be perceived as helping Germany delay their conclusion.⁹⁰ Swiss foreign minister Spühler declared in a parliamentary hearing in May 1969 that other neutrals had been consulted but that Sweden had declared signing the NPT the "duty of a neutral" and that Austria, barred from developing nuclear weapons, had an interest in signing too.⁹¹ Sweden signing the NPT on August 19, 1968, further denied any hopes that may have existed about potential Swiss-Swedish cooperation on nuclear technology.⁹² Isolation even among neutrals was thus looming were Switzerland not to endorse the NPT.

A last attempt by an "Action Committee Against Joining the NPT" formed mostly around the Swiss Officer Society and included the General Chief of Staff opposing the official government position, failed to offer any alternatives to signing the treaty.⁹³ On November 17, 1969, one day ahead of the Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland signed the NPT.

Conclusion

Switzerland signing the NPT was not followed by a swift ratification, though, and did not yet terminate deliberations around the nuclear option. In July

1970, the Federal Council decided to “continue the works” exploring nuclear enrichment. Only in 1976 did a commission end the exploration of uranium deposits in Switzerland, concluding resources were not rich enough for exploitation.⁹⁴ Already in 1973, the *Swiss Defense Policy Conception* fully abandoned the nuclear option.⁹⁵ In March 1977, Switzerland eventually ratified the NPT after a critical mass of states had signed and ratified it.

Switzerland, the permanent neutral in the heart of Europe, thus underwent several phases from the 1950s, when it started seriously exploring, even opting for, the nuclear option, to abandoning the nuclear option. That process began with domestic debates around technological, financial, and doctrinal considerations and only later linked up with the international sphere, where Switzerland ended up as a latecomer to the global discussion despite much of it being held in Geneva.

Popular votes in 1962 and 1963 supporting the Swiss government in pursuing nuclear options marked the peak of general support for the nuclear endeavor. However, the following years until 1966 proved decisive in quickly changing these considerations. The impact of the state crisis around the *Mirage* jets and the private sector’s change of course proved to have a fundamental impact on the government’s change of military doctrine. Parliament lacked trust in large defense projects altogether. Furthermore, an accident occurred in a nuclear heavy-water test reactor, enforcing public perception that the domestic development of a nuclear reactor with potential military use was technologically infeasible and commercially unviable. Generally, Switzerland’s federal political system and its culture of compartmentalized and often private enterprise-driven initiatives were rather inconducive for a large-scale project like the development of nuclear technology.⁹⁶

All these deliberations—which appear fundamentally domestic—were informed by the changes in the international environment; the increasing decoupling of civilian and military use of nuclear technology; the posture of other neutrals, such as Sweden or Austria, with regard to the NPT; the perceptions of the superpowers, the United States and the USSR; and Switzerland’s powerful neighbors such as the Federal Republic of Germany—identified as a crucial reference point regarding its position toward the NPT. The general trend in international relations and superpower relations toward détente increasingly convinced Swiss diplomacy of the usefulness of a nonproliferation agreement. Lastly, the aspect of technical latency proved critical to keeping the nuclear backdoor open and outweighing the consideration against the ceding of sovereignty on nuclear issues to the regime created by the NPT.

Ultimately, Switzerland reluctantly endorsed the NPT when a critical mass of states rallied behind it, despite skepticism over its discriminatory nature, the very limited influence it had over the process as a non-member of the UN, and the limited reaction to Swiss aide-mémoires in November 1967 and May 1968 as late attempts to shape the process. Switzerland’s general perception of a non-role for neutrals would only change in the mid-1970s with regard to the

Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, in which neutral Switzerland found a space to contribute actively to détente, security, and arms control in Europe and break with the passive stance it had taken with regard to the NPT process.⁹⁷

Notes

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- 3 *Ibid.*, 10.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 17.
- 5 Kaspar Luginbühl and Marcus Jurij Vogt, "Schweizer Neutralität im Wandel," in *CIMIC-Aspekte I: Traditionale Neutralität in Europa*, eds. Rudolf Hartmann, Christian W. Meyer, and Marcus J. Vogt (Speyer: Deutsche Universität für Verwaltungswissenschaften, 2005), 40.
- 6 Ursula Jasper, "The Ambivalent Neutral: Rereading Switzerland's Nuclear History," *The Nonproliferation Review* 19, no. 2 (2012): 269, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2012.691021>.
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- 8 Patrick Kupper, "Sonderfall Atomenergie: Die bundesstaatliche Atompolitik 1945–1970," *Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte* 52, no. 1 (2003): 87.
- 9 Tobias Wildi, *Der Traum vom eigenen Reaktor: Die schweizerische Atomtechnologieentwicklung 1945–1969* (Zurich: Chronos, 2003), 39.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 44.
- 11 Dominique Metzler, "Die Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung für die Schweizer Armee," (Basel: 1995), reprinted in *Studien und Quellen: Rüstung und Kriegswirtschaft. Zeitschrift des Schweizerischen Bundesarchivs*, no. 23 (1997), 121–70, 139.
- 12 Winkler, *Kernenergie und Aussenpolitik in der Schweiz*, 53.
- 13 Kupper, "Sonderfall Atomenergie," 87–88.
- 14 Roland Kollert, "Die Politik der latenten Proliferation: Militärische Nutzung 'friedlicher' Kerntechnik in Westeuropa" (PhD diss., Deutscher Universität Verlag, 1994), 204f.
- 15 Reto Wollenmann, "Zwischen Atomwaffe und Atomsperrvertrag: Die Schweiz auf dem Weg von der nuklearen Option zum Nonproliferationsvertrag (1958–1969)," *Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung* 75 (2004): 24.
- 16 It was replaced in 1958 by the Commission on Atomic Sciences, comprising scientists, a representative of the business community, an engineer, and two members of parliament. See Winkler, *Kernenergie und Aussenpolitik in der Schweiz*, 76.
- 17 Bernhard Degen, "Arbeitsbeschaffung," *Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz* (HLS), last modified November 26, 2009, <https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/de/articles/013787/2009-11-26/>.
- 18 Wildi, *Traum vom eigenen Reaktor*, 60.
- 19 Kupper, "Sonderfall Atomenergie," 88f; Winkler, *Kernenergie und Aussenpolitik in der Schweiz*, 74–75.
- 20 Kollert, "Die Politik der latenten Proliferation," 207f.

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- 23 Peter Hug, "Geschichte der Atomentwicklung in der Schweiz" (Bern: unpubl., 1987), 77.
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- 32 Kupper, "Sonderfall Atomenergie," 89.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 89. Switzerland's federal structure resembles that of the United States with many powers devolved to the cantons. Energy policy is one of them.
- 34 Swiss Embassy in Moscow, "letter to the FDFA."
- 35 *Ibid.*
- 36 *New York Times*, "Swiss will seek atomic weapons. Aim to Equip Their Army with Tactical Nuclear Arms," July 12, 1958, <https://www.nytimes.com/1958/07/12/archives/swiss-will-seek-atomic-weapons-aim-to-equip-their-army-with.html>.
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- 42 Metzler, "Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung," 158.
- 43 Jasper, "The Ambivalent Neutral," 277.
- 44 Bundesrat, "Botschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Genehmigung des in Moskau geschlossenen Abkommens über das Verbot von Kernwaffenversuchen in der Luft, im Weltraum und unter Wasser (Vom 18. September 1963)," in *BBl 1963 II*, 616–18, https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/fga/1963/2_615_601_1349/de.
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- 49 Metzler, "Option einer Nuklearbewaffnung," 155f.
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9 Austria

The NPT, Diplomacy, and National Identity

Anna Graf-Steiner and Herbert R. Reginbogin

Introduction

The academic literature on the history of the Austrian State has traditionally not only focused on the historical antecedents before becoming a permanently neutral state¹ but also on the legal interpretations of such a foreign policy status,² as well as on the international relations/political science perspectives,³ and the economic effect of European integration and nation-building on Austria's ambivalent identity.⁴ This chapter imbues these topics as it focuses on Austria's involvement in the initiative for the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) between 1957 and 1968. While it looks at these years of discourse regarding national identity building and national security, research has observed Austria striving to rejoin the international community as a country seeking peace and security in the world by endorsing disarmament and improved relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Yet, nothing is mentioned among the records expressing rebranding the image of Austria about its past before World War II. The remnants of its tarnished past as part of a war of aggression and collaborator of Nazi Germany encapsulated in the overwhelming widespread approval to relinquish Austrian statehood in early 1938 through a plebiscite with 99.6% welcoming the Anschluss with Hitler Germany.⁵

Unpublished records demonstrate that the initiative that led to the NPT 1968 was a significant effort on the part of Austria to rebrand its self-image from involvement in the ashes of destruction until then in the twentieth century to become a nation committed to international peace and security. As research showed when writing this chapter, both Austrian parties SPÖ's and ÖVP leadership at the outset of the Cold War helped lay the tenements for a successful conclusion of the NPT negotiations establishing Vienna as the international headquarters for the International Atomic Energy Association. It ensured that nuclear technology was used for peaceful purposes and to improve prosperity and living conditions for their people. It also laid the foundation for later Austrian prime minister Bruno Kreisky's national identity building in the 1970s. These efforts in published literature and unpublished records establish a vision of efforts to attain peace and security worldwide. At the same

time, a much deeper undercurrent is observed to unwind: a twisted self-image of the Austrian people scrambling in the post-World War II world to find a piece of history they could hold on to by dispensing certain myths. For instance, the view of Austria as the “first free country to fall victim of Hitlerite aggression,” propagated by the Moscow Declaration (in 1943, the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed to this version of events and, in consequence, the interpretation that Austria had to be liberated from German domination).

A significant setback in researching Austria’s role in the NPT debate was the discovery that the archival collection from the Viennese Foreign Ministry dealing with nuclear weapons was missing from the Austrian State Archive.⁶ Thus, a (presumably) central stock of documents could not be accessed.

