Scroll down to open individual chapters

Access to the radio spectrum is vital for modern digital communication. It is an essential component for smartphone capabilities, the Cloud, the Internet of Things, autonomous vehicles, and multiple other new technologies. Governments use spectrum auctions to decide which companies should use what parts of the radio spectrum. Successful auctions can fuel rapid innovation in products and services, unlock substantial economic benefits, build comparative advantage across all regions, and create billions of dollars of government revenues. Poor auction strategies can leave bandwidth unsold and delay innovation, sell national assets to firms too cheaply, or create uncompetitive markets with high mobile prices and patchy coverage that stifles economic growth. Corporate bidders regularly complain that auctions raise their costs, while government critics argue that insufficient revenues are raised. The cross-national record shows many examples of both highly successful auctions and miserable failures.

Drawing on experience from the UK and other countries, senior regulator Geoffrey Myers explains how to optimise the regulatory design of auctions, from initial planning to final implementation. Spectrum Auctions offers unrivalled expertise for regulators and economists engaged in practical auction design or company executives planning bidding strategies. For applied economists, teachers, and advanced students this book provides unrivalled insights in market design and public management. Providing clear analytical frameworks, case studies of auctions, and stage-by-stage advice, it is essential reading for anyone interested in designing public-interested and successful spectrum auctions.

Early praise for Spectrum Auctions

"A comprehensive and practical guide to an under-ratedpolicy tool."

Tim Harford, author of The Undercover Economist

"Geoff Myers was a pioneer in bringing market-like processes into government-controlled resource allocation, and this book highlights the necessary details for getting those processes right."

Paul Milgrom, Shirley and Leonard Ely professor of Humanities and Sciences in the Department of Economics at Stanford University, and co-winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2020 'for improvements to auction theory and inventions of new auction formats'

"Based on the author's huge experience in spectrum auction design and policy development, this valuable book is essential reading for any practitioner working in the field."

Paul Klemperer, Edgeworth Professor of Economics at University of Oxford

"This is a comprehensive guide to designing and conducting mobile spectrum auctions from the auctioneer's perspective. In addition to auction design, the book covers how auction formats interact with policy objectives and offers the potential of the lessons learnt from high stakes spectrum auctions finding relevance in the design of auctions of other public goods such as permissions for offshore wind farms."

Inge Hansen, Telecommunications Executive

This book is included in DOAB.