Bought this for EWS in 2019. Read and discussed portions of it in our CGs.

Read large sections of this while at the NWC in August 2023. Specifically read these sections as required by the S&W syllabus: 61-63, 65-67, 69-71, 75-123, 127- 150, 156-174, 177-222, 258-262, 282-291, 357-359, 370-376, 479-487, 524-528, 566-573, 577-637.

From the S&W Syllabus: This translation of On War, undertaken by the historians Howard and Paret with commentary from the strategic analyst Bernard Brodie, was much heralded when it appeared in 1976 in the immediate aftermath of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. It remains the most widely read English-language version of Clausewitz’s work. While much of On War focuses on technical questions of warfare in Clausewitz’s era, the assigned selections emphasize the enduring contributions of Clausewitz’s book. The preface by Marie von Clausewitz describes her editing of the work after her husband’s death and explains the influence of his career on the book as well as some of its stylistic features.

On War is stereotyped as being a static military manual lost in archaic post-medieval European Battle strategy with nothing new to offer in a world defined by modern and maverick military combat. This, though, is an erroneous misassumption which detracts from Clausewitz's true emphasis on how to win wars.

A witness to the bloodiest wars of his times, Clausewitz developed a theory of war orbiting the soldier-statesman model which proposes that battle is the cumulative result of two opposing forces colliding to adjudge each other's mettle and possibly render one of their number weakened. The true triumph is delivered through non-violent engagements (diplomacies, treaties etc) though the overawing stick of undefeated battlefield prowess works exceptional wonders here as well.

Otherwise Clausewitz proposes the entire gamut of deception and tactical military works necessary to win war. A fascinating read though some of it comes across as being underdeveloped given Clausewitz's propensity to go off tangent. ( )

Vepra "Mbi luftën" e Clausewitz-it, është aq madhore, saqë mbetet vepra e fundit që është shkruar mbi luftën. Sigurisht që pas kësaj vepre janë shkruar punime të ndryshme rreth çështjes së luftës, por askush pas Clausewitz-it nuk ka bërë një vepër sistematike që të kishte për objekt shqyrtimin e hollësishëm dhe të detajuar të luftës.
No reviews

My first full reading of Clausewitz (accepting that the Penguin volume does not include several books on early nineteenth-century military operations) impressed upon me the essence of philosophy and theory as it applies to the social sciences. This Penguin volume is interesting in that it includes an introduction from the editor of the 1908 version used by the US military (Colonel F.N. Maude) and a later introduction from the time of the Cold War (1966 and the early stages of the Vietnam War) by Professor Anatol Rapoport. I have long viewed On War much the same as one might Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: the quote “war is the continuation of policy by other means” proving to be as similarly unhelpful “as if by an invisible hand” in comprehending the extent of the philosophical grounding in store for the avid reader of classic literature. Reading Clausewitz is like reading John Stuart Mill: almost every lesson is so ingrained in the education of political scientists (or in this case, from my training as an army officer) that it seems like nothing new. From morale being one third of combat power (p. 424) to the implied role of the infantry (which I memorised years ago and can still recite), to the essence of war and the changes heralded by the Napoleonic period to the future of absolute or total war that would arrive in 1914, these things I mostly knew. But the references to philosophy (the Stoic’s negative visualisation gets a run), to how to develop a theory, to the social scientific view of the world that is largely inductive (and unfalsifiable if one is a fan of Karl Popper) astounded me. That I could learn so much unexpectedly was a blessing. Some ideas are worth noting. First, in the introduction, Rapoport writes of Clausewitz (p. 72):

Those without specialized mathematical knowledge (e.g. political scientists, administrators, military men) tend to conceive of their expertise as that of the artist rather than of a scientist.

Rapoport explains (p. 431):

In the exact sciences, theory is used precisely in the sense rejected by Clausewitz, namely, in the sense of a collection of theorems deduced rigorously from postulates formulated in ‘if so… then so” terms, i.e. as formulas. Clausewitz here uses ‘theory’ in the sense often used in the social sciences, namely, as a synthesis of concepts which illuminate the subject matter without necessarily enabling us to make specific predictions or to control specific situations.

This was illuminating, given that only today I was rummaging through the inductive nature of my own theories developed from research and then reading of Popper’s critique of historicism (another discussion that is new to me). An interesting reference from the notes is one of what was probably the most outdated books of the twentieth century even before it was published: Cavalry in Future Wars written in 1908. Rapoport argues that by then, cavalry in its traditional form had no future (Henry Chauvel aside). Finally, Clausewitz subordinates the military to the political without diminishing what he considered to be its noble qualities:

In one word, the Art of War in its highest point of view is policy, but, no doubt, a policy which fights battles instead of writing notes.

Clausewitz frequently argues that the Art of War can only be learnt through practice. While policy-makers might best be suited to determining the aim of war (as policy) from book-learning, military commanders could never attain the artistic qualities necessary for successful military campaigning without direct experience of the fog of war. As I have recently moved into research that involves practitioners, Clausewitz gives me some hope for my theoretical aspirations and the use of induction in my work. This was a wonderful surprise, a circumstance that often repeats itself when I embark on a cover to cover reading of books that I thought I knew. I must admit that this is the second volume of this work I have purchased. When the first arrived and I discovered it was an abridged version, I donated it to my local library. When this book arrived (Penguin classics are ‘unabridged’ – this version is unabridged from the 1908 abridged version), I was disappointed but pushed on out of frustration. I must say it was worth it and I will be recommending this as a reading project for others in my field who, like me, might also think they know Clausewitz. ( )