The Second World War Legacy and Austria’s Foreign Policy Dilemma

As the Nazi regime was about to fall, a unified Austrian provisional government was established under Karl Renner⁷ of the Social-Democratic Worker’s Party consisting of anti-fascist political factions of Christian Socialists, Socialists, and Communists. Renner is often referred to as the “Father of the Republic” because he led the first government of German-Austria and the First Austrian Republic in 1919 and 1920 and was once again decisive in establishing the present Second Republic after the fall of Nazi Germany in 1945, becoming its first president after World War II. He called for creating a democratic state along the lines of the First Austrian Republic⁸ in blatant contrast to his appeal “to Austrians to vote ‘yes’ in the April 10 plebiscite that legitimized the Anschluss.”⁹

The Austrian historian Michael Gehler depicts the attempts by the Austrian provisional government and those immediately to follow, attempting to “free itself from everything associated with the Nazi-German legacy by portraying Austria as a victim (*Opferthese*)¹⁰ [...] However, the self-portrait of Austria was a myth as an overwhelming Austrian population approved the ‘Anschluss’ [...] Nonetheless, at the end of World War II, Austria preferred collective amnesia.”¹¹

After Austria had been under Allied occupation for ten years, the way was finally cleared for the State Treaty in the spring of 1955, when the so-called Moscow Memorandum¹² stipulated that Austria would declare neutrality “of its own free will” after the withdrawal of the Allied troops. Thus, there was a political but no legal connection between the State Treaty signed on May 15, 1955, in Vienna and the adoption by Parliament on October 26 of the Federal Constitutional Law on the Perpetual Neutrality of Austria.

A central element of the distinction between Austria and Germany, which was pushed by the political elites, was a—factually incorrect but reasonably ‘practical’—way of dealing with the past that portrayed Austria as a victim of Nazi Germany, which had its origin in the Moscow Declaration of the Allies.¹³

The neutral country's coalition of ÖVP and SPÖ (and until 1947: KPÖ) that existed from December 1945¹⁴ until 1966 acted to safeguard the country's traditional Western orientation, vehemently opposed communism, endeavored to restore the pre-1938 political and economic system as soon as possible, and was prepared to reintegrate ex-Nazi elites within the political system.¹⁵ At the same time, the "young" neutral country had to define its role within the international community.

In the first period after the State Treaty, Austrian leaders were "neither wholeheartedly nor completely convinced about their neutrality (...)"¹⁶ This lack of conviction led to inconsistencies, disloyalties, double games, and dubious political morality, all of which affected the country's precarious position between East and West. However, in this phase of emergence from foreign occupation, Austria began to understand the value of neutrality in "not having to comply with every foreign demand and in making its own decisions about foreign policy."¹⁷ The 1956 Hungarian uprising repressed by the Soviet Union became a test of Austrian neutrality, as its politics endeavored to maintain a credibly impartial foreign policy. For the first time, limits became apparent in the realm of European security between East and West during the Cold War.¹⁸

Unlike Switzerland, Austria quickly joined the United Nations (UN) already in the same year of regaining its sovereignty. For Vienna, its foreign policy strategy shifted from a Euro-centric perspective to greater leeway, allowing the country to nurture relations within Europe and other UN member states with the end goal of engaging as a mediator in conflicts. Since Austria's independence and security were embedded in lasting peace in Europe by balancing the delicate power struggle between two opposing blocs, containing the nuclear threat became a central concern. Therefore, Austria was open and receptive to new policy proposals like that of Ireland's Frank Aiken, who suggested a non-proliferation treaty before the UN General Assembly on October 17, 1958.

Austria's Identity Struggle: A Nuclear-Free State Becomes the "Nuclear Capital of the World"

In order to recast its image and "neutral identity" on an international stage, Austrian foreign policymakers focused on establishing Vienna as a hub for international organizations (GATT, IMF, World Bank, UN) to play a significant role in world affairs. The great powers also appreciated this. In 1965, for example, Soviet ambassador Viktor I. Avilov reported to his Foreign Ministry that the past ten years had shown "that the policy of neutrality, which serves as the basis of Austria's foreign policy, is one of the main factors that have served to increase the authority of the Austrian Republic." He said this was shown "in particular because Austria and its capital, Vienna, have been the site of many international conferences and congresses." He pointed to the International Atomic Energy Agency as an example by saying that the Soviet Union was always favorable to Austria's election to various UN bodies and was "testimony to the fact that the Soviet government has confidence in Austria."¹⁹

Between 1955 and 1970, numerous international organizations established their headquarters in Vienna (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], OPEC, United Nations Industrial Development Organization [UNIDO]). Those organizations' purpose of achieving peace and prosperity not against others but in an inclusive way was well received by Austria, not least for economic reasons since they created jobs and allowed for the improvement of Vienna's infrastructure through the construction of large office buildings and much-needed housing for professional experts from different countries.²⁰

Young neutral Austria, for its part, was keen to attract these organizations, as its policy of neutrality—following the Swiss example—“relied heavily on international organizations.”²¹ Austria submitted a memorandum to the UN secretary-general on June 22, 1956, proposing Vienna as a possible location for the IAEA. The Foreign Ministry was sure that “Vienna now has a unique chance to become the ‘nuclear capital of the world.’”²² Inspired by Eisenhower's “Atoms for Peace” speech to the UN in 1953, the IAEA became the first international agency to be located in Vienna in 1957.²³ When the discussions on the future location of the IAEA began in early 1956, the United States had initially proposed Chicago—and the USSR countered with Moscow.²⁴ As a compromise, the Soviet Union finally proposed to host the institution in the capital of a neutral country and suggested, among others, Vienna, which aroused great hopes in Austria. In particular, the Austrian ambassador in Washington (and former foreign minister) Karl Gruber campaigned intensively for Vienna, hoping that the IAEA could help to make Vienna “once again a center of world affairs.”²⁵ His efforts paid off handsomely—not only did Vienna win the bid, but Gruber was also elected to preside over the IAEA's first General Conference in 1957.²⁶ The US State Department agreed to Vienna as the headquarters of the IAEA in June 1956, and the official nomination finally took place in September 1957.²⁷ In the insightful opinion of the Historian Elizabeth Röhrlich, “Science, especially nuclear science, offered an opportunity for international cooperation that would become a pillar of national identity.” The locating of the IAEA in Vienna showed “how internationalism, science, neutrality, and national identity were bound together in [...] Austria.”²⁸ At the same time, however, a speech by the Austrian delegate Franz Matsch exemplified, according to Röhrlich, “the victim myth that characterized the state's diplomacy” and how it was interwoven with Austria's ambitions to become an international meeting place.²⁹ Matsch advocated for Vienna to be the IAEA location, referring to Austria's past and its proud scientific tradition, praising the “atmosphere of tolerance” in Vienna, all without mentioning the expulsion and murder of Jewish scientists during the National Socialist era.³⁰

Vienna increasingly became a destination for international organization headquarters and multilateral meetings. A high point of this development came when Vienna hosted the Kennedy-Khrushchev Summit in 1961.³¹ Unfortunately, the results of this meeting were meager, and the Cold War intensified (Cuban Missile Crisis, Berlin Crisis).³² Nevertheless, the fact that Vienna would become a hub for civil society, scientific conferences, and dialogue

among East-West and eventually North-South interests was based on critical contributions through government initiatives.

Whereas other neutral and nonaligned states, including Sweden and Switzerland, worked on nuclear weapons programs after 1945, Austria did not. In fact, the State Treaty regulated that “Austria shall not possess, construct or experiment with an atomic weapon,” declaring Austria *de facto* a nuclear weapon-free state. The nuclear question played a decisive role in shaping Austrian identity and its notion of neutrality. There was strong support and encouragement for the government’s course of action to promote disarmament, especially in the nuclear field, which is evidenced by the many letters the Chancellor’s Office received from civil society organizations and private individuals.³³ Its nuclear-free status had quickly become a central factor in the self-image of the Austrians. Hence, when Aiken’s initiative was launched at the UN General Assembly to make nuclear nonproliferation an ideal of international behavior, Austria quickly came to support the idea. The Social Democrat and later prime minister, Bruno Kreisky, who became foreign minister in 1959 (until 1966), and the Austrian delegation to the UN were keenly involved in the NPT debate when the movement gained momentum in the early 1960s. Soon after Aiken’s proposal, two international conferences dealing with the issue took place in Austria. The third Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs was hosted both in Kitzbühel and Vienna from September 4 to 20, 1958. Immediately after that, the Second General Conference of the IAEA also took place there from September 22 until October 4.³⁴ According to Röhrllich, “[T]he Austrian government was keen to host both events, seeing this as a means to strengthen its role in international relations.”³⁵

Austrian Security and the Threat of Nuclear War

Austria’s quickly adopted role as mediator, bridge-builder, and host of international conferences and organizations was motivated by concrete security policy considerations. As a neutral state between the blocs, Austria naturally had a great interest in reducing tensions between the superpowers and the danger of war, especially nuclear war.³⁶

Before the conclusion of the State Treaty and the declaration of perpetual neutrality, Austria would most likely have been involved in NATO defense plans in the case of a Soviet attack.³⁷ But the new status meant the end of the logistical North-South link, which worried Italy in particular.³⁸ Moreover, the “unfinished buildup of forces” in Austria threatened a “substantial gap” on the borders of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Switzerland, and Italy if the Western occupation forces withdrew.³⁹ In order to fend off a possible large-scale Warsaw Pact offensive on Northern Italy or Southern Germany, there were also plans on the part of Rome to deploy nuclear weapons at the Brenner Pass.⁴⁰

It is known today that NATO’s strategy for Europe was fundamentally defensive and focused on deterrence and massive retaliation in the event of a

Soviet pre-emptive strike. This means that Austrian neutrality would have been violated only if the Warsaw Pact had violated it first. However, even though Moscow feared that Austria, as a neutral but Western-oriented country, would side with NATO in the event of war, it can be assumed from the (few) known archival sources that the Warsaw Pact would have “respected Austrian neutrality as long as the West and Vienna did the same.”⁴¹ The attack plans of the Warsaw Pact (which had been founded one day before the signing of the State Treaty as a reaction to the accession of the FRG to NATO, but also to enable continuous troop stationing in Romania and Hungary after the withdrawal from Austria), only became public after the end of the Cold War. The archival record suggests that there were individual offensive plans; the majority of plans were labeled “preventive” or “counter-attacks,” which, because of NATO’s defensive strategy, can be regarded as propagandistic and would instead have been “barely veiled wars of aggression.” Those plans would also have affected Austria—there was even a Hungarian counter-attack plan that would have destroyed Vienna entirely.⁴² Of course, these plans were not known in detail at the time, but the highest military level was naturally concerned with possible attack plans.⁴³

Austria as a Model for a Nuclear-Free Zone in Europe

Paradoxically, the danger posed by any potential attacks on Austria was treated as a taboo subject in the Austrian public sphere. Politicians were reluctant to mention it by name, and the possibility of using nuclear weapons against Austria found little space in public debate.⁴⁴ However, the absence of a concrete nuclear threat discussion does not contradict Vienna’s advocacy for denuclearization and demilitarization at the European level. The nuclear issue was a red rag Vienna wanted to eliminate—or at least contain as much as possible.

This also included support for the so-called Rapacki Plan, a regional demilitarization plan limited in the first step to Poland and the two German states (on-site immediately also joined by Czechoslovakia) that Polish FM Adam Rapacki presented in a speech to the 12th UN General Assembly on October 2, 1957.⁴⁵

The plan met with rejection in Washington, Paris, and Bonn. At the same time, the smaller European states, in particular Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Austria, were interested in spinning it further. Western media continued to pay attention to Rapacki’s plan in the months following its launch, making it the first *détente* plan by an Eastern European state to find supporters beyond the “Iron Curtain.”⁴⁶

With Austria being a model for the concept of a nuclear-free zone in Europe *sui generis*, the Rapacki Plan especially impressed Kreisky, who repeatedly and emphatically called for a discussion of its basic idea.⁴⁷ As early as January 1958, he advocated for the Rapacki Plan in an interview with the Danish newspaper “*Berlingske Tidende*.” At the same time, he suggested an expansion of the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone⁴⁸ to the Scandinavian countries, Austria, Switzerland, and Greece. He also said that the inclusion of Hungary was

desirable.⁴⁹ As he explained in an interview with the Polish press, he hoped for new Polish initiatives.⁵⁰ Indeed, new momentum came to Polish diplomacy that fell when Rapacki presented an updated version of his plan on November 4, in which the reunification of Germany was described as a goal since it was a prerequisite for the normalization of the situation in Europe. This was positively received in Bonn.⁵¹ However, Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum a good three weeks later (on November 27) put an abrupt end to Rapacki's diplomatic courting of Western favor.⁵²

Kreisky nonetheless remained a keen supporter of the plan to create a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe and used the opportunity at meetings with Rapacki in 1959 and 1960 to keep the discussion going.⁵³ Despite those efforts, the plan was never implemented due to the emerging concept of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Austria remained the only small nucleus of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Austria's Engagement for a Test Ban and Nonproliferation Treaty

Before the NPT negotiations officially started, Aiken's idea was discussed at the UN and the IAEA. In a speech before the UN General Assembly on September 23, 1958, Chancellor Figl emphasized that neutrality did not prevent Austria from "actively participating in the solution of the manifold and often complicated tasks of our time." On the contrary, Austria had

a special opportunity [...], due to our special position at the crossroads of two worlds and the specific disposition of our people, as well as with regard to our international status, to make a useful contribution, if necessary, to bridging existing differences through enlightening and mediating intervention.⁵⁴

He expressed satisfaction with the positive results of the expert negotiations in Geneva on the technical possibilities of controlling nuclear weapons testing and the willingness of the major powers to negotiate an agreement to end nuclear weapons testing.

Generally, Austria was interested in negotiating the issue of nuclear weapons testing in a focused and effective manner. Therefore, it opposed what delegates and the foreign minister considered a duplication of negotiations within the IAEA and (in line with the Western stance) preferred keeping them within the UN framework instead. This is evidenced by a diplomatic move at the third IAEA General Conference in October 1959, when Czechoslovakia (CSSR) presented a draft resolution concerning the cessation of nuclear weapons testing. The Austrian delegate Heinrich Haymerle opposed it. That, however, happened in the mistaken belief that a previously agreed deal with Czechoslovakia would hold⁵⁵ because, before the meeting, Great Britain approached Sweden and Finland, asking them to refuse even discussing the proposal. As a bare minimum,

Britain insisted there should be no vote on the resolution. Together with the CSSR and Austria, the delegations agreed on a face-saving compromise: after Czechoslovakia and other supporters had spoken, there would be an appeal from Sweden and Austria to refrain from voting, to which the CSSR would respond positively, thereby taking the topic off the table. However, things turned out differently, as the Czechoslovak delegation did not follow suit. The appeal by the Austrian delegate Haymerle to refrain from voting was instead followed by a sharp rejection by the Soviet delegate, who declared “that the Austrian delegate was pursuing a policy here that was diametrically opposed to the policy of the President and the Austrian Federal Government” and that they were making themselves “stooges of the Americans.” Haymerle expressed that his delegation understood and shared the intention of Prague but that the content almost wholly coincided with a resolution introduced by Austria and other nations at the UN General Assembly and that therefore it did not seem suitable to spark a debate about the same issue before the IAEA. Eventually, the Austrian motion was adopted, and no vote on the cessation of nuclear weapons testing took place during the IAEA Conference.

Naturally, the Austrian delegation reported the Soviet-Austrian controversy to its foreign minister, the president, and the UN delegation under Kurt Waldheim, asking the latter to push the test ban issue at the UN.⁵⁶ Haymerle thought that

[t]he fact that the amicable solution hoped for by Austria and Sweden, to which Czechoslovakia had apparently been prepared, did not come about, is due solely to the account of the Soviet delegation [who] wanted to challenge the Western nuclear powers to a negative stance to be then able to denounce them. That this failed through the intervention of the two neutral states seems to have particularly disappointed the Soviet delegation.⁵⁷

One could read between the lines that the initiative might not have come from the Austrian delegation if it had expected such a severe reaction from Moscow. Nevertheless, they were pleased with the success that was finally achieved. Furthermore, the subsequent success of the draft resolution on nuclear weapons testing sponsored by Austria, Japan, and Sweden at the UN General Assembly mentioned earlier is an example of the forward-looking and skillful diplomacy of Austria’s UN ambassador Franz Matsch, who, in September 1959 was unanimously elected chairman of the political commission of the General Assembly.

During the Geneva deliberations on a ban on all nuclear weapons testing (NTPT), establishing an appropriate monitoring body was also discussed. At the end of June 1959, US ambassador H. Freeman Matthews asked the Austrian secretary-general for foreign affairs whether the American side might propose Vienna. In addition, Stockholm and Geneva were also considered, but the Americans came to prefer Vienna.⁵⁸ In July, the United States submitted a proposal suggesting Vienna to the Soviet and British delegations. On

July 20, Foreign Minister Kreisky received a note from Soviet ambassador S. Lapin and the *chargés d'affaires* of the American and British embassies officially requesting an agreement in principle to establish the headquarters of the future control organization in Vienna.⁵⁹

The Council of Ministers met to vote on the issue the same day. In his oral presentation to the Council of Ministers, Kreisky stressed the “extraordinary political importance” of the control system, which would be “a centerpiece of international *détente* and an essential center for the maintenance of world peace.” Kreisky emphasized that “[t]he fact that the three nuclear powers have chosen Vienna as the seat of this future organization [...] proves the confidence that the world has in Austria and above all in its perpetual neutrality.” Austria’s positive response was conveyed in three identical notes to Ambassador S. Lapin, Minister D. Wainhouse, and Minister J. Mackenzie on July 23.⁶⁰ Subsequently, Austrian authorities became active and began preparations for hosting the organization.

In 1962, the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) began meeting in Geneva. Negotiations soon focused on Aiken’s proposed nuclear ban treaty, and Austria actively participated in them, contributing to the nuclear test ban in 1963 and the NPT in 1968. For nuclear-weapon-free Austria, the NPT meant an additional measure of security and justice: The other non-nuclear-weapon states, which had not previously been prohibited from developing military nuclear capabilities, would be prevented forever from doing so. Moscow was aware that Austria had a substantial interest in the conclusion of an NPT. Intending to prevent NATO’s plans for the creation of a multilateral nuclear force (MLF), which the Warsaw Pact had regarded incompatible with the NPT at a meeting of its Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw at the beginning of 1965,⁶¹ the Soviet ambassador advised his foreign minister (Gromyko) in May 1965 to turn to Vienna and to ask the Austrians to become more active at promoting the NPT and counteracting NATO’s MLF plans. As a neutral country, he argued, Austria could not be “indifferent to European security issues.”⁶² Whether Gromyko had followed this advice remains unknown (and the MLF plans eventually failed due to disagreements within NATO). Still, the episode shows that Moscow was at least considering using the interests of the small neutral state for its own benefit.

The Signing of the NPT

After the draft NPT treaty was submitted to the UN General Assembly by the Committee on Disarmament, the Soviet ambassador visited the Austrian foreign minister on April 3, 1968, to suggest that Austria should sign the treaty as soon as possible and “intercede with its friends” to do so as well.⁶³ Neutral Austria was to act as an advocate in this critical phase, which Foreign Minister Waldheim agreed to do, even if he did not consider the text ideal. Two days later, the Czechoslovak envoy intervened to urge a quick signing with the foreign minister.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, the International Law Office of the Foreign Ministry was assessing whether signing a nuclear nonproliferation treaty was compatible with

its neutrality; after all, the issue was a theoretical renunciation of nuclear weapons—which, on the one hand, Austria was already prohibited from acquiring by the State Treaty, but on the other hand, there was the question of whether a perpetually neutral state could conduct negotiations on disarmament since it could be argued unarmed neutrality would not be compatible with its self-defense obligations. However, the International Law Office concluded that, although concerns about neutrality law could be raised, one could refrain from registering a reservation because other contracting partners could be presumed to be aware of Austria's neutrality and the resulting prohibition on disarmament (“bona fides”).⁶⁵ This official Austrian position on the NPT was handed over to the Soviet ambassador on April 22, 1968.⁶⁶

At the end of May, the Austrian UN delegation informed the Foreign Ministry that the NPT treaty would be adopted by the UN General Assembly on June 7, 1968, and would be open for signature, pointing out that “from the point of view of foreign policy, it [was] particularly important that Austria sign the treaty as soon as possible,”⁶⁷ since Austria had always advocated signing as soon as possible. There was no resistance in Vienna to that view. The Austrian ambassadors to London, Washington, and Moscow duly signed the NPT on July 1.

In Moscow, Austria was even accorded “special privileges,” as Ambassador Wodak reported: the first signatories were Hungary, Ireland, the GDR, Bulgaria “and then me (exclamation point).” Only then did the CSSR, Romania, Poland, and others sign. This was “registered with attention by all present.” The Soviet first deputy minister for foreign affairs, Vasil V. Kuznetsov, reportedly said to Wodak that the Soviets would “look forward to further cooperation with us with interest.”⁶⁸ Wodak obviously thought this was a success for Soviet-Austrian relations and an acknowledgment of Austria's role in bringing about the treaty.

While the IAEA was not at the table during the NPT discussions (which had been criticized by its director general Sigvard Eklund), an NPT Task Force was established at the IAEA after the NPT treaty was signed, giving the IAEA “new and unprecedented powers” as control and inspection organ once the NPT's entry into force in 1970.⁶⁹ Vienna's excitement about these developments could also be inferred from the press release of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announcing full optimism “that this treaty represents the first phase towards nuclear disarmament and will contribute to curbing the arms race, especially in the nuclear sector.” The fact that the nuclear controls provided for in the treaty were to be exercised by the IAEA was a particular cause for rejoicing since the Foreign Ministry concluded that “Vienna will thus become the center of worldwide security control in the nuclear field.”⁷⁰

Conclusion

The process of rebuilding the Austrian State after World War II required a new Austrian identity. Described by the occupying powers as the “first victim,” the political leadership endeavored to say goodbye to its dark past and identify Austria as a state independent of Germany by instrumentalizing the victim

myth. The newly formed Austrian State in 1955 chose the status of permanent neutrality as their foreign policy to end the occupation. From a price one was willing to pay for independence, neutrality evolved into a cornerstone of the new Austrian identity through the efforts of the political leadership, who actively sought to use this status as a bridge-builder and mediator between the blocs. The UN nonproliferation declaration by Aiken and following debates and an eventual treaty was one of those significant milestones in the late '50s and '60s that contributed to this achievement. Due to its geographic location on the Iron Curtain and because the neutrality enshrined in the Austrian constitution contained the provision that Austria had to remain free of nuclear weapons, Austria was a strong advocate of nuclear disarmament and détente for its genuine security reasons. Therefore, the Austrian Foreign Ministry and its UN delegation were eager to move the NPT issue forward. However, this is but half the story. Throughout this period, other initiatives strengthened Austria's role in the international world order as a permanent neutral engaged in international security and humanitarianism, not aloof as some have portrayed neutrals. From the Rapacki Plan and International Conferences on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy to the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, a climate was established for Austria to play an essential role in the discourse about disarmament and international security in a Europe divided by East and West. Eventually, after Austria's independence was restored, the Janus-like profile would dissipate with time. Austria's statehood would be legitimized by the policies it pursued through the international organizations it supported, many of them headquartered in Vienna. This included the IAEA and its control organization, making nuclear-free Austria the "nuclear capital of the world."

Notes

- 1 Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945–1955, Oesterreichs Weg zur Neutralität* (Graz: Styria, 1985), 326–32; together with Wolfgang Mueller, Gerald Stourzh lately published a revised English version of this book. See: Wolfgang Mueller and Gerald Stourzh, *A Cold War Over Austria. The Struggle for the State Treaty, Neutrality, and the End of the East-West Occupation, 1945–1955* (Lanham: Lexington, 2018); see also: Michael Gehler, "From Non-alignment to Neutrality: Austria's Transformation during the First East-West Détente, 1953–1958," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 4 (2005): 104–36; Manfred Rauchensteiner and Robert Kriechbaumer, eds., *Die Gunst des Augenblicks. Neue Forschungen zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2005); Stefan Karner and Gottfried Stangler, eds., *Österreich ist frei. Der österreichische Staatsvertrag 1955* (Vienna: Berger, 2005).
- 2 Alfred Verdoss, *Die immerwährende Neutralität Österreichs* (Vienna: Oldenbourg, 1977); Manfred Rotter, *Die dauernde Neutralität* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1981); Karl Zamenek, "The Changing International System: A New Look at Collective Security and Permanent Neutrality," *Oesterreichische Zeitschrift fuer Oeffentliches Recht und Voelkerrecht* 42 (1991), 277–94; Hanspeter Neuhold, *The European Neutrals in the 1990s: New Challenges and Opportunities* (Boulder: Colorado, 1992); Günter Bischof, Anton Pelinka and Ruth Wodak, eds., *Neutrality in Austria (Contemporary Austrian Studies 9)* (New York: Routledge, 2017). The anthology combines political science, legal, and historical analyses of Austrian neutrality.

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- 6 The signatures on the subject of nuclear weapons (Atom 700 numbers) in the archive holdings of the political section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Pol) are assigned in the index volume "Atom," but are missing from the listing and files of these signatures are—to the amazement of the archivists—not in the State Archives and could not be located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs either.
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- 8 On the establishment and recognition of the provisional government see in detail: Peter Ruggenthaler, *The concept of neutrality in Stalin's foreign policy* (New York: Lexington, 2015), 74–96; here: 88.
- 9 "Austria Welcomed Hitler, and Its Anti-Semitism Persists," *New York Times*, March 30, 1985, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/30/opinion/1-austria-welcomed-hitler-and-its-anti-semitism-persists-129701.html>.
- 10 The Opferthese was based on the so-called "Moscow Declaration." At the Allied conference of foreign ministers in Moscow in November 1943, the goal of restoring Austria as a sovereign state was formulated in a declaration on Austria. In this document, Austria was described as the first victim but also as an accomplice. The former formulation was intended to strengthen the resistance within Austria. Austria's victim role was emphasized especially by the Soviet side. It was also used by Soviet propaganda as an argument against the Western powers to re-establish Austria as a separate state. See in detail: Stefan Karner and Alexander Tschubarjan, eds., *Die Moskauer Deklaration 1943. "Österreich wieder herstellen"* (Vienna: Böhlau, 2015).
- 11 Michael Gehler, *From Saint Germain to Lisbon: Austria's Long Road from Disintegrated to United Europe 1919–2009* (Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2009), 157–58.
- 12 Since, according to the Moscow Memorandum of 1943, Austria was a liberated state (and not an enemy state) in the understanding of the Allies, a state treaty (and not a peace treaty) had been wrangled over in protracted negotiations.
- 13 On the roots of the Victim these see FN 7; on Austria's national identity building after World War II, see in detail Ernst Bruckmueller, "The Development of Austrian National Identity," in *Austria 1945–95*, eds. Kurt Richard Luther and Peter Pulzer (London and New York: Routledge, 2018).
- 14 In the first free elections of the Second Republic, the KPÖ barely made it into the National Council with 5.4% of the vote, winning only 4 of 165 seats. Although the KPÖ was part of the government, it provided only one minister, which made its real political power insignificant. KPÖ Energy Minister Karl Altmann resigned from his ministerial post in November 1947, and from then on the KPÖ was an opposition party.
- 15 Gehler, "From Non-Alignment to Neutrality," 105; Oliver Rathkolb, *The Paradoxical Republic. Austria 1945–2005* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 10.
- 16 Bruckmueller, "The Development of Austrian National Identity," 88–89.
- 17 Gehler, "From Non-Alignment to Neutrality," 136.
- 18 See in detail: Günter Bischof and Peter Ruggenthaler, *Österreich und der Kalte Krieg* (Wien: Leykam, 2022), 139–47.
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- 20 SBKA, VII.2, BKAA, Box 16, Folder 1956, 4. Informationen für den Herrn Bundesminister, Juni 1956.
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 - 23 Elisabeth Röhrlich, *Inspectors for Peace. A History of the International Atomic Energy Agency* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2022), 63–68.
 - 24 *Ibid.*, 63.
 - 25 *Ibid.*, 64.
 - 26 *Ibid.*, 72.
 - 27 *Ibid.*, 65.
 - 28 Elisabeth Röhrlich, "An Attitude of Caution," 44.
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 - 30 *Ibid.*
 - 31 Günter Bischof, Stefan Karner and Barbara Stelzl Marx, eds., *The Vienna Summit and Its Importance in International History* (New York: Lexington, 2013).
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 - 33 See ÖStA/AdR, II-pol 1958ff, folders Atom; for example: ÖStA/AdR, II-pol 1958, Atom 2A-2B, Zl. 1535—PrM/58, Gemeinderat der Gemeinde Wallern, Burgenland; Resolution, an das Bundeskanzleramt—Auswärtige Angelegenheiten; ÖStA/AdR, II-pol 1959, Atom 2, Zl. 2672-A/59. Schreiben von Johann Sorko aus Kempten/Allgäu an die Leitung der internationalen Organisation zur Einstellung der Kernwaffenversuche (z.H. B. Kreisky), July 28, 1959; and many others.
 - 34 Röhrlich, "An Attitude of Caution," 39f.; see also Röhrlich, *Inspectors for Peace*, 71–2.
 - 35 Röhrlich, "An Attitude of Caution," 34.
 - 36 See in detail Bischof and Ruggenthaler, *Österreich und der Kalte Krieg*, 238–52.
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 - 38 Bruno Thoß, "Österreich in der Entstehungs- und Konsolidierungsphase des westlichen Bündnissystems (1947–1967)", in *Zwischen den Blöcken. NATO, Warschauer Pakt und Österreich*, ed., Manfred Rauchensteiner (Vienna: Böhlau, 2010), 19–88, here: 70f.
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 - 42 Mueller, "Der Warschauer Pakt und Österreich 1955–1991," 158f, 164–67.
 - 43 Friedrich Korkisch, "Die atomare Komponente. Überlegungen für einen Atomwaffen-Einsatz in Österreich," in *Zwischen den Blöcken*, ed. Rauchensteiner, 387–450, here: 437.
 - 44 *Ibid.*, 436.
 - 45 The "First Rapacki Plan" and explanations to this plan are printed in extracts in Friedrich-Karl Schramm, Wolfram-Georg Riggert and Alois Friedel, eds., *Sicherheitskonferenz in Europa: Dokumentation 1954–1972* (Frankfurt: Metzner, 1972), 388–90, Doc. 274, "Erster Rapacki-Plan. Rede des polnischen Außenministers, Adam Rapacki, vor der 12. Tagung der Vollversammlung der Vereinten Nationen

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10 Yugoslavia

The Creation of a Nuclear Policy in the 1960s

Marko Miljković

Our deepest interest in the use of nuclear energy is connected to the struggle of our entire country for universal disarmament and international cooperation.¹

Introduction

Piecing together the puzzle of the Yugoslav nuclear policy is a challenging and frustrating task. The biggest obstacle is that until the early 1960s, no discernable nuclear strategy existed, at least not as an organized system of long-term goals, even though the country had invested heavily in the development of the civilian and military nuclear program since the late 1940s. What did exist was more of an adaptable logic, or more precisely, the “logic of independence,” in which possession of a nuclear arsenal was supposed to play an important role.²

A second and even bigger problem is that the Yugoslav President, Josip Broz Tito, communicated most of this logic among his closest associates and foreign observers only when it was absolutely necessary, depending on his strategic thinking, or when important changes on the international level forced his hand. While this approach suggests a lack of structure of the Yugoslav foreign policy in the nuclear field, it also allowed for flexibility and adaptation to changing circumstances. It can also be argued that despite unavoidable blunders and even big mistakes, this approach served Yugoslavia and Tito well, as the country managed to keep a high level of independence during the most challenging period of the Cold War.

Based on the vast and previously unexplored documentary collections of the Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia [*Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije*] and Archives of Yugoslavia [*Arhiv Jugoslavije*], among other sources, the following analysis reveals that during the 1960s, an understanding gradually grew in Belgrade that stopping nuclear weapons proliferation would serve Yugoslav independence better than possessing a nuclear arsenal. As one of the leading nations in the emerging Nonaligned Movement (NAM), Yugoslavia also championed complete global nuclear disarmament, which it viewed as an important precondition for the ‘peaceful coexistence’ of nations.

These were the main pillars on which, gradually, Yugoslavia's nuclear policy was developed in the 1960s. The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—which Yugoslavia signed in 1968 and ratified in 1970—eventually solved the security conundrum, leading to the nearly complete abandonment of the domestic nuclear program, including the development of the atomic bomb. The main argument of this chapter is that, despite the alluring rhetoric, ambitious goals, grand narrative, and calls for international cooperation on an equal basis in the NPT negotiations, the Yugoslav nuclear policy was based almost exclusively on selfish national security needs and calculations.

Internal Considerations: Between 'Extreme' Requests and Achievable Goals

The international climate regarding nuclear proliferation started to change soon after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, although this was only a culmination of the period of rapidly worsening relations between two superpowers. Both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation was continuing unimpeded, all of which was a sign that to avoid a global disaster, the question of disarmament would have to be taken seriously. The Yugoslavs had an added perspective on this problem, which included their own security nightmare of rapid nuclear proliferation in Europe.

While the initial fear of an imminent Soviet attack after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, combined with the USSR's successful atomic bomb test in 1949 had pushed the Yugoslav political establishment into the frantic race for nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent, this motive dissipated relatively quickly after Stalin's death in 1953. What followed was the rollercoaster of political relations between two countries, which produced often harsh rhetoric and public accusations on the political or ideological plain, although the situation never deteriorated to the low point of the late 1940s. Besides Tito's skillful political maneuvering, what saved Yugoslavia from a Soviet attack in the early 1950s was the extensive political, financial, and military support of the United States, whose political establishment was happy to exploit any cracks in the seemingly monolithic Soviet-led socialist bloc. Although it has to be emphasized that the internal political stability of Tito's regime played an equally important role.³

By the mid-1950s, Tito and his inner circle concluded that further nuclear weapons proliferation in Europe might render the country's hard-earned conventional military deterrence useless. It was estimated that successful nuclear weapons programs in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and Italy would trigger a domino effect and nuclear weapons sharing within NATO and Warsaw Pact, leaving Yugoslavia as an independent or nonaligned nation surrounded by nuclear-armed countries of two opposing blocs. Yugoslavia would have no immediate response to such a nightmare scenario, which would spell the end of the country's hard-earned independence and lead to the collapse of the regime with potentially far-reaching consequences, including the country's

dissolution. Tito's only solution was to support any initiative during the 1950s that would guarantee this would not happen, while simultaneously secretly accelerating the nuclear weapons program, fearing, or perhaps even anticipating, failure of these initiatives.⁴

The establishment of the United Nations (UN) Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (EDNC), in 1961, marked the beginning of negotiations on "general and complete disarmament," leading to several interim agreements, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), and eventually the establishment of the global nonproliferation regime based on the 1968 NPT.⁵ In Yugoslavia, this process sparked the need for official formulation of the country's nuclear policy. In April 1962, the State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs [*Državni sekretarijat za inostrane poslove* – DSIP] organized a joint meeting with representatives of the Yugoslav People's Army [*Jugoslovenska narodna armija* – JNA], the Institute for International Politics [*Institut za međunarodnu politiku*], and the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission [*Savezna komisija za nuklearnu energiju* – SKNE] with an aim to "establish permanent cooperation and coordination between aforementioned institutions," which would allow the representatives of the DSIP "to participate with more complete argumentation in international negotiations in United Nations, on conferences for disarmament" and other activities related to the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation.⁶

This rather short official report the DSIP drafted reveals several important issues behind the Yugoslav position on global disarmament. First, the representatives of the DSIP "emphasized that they do not have experts who could follow sophisticated problems and materials being negotiated."⁷ The problem was quite acute since it was also revealed that no one in the Yugoslav diplomatic core had any experience or understanding about the size of nuclear weapons arsenals in the world, global reserves of nuclear raw materials, capacities for production of "nuclear and thermonuclear weapons," or methods for detection of nuclear explosions.⁸ In other words, they had very little knowledge of the key topics negotiated in the EDNC, which was a common problem among the developing and nonaligned nations, whose leaders often lacked staff, technical knowledge, and the belief that they could influence the outcome of negotiations.⁹ This indirectly reveals that, even in Yugoslavia, global disarmament and particularly the nuclear weapons proliferation problem, was not studied at any depth in the previous years except, perhaps, on the basic political and strategic level for the most pressing issue of stopping the nuclear armament of the FRG.

The second important discovery is that the DSIP report repeatedly stressed "the problem of disarmament and control of nuclear explosives production and detection of explosions."¹⁰ This was a burning issue the DSIP wanted covered. The strong emphasis is not surprising considering that negotiations about the PTBT were necessarily very technical, requiring a significant understanding of the related science and technologies from persons engaged in negotiations.¹¹ However, in Yugoslavia, the problem had an additional dimension. As a country invested in the development of the atomic bomb, having a deep

understanding of negotiations and activities directed at stopping or slowing down nuclear weapons proliferation was crucial for planning its own activities in the field.

Successful negotiations in the ENDC could potentially lead to a complete abandonment of these plans—which eventually happened—although back in 1962 this decision was still far from being reached. The report clearly states that coordination between the DSIP, JNA, and SKNE was being prepared only “in case our government decides to engage itself in the disarmament action,” which clearly suggests that no single “Yugoslav position” regarding the disarmament negotiations at the ENDC had been reached at the time. The idea was to follow the evolution of ENDC negotiations in order to be able to prepare an informed foreign policy decision if or when the time comes. Another more pressing reason for following the ENDC activities was that, “besides India,” Yugoslavia was “the most advanced non-aligned country in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy” and that it would be “opportune” to be updated on the question of disarmament. The comment indicates the desire for maintaining Yugoslavia’s leadership within the NAM, which was somewhat undermined by the fact that among its founding members, both India and Egypt (United Arab Republic/UAR) were members of the ENDC, but not Yugoslavia.¹²

Belgrade’s position regarding the test-ban negotiations in the ENDC was relatively quickly formulated following two principles. In January 1963, the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow reported that the Soviets viewed an agreement on this topic as “an obstacle to [nuclear] arming of West Germany,” which “in the USSR is still considered as a particular danger.” In addition, the Soviets revealed they would be happy to use such an agreement as a means of putting “political and moral pressure” on China. Although it was also emphasized that “they have no illusions that China cannot be stopped from performing tests (and building its own atomic power),” it was expected this would take a lot of time.¹³ Overall, the Soviets made extensive use of this strategy, reminding the Yugoslavs about how dangerous it would be to arm the FRG with nuclear weapons to gain their support. For example, on at least one occasion, the Soviets justified any stalling in negotiations with the desire of the West to “draw W. Germany into the circle of nuclear powers” before the test-ban agreement was signed, which was once again a signal for Yugoslavia to support Moscow.¹⁴ What can also be read between the lines was the Soviet desire to use Yugoslavia’s standing in the NAM to gain the group’s support as well, even if only indirectly.

An additional and related Yugoslav fear was that the lack of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States would lead to growing tensions, which Belgrade wanted to avoid. They would necessarily complicate any similar negotiations in the future and perhaps even lead to connecting the test-ban problem with other open international questions. A lumping together of several problems as bargaining chips on one or the other side was an approach Yugoslavia considered completely unacceptable.¹⁵ The logic on this issue was very simple: while other European nations were members of one or

the other bloc and could hide under the nuclear and conventional military umbrella of their respective patron superpower, Yugoslavia, Albania, and by the mid-1960s Romania were in a sort of a 'gray area' of the Soviet interest sphere and could easily become its prey in case of a destabilization of superpower relations.¹⁶

Indian diplomacy used a similar approach to mobilize Yugoslav support, playing the 'West German card' and explaining that in case of the prolongation of negotiations, other problems will be included, "first and foremost the German complex in its entirety and particularly arming of Germany with nuclear weapons."¹⁷ In February 1963, the Yugoslav Embassy in New Delhi reported about informal conversations during which Indian diplomats raised concerns that China might conduct its first atomic bomb test during 1963, in which case "India too will be forced to construct the bomb (reassuring us that I[ndia] is capable of constructing the bomb of the Hiroshima capacity in six months)." For this reason, the Indians argued, the test ban and inspections related to it would have to be agreed soon between the two superpowers.¹⁸

The prospect of an Indian atomic bomb added one more layer of complexity to Yugoslavia's strategic thinking. It would secure New Delhi's leadership in the NAM, as Yugoslavia was still many years away from being able to develop its own bomb and respond to the challenge in the realm of prestige. However, a successful test-ban treaty would make it very complicated for India to pursue this option and balance the competition for leadership between India and Yugoslavia.¹⁹

Putting all of these pieces together eventually led to the formulation of the specific Yugoslav nonproliferation policy. The Indian ambassador in Belgrade estimated that the views of the Yugoslav "have always been somewhat extreme, rather in support of the Moscow line."²⁰ The Yugoslav endorsement of the Soviet proposals should not be too surprising considering that both countries shared deep concerns regarding the potential nuclearization of the FRG and Italy and the shockwaves this may produce. However, the Yugoslav 'extreme' position included the request for total nuclear disarmament. It was estimated that the country simply could not keep up with the growing sophistication, strength, and sheer volume of nuclear arsenals, even if it decided to commit itself completely to a full-scale nuclear weapons project. Therefore, the only solution to the country's security dilemma would be total nuclear disarmament, although the Indian ambassador also noted, "by and large Yugoslav attitude was determined by her own geography."²¹

By the end of July 1963, Yugoslavia officially announced its readiness to sign the treaty even before the final agreement had been reached.²² Although many nations wanted to lure Belgrade to support their own proposals and arguments, with the visible absence of the United States, it seems that Yugoslavia developed its own stance in support of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, stretching between 'extreme' views and quickly achievable goals. In August, a report with explanations had been dispatched to its embassies and diplomatic missions outlining the government's official policy:

Convergence of views and readiness for limited agreements between the USA and USSR is met and will continue to be met with resistance of W[est] G[ermany] and France (the German problem, resistance to the USA-USSR bilateralism, etc.), but this development had already imposed certain evolution in their positions. [...] All this requires as wide as possible and more active inclusion of the rest, and above all, non-aligned countries, in presently initiated positive processes.²³

Diplomatic Actions toward the Signing of the NPT

During the heated debate about details and provisions of the NPT, the anchoring points of Belgrade's foreign policy did not change dramatically, nor did the strategies of the Soviet Union and the United States toward Yugoslavia. While the USSR was attempting to secure support from the NAM (and indirectly also gain control over it), the United States was more active than earlier but far less than the Soviets. The only significant change was visible in relations with India, which was a strong opponent of the treaty. Formally, it bemoaned the inequality the NPT enforced and formalized between nuclear haves and have-nots, while it wanted to keep the nuclear weapons option open as a potential answer to future challenges. Considering the Yugoslav continuous, albeit occasionally grumbling support to the NPT, and with the benefit of hindsight, it seems safe to argue that, unlike his Indian allies, Tito was willing to abandon his atomic bomb dreams for a treaty that would guarantee the global nuclear status quo. In order to support rapid formulation and signing of the NPT, Yugoslav diplomacy developed a real-political strategy that reflected its nuclear policy of voicing its maximal demands, such as total nuclear disarmament, while endorsing goals that had an almost universal recognition and thus seemed achievable.

Yugoslavia formally expressed its support for the conclusion of the NPT in its government Memorandum to the UN Disarmament Commission, delivered on May 3, 1965.²⁴ Considering that it started to seriously analyze and wholeheartedly support nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament during negotiations for the PTBT in 1962 and 1963, the date of submission of this Memorandum may be regarded as a specific 'point of no return,' which defined definitively its foreign policy toward the issue.

The Memorandum contained the usual formulas in support of "general and complete disarmament" and critique of previously failed initiatives, but it also strongly criticized the apparent lack of interest among superpowers to contain the nuclear arms race, requesting "urgent and concrete actions [to] be undertaken both on the national and international plane."²⁵ This position actually fit well with traditional NAM principles, which emphasized nuclear disarmament over nonproliferation, partly due to disappointment with the ongoing superpower negotiations and partly because disarmament negotiations would necessarily have to be debated in a global arena.²⁶ In Yugoslavia, one of the

explanations for the necessity of urgent action was the fear of an arrested economic progress of less developed nations due to nuclear and conventional arms races, a goal common to the nonaligned nations.²⁷

More importantly, the Memorandum confirmed that Yugoslavia was not only supporting the initiative but wanted it to succeed as soon as possible. Therefore, the Yugoslavs insisted on “a minimum number of measures” that could be quickly adopted to break almost two decades of stalemate in negotiations, including

- a the obligation not to use nuclear weapons,
- b the banning of all nuclear weapon tests with no exception, and
- c the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form whatever, with an agreement to begin solving the problem of denuclearization of nuclear Powers themselves.²⁸

The suggestion was designed as a middle ground between policies supported by the nonaligned nations and Yugoslavia’s own security concerns while retaining a semblance of originality. The latter was particularly visible in the continuous and strong insistence on total nuclear disarmament, which was an important component of the strategic thinking and had become characteristic of Belgrade’s approach. The nuclear powers never seriously contemplated the renouncing of nuclear arsenals, even though recent groundbreaking scholarship revealed that some initiatives had been seriously contemplated between the United States and Soviet Union in the mid-1980s.²⁹ Two decades earlier, this was unthinkable and the Yugoslav diplomacy obviously played the “more Catholic than the Pope” role in the global arena, minimally aiming at scoring some moral and propaganda points over adversaries and allies alike, while keeping the topic open for debate. Overall, the Memorandum reflects Yugoslavia’s enthusiasm after the relatively quick and successful conclusion of the PTBT, which was most likely the underlying reason behind the “minimum number of measures” logic.

At the same time, the Indian embassy in Belgrade was closely monitoring the Yugoslav initiatives, particularly its activities among the nonaligned countries, and any potential changes of the general policy regarding ongoing disarmament negotiations within the ENDC that could potentially undermine the Indian arguments against the NPT. The relaxation of Belgrade’s ‘extreme’ position became visible by April 1967, when the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on an NPT draft. Admitting that the agreement had its shortcomings, Belgrade stressed that it “can be an important contribution to the policy of peaceful co-existence and negotiations without which it would be impossible to reach an agreement on general disarmament.”³⁰ The adapted position was that “the agreement must not be an end in itself but a means for starting the process of disarmament which includes the de-nuclearization of the existing atomic powers.”³¹

By the beginning of 1968, Yugoslavia's own estimates became even more realistic and better informed. It was understood that both the United States and the Soviet Union had no intention to accept amendments of the non-aligned countries and that the draft will probably not be significantly changed. The 'take it or leave it' approach traditionally did not sit well with the Yugoslavs, but the understanding had been reached in previous months that "it is more important to receive the acceptance of the FRG" than succeed with the maximalist demands of the NAM.³² It was also begrudgingly accepted that the United States and the Soviet Union would only start negotiations on the freezing of their nuclear weapons programs and antimissile systems after the NPT was signed and ratified. The same disillusion was present about discussions on "the [military] bases [in foreign countries], ban on the use of nuclear weapons, and particularly general disarmament," where there were "no real perspectives for progress."³³

In the following months, the DSIP was very active in its attempts to secure the necessary support for the treaty among the nonaligned nations, after it had been satisfied with reassurances that it would deny nuclear weapons to the FRG. According to the estimate of the Yugoslav Embassy in Washington, DC, "the most serious opponents were India, Brazil and Romania." Yugoslavia tailored its diplomatic activities accordingly. It was suggested that with India the only realistic goal was "to secure that it does not initiate action against the treaty," while regarding Brazil, diplomats suggested that they would sign the contract "with some reservations," particularly regarding the exclusion of peaceful explosions from the treaty. It was also expected that the safeguards were "the question which can spark the most serious resistance of non-nuclear countries."³⁴

The relations among the nonaligned nations were particularly tense, as they could not agree on a unified position on the draft of the treaty, being immersed in their own political strategies, like India or neutral Sweden, or presenting very drastic amendments, like Brazil and Argentina who defended the right to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE).³⁵ In the given circumstances, the Yugoslav DSIP was questioning the expediency of submitting any additional amendments, expressing doubt if "in this phase it would contribute to the improvement of the treaty."³⁶ A related problem was that Yugoslavia simply did not have any concrete suggestions or complaints that could be formulated as constructive amendments.³⁷ The main components of the Yugoslav nuclear policy were already promulgated in the 1965 Memorandum and were eventually further elaborated in the "Statement of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Government on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" of April 11, 1968. The statement focused on nuclear disarmament, international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, "including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes," and firm security guarantees to non-nuclear weapons states that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.³⁸

Not having fresh ideas, nor realistic chances to implement significant changes in the draft treaty, Yugoslav decision-makers opted to utilize the

opportunity to gain some prestige points among nonaligned nations. Hence, the 1968 Statement was directed more toward (if not against) India, than toward the Great Powers. New Delhi's prominent role in the ENDC and NAM but also its significant capacities to develop nuclear weapons in the relatively near future were a bother to Belgrade. Canadian diplomats helped ease the concerns, warranting that India would not break the agreement and use plutonium from the CANDU reactor they sold to them for construction of the atomic bomb, while the independent production of plutonium in India would not start before 1975, all of which was accepted as sufficient guarantees.³⁹ Roughly at the same time, Indian diplomats in New York assured their Yugoslav counterparts that "India will not develop atomic weapons, but is interested to continue use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes unimpeded."⁴⁰

The superpowers, too, had clear messages for Yugoslavia. The head of the US delegation in the ENDC reassured Belgrade that the FRG would sign the treaty, which would also make it impossible for the United States to share their nuclear weapons with their allies, including the FRG.⁴¹ Similar guarantees were received from the head of the US delegation in the UN Disarmament Commission, who admitted the treaty was not perfect, but it was the best possible outcome given the circumstances. He expressed the hope Yugoslavia would support it too.⁴² American diplomats also emphasized that "détente between USA-USSR" was more important than any problems non-nuclear countries raised, particularly regarding the safeguards.⁴³

This was the main rationale and logic on which US policies regarding the NPT had been developed. The importance attached to détente guided the decision even after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia to avoid "heavy-handed pressure or arm twisting" in gathering support for the NPT among other nations, "especially the Federal Republic of Germany."⁴⁴ The "two-pronged problem," as it was called, was that any such pressure could result in expectations and even demands for stronger US security guarantees, consequently complicating conversations with the Soviets. At the same time, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the second prong, had "demonstrated their disregard for treaty obligations such as those contained in the NPT," which suggested that the Nixon administration considered the NPT more as a means to détente than an actual functional international treaty.⁴⁵ The same logic can be identified in the US government's signing and ratifying the NPT, as any haste and expedience in this matter aimed primarily at preempting "efforts by allies and neutrals to reopen earlier issues on the NPT" while simultaneously denying the Soviets this topic as a bargaining chip in any future negotiations.⁴⁶ The reasoning behind such decisions was obviously more complex than presented here, but for the purpose of this analysis, it is useful in explaining the lack of US pressure on Yugoslavia to sign the NPT.

Soviet diplomacy was, unsurprisingly, more direct, using a different argument but coming to the same conclusion. The advisor of the Soviet embassy in Berlin bluntly expressed his worry that "the behavior of the FRG recalls the avoidance of obligations and camouflage [seen] in German policies after the

First World War,” expressing also his doubt that they would sign the treaty. In an attempt to reinforce Yugoslav fears of German revisionism—this time armed with nuclear weapons—the Soviet delegation described that the FRG was “expansionist, against the socialist countries, wants revision of borders and does not recognize post-war realities, [and] strives for atomic weaponry.” Thus, Moscow was trying to secure Yugoslav support for the treaty by assuring it was the best safeguard against the FRG’s nuclear arsenal. At the same time, the Soviets hoped to promote the idea among the nonaligned countries too. The approach worked with the Yugoslav diplomat in Berlin who reported back to Belgrade he believed “that in this period there really is a great understanding of the two countries in policy towards the FRG and West Berlin.”⁴⁷ It is also worth mentioning the DSIP suggested not to condition the signing of the NPT on FRG accession, expecting it to happen soon anyhow—although one official estimate emphasized, “[T]his probably will not be the case with ratification.”⁴⁸

Having received reassurances from both superpowers, the FRG would sign the treaty and consequently give up on the independent development of nuclear weapons, the United States would not be able to share its weapons with the FRG (or any other country), and India would not construct a bomb in the foreseeable future, all the important boxes were ticked in the Yugoslav agenda. In addition, the beginning of the *détente* between the USSR and the United States—a process to which the NPT was an important milestone—was an added benefit to Belgrade, as it implied stability and a potential political status quo in which Yugoslavia proved capable of surviving. Interestingly, the same calculations influenced its decision *not* to sign the NPT immediately after the treaty was opened for signatures on July 1, 1968. Belgrade delayed the act for several days purposefully to stress its reservations, as well as symbolically support other nonaligned nations, which were openly against the treaty. Only after the first 36 countries had signed the NPT did Yugoslavia follow suit on July 10, signing simultaneously in Moscow as the 37 and in London as the 38 signatory.⁴⁹ The final estimate of the DSIP about the utility of the NPT neatly summarizes the Yugoslav strategy as it evolved during the 1960s:

Our security in relation to the FR Germany and Italy is increasing [original emphasis]. Namely, if there were no Treaty and if nuclear weapons proliferation would occur in Europe, FR Germany and Italy would be the first to acquire them. If we, in a particular set of circumstances, were forced to go for the military nuclearization, it would be a lot slower and less efficient, considering our much weaker financial and technological capabilities. Therefore, our security is, according to our opinion, greatest if none of our potential enemies has nuclear weapons. Consequently, it is in interest of Yugoslavia to directly advocate for the absolute prevention of further nuclear weapons proliferation. Since our concept of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is more comprehensive than the one in the treaty, Yugoslavia must constantly insist on a wider concept which would aspire for the

withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign territories, from seas and oceans, suspension of training of foreign armies in handling nuclear weapons and in general, stopping the so-called ‘vertical’ nuclear weapons proliferation, that is to say, its further sophistication and multiplication among existing nuclear powers.⁵⁰

Other benefits and motives identified by the DSIP included the possibility to “significantly improve the development of modern [nuclear] technology,” as stipulated in Articles IV and V of the NPT. Like many times before, it was also emphasized that the main precondition for the fulfillment of these ambitions was a “clearly conceived long-term and short-term plan” for the development of the country’s nuclear program.⁵¹ The NPT (Article VI) also allowed “better conditions for more direct engagement in efforts to achieve certain disarmament and security measures.” This was particularly important to Yugoslavia, whose core foreign policy and defense strategy was based on the notion that “military alliances and blocs are not the form through which security should be pursued,” focusing instead on “disarmament and development of fresh and far-reaching forms of collective security through the UN.”⁵²

Contemplating the Ratification of the NPT

On November 19, 1969, the DSIP forwarded the text of the treaty to a number of ministries, scientific institutes, republic governments, and other institutions, requesting opinions and suggestions.⁵³ Most institutions provided short written confirmations that they did not have any reservations regarding the ratification, although the fact that this was not a topic discussed publicly suggests this debate was more of a formality.⁵⁴ Since the security implications of the NPT were most relevant to the formulation of Yugoslavia’s nuclear policy—particularly in relation to the FRG—the opinion of its army, the JNA, had potentially the greatest weight. However, the only concern it voiced was that the ratification should not be initiated before “this treaty is ratified by neighboring countries, as well as the FR Germany.” In fact, the JNA reply contained only two sentences, suggesting no real objections existed among Yugoslav generals.⁵⁵

Whichever concerns and reservations different state actors and institutions had regarding the ratification, the DSIP included only their most general comments in the final proposal, such as reflections on the inherent inequality or “discriminatory character of the treaty,” focusing mainly on the received approvals.⁵⁶ Once again, this suggests that the decision had already been made and that the entire ‘discussion’ was a simple formality, designed to camouflage that Yugoslavia still ran on a centralized decision-making system.

More crucially, two other important conditions had already been met by that time. First, the FRG signed the NPT on November 28, 1969. The importance of this event is clearly visible from the fact that the translation of the official FRG statement concerning the signing of the NPT was included in the package

of materials prepared for the DSIP's ratification deliberations. Second, by the beginning of 1970, the ambassadors of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain made a joint request for Yugoslavia "to ratify the Treaty as soon as possible."⁵⁷ No details about Belgrade's reactions to these requests have been recorded, but it is safe to assume voicing any kind of concerns against such a united front of (super)powers would not have diffused the pressure.

Even though the NPT did not tackle the most sensitive issues raised by Yugoslav diplomacy, such as total nuclear disarmament or the obligation that nuclear powers would not use nuclear weapons against other nations, it did address the country's greatest security challenge—the prevention of further nuclear weapons proliferation, particularly in Europe (with focus on the FRG), neatly corresponding to the "minimum number of measures" strategy. On the other hand, considering the somewhat surprising lack of any real internal opposition to the NPT ratification, the question remains if Tito actually managed to bargain with superpowers for additional guarantees and provisions through less formal channels, which would satisfy even the greatest opponents in the country.

The question of security guarantees of nuclear powers to non-nuclear nations was often raised by the Yugoslavs in international forums during the NPT negotiations. However, it was formulated in an official document only through the 1968 Statement. The Yugoslav government wanted to find a solution that would obligate nuclear powers "not to use nuclear weapons against signatory treaty states on whose territory there are no nuclear weapons," and secure that UN mechanisms could provide "efficient protection of non-nuclear countries who could become victims of attacks or threats of the nuclear weapons attack."⁵⁸

Even though this was the final point in the 1968 Statement, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the summer of that year, definitively raised the importance of the issue, pushing it higher on the agenda. It greatly affected Tito and the entire political leadership, leading to a rethinking of their security policy. As in the aftermath of the 1948 conflict with Stalin, the solution was found in soliciting informal but strong security guarantees from the United States and NATO.

Tito's biggest fear was that Brezhnev could use the same logic as in Czechoslovakia, provide direct or indirect support to the sarcastically called "healthy forces" in Yugoslavia, and topple his regime.⁵⁹ To secure guarantees from the United States, Tito swiftly organized a political campaign against the Soviet Union. Already on August 22, 1968, the Plenum of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Communist Party) made a public statement, condemning the invasion of Czechoslovakia, defining it as an "act of aggression, [...] trampling on the sovereignty of a sovereign country," and "a clear indicator of the Soviet hegemonic aspiration," requesting the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops.⁶⁰

The next step was to show to both the West and the Soviets that a potential similar invasion of Yugoslavia would meet an organized and decisive resistance by the JNA and the entire population. This national defense doctrine, better

known as the ‘Total People’s Defense’ [*Opštenarodna odbrana*], was formally adopted as a Law on People’s Defense on September 18, 1968. It was based on general provisions in the 1963 Constitution and experiences of partisan guerilla warfare during the Second World War and designed to be a strong conventional deterrent. In one of the conversations with US under-secretary of state Nicholas Katzenbach, in October 1968, Tito emphasized that Yugoslavia could immediately deploy two million troops, with 1.2 million drawn from the regular army, and that any aggressor would probably need three to four times more troops to successfully invade the country.⁶¹

The “Total People’s Defense” doctrine was understood by the US strategists as the Yugoslav determination to resist a Soviet invasion:

Yugoslavia seeks to deter Soviet political threats or invasion, now and in the post-Tito period, by demonstrating that a Czechoslovak-like road march into Yugoslavia is not possible; that an invasion would have unpredictable consequences; that an occupation effort would be bloody, prolonged and expensive in terms of manpower and materiel; and that, if a *blitz* invasion were indeed transformed into a protracted conflict in Europe in which Yugoslavia would seek outside assistance, it would involve a risk of superpower confrontation.⁶²

Already in 1968, US officials estimated that “the Yugoslav resistance potential is an enormous, proven quantity,”⁶³ and that if the Soviets would invade Yugoslavia “we would [...] make early, unmistakable reference to the risk and real possibility of nuclear war.”⁶⁴ The bottom line for the US Department of State was the conviction that Yugoslavia would offer fierce resistance to a Soviet invasion, which was considered a good enough reason to provide the country with necessary political, economic, and military support, including the nuclear umbrella. The importance of such a Yugoslav posture in securing the extended deterrence and support of the United States can be found in the same document related to a potential American response in case of a Soviet invasion of Romania:

Neither the capacity of the Romanian military nor the experience of Romanian history suggests the likelihood of protracted military resistance, guerilla warfare, or even, in fact, harassments of the type executed by the Czechoslovaks in the early days of the Soviet invasion.⁶⁵

These initiatives were complemented by a range of diplomatic activities. In a series of meetings with American representatives in September and October 1968, including the meeting between Tito and Katzenbach and meetings with the US ambassador, Charles B. Elbrick, Yugoslavia eventually received security guarantees and reassurances that the United States and NATO would not sit idly in case of a Soviet invasion of the country. These included a combination of strong, yet informal guarantees and several public statements. The most

direct promise was made by Ambassador Elbrick, who assured Tito during one of the meetings that the West would not allow an occupation of Yugoslavia, as this would directly jeopardize the security of NATO's South Wing (Greece, Turkey, and Italy). This satisfied Tito, to whom informal guarantees were a perfect solution, as they did not compromise his country's nonalignment policy or formal independence while providing enough deterrence directed toward the Soviet Union. The newly inaugurated US president, Richard Nixon, and his administration later expanded the cooperation with Yugoslavia, complementing the security guarantees with credit lines through the Eximbank and other lucrative loans and commercial deals.⁶⁶

Informal security guarantees were equally desirable to the US administration. Any public commitments to the Yugoslav cause were considered dangerous, as these could be understood as "giving the Soviets a green light on Romania." Instead, it was estimated that a combination of raising awareness in public forums on the aggressive Soviet posture in the Balkans, discrediting the Soviet justification of an armed intervention within their sphere of interest, and carefully designed meetings between Yugoslav and US officials would be a sufficient message to the Soviets to back off Yugoslavia.⁶⁷

Therefore, US security guarantees to Yugoslavia based on informal extended nuclear deterrence were sufficient for Tito to digest the lack of nuclear powers' formal commitments in the NPT. Even though this was a far cry from the original demands on banning the global use of nuclear weapons, the creation of circumstances that would prevent such a scenario for Yugoslavia and outside the budding nonproliferation regime was probably the maximum that could be negotiated. More importantly, through the entire process, Tito was focused almost exclusively on selfish real-political interests. Once official diplomatic activities achieved what was possible through the NPT, he quickly devised a strategy to receive additional security guarantees independently, indirectly, and informally.

Conclusion

On March 4, 1970, Yugoslavia officially ratified the NPT.⁶⁸ Having received strong security guarantees from the United States, supported by the growing confidence in the global NPT regime, and the emerging détente between the two superpowers, all of which spelled stability and solidification of existing Cold War divisions, the utility of nuclear weapons for Yugoslav security became close to insignificant. With the turbulent internal political development, combined with the growing economic crisis, the development of nuclear weapons as a powerful deterrent was also becoming an unobtainable goal. Considering everything that has been said about different motives and underlying logic in the formulation of the Yugoslav nuclear policy, the full support of the emerging NPT regime seemed like the only sensible decision, despite its inherent flaws and all the efforts and investments already made into the nuclear program.

By the beginning of the 1970s, the only remnant of the program (and the somewhat embarrassing monument to Tito's earlier nuclear ambitions) was the Federal Nuclear Energy Commission (SKNE). Its destiny was deeply related to the accession ratification of the NPT. The government conducted its first analyses about the future role of the SKNE in March 1968 but had decided to "postpone delivering definitive decision [...] until responsible bodies specify interests of federation in the field of nuclear energy," which made sense in the period of heated diplomatic negotiations related to signing and ratification of the treaty.⁶⁹ However, after Yugoslavia had ratified the NPT, these reasons lost their relevance, and the dissolution of the SKNE became a matter of time, even though its existence was supported by the most important federal government ministries (defense, foreign affairs, economy, etc.). It was finally dissolved on October 1, 1971.⁷⁰

The decision spelled the official end of the Yugoslav nuclear program and sensitive work on the atomic bomb, which had lost all relevance to the country's security. More importantly, this also serves as a reminder about the significance of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime and how much importance Yugoslavia attached to it. An equally important conclusion is that through the entire process of NPT negotiations and eventual ratification, Tito was guided by selfish real-political interests. This is evident in the insistence on guarantees that the FRG would eventually adhere to the NPT regime, and even more so in a set of diplomatic and public activities in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, skillfully designed with an aim of receiving additional and independent US security guarantees. Even though Tito's blatant diplomatic bargaining throws a different light on the entire NPT negotiations, it should also serve as a call for further research on the topic and with a changed perspective, including smaller nations that could and obviously did play a considerably more active role in these negotiations than presented in traditional historiography and International Relations studies.

Notes

- 1 Arhiv Jugoslavije, fond 177 Savezna komisija za nuklearnu energiju [Federal Nuclear Energy Commission], f. 17–58 (in further reference, AJ, 177, f. 17–58). Postavke perspektivnog plana nuklearne energije, April 28, 1962.
- 2 In my PhD thesis about the Yugoslav nuclear program, I confirmed that the production of the atomic bomb was the ultimate goal. I also defined the 'logic of independence' as the central component of the Yugoslav foreign policy since the late 1940s, arguing that all of the foreign policy decisions were designed and subjugated to this ultimate goal, the country's independence. More in Marko Miljković, *Tito's Proliferation Puzzle: The Yugoslav Nuclear Program, 1948–1970* (PhD Thesis, Central European University: Department of History, Budapest and Vienna, 2021), 116–21. See also Marko Miljković, "Nuclear Yutopia: The Outcome of the First Nuclear Accident in Yugoslavia, 1958," in *Labor in State-Socialist Europe, 1945–1989*, ed. Marsha Siefert (Budapest-New York: Central European University Press, 2020), 273–305.

- 3 Miljković, *Tito's Proliferation Puzzle*, 168–75.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 241–62. Yugoslav fears were not unfounded considering that Yugoslavia was established only in 1918 as a fragile union of nations that had for centuries been under successive Ottoman, Austrian, Russian, or German dominance. The fragility of this union was proven during the Second World War, which saw rise of extremism based on national divisions with corresponding atrocities and destruction across the country.
- 5 Joseph Goldblat, *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 48, 56; U.N. Resolution 1722 (XVI), “Question of disarmament,” December 20, 1961, [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1722\(XVI\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1722(XVI)) (accessed on March 15, 2021).
- 6 AJ, 177, f. 11. Poverljivi izveštaj DSIP-a o sastanku kod druga Đure Ničića, April 2, 1962.
- 7 *Ibid.*
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 121–22.
- 10 *Ibid.*
- 11 *Ibid.*; Goldblat, *Arms Control*, 56.
- 12 AJ, 177, f. 11. Poverljivi izveštaj DSIP-a o sastanku kod druga Đure Ničića, April 2, 1962; UN Resolution 1722 (XVI), “Question of disarmament,” December 20, 1961. The founding members were Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France, India, Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America.
- 13 Diplomatski arhiv Ministarstva spoljnih poslova Republike Srbije, Politička arhiva, 1963, fascikla 140 (UN) [Diplomatic Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Political Archive, 1963, folder 140] (in further reference DA MSPRS, PA, 1963). Telegram Ambasade FNRJ u Moskvi, br. 69, January 29, 1963.
- 14 DA MSPRS, PA, 1963, f. 140 (UN). Telegram delegacije FNRJ u Ženevi, DSIP-u, br. 51, February 28, 1963.
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